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DEVELOPMENTS IN
CALIFORNIA HOMICIDE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION*
Of all crimes, homicide is perhaps the most serious. The result
is, by definition, the death of a human being or fetus, and the
consequences to the guilty individual may be equally as severe.
Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that a practitioner, who
either prosecutes or defends a homicide charge, understands the
current state of California's homicide law. The interests at stake are
that of the public's protection from criminal actors, and a defendant's
protection from the infliction of a harsh penalty.'
California homicide law, however, is far from clear. Legislative
inaction and ineffective ameliorative attempts by the courts to clarify
archaic statutes prompted Justice Mosk to declare that "the law of
homicide is in need of revision.",2 The purpose of this work is not to
critique or propose solutions, but to serve as a reference guide to
important developments in California homicide law. This work
attempts to clarify the current state of the law in those respective
areas affected by recent developments and, through citations, to
serve as a gateway to recent case law, pertinent statutes, and
secondary material.
Part II outlines the general structure of California homicide law.
It lays out the basic foundation of criminal liability and defines the
categories of murder and manslaughter. Part II then concludes with
an overview of California death penalty law, known as special
* The Developments authors would like to thank Professor Samuel H.
Pillsbury, Professor Theodore Seto, and editors Sahar Bina and Haaris Syed for
their invaluable guidance, critique, and insight throughout this project.
1. 1 OSCAR LEROY WARREN & BASIL MICHAEL BILAS, WARREN ON
HOMICIDE, at iii (1938).
2. In re Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th 768, 784-85, 872 P.2d 574, 584, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 33, 43 (1994) (Mosk, J., concurring); see Charles L. Hobson,
Reforming California's Homicide Law, 23 PEPP. L. REv. 495, 495 (1996).
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circumstances, and provides an in-depth analysis of prior-murder and
felony-murder special circumstances.
Part III discusses the mens rea requirement for the intentional
homicides. In California, the three types of murder that involve an
intent to kill are: premeditated murder, second-degree murder with
express malice, and murder as a result of provocation. Part III
analyzes the elements of the offenses, as well as the trends in the
current courts. For instance, courts now tend to stray from the once
rigid "Anderson factors" in determining whether sufficient evidence
exists for premeditation. Second-degree murder with express malice
requires a purpose to kill. Provocation enables murder to be
mitigated to voluntary manslaughter.
Part IV examines the mens rea for the unintentional homicides.
An actor may be liable for his unintended killings pursuant to several
theories: second-degree murder under an implied malice theory,
provocative act murder, or involuntary manslaughter. Implied
malice murder exists where death results because of the defendant's
reckless conduct. Provocative act murder also requires that a
defendant act recklessly. Here, however, a defendant is liable for a
killing that occurs when his provocative conduct triggers a third
party to respond in a fatal way. As long as the defendant's conduct
proximately caused the killing, he is liable although someone else
actually fired the fatal shot. Part IV concludes with a discussion of
involuntary manslaughter, which occurs when a defendant's criminal
negligence causes a death.
Part V explores the issue of causation in homicide as divided
into the elements of causation-in-fact and proximate causation.
Typically, homicide cases focus primarily on the doctrine of
proximate cause. Part V divides proximate cause into the following
categories: (1) concurrent causation; (2) preexisting condition of the
victim; (3) the intervening act doctrine; and (4) the felony-murder
doctrine. This approach provides useful tools for practitioners
confronted with various issues of causation. In addition, Part V
explores the doctrine of transferred intent. While similar in some
aspects to causation, this Part effectively treats the transferred intent
doctrine as a separate discussion.
Part VI examines the felony-murder doctrine, which is triggered
when a killing is committed during the perpetration of a non-assault
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felony. Codified under Section 189 of the California Penal Code, the
first-degree felony-murder doctrine applies strictly to killings
committed during the commission of an enumerated felony. On the
other hand, courts have attempted to limit the scope of the second-
degree felony-murder doctrine by imposing restrictions such as an
inherent danger requirement. This disparity in the scope of
application of the felony-murder doctrine between first and second-
degree murder demonstrates that, while some courts and scholars
may disfavor the felony-murder doctrine, it remains firmly rooted in
California law. Part VI then turns to a discussion of the agency
doctrine as applied to felony-murder in California homicide law.
Several problems arise regarding how far liability should extend
when a co-felon or third party actually commits the killing.
Part VII turns to accomplice liability, which is a difficult area of
California criminal law. This Part seeks to explore what courts mean
by "aiding and abetting" and "natural and probable consequences."
Part VII concludes with a brief examination of the relationship
required between the accomplice and the primary perpetrator before
liability can be imposed.
Part VIII analyzes the conspiracy doctrine in California as it
applies to homicide law. The discussion provides an overview of the
elements of the crime, followed by an exposition of the various
characteristics that make conspiracy unique as well as controversial.
For instance, conspiracy is punishable as a separate crime from the
underlying offense. This means conspirators may face charges both
for the conspiracy itself and for the completed offense. As an
inchoate crime, conspiracy subjects the defendant to criminal
sanctions at a stage earlier than any other offense. Moreover, it
imposes vicarious liability for the substantive offenses of co-
conspirators. Finally, there are procedural advantages that make
charging conspiracy an attractive alternative to charging a defendant
for the substantive offense. Part VIII illustrates how, because of its
unique characteristics, conspiracy is a powerful weapon for the
prosecutor and can lead to unjust results if abused.
Part IX explores the subject of self-defense to murder. First, the
concept of justifiable homicide is introduced and discussed, followed
by a detailed discussion of the imminent harm requirement. Part IX
then examines the current controversy regarding how much of a
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defendant's experiences and point of view should be considered in
determining how an objectively reasonable person in the place of the
defendant would have acted. In addition, the limitations that the
courts have placed on the use of individualized evidence to prove
objective belief are explored. The development of the self-defense
doctrine in cases of battered women's syndrome is analyzed
throughout Part IX and compared to the more common applications
of self-defense.
Finally, Part X discusses the insanity defense as it operates in
California homicide law. Since the early nineteenth century,
California has, with slight variation, followed the "M'Naughton test"
for legal insanity. Part X examines the substantive aspects of that
test, including the requirement that a defendant claiming insanity
must have been either unable to appreciate the nature of his conduct
at the time he committed a criminal act or unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of the act. Part X then touches upon some of the
procedural implications of the defense, including competency to
stand trial and the role of expert testimony.
1374
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II. CALIFORNIA HOMICIDE LAW: THE BASICS*
This Article outlines the general structure of California
homicide law. After laying out the basic foundation of criminal
liability, the Article turns to the relevant sections of the California
Penal Code that delineate the elements of murder and manslaughter.
The discussion concludes with an overview of California death
penalty law, known as special circumstances, and provides an in-
depth analysis of prior-murder and felony-murder special
circumstances.
A. Definition of Murder
California Penal Code section 187 defines murder as "the
unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
aforethought."' Section 187(b) explicitly excludes from criminal
liability death of a fetus due to 1) an abortion performed under the
Therapeutic Abortion Act,2 2) procedures that are medically
necessary to save the mother's life, or 3) acts that the mother of the
fetus approved, aided or solicited.4
B. Overt Act
The basic requirement for criminal liability is an actus reus, an
affirmative act or an omission to act when there is a duty to act.5
* Shiva Shirazi Davoudian: J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Loyola Law
School; B.A., Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, June 2000. I
wish to thank my family, Minoo, Shahrokh, Shahin, Flora, David and Kamran
for their endless sacrifices that have enabled me to achieve so much. I dedicate
this Part to my husband, Keyvan Davoudian, for his absolute love, support and
encouragement throughout the years.
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
2. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123400-123450 (West 2002). The
Therapeutic Abortion Act legalized and regulated abortions in California. But
in 2002, due to constitutional infirmities, the California legislature repealed the
Therapeutic Abortion Act, and instead adopted the Reproductive Privacy Act.
See id. § 123460-123468. However, California Penal Code section 187 still
refers to the Therapeutic Abortion Act. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(b)(1).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(b)(2).
4. Id. § 187(b)(3).
5. See People v. McCoy, 25 Cal. 4th 1111, 1117, 24 P.3d 1210, 1214, 108
Cal. Rptr. 2d 188, 193 (2001) (actus reus can be an act or an omission).
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Penal Code section 20 provides that "[i]n every crime or public
offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent,
or criminal negligence.' '6 An intention to commit a crime or belief
that one is committing a crime is not an adequate basis for criminal
liability;7 there must be an overt act that is the result of conscious
and volitional movement that violates the law.
An act committed when the actor is unconscious does not
constitute actus reus and does not bear criminal liability. In People
v. Newton, the defendant, a member of the Black Panther Party, was
pulled over by two police officers. A gun battle ensued and the
defendant was shot in the stomach. The defendant alleged both that
he was unconscious when he shot the police officer and that he only
pulled the trigger in a reflexive action.9 The California Court of
Appeal held that unconsciousness is a "'complete defense' because it
negates capacity to commit any crime at all." 10
The law imposes criminal liability not only for overt acts, but
also for an omission to act when there is a legal duty to act.'1 The
duty to act can be statutory, contractual, or based on the parties'
special relationship, such as 1) voluntary assumption of care for
another, 12 2) parent-child, 13 3) employer-employee, or 4) landowner-
licensee. 14
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
7. See 1 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
LAW ELEMENTS CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS § 21 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter 1
WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS.
8. 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970).
9. Id. at 373, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 402-03.
10. Id. at 377, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
11. See 1 WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 7, § 22; see also
People v. Woodward, 45 Cal. 293 (1873) (holding that a person who stood by,
while others attempted to rape a little girl was not guilty of attempted rape
when he did not aid, encourage or abet the assailants); Davidson v. City of
Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1982) (holding
that police officers did not have a duty to warn or to protect the plaintiff from a
suspected assailant who was under police surveillance); Barber v. Superior
Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490-91 (1983)
(explaining that when a patient is diagnosed as comatose without any likely
recovery of brain function, "cessation of 'heroic' life support measures is not
an affirmative act but rather a withdrawal or omission of further treatment ....
A physician has no duty to continue treatment. . . once it has become futile in
the opinion of qualified medical personnel.").
12. In People v. Heitzman, the California Supreme Court relied on
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 319 and explained that "[o]ne who
1376
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Most often, criminal liability for an omission to act arises from a
statutory duty. For example, in People v. Jones the California Court
of Appeal held that a father who failed to pay statutorily mandated
child support was criminally liable, even though he did not live in
California. 15  Similarly, in People v. Heitzman, a daughter was
charged with violating California -Penal Code section 368(a) for
abuse of her elderly father. 16 The defendant's father lived with her
brothers and died because of malnutrition, dehydration and extensive
neglect. The California Supreme Court held that although the
defendant knew that her brothers were neglecting their father and
violating elder abuse statutes, she did not have a legal duty to control
her brothers' actions.
17
C. Mens Rea
In addition to the overt act requirement, Penal Code section 20
provides that each criminal act must also be accompanied by a
takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to
cause bodily harm to others if not controlled" is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such
harm. 9 Cal. 4th 189, 213, 886 P.2d 1229, 1244, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236, 251
(1994). See People v. Oliver, 210 Cal. App. 3d 138, 149, 258 Cal. Rptr. 138,
144 (1989) (woman convicted of involuntary manslaughter for taking an
inebriated man home, giving him a spoon to inject heroin, and not calling an
ambulance when he collapsed and later died of a drug overdose. The Court of
Appeal explained that because the defendant knew the victim was drunk and
"took him from a public place where others might have taken care to prevent
him from injuring himself, to a private place-her home-where she alone
could provide such care. . .[she voluntarily assumed a duty to summon aid
and her failure to do so was] a breach of that duty.").
13. In California, definitions and scope of parental duties are derived from
California dependency and tort laws. See Williams v. Garcetti, 5 Cal. 4th 561,
570, 853 P.2d 507, 511, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 345 (1993); see also Singer v.
Marx, 144 Cal. App. 2d 637, 301 P.2d 440 (1956) (mother held liable for
damage caused by her child's negligent rock throwing); People v. Burden, 72
Cal. App. 3d 603, 616, 140 Cal. Rptr. 282, 289 (1977) (A father was convicted
of second degree murder for the death of his five-month-old son, who died
because of malnutrition and dehydration. "The omission of a duty is in law the
equivalent of an act and when death results, the standard for determination of
the degree of homicide is identical.").
14. Heitzman, 9 Cal. 4th at 212, 886 P.2d at 1244, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 251.
15. 257 Cal. App. 2d 235, 237, 64 Cal. Rptr. 622, 623 (1967).
16. See Heitzman, 9 Cal. 4th at 196, 886 P.2d at 1232, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
239.
17. Id. at 215, 886 P.2d at 1245, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252.
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necessary criminal intent, commonly referred to as mental state or
mens rea.18 As early as 1892, in People v. Wright, the California
Supreme Court explained that each crime or public offense, under
Penal Code section 20, consists of two elements: actus reus and
mens rea.
19
However murder also requires the additional element of malice
aforethought.2 0 Today, California Penal Code section 188 defines
the requisite malice for murder,2 1 which is the distinguishing element
between the different categories of murder and manslaughter.22
Section 188 differentiates between express and implied malice.
Express malice is the "deliberate intention [to] unlawfully... take
away the life of a fellow creature." 23 Implied malice exists when
there is "no considerable provocation.., or when the circumstances
attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.
2 4
Although express and implied malice are used to distinguish
between the different categories of murder, the felony-murder
doctrine2 5 does not require malice at all. Instead, due to the public
policy concern of deterring felons from accidentally or negligently
killing during the commission of a felony, the law holds felons
"strictly responsible for killings they commit. '26 Thus, if the felon
has the requisite mens rea for committing or aiding and abetting the
underlying felony, malice for the killing is imputed to the felon.27
18. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003); see also,
People v. McCoy, 25 Cal. 4th 1111, 1117, 24 P.3d 1210, 1214, 108 Cal. Rptr.
2d, 188, 193 (2001) (equating mens rea with criminal intent).
19. 93 Cal. 564, 566, 29 P. 240, 241 (1892).
20. See id.
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1999).
22. For an in depth analysis of malice aforethought, see discussion infra
Parts III.A & III.B.
23. CAL. PENALCODE § 188.
24. Id.
25. Felony murder occurs when a perpetrator kills while committing or
attempting to commit one or more of the enumerated crimes in section 189 of
the California Penal Code. See CAL. PENAL CODE §139 (West 1999); see also
Felony-Murder, infra Part VI.
26. People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 388, 491 P.2d 793, 801, 99 Cal. Rptr.
1, 9 (1971) (directly quoting their earlier decision People v. Washington, 62
Cal.2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965)).
27. See DOUGLAS DALTON, WEST'S CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW §
5.05[D][4] (1995).
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D. Unlawful
California Penal Code section 187(a) explicitly states that
murder is the "unlawful" killing of another human being or fetus.
28
In murder proceedings, however, the court may find that the
homicide is "excusable" or "justifiable."29 Penal Code section 195
provides that a killing is excusable when it was caused by an
"accident and misfortune" while partaking in lawful activity by
lawful means, with "usual and ordinary caution, and without any
unlawful intent. 30  Moreover, section 197 essentially limits
"justifiable" homicide to instances of self-defense or defense of
others.
31
California Penal Code sections 195 and 197 limit instances of
"excusable" and "justifiable" homicide to those enumerated in the
statute and do not address the consequences of other possibly
excusable killings. For instance, doctors who take patients off life
support or cease to provide intravenous hydration or nourishment are
not currently prosecuted for murder. In Barber v. Superior Court,
two doctors were charged with murder when they respected the
wishes of a comatose patient's family and removed all respiratory
32and hydration equipment. The court explained that California
Penal Code sections 195 and 197 were inapplicable and the doctors'
actions would not be deemed "unlawful" because the removal of
respiratory and hydration equipment did not constitute an affirmative
act.3 3 The court explained that because a doctor does not have a duty
to continue medical treatment when the treatment has become futile,
the death does not constitute an unlawful killing.
34
E. Killing
A person can be prosecuted for homicide only when there is a
killing of a human being. The prosecution must establish the corpus
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
29. Id. §§ 195, 197.
30. Id. § 195.
31. See Barber v. Superior Court 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1012, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 487 (1983) (citing California Penal Code § 197).
32. See id. at 1010-11, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
33. See id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490; see also cases cited supra note 11
(holding that defendants were not criminally liable because they did not have a
legal duty to act).
34. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
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delicti," which is a prima facie showing that there was a death
caused by criminal agency. 36 The corpus delicti must be proven
independently of the defendant's extrajudicial statements.
37
Although the corpus delicti rule resulted from the judiciary's fear
that a defendant could be coerced to confess to a homicide that never
occurred,38 the victim's body does not need to be recovered to
support a murder conviction.
39
The victim's death is often easily established. However, the use
of life support equipment, which extends circulatory and respiratory
capabilities, can make the timing of death hard to establish. n
Current law41 provides two alternative definitions of death and thus
alleviates this uncertainty: first, a person who has "irreversible
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions" is legally dead;
42
second, a person is considered legally dead when there is
"irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including
the brain stem.
'A3
Prior to the adoption of a statutory definition of death under
section 7180 of the Health and Safety Code, California courts relied
on the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "death, '"4 which
provided that death was "the cessation of life; the ceasing to exist;
defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the
blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent
35. Latin for "body of the crime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (7th ed.
1999).
36. See People v. Jennings, 53 Cal. 3d 334, 364, 807 P.2d 1009, 1027, 279
Cal. Rptr. 780, 798 (1991) (quoting People v. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d 1142, 1175,
774 P.2d 730, 749, 259 Cal. Rptr. 701, 720 (1989)).
37. See People v. Hamilton, 48 cal. 3d 1142, 1175, 774 P. 2d 730, 749, 259
Cal. Rptr. 701, 720 (1989).
38. Id. at 1176, 774 P.2d at 750, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
39. See People v. Cullen, 37 Cal. 2d 614, 624, 234 P.2d 1, 6 (1951);
DALTON, supra note 29, § 5.04[F].
40. See e.g., People v. Mitchell, 132 Cal. App. 3d 389, 396, 183 Cal. Rptr.
166, 170 (1982).
41. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003).
42. Id. § 7180(a)(1).
43. Id. § 7180(a)(2).
44. See e.g., Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 376, 215 P.2d 478,
481-42 (1950) (using Black's third edition definition of death); Estate of
Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 273, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847, 854 (1968) (borrowing
Black's third edition definition of death).
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thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc."as For instance, in
People v. Mitchell, the California Court of Appeal explained that
under the common law definition of death, a brain dead victim is still
legally alive. 6
The common law definition of death posed unique problems for
surgeons performing organ transplants. Because the common law
provides that a brain dead victim is still alive if surgeons perform an
organ transplant and the victim subsequently dies, the surgeon's
actions can be deemed a superceding, intervening cause of death.
Thus, the perpetrator who harmed the victim might avoid a murder
charge.47 However, because the common law definition of death is
no longer used, such causation problems are rare.
F. Causation
Assuming that the prosecution has proven mens rea and the
corpus delicti of the crime, it must then prove that the defendant's
acts caused the victim's death. The prosecution must prove that the
defendant's unlawful act was the cause-in-fact as well as the
proximate cause of the homicide. 48 Cause-in-fact is usually defined
as "but for" causation. That is, "but for" the defendant's acts, the
victim would not have been killed.49
Because cause-in-fact is a broad doctrine, proximate cause, also
known as legal cause,50 serves as a limitation on causation.'
Proximate cause is the nexus between the defendant's act and the
death of the victim.5 2 It can be divided into five different categories:
45. Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 376, 215 P.2d 478, 481-82
(1950) (citing Black's Law Dictionary third edition).
46. 132 Cal. App. 3d 389, 396, 183 Cal. Rptr. 166, 170 (1982).
47. Id. The court explained that "[w]here the accused intended to murder
the victim but, using the common law definition of death, causation was
interrupted by the transplant surgeon, the accused may be convicted of only
attempted murder, battery or assault, all of which have much less severe
punishments when compared to the punishment for criminal homicide." Id. at
397, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
48. See 1 WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENT, supra note 7, §35.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Proximate cause is "a limitation which the courts have placed upon the
actor's responsibility for the consequences of... [his] conduct." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 213 (7th ed. 1999).
52. See 1 WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 4, § 35.
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concurrent causation; preexisting condition of the victim; the
intervening act doctrine; alcohol related homicides; and felony-
murder homicides.53
G. Human Being or Fetus
According to California Penal Code section 187(a), a defendant
can only be convicted of murder by killing another human being or a
fetus.54 Fetus is defined as "an unborn [human] offspring in the
postembryonic period, after major structures have been outlined.
This period occurs in humans seven or eight weeks after
fertilization.
'" 55
Not only does a death of a fetus allow the prosecutor to charge
the defendant with first-degree murder of the fetus, but if a pregnant
woman is killed, the prosecutor can pursue a charge for multiple-
murder special circumstance. 56 In People v. Bunyard, the California
Supreme Court held that Penal Code section 190.2(a)(3) 57 can be
read together with Penal Code section 187(a).58 That interpretation
made a single act that kills a pregnant woman and her unborn fetus
prosecutable as a multiple-murder5 9 and makes the defendant eligible
for the death penalty or life in prison without the possibility of
parole.60 In Bunyard, the defendant hired a childhood friend to kill
his pregnant wife.61 The defendant tried to persuade the court to read
sections 190.2 and 187(a) separately, arguing that a single act of
pulling the trigger and "the word 'offense' in section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(3) should be interpreted to emphasize the number of
53. For a detailed analysis of causation, see infra Part V.
54. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
55. California Jury Instructions in Criminal Law, no. 8.10 (6th ed. 1996)
[hereinafter CALJIC 8.10].
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(3) (West 2002 & Supp. 2003).
57. The California Penal Code § 190.2(a) provides that "[t]he penalty for a
defendant who is found guilty of murder in the first degree is death or
imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole...
(3) [if] [t]he defendant, in this proceeding, has been convicted of more than
one offense of murder in the first or second degree." Id. § 190.2(a).
58. 45 Cal. 3d 1189, 1237, 756 P.2d 795, 827-28, 249 Cal. Rptr. 71, 104
(1988).
59. See id.
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)
61. See Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d. at 1200-01, 756 P. 2d at 801-02, 249 Cal.
Rptr. at 77-78.
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acts, not merely the number of deaths." 62 The court rejected the
defendant's argument and concluded that judicial interpretation was
unnecessary because both statutes were clear and unambiguous.
63
H. Categories of Murder
The California Penal Code divides criminal homicide into two
categories: murder and manslaughter.64 Section 189 further defines
two types of murder, first and second-degree murder.65 Similarly,
section 192 defines three types of manslaughter: (1) voluntary
manslaughter; (2) involuntary manslaughter; and (3) vehicular
manslaughter.66 The primary distinction between murder and
manslaughter is the mens rea requirement of malice aforethought.
Whereas section 187 provides that a homicide committed with
malice aforethought constitutes murder,67 section 192 provides that
an unlawful killing without malice constitutes manslaughter. 68 This
section will first define murder and then discuss manslaughter.
1. First-degree murder
California Penal Code section 189 distinguishes between first
and second-degree murder. 69 First-degree murder can be satisfied in
three ways.70 One can be charged with first-degree murder if the
killing is (1) "willful, deliberate, and premeditated;" (2) committed
by a "destructive device or explosive, a weapon of mass destruction,
knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or
armor, poison, lying in wait, [and] torture;" or (3) if the killing
constitutes felony-murder-i.e., murder committed in the course of
committing one or more of the enumerated crimes in section 189.71
62. Id. at 1238-39, 756 P.2d at 828, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
63. See id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
64. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 192.
65. Id. § 189.
66. Id. § 192.
67. Id. § 187(a).
68. Id. § 192.
69. Id. § 189.
70. Id.
71. Id. The enumerated felonies are: arson, rape, carijacking, robbery,
burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, torture, sodomy, lewd or
lascivious act with a child under fourteen years old, oral copulation, rape by an
instrument, or killing by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle.
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The only criminal intent required to trigger the felony-murder
doctrine is the specific intent to commit one of those enumerated
underlying felonies.
72
2. Second-degree murder
Second-degree murder is a catchall category that encompasses
"[a]ll other kinds of murders" that do not qualify as first-degree
murder or felony-murder. 73 Although second-degree murder is a
hodgepodge of numerous types of murder, it can be divided into
three basic categories: 1) purposeful killing without premeditation,74
2) implied malice murder, or 3) inherently dangerous felony-
murder. This Section will provide a brief summary of each
category.
a. purposeful killing without premeditation
First, a purposeful killing without premeditation is usually
defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought when the perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a
human being but the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation
and premeditation." 76 This type of second-degree murder has three
elements: 1) an intentional killing with express malice,77 2) without
premeditation, and 3) without provocation.
78
See id. For an in-depth discussion of first-degree murder, see infra, Part I.A.
For a discussion of felony-murder, see infra, Part VI.
72. See People v. Coefield, 37 Cal. 2d 865, 869, 236 P.2d 570, 573 (1951).
73. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189.
74. California Jury Instructions in Criminal Law number 8.30 defines
second-degree murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought when the perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a human being
but the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and premeditation."
CALJIC, supra note 57, no. 8.30 (6th ed. 1996). For an in depth analysis of
unpremeditated murder, see Parts HI.B & III.C.
75. For an in-depth analysis of inherently dangerous felony-murder, see
infra Part VI.C.
76. CALJIC, supra note 57, no. 8.30.
77. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (defining the difference between express
and implied malice).
78. For an in-depth analysis of purposeful killing without premeditation,
see infra Part III.B.
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b. implied malice murder
The second category of second-degree murder is implied malice
murder, which is an unintentional killing caused by extremely
reckless behavior. California law provides two types of implied
malice murder: depraved heart murder and provocative act murder.
In California, the courts do not use the term "depraved heart
murder." The concept is instead discussed in terms of implied
malice.79  However, California courts do utilize the term
"provocative act murder." These two categories of implied malice
share the same mens rea requirement of extreme recklessness. The
primary difference between them is that in provocative act murder,
liability attaches because of a particular causal pattern involving a
defendant's action and a third party's reaction that kills the victim.
The two basic elements of implied malice murder are: 1) an
unlawful act resulting in dangerous consequences, and 2) the
defendant knew about the danger of the acts, yet consciously and
deliberately disregarded the danger to human life. These elements
together show that the defendant acted with extreme recklessness.
80
In People v. Watson, the California Supreme Court defined
implied malice as a subjective determination that the defendant in
fact realized that his actions had "a high probability... [of] ...
result[ing] in death... [and yet acted] with a base antisocial motive
and with a wanton disregard for human life., 81  However, the
prosecution does not need to prove that the defendant intended to
kill.
82
The second category of unintentional killing caused by extreme
recklessness is provocative act murder.83 Provocative act murder
79. See, e.g., Charles L. Hobson, Reforming California's Homicide Law, 23
PEPP. L. REV. 495, 540-41 (1996) (asserting that "depraved heart" and
"implied malice" are synonymous); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (defining
express and implied malice). For an in-depth analysis of depraved heart
murder and implied malice, see infra Part IV.A.
80. CALJIC, supra note 57, no. 8.31.
81. 30 Cal. 3d 290, 300, 637 P.2d 279, 285, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43, 49 (1981)
(quoting People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 782, 402 P.2d 130, 134, 44
Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965)).
82. CALJIC, supra note 57, no. 8.31. For an in depth analysis of depraved
heart murder and the requisite elements, see infra Part IV.A.
83. See In re Aurelio R., 167 Cal. App. 3d 52, 57, 212 Cal. Rptr. 868, 870
(1985).
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does not require that the defendant or the defendant's cohorts commit
an act that immediately leads to death or even intend to kill the
victim. Instead, the defendant acts in a manner that provokes a
deadly response from a third person. 84 The actus reus element of the
crime is the provocation and the mens rea element of the offense is
knowledge that the provocation has a high probability of "eliciting a
life-threatening response from the third party."
85
Provocative act murder is often used when criminals attempt to
escape the crime scene, law enforcement officers pursue them, and
the criminals act in a manner that provokes the officers to kill one of
them.86 Provocative act murder theory is also used to convict gang
members who partake in a gunfight that kills one of their members,
or when a victim kills a co-conspirator or agent in self-defense.88
Provocative act murder often raises causation concerns because
the defendant is charged with murder when the defendant did not
pull the trigger. In People v. Garcia, the California Court of Appeal
explained that liability for provocative act murder is based on "proof
of malice and vicarious liability." 89 However, a mere showing that
the defendant committed an "intentional provocative act whose
natural consequences are dangerous to human life" is not enough.90
The prosecution must also show that the killing was proximately
caused by the defendant's intentional and dangerous acts.9 1
Although most provocative act murders occur in the course of a
felony, such as attempting to resist arrest or robbery,92 this doctrine
differs from felony-murder. Under the felony-murder doctrine, the
defendant and the defendant's co-conspirators begin their criminal
enterprise with intent to commit a felony and they kill a third party in
84. Id. at 57, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71.
85. Id. at 57-58, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
86. See id. at 58, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
87. See id. at 56, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
88. See id. at 58, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
89. 69 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 1329, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 254, 257 n.2 (1999).
90. People v. Gardner, 37 Cal. App. 4th 473, 480, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 603, 608
(1995).
91. Id.; see also People v. Cervantes, 26 Cal. 4th 860, 874, 29 P.3d 225,
235, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148, 159 (2001) (holding that the provocative act
doctrine requires a finding of proximate cause). For an in-depth analysis of
proximate causation and provocative act murder, see infra Part IV.B.
92. See Garcia, 69 Cal. App. 4th at 1327, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 256; Aurelio
R., 167 Cal. App. 3d at 57-58, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
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order to further their crime.93 However, provocative act murder does
not require that the defendant or one of the defendant's cohorts
actually fire the fatal shot. In fact, a third party, such as a police
officer, may pull the trigger. Moreover, unlike felony-murder where
the killing furthers a criminal enterprise, provocative act murder does
not require that the killing further a criminal design.
c. inherently dangerous second-degree felony-murder94
The third category of second-degree murder, inherently
dangerous felony-murder, only applies to felonies that are
"inherently dangerous to human life. '' 95 In determining whether a
felony is inherently dangerous, the courts look at "the felony in the
abstract, not the particular 'facts' of the case." 96 The court must
determine whether there is a high probability that death will result
from the commission of that felony.97 The felony-murder doctrine
does not apply if the felony "merges" with the resulting homicide.98
3. Manslaughter
The second category of homicide is manslaughter. California
Penal Code section 192 defines manslaughter as the "unlawful
killing of a human being without malice" 99 and divides manslaughter
into three categories: 1) voluntary, 2) involuntary, and 3)
vehicular.1 °°
93. See Aurelio R., 167 Cal. App. 3d at 57, n.2, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 870 n.2.
94. For a discussion of inherently dangerous felony-murder, see infra Part
VI.C.
95. See People v. Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th 300, 308, 885 P.2d 1022, 1026, 36
Cal. Rptr. 2d 609, 613 (1994); People v. Ford, 60 Cal. 2d 772, 795, 388 P.2d
892, 907, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 635 (1964) (overruled on other grounds by People
v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 36, 489 P.2d 1361, 1367, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33, 39
(1971)).
96. See Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th at 309, 885 P.2d at 1026, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 613
(internal quotations omitted); People v. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452, 458 n.5, 406
P.2d 647, 650 n.5, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10 n.5 (1965).
97. See Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th at 309, 885 P.2d at 1026, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
613; People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 626-27, 778 P.2d 549, 558, 262 Cal.
Rptr. 195, 204 (1989).
98. See Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th at 311-12, 885 P.2d at 1028, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
615; People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 539-40, 450 P.2d 580, 590, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 188, 198 (1969).
99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
100. See id. § 192(a)--(c).
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. There are two primary distinctions between murder and
manslaughter. First, manslaughter is a killing without malice,
whereas murder requires proof of malice aforethought.'01 Second,
unlike murder, where one is liable for the death of a human being or
fetus, manslaughter does not apply to the killing of a fetus when the
killing lacks malice.
10 2
a. voluntary manslaughter
The first category of manslaughter is voluntary manslaughter.1
0 3
First-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary
manslaughter all require an intent to kill, but the primary distinction
between them is that a defendant charged with voluntary
manslaughter lacks malice because the defendant acts "upon a
sudden quarrel or heat of passion." 1
04
b. involuntary manslaughter
The second category of manslaughter is involuntary
manslaughter. Section 192(b) defines involuntary manslaughter as a
killing resulting from "the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which
might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution
and circumspection."' 0 5 The primary distinction between voluntary
and involuntary manslaughter is that involuntary manslaughter does
not require an intent to kill.0 6
101. See id. §§ 189, 192; CALJIC, supra note 57, no. 8.50.
102. See People v. Dennis, 17 Cal. 4th 468, 510, 950 P.2d 1035, 1058, 71
Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 703 (1998).
103. For a detailed analysis of voluntary manslaughter, see infra Part III.B.
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(a); see People v. Lee, 20 Cal. 4th 47, 58, 971
P.2d 1001, 1007, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 631 (1999); People v. Lasko, 23 Cal.
4th 101, 108, 999 P.2d 666, 670, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 441, 446 (2000).
105. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b).
106. See People v. Welch, 137 Cal. App.3d 834, 839-40, 187 Cal. Rptr. 511,
514 (1982); People v. Broussard, 76 Cal. App. 3d 193, 197, 142 Cal. Rptr. 664,
666 (1977); CALJIC, supra note 57, no. 8.45. For a detailed analysis of
involuntary manslaughter, see infra Part IV.C.
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c. vehicular manslaughter
Vehicular manslaughter is the third category of manslaughter
and consists of five different types. 10 7  The primary distinctions
among the various categories of vehicular manslaughter are whether
the killing resulted from gross negligence, whether the driver was
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and whether death was the
proximate result of a car accident for financial gain.10 8  It is
important to note that as long as the facts support a finding of
implied malice under section 188 of the California Penal Code,' 09 the
prosecution has discretion to charge the defendant with second-
degree murder instead of vehicular manslaughter. 110
If the prosecutor decides to pursue a vehicular manslaughter
charge, the prosecutor must decide whether the defendant acted with
gross negligence. Gross negligence is often defined as "the exercise
of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of conscious
indifference to the consequences.""'1 Although this definition of
gross negligence seems very similar to the extreme recklessness
requirement of second-degree implied malice murder, the California
Supreme Court has held that they are not synonymous.
1 12
The first difference between gross negligence and second-degree
implied malice murder is that an objective standard is used to
determine whether a defendant was grossly negligent, whereas a
subjective standard is used to determine implied malice murder."
13
Second, "implied malice contemplates a subjective awareness of a
higher degree of risk than does gross negligence, and involves an
element of wantonness which is absent in gross negligence."
114
107. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 191.5(a), 192(c)(1)-(3).
108. Id. §§ 191.5, 192.
109. Id. § 188.
110. See id. §§ 191.5, 192; People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290, 294, 637 P.2d
279, 282, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43, 46 (1981).
111. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d at 296, 637 P.2d at 283, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
112. See id. at 296-97, 637 P.2d at 283, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 296, 637 P.2d at 283, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 47. In response to People
v. Watson, the California legislature amended sections 191.5 and 192 of the
California Penal Code, which now explicitly provide that the vehicular
manslaughter statutes "shall not be construed as prohibiting or precluding a
charge of murder under Section 188 upon facts exhibiting wantonness and a
conscious disregard for life to support a finding of implied malice, or upon
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In determining whether the defendant was grossly negligent, the
offense must be dangerous as committed. In People v. Wells, the
defendant was driving between fifty and eighty miles per hour on a
curvy road, struck another car, and killed the passenger.115 The
California Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that although
driving over the speed limit is an "unlawful act," as defined by
section 192(c)(1), the unlawful act "need not be an inherently
dangerous misdemeanor or infraction."' 1 6  Moreover, the court
explained that gross negligence is found where the defendant
commits an offense that is "dangerous under the circumstances of its
commission. The inherent or abstract nature of a misdemeanor
which underlies an involuntary manslaughter charge is not
dispositive.",17
Moreover, the mere fact that the defendant is driving while
under the influence of alcohol is not enough to constitute gross
negligence." 8 In People v. Bennett, the California Supreme Court
held that a finding of gross negligence should be based on "'the
overall circumstances of [the defendant's] intoxication."" '
19
In Bennett, the defendant, who drank heavily with two friends
and became extremely intoxicated, drove his two friends to another
destination. 20  The defendant was driving ten miles per hour in
excess of the speed limit, weaving in and out of his traffic lane, and
drifting off the road.' 2' As the defendant approached a blind curve,
he lost control of his car. The defendant and his friends were all
ejected from the car, killing one friend. The defendant's blood
alcohol level two hours after the accident was 0.20 percent.
122
At trial, the court instructed the jury to determine gross
negligence from "the overall circumstances of the defendant's
facts showing malice consistent with the holding of the California Supreme
Court in People v. Watson, 30 Cal.3d 290." CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(4).
115. 12 Cal. 4th 979, 982, 911 P.2d 1374, 1375, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 700
(1996).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 988, 911 P.2d at 1379, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704.
118. See CALJIC, supra note 57, no. 8.94.
119. 54 Cal. 3d 1032, 1034, 819 P.2d 849, 854, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8, 13 (1991)
(quoting CALJIC no. 8.94.)
120. Id. at 1034-35, 819 P.2d at 851, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 1035, 819 P.2d at 851, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10.
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intoxication or the manner in which he drove, or both .... ,,123 The
trial court convicted the defendant of gross vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated. 124 The California Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction, because "a driver's level of intoxication is an integral
aspect of the 'driving conduct.'
125
I. Special Circumstances
California Penal Code section 190, also known as the 1978
death penalty law, provides that every person convicted of first-
degree murder can be punished by death, life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole, or imprisonment in the state prison for
twenty-five years to life. Specifically, Penal Code section 190.2
dictates twenty-two different categories, 126 known as "special
circumstances" that jurors may use to decide whether to punish the
defendant with either the death penalty or life in prison without the
possibility of parole. They are:
1) Intentional murder for financial gain; 27
2) Prior conviction for first-degree or second-degree
murder;
128
3) A defendant, in this proceeding, has been convicted of
multiple murders in the first or second-degree;
29
4) Murder committed by destructive device, bomb or other
explosives;'
30
5) Murder to avoid arrest or to perfect an escape;
13 '
6) Murder committed by "destructive device, bomb, or
explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered;"'
132
7) Intentional murder of a current or former peace officer,
federal officer or agent, or firefighter;
133
8) Intentional murder of a witness to a crime;
134
123. Id.; see also CALJIC, supra note 57, no. 8.94.
124. Bennett, 54 Cal. 3d at 1035, 819 P.2d at 851, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9.
125. Id. at 1038, 819 P.2d at 853, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12.
126. For efficiency, this Part combines some categories.
127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
128. See id. § 190.2(a)(2).
129. See id. § 190.2(a)(3).
130. See id. § 190.2(a)(4).
131. See id. § 190.2(a)(5).
132. See id. § 190.2(a)(6).
133. See id. § 190.2(a)(7)-(9).
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9) Intentional murder of a current or former state or local
prosecutor or assistant prosecutor, judge, federal official or
juror;135
10) Murder that is "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel;"' 36
11) Intentional murder by lying in wait;
137
12) Intentional murder because of the victim's "race, color,
religion, nationality, or country of origin;
'' 3
13) Murder while the defendant was engaged in robbery,
kidnapping, rape, sodomy, performance of lewd or
lascivious act on a child under the age of fourteen, oral
copulation, burglary, arson, train wrecking, mayhem, or
carjacking; 139
14) Intentional murder involving torture; 4 °
15) Intentional murder by poison;1
4 '
16) Intentional murder by discharging a firearm from a motor
vehicle;
142
17) Murder to further gang activity.
143
This Section will provide a brief overview of special
circumstances as an aggravating factor, the requirement of intent, the
constitutionality of special circumstances, and the application of the
special circumstances doctrine to juveniles. The discussion will then
focus on an in-depth analysis of sections 190.2(a)(2) and
190.2(a)(17).
1. Special circumstances as aggravating factors
Although sections 190, 190.1, and 190.2 refer to "special
circumstances" as a means of punishment and sentencing, the
134. See id. § 190.2(a)(10).
135. See id. § 190.2(a)(11)-(13), (20).
136. See id. § 190.2(a)(14).
137. See id. § 190.2(a)(15).
138. See id. § 190.2(a)(16).
139. See id. § 190.2(a)(17). Section 190.2 (a)(17) is also commonly known
as "felony-murder special circumstances" [hereinafter felony-murder special
circumstances]. See DALTON, supra note 29,§ 5.05 [D][9].
140. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(18).
141. See id. § 190.2(a)(19).
142. See id. § 190.2(a)(21).
143. See id. § 190.2(a)(22).
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California Supreme Court has explained that "special circumstances
are sui generis-neither a crime, an enhancement, nor a sentencing
factor." 144 Instead, special circumstance proceedings can be
compared to a trial to determine guilt and should be viewed as "an
aggravating factor ... found beyond reasonable doubt by a
unanimous verdict," 145 which then changes the punishment to either
death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 
146
2. Special circumstances and the intent requirement
Fourteen of the twenty-two special circumstances listed in
section 190.2 explicitly require an intentional killing. The only
categories that do not require an intentional killing are prior-murder
convictions, 14 7 multiple murders,
148 murder by destructive device, 1
49
murder to avoid arrest or to perfect an escape, 150 murder by
destructive device via mail, 15 1 and especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel murder.
152
3. Constitutionality of special circumstances
Section 190.4 provides many procedural requirements for
applying "special circumstances." These strict requirements are
necessary because in Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia, the
United States Supreme Court held that death penalty laws giving
juries absolute discretion are too arbitrary because they can be
applied capriciously, and thus constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 53  Therefore, in 1997 the California legislature
144. People v. Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d 539, 552, 684 P.2d 826, 832, 205 Cal.
Rptr. 265, 271 (1984).
145. People v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 31 Cal. 3d 797, 803,
647 P.2d 76, 79, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800, 803 (1982) (internal citations omitted)
(real party in interest, Engert).
146. See id.
147. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(2).
148. See id. § 190.2(a)(3).
149. See id. § 190.2(a)(4).
150. See id. § 190.2(a)(5).
151. See id. § 190.2(a)(6).
152. See id. § 190.2(a)(14).
153. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 155 (1976).
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instituted the procedural provisions of section 190.2 and 190.4 in
order to comply with the Furman-Gregg standard.
154
In short, section 190.4 provides that during the guilt phase of the
trial, one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in section
190.2 must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Only if the jury
unanimously finds that one or more of the special circumstances are
true may the court then hold a separate penalty hearing. At that
hearing, the trier of fact will decide whether to sentence the
defendant to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole.1
55
4. Death penalty and juveniles
Although section 190(a) provides that every person found guilty
of first-degree murder may be sentenced according to the "special
circumstances" classifications of section 190.2,156 juveniles are
explicitly exempt from the death penalty. Section 190.5 provides
that people between the ages of sixteen and eighteen, at the time of
the offense, and who are convicted of first-degree murder with one or
more special circumstances, will be sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole or twenty-five years to life. 1
57
California voters enacted section 190.5 as part of Proposition
115 in June 1990, making juveniles eligible for charges of special
circumstance murder and sentences of life in prison without the
possibility of parole or twenty-five years to life.15 8 Under section
190.5, juveniles may be sentenced to state prison, and judges cannot
154. See, e.g., People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 49, 609 P.2d 468, 497, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 30 (1980), overruled on other grounds by People v. Martinez, 20 Cal.
4th 225, 973 P.2d 512, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533 (1999).
155. See CAL PENAL CODE § 190.4(a).
156. See id. §190(a).
157. See id. § 190.5.
158. See People v. Bustos, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1747, 1756, 29 Cal. Rptr.2d 112,
118 (1994). Prior to Proposition 115, in People v. Spears, the California
Supreme Court held that juveniles are ineligible for special circumstance
proceedings. People v. Spears, 33 Cal.3d 279 at 283, 655 P.2d 1289 at 1292,
188 Cal. Rptr. 454 at 457 (1983). In Spears, a seventeen-year-old boy was
convicted of two counts of murder with special circumstances and sentenced to
two consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole. See
id. at 280, 655 P.2d at 1290, 188 Cal. Rptr at 455. The Supreme Court held
that the 1978 death penalty law was not intended to penalize juveniles with life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See id. at 283, 655 P.2d at
1291, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
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automatically refuse to commit them to the California Youth
Authority (CYA).15 9 In People v. Bustos, the California Court of
Appeal held that prior to sentencing, trial courts should adhere to
section 707.2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which requires
that trial courts obtain a diagnostic study from the CYA to determine
if the juvenile could benefit from any CYA training or treatment
programs. 160 Moreover, the court in Bustos held that even if a
juvenile is sentenced to twenty-five years to life, he still qualifies for
commitment to the CYA.
16 1
5. Prior murders
A defendant can be charged with special circumstances under
section 190.2(a)(2) if he has previously been convicted of first-
degree or second-degree murder in California or another jurisdiction.
Section 190.2(a)(2) applies even if the prior murder conviction was
subsequent to the current offense. For example, in People v.
Hendricks, the defendant was working as a male prostitute and
robbed and killed two of his clients-Carter and Burchell.162 One
year later, he was arrested and charged with the murder of two other
men, Partner and Haynes. 163 During the course of his interrogation
for the murders of Partner and Haynes, the defendant also confessed
to killing Carter and Burchell the year before. 164 During his first
trial, the defendant was tried and convicted of murder and robbery
for the Partner and Haynes killings.' 65  In his second trial, the
defendant was convicted of both multiple-murder special
159. Bustos, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1758, 29 Cal. Rptr.2d at 119.
160. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 707.2 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003).
161. See Bustos, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 1757, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118; see also
People v. Ralph, 24 Cal. 2d 575, 583, 150 P.2d 401, 405 (1944) (holding
similarly that juveniles are entitled to be committed to the CYA), overruled in
part by People v. Yates, 34 Cal. 3d 644, 669 P.2d 1, 194 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1983);
In re Jeanice D., 28 Cal. 3d 210, 212-13, 617 P.2d 1087, 1088, 168 Cal. Rptr.
455, 456 (1980) (holding that a juvenile's conviction for first-degree murder
without special circumstances does not automatically make her ineligible for
CYA commitment); People v. King, 5 Cal. 4th 59, 62-63, 851 P.2d 27, 28, 19
Cal. Rptr. 2d 233, 234 (1993) (holding that a person who committed first-
degree murder when he was under eighteen is eligible for CYA).
162. 43 Cal. 3d 584, 588, 737 P.2d 1350, 1352, 238 Cal. Rptr. 66, 68 (1987).
163. See id. at 590, 737 P.2d at 1353, 238 Cal. Rptr at 69.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 588-89, 737 P.2d at 1352, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
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circumstance and felony-murder special circumstance for the Carter
and Burchell killings. He was then sentenced to death.
1 66
The defendant argued that the prior-murder special circumstance
verdict from the Carter and Burchell trial should be set aside because
the Parmer and Haynes murders were committed after the Carter and
Burchell murders. He reasoned that because he was first prosecuted
for the Parmer and Haynes murders, he did not qualify for the
previous murder special circumstance of section 190.2(a)(2). 67 The
court found this argument unconvincing and stated that the plain
language of section 190.2(a)(2) shows that the order of the homicides
is irrelevant.
1 68
Moreover, prior-murder special circumstance is not limited to
prior murder convictions in California. Killings in other jurisdictions
that would be punishable as first-degree or second-degree murder in
California can be considered as prior murders, and the defendant can
be subject to special circumstance proceedings. In People v.
Andrews, the defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree
murder with special circumstances of prior-murder, multiple murder,
robbery-murder, and murder during commission of a rape.169 In
1967, when the defendant was sixteen years old, he had been
convicted of murder in Alabama. The jury in the current trial used
the defendant's Alabama murder conviction to find the special
circumstance of prior-murder under 190.2(a)(2). 1
70
The defendant argued that under California law in 1967, most
juveniles between sixteen and eighteen years old were usually tried
in juvenile court, but Alabama tried juveniles in adult criminal court.
The defendant claimed that his Alabama conviction should not be
used to find a prior-murder special circumstance under section
190.2(a)(2) because it denied him equal protection of the law.1 71 The
court rejected the defendant's argument and held that in 1967, if a
166. See id. at 588-89, 737 P.2d at 1352-53, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
167. The defendant reasoned "the death penalty is appropriate only when a
defendant commits murder after he has been put on notice by a previous
murder conviction that if he repeats the crime he might suffer the ultimate
punishment." Id. at 595, 737 P.2d at 1357, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 72-73 (emphasis
added).
168. See id. at 596, 737 P.2d at 1357, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
169. 49 Cal. 3d 200, 206, 776 P.2d 285, 287, 260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 586 (1989).
170. See id. at 221-22, 776 P.2d at 298, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
171. Id.
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juvenile committed murder in California, he could be tried as an
adult if the court found that it would be appropriate to do so.
172
The debate about minors' prior convictions in other jurisdictions
was conclusively decided in People v. Trevino.173 The California
Supreme Court held that, regardless of a defendant's age, a first-
degree or second-degree murder conviction in another jurisdiction
may be used for prior-murder special circumstance "if the offense
involved conduct that satisfies all the elements of the offense of
murder under California law.
174
6. Felony-murder special circumstance
The felony-murder special circumstance is used when the
defendant kills during the course of a felony enumerated in section
190.2(a)(17).175 The underlying felonies constituting felony-murder
special circumstance under section 190.2(a)(17) and first-degree
felony-murder under section 189 are identical. 176  Special
circumstances may be found if the perpetrator kills while committing
or attempting to commit one of the following twelve crimes:
1) Arson
2) Burglary
3) Carjacking
4) Kidnapping
5) Lewd or lascivious act with a child under fourteen
years old
6) Mayhem
7) Oral copulation
8) Rape
9) Rape by an instrument
172. Id.
173. 26 Cal. 4th 237, 27 P.3d 283, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 567 (2001).
174. Id. at 244, 27 P.3d at 287, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571 (emphasis in
original).
175. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
176. See id. §§ 189, 190.2(a)(17) (it should be noted that §190.2(a)(17)
solely enumerated felonies constituting felony-murder, whereas the
corresponding list under § 189 follows the more obscure description-
"committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate," and is buried
between two other lists of felonies not qualifying as felony-murder-thereby
not making it readily apparent that the lists are identical).
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10) Robbery
11) Sodomy
12) Train wrecking
177
Despite their similarities, there are two fundamental differences
between sections 189 and 190.2(a)(17). First, under felony-murder
special circumstances, the prosecution may seek the death penalty,
whereas the prosecution may not do so under section 189.178
Second, unlike section 189 felony-murder, which never requires
intent to kill, the felony-murder special circumstance requires that an
aider and abettor either intend to kill or have "reckless indifference
to human life,' 79 but it does not require that the actual killer intend
to kill.'
80
In Tison v. Arizona, the United State Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether intent to kill is constitutionally required.1
8 '
After surveying death penalty laws across the country, the Supreme
Court held that felony-murder special circumstance laws need not
require specific intent to kill. The court reasoned that when looking
at the totality of circumstances, "major participation in the felon
committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life.. ..Z
constituted a culpable mental state that can be considered during
capital sentencing.
Although felony-murder special circumstance does not require
that the murderer intended to kill, the prosecution must prove that the
accused had the requisite mens rea for the underlying felony. 83 In
177. See id. §§ 189, 190.2(a)(17). For an in depth discussion of first-degree
murder, see infra Part III.A. For a detailed discussion of felony-murder, see
infra Part VI.
178. See id. § 190.2(a).
179. Id. § 190.2(d).
180. See id. § 190.2(b); see also People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1138-
39, 742 P.2d 1306, 1325-36, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 604-605 (1987) (holding that
felony-murder special circumstance does not require that the murderer
intended to kill, but the prosecution must prove that an aider and abettor had
the requisite intent to kill); 3 WITKIN CAL. CRiM. LAW PUNISHMENT § 453
(2000) (explaining that Proposition 115 codified the Anderson decision in
1990, and added section 190.2(b) to the California Penal Code).
181. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
182. Id. at 158.
183. See People v. Musselwhite, 17 Cal. 4th 1216, 1263, 954 P.2d 475, 504,
74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 212, 241 (1998).
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People v. Davis, the California Supreme Court explained that section
190.4184 requires that when the underlying felony is a general intent
crime,185 only a general intent instruction should be given.'8 6 The
court further explained that "[w]e have never held that 'specific
intent' is required for the felony-murder special circumstance."'
187
Once the prosecution proves the mens rea for the underlying
felony, the prosecution does not need to independently prove that the
killing happened during the commission of the underlying felony.'
88
In People v. Musselwhite, the defendant killed a woman one week
after attempting to kill another woman in the course of a robbery.
1 89
The defendant admitted to killing the victim but argued that his
prolonged use of crack cocaine led to brain damage that rendered
him unable to form the requisite intent to kill. 190 The California
Supreme Court held that because section 190.41 explicitly provides
that "the corpus delicti of a felony-based special circumstance...
need not be proved independently of a defendant's extrajudicial
statement,"'191 and thus felony-murder special circumstance does not
"require independent proof of the additional special circumstance...
the jury [need only] apply the corpus delicti rule to the underlying
felony."
192
184. California Penal Code section 190.4(a) provides that:
Whenever special circumstances... are alleged and the trier of fact
finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, the trier of fact shall
also make a special finding on the truth of each alleged special
circumstance... Whenever a special circumstance requires proof of
the commission or attempted commission of a crime, such crime shall
be charged and proved pursuant to the general law applying to the trial
and conviction of the crime.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a).
185. "General intent" crimes require that the defendant intends to do the act
that causes harm, such as rape or kidnapping. "Specific intent" crimes require
that defendants intend to cause harm. See Davis, 10 Cal. 4th at 518 n.15, 896
P.2d at 148-49 n.15, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856 n.15.
186. See 10 Cal. 4th 463, 519, 896 P.2d 119, 149, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 826 856.
187. Id.
188. See Musselwhite, 17 Cal. 4th at 1264, 954 P.2d at 504, 74 Cal Rptr. 2d
at 241.
189. Id. at 1228-29, 954 P.2d at 482, 74 Cal Rptr. 2d at 219.
190. See id.
191. CAL. PENALCODE § 190.41.
192. Musselwhite, 17 Cal. 4th at 1264, 954 P.2d at 504-05, 74 Cal Rptr. 2d
at 241-42 (emphasis in original).
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Although the prosecution only needs to prove that the killer
intended to commit the underlying felony, the prosecution must
prove that the defendant killed the victim in order to advance the
felony. 193 For example, in People v. Green, the defendant killed his
sixteen-year-old wife because he thought that she was having an
affair. 194 He then took her clothes, purse and jewelry to make it look
like a robbery.195  The defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder with robbery and kidnapping special circumstances. The
California Supreme Court affirmed the first-degree murder charge
but overturned the special circumstance verdicts because the "sole
object [of the robbery was] to facilitate or conceal the primary
crime."' 96 The court also explained that the legislature intended that
section 190.2 be used to punish "those defendants who killed in cold
blood in order to advance an independent felonious purpose, e.g.,
who carried out an execution-style slaying of the victim of or witness
to a holdup, a kidnapping, or a rape."
197
J. Conclusion
Once the prosecution proves the corpus delicti of the crime, it
may then pursue a charge of first-degree or second-degree murder, or
manslaughter. Because the primary distinction between these
categories of homicide is mens rea, the prosecution must determine
whether it has sufficient evidence to prove the requisite mental state
and to show that the defendant's actions caused the victim's death. If
the defendant is convicted of first-degree murder, the prosecution
may then determine whether the defendant qualifies for special
circumstances proceedings under the enumerated categories of
California Penal Code section 190.2. If one of the categories is
satisfied, the prosecution may pursue either the death penalty or life
in prison without the possibility of parole.
193. See People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 61, 609 P.2d 468, 505, 164 Cal. Rptr.
1, 38 (1980).
194. See id. at 13, 609 P.2d t 474, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
195. See id. at 15-16, 609 P.2d at 475-76, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 8-9.
196. Id. at 61, 609 P.2d at 505, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
197. Id.
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III. MENS REA: PURPOSE TO KILL OFFENSES*
In California, there are three types of murder that involve a
purpose to kill-a conscious object to end another's life: (1)
premeditated murder; (2) purpose to kill without premeditation; and
(3) purpose to kill as a result of provocation. Premeditated murder
involves a purpose to kill, accomplished with forethought.1 A
purpose to kill without premeditation, on the other hand, is a
purposeful murder accomplished without reflection or sufficient
provocation. 2  A purposeful killing committed upon provocation
involves an individual who acts rashly and not by judgment in
response to provocative conduct of the victim. Section A explains
how courts define and assess premeditated murder. Section B
clarifies purposeful murder without premeditation or adequate
provocation-second-degree murder. Section C elucidates what
constitutes adequate provocation, which enables a court to reduce
first-degree murder to voluntary manslaughter.
A. Premeditation
1. The elements: purpose to kill and preexisting reflection
Murder in California is defined as "killing... with malice
aforethought."3  Malice aforethought involves a malicious will.
"Malice may be express or implied."4  It is express when the
defendant possesses a purpose to take another's life.5 It is implied
"when no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and
* Julie Engels: J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Loyola Law School; B.A.,
Comparative Literature, Brown University. I would like to thank my parents,
Marty and Nancy Engels, my brother, Ken Engels, and Craig Gerber for their
love, support and humor.
1. See discussion infra Section A.
2. See discussion infra Section B.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (1999).
4. Id. at § 188.
5. See id.
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malignant heart."6 While premeditated murder requires a purpose to
kill,7 it also demands a "preexisting reflection and weighing of
considerations." 8 Thus, the mental state or mens rea required for
premeditation involves a purpose to kill and preexisting reflection. 9
Premeditation does not, however, demand careful, intelligent, or
meaningful reflection.' 0 In effect, purpose to kill and preexisting
reflection are separate elements, both of which comprise the mental
state needed for premeditation."
While premeditation is often defined as a preexisting purpose to
kill, a purpose to kill alone is not sufficient to support a finding of
premeditation. 12 In People v. Thomas, the defendant shot and killed
his wife. 13 The question before the court was whether the defendant
acted with premeditation when he carried out his purpose to kill the
victim.' 4 For a first-degree murder conviction, the purpose to kill
must be formed upon a preexisting reflection. 15 A mere purpose to
kill is insufficient. 16 Although the defendant admitted to waiting for
his wife to return in order to kill her, waiting was insufficient proof
of a preexisting reflection to kill.'7
6. Id.
7. See Suzanne Mounts, Premeditation and Deliberation in California:
Returning to a Distinction Without a Difference, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 261, 275
(2002).
8. People v. Perez, 2 Cal. 4th 1117, 1125, 831 P.2d 1159, 1163, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 577, 581 (1992).
9. See People v. Bender, 27 Cal. 2d 164, 182, 163 P.2d 8, 18 (1945);
People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 900, 156 P.2d 7, 18 (1945); Perez, 2 Cal.
4th at 1125, 831 P.2d at 1163, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581; see also CAL. PENAL
CODE § 189 (1999) ("All murder which is perpetrated by means of... poison,
lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt
to perpetrate arson, rape, carijacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping,
train wrecking, ... is murder of the first degree. All other kinds of murder are
of the second-degree.").
10. See id.
11. See People v. Holt, 25 Cal. 2d 59, 70, 153 P.2d 21, 27 (1944); see also
Mounts, supra note 7 at 290.
12. See Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d at 901, 156 P.2d at 18.
13. Id. at 888, 156 P.2d at 11-12.
14. Seeid. at 885, 156 P.2dat 11.
15. See id. at 900, 156 P.2d at 19.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 891, 156 P.2d at 13.
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No considerable amount of time between the purpose to kill and
the killing itself needs to exist because "they may be as instantaneous
as successive thoughts of the mind., 18 Reflection and consideration,
however, must precede the purpose to kill. 19 If that requirement is
satisfied, then once the purpose to kill is formulated, the "act of
killing may instantaneously follow the intention., 20 Thus, the test for
premeditation does not consider the duration, but rather the extent of
reflection.2 l
In People v. Memro, the court found the defendant guilty of the
premeditated killing of two boys even though the time period
between the defendant's purpose to kill and the actual killing was
minimal.22 The defendant murdered three young boys.23 He killed
the first after he became enraged at the boy's remark towards
homosexuals. 24 He murdered the second after the victim screamed in
response to the first murder.25 The court found ample evidence of
premeditation for the second murder, reasoning that the time between
the scream and the defendant running over to the second victim was
"imbued with deliberation and premeditation" 26 because the
defendant considered his options as he ran from his first victim to his
next. The murder of the third victim was also premeditated because
the defendant's act of tying the victim's hands behind his back and
strangling him gave the defendant sufficient time, although short, for
reflection.27
Even less time existed between the purpose to kill and the
killing in People v. Hughes.28 In that case, the defendant stabbed and
murdered his neighbor.29 More specifically, the defendant's failure
to inflict any fatal stab wounds provoked him to strangle his victim
18. Id. at 900, 156 P.2d at 18 (quoting People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17, 30
(1864) (citations omitted)).
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. 11 Cal. 4th 786, 905 P.2d 1305, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219 (1995).
23. See id. at 811-14, 905 P.2d at 1314-16, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 228-30.
24. See id. at 814, 905 P.2d at 1316, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 229-30.
25. See id. at 814, 905 P.2d at 1316,47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 230.
26. Id. at 863, 905 P.2d at 1347, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261.
27. See id.
28. 27 Cal. 4th 287, 39 P.3d 432, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401 (2002).
29. See id. at 316, 39 P.3d at 450, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422-23.
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in order to eliminate her as a witness. 30 Because the victim had not
died from the stab wounds, the defendant acted upon sufficient
reflection in strangling her to death.31 This was sufficient evidence
to support an inference of a preexisting purpose to kill, despite the
lack of an appreciable amount of time between the initial stabbing
and the strangulation.
32
2. Anderson factors: planning, motive, and manner
It is difficult to distinguish between a bare purpose to kill and a
purpose to kill resulting from preexisting reflection.33  Following
People v. Anderson,34 California courts look for three factors as
evidence of premeditation. 35 The three Anderson factors are merely
guidelines for gauging evidence of premeditation; Anderson does not
set forth a strict rule.36 These factors do not have independent legal
significance, but they stand as potential indicators of the degree to
which the defendant reflected upon a decision to kill prior to the
actual killing.37 Despite this caveat, the modern court still uses the
Anderson factors as guidelines for assessing premeditation.
In Anderson, the defendant perpetrated a brutal murder upon a
ten-year-old girl. Nevertheless, the court convicted the defendant of
second-degree murder rather than first-degree murder because there
was an absence of premeditation. 38  The first factor the court
examined involves planning activity-the defendant's actions prior
to the killing.3 9 The second factor is motive.40 Proof of motive is
30. See id. at 371, 39 P.3d at 486, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 466.
31. See id. at 371, 39 P.3d at 487, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 466.
32. See id.
33. See Suzanne Mounts, Malice Aforethought in California: A History of
Legislative Abdication and Judicial Vacillation, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 313, 332
(1999).
34. 70 Cal. 2d 15,447 P.2d 942, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968).
35. California courts must also review the whole record, "drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of [the judgment to] ... determine whether a
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt." Hughes, 27 Cal. 4th at 370, 39 P.3d at 486, 116
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454 (citations omitted).
36. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
37. See infra subsection 2.b.
38. See Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d at 35-36, 447 P.2d at 954-55, 73 Cal. Rptr. at
563.
39. See id. at 26-27,447 P.2d at 942, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
40. See id.
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significant to the extent it reveals reflection. The defendant's prior
relationship with the victim or the defendant's conduct towards the
victim may reveal a premeditated desire to kill.4 1 The third factor
considers the manner of the killing.42 If the manner of killing
implies that the defendant must have purposefully killed according to
a "preconceived design, ' 4 3 courts will infer that the defendant acted
with preexisting reflection. California courts typically find
premeditation when there is evidence of all three factors.44 Either
strong evidence of planning or evidence of motive, in conjunction
with planning or manner of killing, however, is often sufficient.45
In Anderson, although the defendant murdered the daughter of
the woman with whom he was living,46 the court found insufficient
47evidence of the above three factors: planning, motive, and manner.
The defendant's actions prior to the murder did not support a
preexisting reflection.48  Furthermore, the defendant lacked a
tangible motive to kill the victim.49 Finally, the manner of killing did
not suggest that the victim's wounds were "deliberately calculated to
result in death.",50 Therefore, despite the brutality of the murder, the
court found that the defendant did not kill with premeditation.
Accordingly, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder
rather than first-degree murder.
a. applying the Andersonfactors
People v. Bolin is an example of a case in which all three
Anderson factors were present.5' The defendant shot three
individuals, including his "business" partner, because his partner
showed their marijuana plants to the other two individuals.52 The
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See People v. Koontz, 27 Cal. 4th 1041, 1081, 46 P.3d 335, 361, 119
Cal. Rptr. 2d 859, 891 (2002).
44. See id.; see also Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d at 27, 447 P.2d at 949, 73 Cal.
Rptr. at 557.
45. See Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d at 19, 447 P.2d at 944, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 33-34, 447 P.2d at 953, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
48. See id. at 34-35, 447 P.2d at 953-54, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 561-62.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 33-34,447 P.2d at 953, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
51. 18 Cal. 4th 297, 956 P.2d 374, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412 (1998).
52. Id. at 310, 956 P.2d 384, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 422.
Summer 2003] 1405
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1401
court held that the defendant's murders were premeditated. First, the
defendant planned the murders; once he realized his partner had
shown his crop to others, he walked to his cabin to retrieve his gun,
and before leaving the crime scene, he tried to cover up his
involvement.53  Second, defendant's motive for the killings
suggested reflection; he sought to protect his marijuana crop, punish
his partner for betraying his trust, and eliminate witnesses to the
crimes of marijuana possession and murder.54 Finally, the manner of
killing revealed preexisting reflection; the victims died of multiple
gunshot wounds. While each gunshot would have been fatal, the
defendant continued shooting at the victims, suggesting a purpose to
kill imbued with premeditation.55 Although the time between his
purpose to kill and the actual killing occurred over a short period, the
defendant's actions revealed a purposeful, reflective killing.
56
Similarly, in People v. Steele all three Anderson factors were
present. 57  In that case, the defendant murdered his victim by
strangulation and multiple stab wounds.58 A reasonable jury could
infer that the defendant planned to murder the victim because the
defendant carried a knife with him into the victim's house.59 Once in
the house, the defendant told the victim to "[p]ut the phone down or
I'll kill you. ' 60 Although the time between this threat and the murder
was minimal, this statement "suggest[ed] a planned killing."
6'
Furthermore, the defendant's admission that he hated women and
had murdered a woman in the past established sufficient evidence of
62motive, which suggested reflection. Moreover, the defendant
murdered another woman in almost the same distinct manner.63 The
53. See id.
54. See id. at 333, 956 P.2d 399, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437.
55. Seeid.
56. See id.
57. 47 P.3d at 225, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432, 447-48 (2002); see also Perez,
2 Cal. 4th at 1127, 831 P.2d at 1164, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 582 (finding
premeditation where the defendant beat and stabbed his victim to death despite
"evidence [that] is admittedly not overwhelming.").
58. See Steele, 27 Cal. 4th at 1238-39, 47 P.3d at 230, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
439.
59. See id. at 1250, 47 P.3d at 238, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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pattern of using multiple stab wounds and strangulation in order to
kill women suggested a "calculated design to ensure death, rather
than an unconsidered 'explosion' of violence."
64
Generally, if the Anderson factors are satisfied, a killing will
appear especially brutal; however, "the brutality of a killing [alone
does not] support a finding [of] premeditation.... . 65 Acts of severe
violence are not sufficient to establish that an individual acted with
"careful thought and weighing of considerations. 66  Rather, the
"People bear the burden of establishing [premeditation] beyond a
reasonable doubt....",67 Therefore, the presumption rests in favor
of a finding of second-degree murder rather than first-degree
murder.
68
For instance, the brutal beating of an eighty7-two-year-old
stepfather was insufficient evidence of premeditation. 9 In People v.
Tubby, the defendant and his stepfather had an "amicable"
relationship. 70 The defendant, however, was severely intoxicated
during his vicious outburst.71 Even though "the defendant dragged
the [victim] inside the house to continue his assault.., that in itself
[does not point to] a pre-existing intent to kill."72 Thus, the Tubby
court found that the defendant did not plan to kill his stepfather,
either before or during the beating.73
64. Id. (quoting People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d 604, 627, 685 P.2d 1126,
1138, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 787 (1984)).
65. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d at 24, 447 P.2d at 947, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
66. Bender, 27 Cal. 2d 164, 184, 163 P.2d 8, 19 (1945) (discussing the
meaning of deliberate); see also People v. Caldwell, 43 Cal. 2d 864, 869, 279
P.2d 539, 542 (1955); People v. Tubby, 34 Cal. 2d 72, 78-79, 207 P.2d 51, 55
(1949).
67. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d at 24,447 P.2d at 947, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
68. See Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d at 25, 447 P.2d at 947-48, 73 Cal. Rptr. at
555-56.
69. See Tubby, 34 Cal. 2d at 74-75, 207 P.2d at 55.
70. Id. at 77, 207 P.2d at 54.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 78-79, 207 P.2d at 55.
73. See id. at 79, 207 P.2d at 55.
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b. Anderson factors as guidelines, not rules
Although courts employ the Anderson factors as support for
premeditation, these factors "do not establish normative rules. 74
Instead, they provide descriptive guidelines for a premeditation
analysis.75 The Anderson factors aid courts in determining whether
sufficient evidence exists to support an inference that the killing was
the result of "preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations
rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse. 7 6 The factors do not
provide an exclusive list of evidence that supports premeditation, nor
must they exist in a particular combination or hold a specified
weight.
In People v. Thomas, for example, only two of the three
Anderson factors were present, but the court still allowed the
defendant to be convicted of first-degree premeditated murder for
killing two individuals.78 The court found that planning activity was
present because the defendant returned to his car to retrieve his rifle
before shooting the victims. 79 Additionally, due to a malfunction in
the defendant's rifle, he had to reload before each shot, suggesting
planning.8° Furthermore, the manner of the killings showed the
defendant's premeditated, preconceived design because both victims
were shot at point-blank range.81 The court, however, chose not to
decide whether a motive existed because the prosecution had never
74. People v. Sanchez, 12 Cal. 4th 1, 32, 906 P.2d 1129, 1148, 47 Cal. Rptr.
2d 843, 863 (1995). "The Anderson analysis was intended as a framework to
assist reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence supports an inference
that the killing resulted from preexisting reflection and weighing
considerations. It did not refashion the elements of first degree murder or alter
the substantive law of murder in any way." People v. Thomas, 2 Cal. 4th 489,
517, 828 P.2d 101, 114, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 199, 212 (1992) (citation omitted). It
has been argued, however, that "the court now seems to regard the category of
premeditated and deliberated murders as sort of a 'catchall' for murders that
the court deems particularly reprehensible but that are not committed by one of
the other means specified in section 189." Mounts, supra note 7, at 324.
75. SeePerez, 2 Cal. 4th at 1125, 821 P.2d at 1163, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581.
76. Id.; see also Steele, 27 Cal. 4th at 1250, 47 P.3d at 237, 120 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 447 (jury could infer that because defendant carried a knife into the
victim's house, defendant deliberated about the possibility of homicide).
77. SeePerez, 2 Cal. 4th at 1125, 821 P.2d at 1163, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581.
78. 2 Cal. 4th 489, 828 P.2d 101, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 199 (1992).
79. See id. at 517, 828 P.2d at 115, 7 Cal Rptr. 2d at 213.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 518, 828 P.2d at 115, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213.
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before been required to prove a motive. The court held that, "[a]
senseless, random, but premeditated killing supports a verdict of first
degree murder.,
82
Therefore, premeditated murder requires both a purposeful,
conscious object to end another's life, as well as a preexisting
reflection and weighing of considerations. No specific amount of
time needs to exist between the formation of a purpose to kill and the
killing itself, but a preexisting reflection must pervade the murder.
Furthermore, although not required to do so, courts use the Anderson
factors-planning, motive, and manner-to aid in the premeditation
analysis and to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to
support an inference that the defendant killed with reflection. The
original notion of Anderson was to provide a strict guideline for
courts to assess evidence of premeditation. If the factors were
present, then courts would hold that the killing was premeditated.
The modem trend, however, is to apply the Anderson factors more
leniently. The result is that premeditation has taken on less and less
meaning, becoming more synonymous with a purpose to kill.
B. Second-Degree Murder with Express Malice:
Purpose to Kill without Premeditation
Second-degree murder is the catch-all murder. If a murder is not
committed in the first degree-if it is not accomplished with
premeditation, or if it is not an enumerated felony-murder-then it is
second-degree murder. 83 Unlike premeditation, which requires
express malice, the mental state for second-degree murder can be
either express or implied.84 If the mental state is express, the
82. Id. at 519, 828 P.2d at 116, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214.
83. "All murder which is perpetrated by means of. . . poison, lying in wait,
torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, andpremeditated killing, or
which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape,
carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem... is murder of the first degree. All
other kinds of murder are of the second-degree." CAL. PENAL CODE § 189
(1999).
84. See People v. Butts, 236 Cal. App. 2d 817, 827, 46 Cal. Rptr. 362, 368
(1965).
"Malice" may be either express or implied.
[Malice is express when there is a manifested intention unlawfully
to kill a human being.]
[Malice is implied when:
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defendant must possess a purpose to kill, but preexisting reflection is
not required. In these cases, the span of reflection necessary to
constitute premeditated murder is absent.8 5  Second-degree murder
with express malice also includes situations in which the defendant
harbors a purpose to kill and kills his victim without sufficient
provocation.
On the other hand, if malice is implied, then proof of a purpose
to kill is not required. 86 Malice is implied "when the circumstances
surrounding a killing reveal a malignant heart." 87  This section
explains killings committed with express malice-a purpose to kill-
but which lack sufficient evidence of premeditation or provocation.
1. The elements: purpose to kill
Second-degree murder with express malice requires the
prosecution to prove both that the defendant committed an act that
caused the killing, and that the defendant committed that act with a
1. The killing results from an intentional act,
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life,
and
3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the
danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life.]
[When it is shown that a killing resulted from the intentional doing
of an act with express or implied malice, no other mental state need be
shown to establish the mental state of malice aforethought.]
The word "aforethought" does not imply deliberation or the lapse
of considerable time. It only means that the required mental state
must precede rather than follow the act.
CALJIC No. 8.11 (1996); see also People v. Love, 111 Cal. App. 3d 98, 108,
168 Cal. Rptr. 407, 412-13 (1980) (holding that malice can either be express
or implied for second degree murder, as second degree murder encompasses
both life-threatening conduct accomplished with a purposeful intent, and
subjective awareness of the risk involved as well as life-endangering conduct
which is only done with the awareness that the conduct is contrary to the laws
of society).
85. See Butts, 236 Cal. App. 2d at 828, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 368. "Murder of the
second-degree is [also] the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought when the perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a human being
but the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and premeditation."
CALJIC No. 8.30.
86. See Butts, 236 Cal. App. 2d at 827, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
87. Id.
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purpose to kill. 88 A purpose to kill does not demand a hatred for the
victim.89  Rather, a purpose to kill implies "a wish to... injure
another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established either
by proof or presumption of law."90 In effect, the mens rea required
for second-degree murder with express malice is a purpose to kill.
As long as a defendant, who harbors a purpose to kill, neither
murders with premeditation nor acts upon a sudden heat of passion
or adequate provocation, then he has acted with express malice and is
guilty of second-degree murder.
91
The purpose to kill that is required for second-degree murder
with express malice, however, is not synonymous with the mental
state required for premeditated murder. 92 While premeditated
murder includes both a purpose to kill as well as a preexisting
reflection, second-degree murder with express malice only requires a
purpose to kill. Thus, if the prosecution proves that the defendant
purposefully killed, but does not prove premeditation, 93 the verdict
should then be second-degree murder, not first-degree murder.
94
For example, In People v. Bender, the Supreme Court reduced
the defendant's conviction from murder in the first degree to murder
in the second degree because the defendant purposefully killed his
victim, but he did so without premeditation. 95  The defendant
strangled his wife following a marriage characterized by violent,
drunken arguments over the fact that the defendant was still married
to his first wife.96  The trial court's jury instructions, however,
88. See Love, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 105, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 410 (1980).
Malice aforethought exists "when no considerable provocation appears, or
when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart." CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (1999).
89. See Love, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 105, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
90. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(4) (1999).
91. See Love, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 105-06, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
92. See People v. Bender, 27 Cal. 2d 164, 179, 163 P.2d 8, 17 (1945); see
also Suzanne Mounts, Malice Aforethought in California: A History of
Legislative Abdication and Judicial Vacillation, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 313, 328
(1999) ("An intentional killing in the absence of adequate provocation was
committed with malice and unless accompanied by premeditation and
deliberation, or other aggravating circumstances, was second-degree murder.").
93. See Bender, 27 Cal. 2d at 179, 163 P.2d at 17 (citing People v. Howard,
211 Cal. 322, 329, 295 P.2d 333, 336 (1930)).
94. See id.
95. 27 Cal. 2d 164, 167, 163 P.2d 8, 11 (1945).
96. See id. at 168, 163 P.2d at 11.
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blurred the distinction between a purposeful murder and a murder
committed with calculation and forethought.9 7 While first-degree
premeditated murder and second-degree murder with express malice
both require a purpose to kill, an individual cannot properly be
convicted of first-degree murder if the murder was purposeful, yet
without reflection and calculation. 98 Thus, because the defendant in
Bender had a purpose to kill, but not a preexisting reflection, his
conviction was reduced to second-degree murder.
99
Furthermore, in People v. Butts, the court found the defendant
guilty of second-degree murder where there was insufficient
evidence of premeditation. 100 There, defendant Otwell engaged in a
knife fight that resulted in the victim's death. 1 The defendant
argued that because the jury found that he did not commit the murder
with premeditation, the court could not find that he acted with a
purpose to kill the victim and thus could not convict him of second-
degree murder. °2 Because the defendant used a knife in a fight
against unarmed individuals while shouting, "You damn right I've
got a knife, and I'm going to use it," the court found that a jury could
infer that the defendant possessed a purpose to take the victim's
life.'0 3 Ultimately, the defendant was found guilty of second-degree
murder, despite a lack of premeditation, because the defendant
possessed the requisite mental state of a purpose to kill.
°4
Courts also look at the previous relationship between the
defendant and the victim when assessing whether the murder is
committed in the first degree or second degree. In People v. Mendes,
the defendant had an argument with a stranger in a bar.105  The
defendant left the scene of the argument, but later returned with a
gun. A police officer then chased after the defendant, and the
defendant, believing the officer was the stranger, shot and killed
him. 0 6 Regardless of whether the defendant thought his pursuer was
97. See id. at 183-84, 163 P.2d at 19-20.
98. See id. at 180-81, 163 P.2d at 18.
99. See id. at 186-87, 163 P.2d at 21.
100. 236 Cal. App. 2d 817, 46 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1965).
101. See id. at 825, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
102. See id. at 829, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. 35 Cal. 2d 537, 219 P.2d 1 (1950).
106. See id. at 540, 219 P.2d at 3.
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the stranger or the police officer, there was insufficient evidence that
the defendant premeditated the killing. 10 7 The defendant did not
know either the stranger or the police officer prior to the shooting.
Without a prior relationship or a motive suggesting a reflective rather
than impulsive killing, the evidence supported a finding that the
defendant was guilty of second-degree murder, not first-degree
murder.
0 8
Additionally, if the defendant does not meet his burden of
producing sufficient evidence of provocation, the result will be a
second-degree murder verdict.109 The defendant, however, must still
possess express malice-a purpose to kill. If the defendant does not
kill in response to adequate provocation, a court will not reduce the
crime to voluntary manslaughter, and the defendant will be convicted
of murder in the second degree.
In People v. Fields, for example, the court found the defendant
guilty of second-degree murder, despite possessing a purpose to kill
his victim, because the murder was neither a result of preexisting
reflection nor a response to adequate provocation. 1 0 The defendant
ingested sedative pills that caused extreme mood changes, and then
he shot and killed his friend."' Although his mood was volatile on
the night of the shooting, the defendant harbored no anger towards
his victim. This lack of anger indicated that the murder was not
planned! 12 Furthermore, there was no evidence of provocation prior
to the shooting." 3  Rather, the court found that the defendant's
sudden reach for the gun after hearing someone enter the room
suggested that the killing was the result of a "sudden and
unconsidered" impulse. 1 4  The conviction, therefore, was for
second-degree murder because the killing was purposeful, but
lacking in both premeditation and provocation.
Additionally, in People v. Pacheco, the defendant was convicted
of second-degree murder because he failed to produce sufficient
107. See id. at 545, 219 P.2d at 5.
108. See id. at 544-45, 219 P.2d at 5-6.
109. See People v. Ashland, 20 Cal. App. 168, 175, 128 P. 798, 801-02
(1912).
110. 99 Cal. App. 2d 10, 221 P.2d 190 (1950).
111. Seeid. at 11-12,221P.2dat 191.
112. See id. at 14, 221 P.2d at 192.
113. See id. at 13, 221 P.2d at 192.
114. Id.
Summer 2003) 1413
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 36:1401
evidence of provocation for a lesser conviction of voluntary
manslaughter."15 The defendant engaged in an argument with his
girlfriend's first husband. The argument resulted in the first
husband's death.116  The defendant stabbed the unarmed, first
husband forty-five times. 117 The first husband's arms and hands
contained stab wounds, indicating that he tried to shield himself from
the attack.118  Although the defendant claimed that finding his
girlfriend with her lover (her first husband) was adequate
provocation sufficient to arouse the passions of a reasonable man, the
court found this to be insufficient proof of provocation." 19 Rather,
the defendant, deemed the first aggressor by the jury, engaged in a
brutal fight with a man with whom he had a peaceful encounter that
same evening. 12  Therefore, the defendant was guilty of second-degree murder because he purposefully killed without provocation.
2. Jury instructions
A trial court must give a second-degree murder instruction if
evidence of provocation would allow a jury to infer that the
defendant formed a purpose to kill as a direct response to the
provocation.' 21 Likewise, if sufficient evidence exists to justify a
finding of premeditation, as well as a finding that the defendant
possessed a purpose to kill without premeditation, the court must
give the jury a second-degree murder instruction.
122
Courts supply second-degree murder instructions where
evidence can reveal either the occurrence of a first-degree or second-
degree murder. In People v. Wickersham, the trial court failed to
give the jury a second-degree murder instruction where the defendant
shot her husband during a scuffle that occurred after her husband saw
115. 116 Cal. App. 3d 617, 627, 172 Cal. Rptr. 269, 274 (1981).
116. See id. at 622-24, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 271-73.
117. See id. at 624, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 627, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
120. See id.
121. See People v. Wickersham, 32 Cal. 3d 307, 330, 650 P.2d 311, 323, 185
Cal. Rptr. 436, 448 (1982), overruled by People v. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th 186, 906
P.2 531, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569 (1995) (overruled only on the grounds that
"unreasonable self-defense" is a "defense").
122. See id.
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the gun. 12 3 Although sufficient evidence existed to justify a finding
of first-degree murder, "such a finding was not compelled.'
124
According to the same facts, the jury could have found that the
defendant did not premeditate the murder, but acted impulsively in
response to the scuffle.' 25 In effect, the defendant could have had a
purpose to kill her husband, while not acting upon adequate
provocation or with premeditation.1
26
C. Provocation
Manslaughter is "the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice."' 127 "Malice is presumptively absent when [a] defendant[, in
response to sufficient provocation,] acts upon a sudden quarrel or
heat of passion .... ,12 A person who purposefully kills another as
a result of provocation is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, not
murder.
129
1. The elements
Defining provocation is not easy. Rather than provide a succinct
definition, California courts often define provocation by example-
by what does or does not constitute provocation. Despite this
confusion, provocation can be broken down into three basic
elements. First, provocation is an action, caused by the victim,
which causes a reasonable person to lose self-control and act rashly.
This action must be caused by the victim, or the defendant must
123. See id. at 329, 650 P.2d at 313-14, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 438-39.
124. Id. at 330, 650 P.2d at 323, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
125. See id. at 329-30, 650 P.2d at 323, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
126. See People v. Jeter, 60 Cal. 2d 671, 676, 388 P.2d 355, 358, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 326 (1964) (trial court erred in giving only first degree murder
instructions where the defendant shot and killed his victim during a robbery,
for a reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant purposefully killed
his victim without deliberation).
127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (1999).
128. People v. Lee, 20 Cal. 4th 47, 59, 971 P.2d 1001, 1007, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d
625, 631 (1999). An "unreasonable, but good faith, belief that deadly force is
necessary [for] self defense" can also mitigate a crime to voluntary
manslaughter. Id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(a) (1999) (defining
voluntary manslaughter as the "unlawful killing of a human being.., upon a
sudden quarrel or heat of passion.").
129. See People v. Lasko, 23 Cal. 4th 101, 108, 999 P.2d 666, 671, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 441,446 (2000).
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reasonably believe the victim engaged in the provocative conduct.130
Second, the conduct must be sufficiently provocative such that it
would encourage a reasonable person of average disposition to act
without consideration.13 1 The victim's conduct can be physical or
verbal, 132 and thus, no specific type of provocation is required for a
court to mitigate a crime to voluntary manslaughter. Third, at the
time of the killing, the defendant must be in an actual heat of
passion; he must act from passion, not from judgment.'33 The
130. See Lee, 20 Cal. 4th at 59, 971 P.2d at 1007, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 631; see
also In re Thomas C., 183 Cal. App. 3d 786, 798, 228 Cal. Rptr. 430, 438
(1986); People v. Brooks, 185 Cal. App. 3d 687, 694, 230 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89
(1986).
131. See Lee, 971 P.2d at 1007, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 631; see also People v.
Berry, 18 Cal. 3d 509, 515, 556 P.2d 777, 780, 134 Cal. Rptr. 415, 418 (1976).
"To satisfy the objective or 'reasonable person' element of this form of
voluntary manslaughter, the accused's heat of passion must be due to
'sufficient provocation."' Wickersham, 32 Cal. 3d at 326, 650 P.2d at 321, 185
Cal. Rptr. at 446 (citing People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 719, 518 P.2d 913,
923, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11 (1974) (overruled on other grounds)).
132. See Berry, 18 Cal. 3d at 515, 556 P.2d at 780, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 418
(1976).
133. See People v. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th 186, 201, 906 P.2d 531, 540, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 569, 578 (1995). See also CALJIC No. 8.42 (2002), which states:
To reduce an unlawful killing from murder to manslaughter upon
the ground of sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation must
be of the character and degree as naturally would excite and arouse the
passion, and the assailant must act under the influence of that sudden
quarrel or heat of passion.
The heat of passion which will reduce a homicide to manslaughter
must be such a passion as naturally would be aroused in the mind of
an ordinarily reasonable person in the same circumstances. A
defendant is not permitted to set up [his][her] own standard of conduct
and to justify or excuse [himself][herself] because [his][her] passions
were aroused unless the circumstances in which the defendant was
placed and the facts that confronted [him][her] were such as also
would have aroused the passion of the ordinarily reasonable person
faced with the same situation. [Legally adequate provocation may
occur in a short, or over a considerable, period of time.]
The question to be answered is whether or not, at the time of the
killing, the reason of the accused was obscured or disturbed by
passion to such an extent as would cause the ordinarily reasonable
person of average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation
and reflection, and from passion rather than from judgment.
If there was provocation, [whether of short or long duration,] but of
a nature not normally sufficient to arouse passion, or if sufficient time
elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to
1416
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aroused passion may be a result of rage, or it can consist of any
violent, intense emotion. 134 Aside from the above elements, there
must be a lack of cooling time. If sufficient time exists between the
provocative conduct and the killing, the law presumes that the
defendant should have cooled off-as the reasonable person would
have-thus precluding mitigation to voluntary manslaughter.
a. applying the elements
"[P]rovocation must be such that an average, sober person
would be so inflamed that he or she would lose reason and
judgment." 135  Courts have found that a separated spouse in a
romantic relationship with another is insufficient provocation to
inflame the passions of a reasonable person. In People v. Lujan, for
example, the court found that the defendant did not kill as a result of
provocation.' 36 The defendant and his wife were separated, but he
continually stalked and harassed her. 137 After watching his wife
walking and talking with another man, the defendant bludgeoned
both of them to death.' 3 8 The defendant did not act upon a heat of
passion because neither victim engaged in any provocative
conduct; 139 a separated woman in a romantic relationship with a man
other than her husband is not a sufficiently provocative action.
140
The court also found that this conduct should not arouse a person to
act rashly.141 The defendant and his wife were separated, and a
police officer warned the defendant that he must stay clear of his
wife. 42 The defendant's rash temptation to kill was not reasonable,
and thus the court refused to mitigate the crime to voluntary
manslaughter.
subside and reason to return, and if an unlawful killing of a human
being followed the provocation and had all the elements of murder, as
I have defined it, the mere fact of slight or remote provocation will not
reduce the offense to manslaughter.
134. See Lasko, 23 Cal. 4th at 108, 999 P.2d at 670, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446.
135. Lee, 20 Cal. 4th at 60, 971 P.2d at 1008, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
136. 92 Cal. App. 4th 1389, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769 (2001).
137. See id. at 1412, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786-87.
138. See id. at 1414, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 1415, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789.
141. See id.
142. Seeid.
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Courts also find the predictable conduct of a victim resisting the
crime to be insufficient provocation. 143 In People v. Williams, the
court properly refused voluntary manslaughter instructions where the
defendant shot his two victims. 44 The victims allegedly robbed the
defendant's home.145 After his wife threatened to leave him over the
event, the defendant went to the victims' home, engaged in an
argument with them, and then shot them.146  The defendant
maintained that the victims' statement, "we didn't rob you on
Saturday, Kerry did," was adequate provocation justifying the
reduction of his conviction to voluntary manslaughter. 47 The court,
however, disagreed because dialogue between a victim and her
attacker is not adequate provocation.
4 8
b. timing
Generally, provocation requires a lack of cooling time between
the provocative conduct and the killing. If sufficient time has
elapsed between the provocation and the killing, courts will presume
that the defendant's passions have cooled, thereby precluding a
finding of provocation. No specific time limit, however, needs to
exist to prohibit a finding of provocation. Rather, courts take an ad
hoc approach, examining each case to determine if sufficient time
has passed to enable a reasonable person's passions to subside.
In People v. Brooks, for example, the court found adequate
provocation despite a two-hour period between the provocative
conduct and the killing.149 The defendant's brother was stabbed to
death.' 50 The defendant, "in a very excited, upset state, was running
around talking to people," trying to ascertain who murdered his
143. See People v. Williams, 40 Cal. App. 4th 446, 454, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
730, 734 (1995); see also People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 306, 618 P.2d
149, 169-70, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 623-24 (1980) (holding that the defendant's
brutal attack and killing of one of his elderly victims when she awakened
during the robbery and began to scream was a predictable reaction of a
resisting victim and not a sufficient provocation to reduce a murder charge to
manslaughter).
144. 40 Cal. App. 4th 446, 454-55, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 730, 734 (1995).
145. See id. at 451, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 732.
146. See id. at 452, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733.
147. See id. at 453, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733.
148. See id. at 454-55, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 734.
149. 185 Cal. App. 3d 687, 230 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1986).
150. See id. at 690, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
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brother.15 ' The defendant finally determined who shot his brother
and shot that person five times.1 52  Even though two hours had
passed between his brother's murder and the victim's murder, there
was substantial evidence that the defendant killed in a heat of
passion.
53
Provocation, however, can occur over a long period of time and
can include any kind of high-wrought emotion. In People v.
Borchers, the court found sufficient evidence of provocation where
the defendant was involved in a relationship with a woman who
admitted infidelity, constantly threatened to commit suicide, and
repeatedly urged the defendant to shoot her by calling him
"chicken."' 154 A chain of events over a considerable length of time
can cause a defendant to act rashly and without consideration. 55 The
court held that passion does not need to be rage or anger, but can
consist of any violent or intense emotion. 156 Thus, sufficient
evidence existed for a finding of provocation-that the defendant
"killed in wild desperation induced by [the victim's] long continued
provocatory conduct."'
157
Provocation can also take the form of a long, smoldering
accumulation of provocation inciting rage and passion. In People v.
Berry, a forty-six-year-old defendant married a twenty-year-old
woman, who left for Israel three days after their marriage. 5 8 The
defendant maintained that upon her return, she announced that she
had met another man abroad, fallen in love with him, and engaged in
sexual intercourse with him.' 59 Over the next two weeks, the victim
allegedly provoked the defendant with sexual taunting, alternating
between inviting his sexual advances and rejecting them.' 60  The
situation purportedly culminated in a screaming match followed by
the defendant strangling the victim. The court held that a
"cumulative series of provocations" coupled with the final screaming
151. Id. at 691,230 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
152. See id. at 690, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
153. See id. at 696, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
154. 50 Cal. 2d 321, 328-29, 325 P.2d 97, 102 (1958).
155. See id.
156. Seeid.
157. Id.
158. 18 Cal. 3d 509, 512, 556 P.2d 777, 778, 134 Cal. Rptr. 415, 416 (1976).
159. See id. at 513, 556 P.2d at 779, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
160. See id. at 513-14, 556 P.2d at 779, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
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fit could cause a person to kill in an uncontrollable rage "under the
sway of passion."'161 Ultimately, on retrial, the defendant was
convicted of second-degree murder.
c. intent to kill?
While most killings that result from provocation involve a
purpose to kill, a heat of passion killing may also not be purposeful.
An individual in the heat of passion can merely intend to scare or
cause injury to the victim, but his actions may still result in death. 62
At a minimum, these cases involve recklessness-acting despite an
awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Nonetheless, a heat
of passion killing performed with the intent to scare or injure is
considered voluntary manslaughter.
A purpose to scare, as opposed to a purpose to kill, was
sufficient to convict the defendant in People v. Lasko of voluntary
manslaughter. 163 The defendant was found guilty of provocation
even though he did not purposefully kill the victim. 164 The defendant
killed the victim over a money quarrel which developed into a brutal
fight. 165 The defendant maintained that he unintentionally killed the
victim with a bat only as a response to the victim hitting him with the
same bat. 166  The court held the defendant guilty of voluntary
manslaughter despite an absence of a purpose to kill because a
conviction of voluntary manslaughter does not require a purpose to
kill. 167 California Penal Code section 192 defines manslaughter as
an unlawful killing without malice. It further defines voluntary
manslaughter as a killing resulting from a sudden heat of passion. 
68
The statute, however, says nothing about a purpose to kill. 169 A
killer "who acts in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion lacks malice
161. Id. at 514, 556 P.2d at 779, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
162. See People v. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th 186, 906 P.2d 531, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d
569 (1995).
163. See Lasko, 23 Cal. 4th 101, 999 P.2d 666, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 441.
164. See id. at 104, 999 P.2d at 668, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443.
165. See id. at 105-06, 999 P.2d at 668-69, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443-44.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 108, 999 P.2d at 620, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445.
168. See id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (1999).
169. See Lasko, 23 Cal. 4th at 108, 999 P.2d at 671, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446.
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and is therefore not guilty of murder, irrespective of the presence or
absence of an intent to kill."17 The court in Lasko further stated:
Just as an unlawful killing with malice is murder regardless
of whether there was an intent to kill, an unlawful killing
without malice (because of a sudden quarrel or heat of
passion) is voluntary manslaughter, regardless of whether
there was an intent to kill. In short, the presence or absence
of an intent to kill is not dispositive of whether the crime
committed is murder or the lesser offense of voluntary
manslaughter. 171
Thus, a purpose to kill, although often present, is not a necessary
element of provocation. Mere recklessness is sufficient.
2. Burden of proof
Provocation holds a unique place in the law. Unlike most
crimes which are comprised of elements which need to be
established to prove the crime, provocation merely mitigates an
unlawful, intentional homicide. Provocation, standing alone, does
not establish or increase criminal liability. 72  In effect, what
distinguishes murder from manslaughter is not the elements of a
crime, but rather the mitigating factor of provocation. Thus,
provocation resembles an affirmative defense. Unless the
prosecution's case makes it apparent that the murder was committed
upon sufficient provocation, the defendant has the burden of
production-the defendant must raise the issue of provocation.
73
170. Id. at 109, 999 P.2d at 671, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447.
171. Id. at 109-10, 999 P.2d at 671, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447. Although some
courts appear to have held to the contrary, that voluntary manslaughter requires
an intent to kill, none expressly have held that "a defendant who kills in a
sudden quarrel or heat of passion, with conscious disregard for life but without
intent to kill, is guilty of murder." Id. at 110; see also People v. Hawkins, 10
Cal. 4th 920, 958, 897 P.2d 574, 595-96, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 636, 657-58 (1995);
People v. Ray, 14 Cal. 3d 20, 28, 533, 897 P.2d 1017, 1021, 120 Cal. Rptr.
377, 381 (1975); People v. Forbs, 62 Cal. 2d 847, 852, P.2d 825, 828, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 753, 756, 402 (1965); People v. Brubaker 53 Cal.2d 37, 44, 346 P.2d 8,
12 (1959); People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal.2d 716, 732-33, 336 P.2d 492 (1959);
People v. Bridgehouse, 47 Cal.2d 406, 413, 303 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1956);
People v. Bender, 27 Cal. 2d 164, 181, 163 P.2d 8, 18 (1945).
172. See People v. Rios, 23 Cal. 4th 450, 459, 2 P.3d 1066, 1072, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 512, 519 (2000).
173. See id. at 461-62, 2 P.3d at 1074, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 521.
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The prosecution then has the burden of proving the absence of
provocation beyond a reasonable doubt. 1
74
In People v. Dixon, for example, the defendant failed to meet his
burden of showing both adequate provocation and heat of passion
evidence.'75 In that case, the defendant shot a prostitute in the back
after she did not follow through with her agreement to produce
sexual favors for cocaine.' 76  The defendant did not provide
testimony as to the time that elapsed between when the victim
received the cocaine and when she refused sexual favors.' 77  In
addition, the defendant did not provide adequate testimony to
establish that the provocation at issue was sufficient to arouse the
passions of an ordinary, reasonable person. 7 8 The court found that
the refusal of sexual activity as payment for drugs did not constitute
the provocative conduct necessary to mitigate murder to voluntary
manslaughter. 79  Thus, the court was not required to provide a
manslaughter instruction because the defendant failed to meet his
burden of offering substantial evidence of provocation.
80
3. Jury instructions
The court has the obligation to give jury instructions on lesser
offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the
necessary elements of the crime are met'8  -regardless of whether
the defendant requests the lesser offense instructions. z8 2 If there is
no evidence of provocation, then the court does not have the
obligation to give instructions for the lesser offense of voluntary
manslaughter.' 3 To warrant voluntary manslaughter instructions,
the evidence of provocation must be "'substantial enough to merit
174. See id.; see also People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 719, 518 P.2d 913,
923, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11 (1974); People v. Spurlin, 156 Cal. App. 3d 119,
123-24 (1984).
175. 32 Cal. App. 4th 1547, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859 (1995).
176. See id. at 1551, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860.
177. See id. at 1555, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863.
178. See id. at 1555-56, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864 (citations omitted).
179. See id. at 1556, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864.
180. See id.
181. See People v. Breverman, 19 Cal. 4th 142, 154, 960 P.2d 1094, 1100,
77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 870, 876 (1998).
182. See id.
183. See id.
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consideration."" 184  This is to ensure that the defendant is only
convicted of the crime he actually committed.
In People v. Breverman, for example, substantial evidence of
provocation existed to require voluntary manslaughter
instructions. 185 A group of people charged the defendant's car while
he attempted to enter it.186  The group was large, mob-like, and
armed with dangerous weapons. 187 The group further intimidated the
defendant when they challenged him to fight and damaged his car.'
88
These circumstances indicated to the court that a jury could infer
from the evidence that the defendant was blinded by a sudden heat of
passion when he shot towards the mob and killed the victim.'
89
Thus, the court was obligated to give voluntary manslaughter
instructions.
Even if the defendant requests that the court abstain from giving
instructions on the lesser offense, the court must still supply the
instructions if substantial evidence of the lesser crime exists. In
People v. Barton, the defendant contended that he shot his victim
accidentally. 190 The defense requested the trial court omit voluntary
manslaughter instructions for tactical reasons; the defense believed
that because voluntary manslaughter required a purpose to kill,' 9' the
court's instructions that the jury convict the defendant of voluntary
manslaughter if it found that the killing occurred upon a sudden heat
of passion were inconsistent with the defense's assertion that the
killing was accidental. 192 The court, however, held the instruction
appropriate. There was a substantial question as to whether the
elements of murder existed, thus requiring instructions of the lesser
offense.
193
184. Id. at 162, 960 P.2d at 1106, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (citations omitted).
185. See id. at 163-64, 960 P.2d at 1107, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883.
186. See id.
187. Seeid.
188. See id.
189. See id.; see also Self Defense, infra Part IX.
190. See Barton, 12 Cal. 4th 186, 192, 906 P.2d 531, 533, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d
569, 571 (1995).
191. In most instances, including Barton, a provocation theory presumes a
purpose to kill even though it is not legally required.
192. See id. at 193-94, 906 P.2d at 534, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572.
193. See id. at 194, 906 P.2d at 534, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572.
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On the other hand, in People v. Fenenbock, substantial evidence
of provocation did not exist to merit a voluntary manslaughter
instruction. 194 In that case, a group of people brutally murdered their
victim out of revenge for the sexual molestation of one of the
defendant's children.' 95 The defendant's reason was not obscured by
passion because after hearing about the molestation, the defendant
continued with his daily activities and did not confront the victim. 1
96
The defendant's passions had cooled, and the killing became an act
of revenge, not passion. 197 As a result, the court affirmed the trial
court's omission of a provocation instruction because insufficient
evidence existed that the defendant had acted in a heat of passion.
Thus, provocation requires an action that is caused by the
victim, which causes the defendant to passionately lose self-control
and act rashly without judgment. The victim's conduct, whether
physical or verbal, must be such that it could cause an individual to
lose control. Moreover, at the time of the killing, the defendant must
be in an actual heat of passion. Finally, there must be a lack of
cooling time between the provocative conduct and the killing.
Otherwise, courts will presume that a reasonable person should have
cooled off, thus precluding mitigation to voluntary manslaughter.
194. 46 Cal. App. 4th 1688, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 608 (1996).
195. See id. at 1695-96, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612.
196. See id. at 1704, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
197. See id.; see also People v. Golsh, 63 Cal. App. 609, 617, 219 P.2d 456,
459 (1923).
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IV. MENS REA: UNINTENTIONAL HOMICIDE*
Part III discussed criminal liability for homicide where there is a
purpose to kill. Part IV will discuss three different theories under
which a defendant can be held liable for an unintentional killing.
A. Second-Degree Murder Under an Implied Malice Theory
A defendant can be convicted of murder if he does an act that
involves a strong probability of death to another and death results.1
As this Part will illustrate, murder liability can attach even where a
defendant does not possess an intent to kill.2 Malice can be implied
in this type of killing where the defendant's conduct is so wanton and
reckless as to demonstrate a depraved heart or an extreme
indifference to human life.
3
The following paragraphs illustrate how a defendant's reckless
conduct can make him liable for murder under the "implied malice"
murder theory. Other jurisdictions have coined this type of
unintended homicide "depraved heart murder." The Model Penal
Code classifies an unintended killing as a murder when the killing is
committed recklessly under circumstances that show an extreme
indifference to human life.4 California discusses the same type of
killing under second-degree murder within an "implied malice"
theory. Therefore, "unintentional murder, whether it is called
'depraved heart,' 'implied malice,' or given some other label, centers
• Amanda Gamer: J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Loyola Law School; B.A.,
Theater, UCLA. To my brother for inspiring me to follow my dreams, my
father for teaching me to live life to the fullest, my grandparents for
encouraging me to dance and be artistic, and my mother for being my best
friend and biggest fan. You have all blessed my heart and supported me
through all of my endeavors.
1. See 1 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
LAW ELEMENTS § 195 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter 1 WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW
ELEMENTS].
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1980).
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around a very risky act that causes the death of another, even though
the defendant does not intend to kill.",
5
1. The nature of implied malice
A defendant is guilty of murder, under some circumstances, if he
intentionally acts in a manner that involves a high probability of
death to another. 6  The way that this idea works in practice is
complicated. Courts have held that malice is implied when the
defendant's conduct is wanton and reckless and suggests an
"abandoned and malignant heart." 7 The phrases "abandoned and
malignant heart," and "implied malice" lead to complexities in
defining "murder." Therefore, it is necessary to define the terms that
are invoked in this area of homicide and use those terms consistently.
For the purposes of this Part, the necessary level of culpability for
implied malice murder is "recklessly." Before defining the term
recklessly, however, it is important to illustrate California's
terminology in its implied malice murder jurisprudence.
Courts have adopted two approaches to find implied malice. In
reality, they lead to the same result, which is discussed in the
following subpart. One line of cases finds implied malice where the
defendant-with a base, antisocial motive, and a wanton disregard
for human life-completes an act which involves a high probability
that death will result.8 Another line of cases finds implied malice
where a killing results from a dangerous act that is deliberately
performed by a defendant who knows that his conduct endangers
5. Charles L. Hobson, Reforming California's Homicide Law, 23 PEPP. L.
REv. 495, 540-41 (1996) (citation omitted).
6. See 1 WITKN CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 1, § 195.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1999) (defining malice as express or
implied: "It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention
unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no
considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the
killing show an abandoned and malignant heart."); see also, Hobson, supra
note 5, at 495 (describing the evolution of the definition of malice, and how its
modem form is "completely divorced from any common sense notion of ill
will." For that reason, an alternative definition of malice is necessary.).
8. See, e.g., People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 703-04, 408 P.2d 365, 373-
74, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 917-18 (1965).
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human life.9  That is, the killing results from the defendant's
conscious disregard for life.
People v. Watson adopted the following definition: Implied
malice exists "when a person does an act, the natural consequences
of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed
by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another
and who acts with conscious disregard for life."10 Therefore, malice
may be implied when the defendant unintentionally kills as a result
of his reckless conduct.' In this Part, the Model Penal Code's
definition for recklessly will be employed in order to illustrate the
mens rea for implied malice murder.12 A person acts recklessly
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk to
life, and thus demonstrates extreme indifference to the value of life. 3
2. Three elements of second-degree murder
under an implied malice theory
As stated above, a defendant is guilty of murder if he acts
recklessly and causes a death, even if he does not have an intent to
kill. 14 Practitioners and jurors should think of this type of murder as
requiring the following three elements: (1) An act that is dangerous
to life; (2) The defendant is aware of an unjustifiable risk; and (3)
The defendant acts anyway, showing a conscious disregard for the
unjustifiable risk.' 5 These elements of implied malice murder must
be shown in order to hold a defendant liable for an involuntary
killing.
16
9. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 586, 414 P.2d 353, 359, 51
Cal. Rptr. 225, 231 (1966), overruled on other grounds by, People v. Flood, 18
Cal. 4th 470, 957 P.2d 869, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 180 (1998).
10. 30 Cal. 3d 290, 300, 637 P.2d 279, 285, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43, 49 (1981).
11. See id.
12. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1999).
13. Seeid.
14. See generally 1 WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 1, §
195.
15. See id.
16. See id. § 195 (describing the many different ways that California case
law has attempted to define this unintentional murder under the depraved heart
murder theory).
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a. elements of implied malice murder in application
i. act dangerous to life
People v. Nieto Benitez posed the question of whether the act of
brandishing a firearm is sufficiently dangerous to life to support a
conviction under the implied malice murder theory. 17 The defendant
was charged with second-degree murder after he fatally shot a man
who spilled food on his shirt and then refused to clean it.'8 The court
instructed the jury to find malice based on the defendant's intentional
brandishing of a firearm-an intentional act dangerous to human life.
The defendant was then convicted under the implied malice murder
theory. 19
In Nieto Benitez, the court used California jury instruction 8.31
to instruct the jury on what constitutes second-degree murder under
an implied malice murder theory.20 The court instructed the jury that
the term "intentional act" should be construed in accordance with
everyday language, and that "act" refers to an act from which death
results.2 1 Such an act could be pulling a handgun in a particular
manner, shooting a gun, or similar acts because it is common
22knowledge that guns are dangerous. 22 Furthermore, all of the events
leading up to the death in this case-the dispute, the threats, and the
retrieval of extra ammunition--"justifiably could lead a jury to reach
17. 4 Cal. 4th 91, 840 P.2d 969, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (1992).
18. See id. at 97-98, 840 P.2d at 971-72, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866.
19. See id. at 96-97, 840 P.2d at 970-71, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865.
20. See id. at 113, 840 P.2d at 892, 13 Cal. Rptr., 2d at 877 (Mosk, J.,
concurring). CALJIC No. 8.31 reads:
Murder of the second degree is [also] the unlawful killing of a human
being when: 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, 2. The
natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and 3.
The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to,
and with conscious disregard for, human life.
When the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not necessary
to prove that the defendant intended that the act would result in the
death of a human being.
California Court Jury Instructions no. 8.31 (6th ed. 1996) [hereinafter
CALJIC].
21. See Nieto Benitez, 4 Cal. 4th at 111, 840 P.2d at 981, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
876.
22. See id. at 113, 840 P.2d at 982, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
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a verdict different from one which might be reached in a case
involving an accidental shooting during a friendly hunt for wild
game."23 Therefore, the defendant's brandishing of the firearm in a
dangerous manner was sufficient to satisfy the dangerous-to-life
requirement of second-degree murder under an implied malice
theory.24
Currently, a new instruction is given in the context of implied
malice with respect to surgical procedures. For example, in People
v. Brown, the defendant surgeon was convicted of second-degree
murder under an implied malice murder theory.25 There, the victim
suffered from apotemnophilia.26 The victim learned of the defendant
through a newspaper article about transsexual surgery and believed
the surgeon might be willing to amputate his leg.27 The defendant
did indeed remove the seventy-nine-year-old victim's leg.28 Earlier,
the victim had told the surgeon that he suffered from a heart
condition.29  The surgeon completed the surgery despite his
23. Id. at 108, 840 P.2d at 978, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 873.
24. See id. at 113-14, 840 P.2d at 982-83, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877-78
(Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Mosk's concurring opinion illustrates the
confusion in describing this category of acts, and explains the legislature's
intended definition:
In 1983 the Legislature adopted the "high probability of death/natural
consequences" standard this court set forth in Watson for implied
malice. Therefore, even if I agreed with amicus curiae the State
Public Defender that the "high probability of death" language requires
a graver act than the "natural consequences dangerous to life"
language, and believed that the Legislature's original "abandoned and
malignant heart" formulation also set a high standard for the necessary
physical act, my view would be purely academic, for the Legislature
has decided that the two phrases are synonymous.
Id.
Therefore, the current version of the instruction and the 1983 version articulate
the same standard, but the current version is in more straightforward terms.
See id. The court urged the trial courts to adopt the clearest language
describing the requirements of implied malice-i.e., the Watson court's
formulation that the act must have carried a "high probability that death would
result." Id.
2691 Cal. App. 4th 256, 259, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 881 (2001).
26. See id. Apotemnophilia is the desire to have a limb amputated.
Surgeons in the United States will not amputate the limbs of apotemnophiliacs.
See id.
27. See id. at 260, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881.
28. See id. at 260, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882.
29. See id. at 260, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881.
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awareness of the unjustifiable risk to the victim's health.30 That risk
was unjustified not only because the surgery was unnecessary, but
also because the defendant's act was dangerous to life since he was
aware of the victim's heart condition. The victim developed
gangrene and died two days after the surgery.
3 1
The defendant in Brown argued that the current jury instruction
on implied malice was misleadin when applied to an implied malice
murder resulting from surgery. He further alleged that the jury
should have been provided with the 1983 version of the instruction,
which stated that the act must have been "done for a base, antisocial
purpose and with a wanton disregard for human life."3 3  His
reasoning was that there was evidence that all surgical procedures,
even the simplest, are potentially life-threatening.34 However, the
court rejected the argument that the inherent dangers of surgery
required the requested modification of the jury instruction.
35
Consequently, the court held that the trial judge did not err in giving
the current version of the instruction.36 Brown is also relevant to the
next section, which deals with awareness of unjustifiable risk.
Nevertheless, here, malice could be implied because the defendant
realized the unjustifiable risk of his actions, and acted in total
disregard of the danger to the victim's life.37 This case illuminates
the idea that there is a lot of conduct beyond brandishing weapons,
shooting guns, and fighting that is dangerous to life. Although failed
surgery normally does not trigger a murder prosecution, Brown
indicates that a surgeon who acts recklessly-with an extreme
indifference to human life-may be found guilty of murder under an
implied malice murder theory.
ii. awareness of unjustifiable risk
If a person is aware of and realizes the unjustifiable risk attached
to his conduct, yet acts in conscious disregard of the danger to life,
30. See id. at 260-61, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882.
31. See id. at 261, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882.
32. See id. at 268-69, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887-88.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 268, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 888.
35. See id. at 268-69, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 888.
36. See id. at 270, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 889.
37. See id. at 268, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887.
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his crime is murder under the implied malice murder theory.38 This
Section focuses on what is needed to show that the defendant was
aware of an unjustifiable risk. This awareness element requires
defendant's subjective understanding that his behavior is reckless or
dangerous to life.39 Subjective awareness, however, does not require
an understanding or knowledge that someone will die.
Unjustifiable risk is further defined in the Model Penal Code's
definition of the term "recklessly. ' 4° That definition of recklessness
is probably the best known and most widely accepted. Under the
Model Penal Code, the actor's risk is unjustified where, considering
the nature of the conduct and the circumstances known to the actor,
the actor's conduct demonstrates a gross deviation from the standard
that a law-abiding person would observe if placed in the same
situation.41 For example, a police officer who is driving at extremely
high speeds is taking a risk, but the risk is justified if he is speeding
in pursuit of someone who has committed a crime. On the other
hand, a civilian who is speeding because he is racing with his friends
is taking a risk that is unjustified. If that civilian were to cause death
due to his reckless driving, it is possible that he could be found guilty
of second-degree murder under the implied malice murder theory.
In People v. Watson, a drunk driver was convicted of murder.
42
The court found that the defendant was aware of danger to life
because he drove his car to a bar, knowing that he would be driving
later.43 This court also presumed that the defendant was aware of the
dangers of drunk driving.44 Therefore, even absent an intent to kill,
the defendant was held liable because he behaved recklessly under
circumstances which showed an extreme indifference to human life.
The awareness element is also applicable in cases where the
defendant is liable because of an omission to act. In People v.
Burden, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder after
38. See CALJIC, supra note 20, no. 8.51.
39. See generally, People v. Dellinger, 49 Cal. 3d 1212, 783 P.2d 200, 264
Cal. Rptr. 841 (1989) (discussing whether implied malice requires a finding of
the defendant's subjective awareness or appreciation of the life-threatening risk
created by his conduct).
40. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
41. See id.
42. 30 Cal. 2d 290, 637 P.2d 279, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1981).
43. See id.
44. See id.
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his five-month-old son died from malnutrition and dehydration.
45
The defendant was aware during the last two weeks of the child's life
that the child was starving to death.46 On appeal, the court affirmed
his second-degree murder conviction.47 "[T]he common law does
not distinguish between homicide by act and homicide by
omission.,,48 In Burden, the evidence demonstrated that the
defendant failed to feed the infant despite his awareness that the baby
was starving.49 Applying the subjective awareness element to this
case, a law-abiding person in the defendant's situation, aware that his
child was starving, would not take the unjustified risk of withholding
food from the child. The defendant was aware that his child could
starve or become extremely malnourished. His lack of concern
demonstrated recklessness and was substantial evidence of an
extreme indifference to human life, making him liable for second-
degree murder under an implied malice murder theory.
iii. conscious disregard of unjustifiable risk
The next two cases concern implied malice and intoxication.
Defendants who kill as a result of their intoxication act recklessly.
They exhibit an extreme indifference to human life, and thus can be
guilty of murder even though they do not possess an intent to kill.
In People v. Albright, the court convicted the defendant of
second-degree murder under an implied malice theory. 50 The court
reached that conclusion because the defendant operated a motor
vehicle after he had willfully consumed alcoholic beverages to the
point of intoxication in conscious disregard for the safety of others.
51
In Albright, the defendant drank at least eight beers before he
drove between 90 and 110 miles per hour down a street in a small
town.52  He entered an intersection and crashed into the victim,
45. 72 Cal. App. 3d 603, 606, 140 Cal. Rptr. 282, 283 (1977).
46. See id. at 609, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 284-85.
47. See id. at 621, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
48. Id. at 618, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 290-91.
49. See id. at 609, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 284-85.
50. 173 Cal. App. 3d 883, 884, 219 Cal. Rptr. 334, 335 (1985).
51. See id. at 886-87, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37.
52. See id. at 884, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
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killing him instantly.53 The defendant told police that "he had tried
to kill himself and had not meant to hurt anyone else."
54
Even though the defendant had no intent to kill, he could still be
convicted of second-degree murder under the implied malice murder
theory.55 The court focused on the conscious disregard element of
the crime. It stated that a defendant exhibits a conscious disregard of
the safety of others when he willfully drinks alcohol to the point of
intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must drive a car-thus
combining impaired physical and mental abilities with a "vehicle
capable of great force and speed .... ,56 The court concluded:
Intoxicated and possibly attempting suicide, defendant
bolted at about 100 miles per hour through a residential
area, passing three cars but smashing into the last.
Defendant knew other people were on the road, and must
have known of the high probability he would cause death if
he continued his conduct and hit another car. His gamble
that no one would enter his path killed a young man; it also
rendered him guilty of second degree murder.5 7
People v. Olivas is another example of a defendant acting with a
conscious disregard for life.58 The court convicted the defendant of
second-degree murder, without finding any intent to kill, where
defendant led police on a deadly high speed chase.59 The court
found that a vehicular homicide committed while intoxicated
involved implied malice. The court also found that such a vehicular
homicide was second-degree murder if a person knew that his act
endangered the life of another, yet acted with conscious disregard for
life.60 The defendant had consumed the drug PCP, which impaired
his physical and mental faculties.61 He drove at extremely high
speeds, creating an unjustifiable risk.62 His near misses with other
53. See id. at 885, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 886-87, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37.
56. Id. at 887, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37.
57. Id.
58. 172 Cal. App. 3d 984, Cal. Rptr. 567 (1985).
59. See id. at 986, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 568.
60. See id. at 987, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 569 (citing People v. Watson, 30 Cal.
3d 290, 637 P.2d 279, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1981)).
61. See id. at 986, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 568.
62. See id. at 989, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
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cars and his willful avoidance of pursuing police cars showed that he
was aware of this risk, yet he continued his reckless driving.63 It did
not matter whether the defendant took the PCP knowing that he
would later drive.64 What mattered was that at the time of the fatal
accident, the defendant acted purposefully with "conscious disregard
for a known, life-threatening risk.1
65
B. Provocative Act Murder Doctrine
"In a provocative act murder, neither the defendant nor the
defendant's accomplice kill or intend to kill."66 Instead, the killer is
a third party, and the victim is usually an accomplice or an innocent
bystander.67 Provocative act murder is a form of implied malice
murder, originally derived from the felony-murder rule.68 This type
of homicide follows logically after implied malice murder because
they share generally the same mens rea requirements. The difference
is that in provocative act murder, liability attaches because of a
particular causal pattern involving a defendant's action and a third
party reaction that kills the victim. Normally homicides falling
under this doctrine are murder in the second-degree under the
implied malice theory. However, in a few instances, the doctrine
operates within a different context analogous to that of first-degree
felony-murder.69
1. How provocative act murder doctrine is triggered
"Under the provocative act murder doctrine, the perpetrator [or
instigator] of a crime is held vicariously liable for the killing," absent
an intent to kill, when a third party kills the perpetrator's accomplice,
or target.70 Provocative act murder does not require that either the
defendant or his accomplices have an intent to kill.7' In fact, neither
63. See id.
64. See id. at 988, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
65. Id. at 989, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
66. 1 WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 1, §§ 192, 195.
67. See id.
68. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2003).
69. See infra note 100.
70. People v. Briscoe, 92 Cal. App. 4th 568, 581-83, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401,
411-14 (2001); People v. Aurelio, 167 Cal. App. 3d 52, 57, 212 Cal. Rptr. 868,
870 (1985).
71. See Aurelio, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 57, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
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the defendant nor his accomplice needs to pull the trigger.7 2 Rather,
to invoke the provocative act doctrine, a third party actually fires the
shot that results in the death of either the defendant's accomplice or
an innocent bystander.73
2. The requirements of provocative act murder
The provocative act murder doctrine requires the prosecution to
establish that the defendant committed a dangerous act (actus reus),
and that it was highly probable a third party would react in a life-
threatening manner (mens rea). Under the doctrine, actus reus
requires that the defendant or an accomplice "commit[s] an act which
provokes a third party into firing the fatal shot.",74 Furthermore,
mens rea is established where "the defendant or his [accomplice
knows] this act has a 'high probability' ... of eliciting a life
threatening response from the third party."'75 "[A] 'foreseeable
possibility' of eliciting a life-threatening response from a third party"
is not sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement.76 In addition,
the prosecution must establish that the defendant's conduct, rather
than the conduct of the third party who actually fired the fatal shot,
proximately caused the killing.77 The relevant California jury
instruction states:
[H]omicide committed during the commission of a crime by
a person who is not a perpetrator of such crime, in response
to an intentional provocative act by a perpetrator of the
crime other than the deceased [perpetrator], is considered in
law to be an unlawful killing by the surviving perpetrator[s]
of the crime.78 To qualify as a provocative act, the felon's
conduct must be sufficiently provocative of [a] lethal
response to support a finding of implied malice.79
In order to prove this crime, the California jury instructions
require proof of each of the following elements:
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See CALJIC, supra note 20, no. 8.12.
78. Id.
79. See id.
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1. The crime of - [or] attempted ] was
committed;
2. During the commission of the crime, a [surviving
perpetrator] [the defendant] also committed an intentional
provocative act;
3. [The victim of the . ] [a peace officer] [another
person not a perpetrator of the crime of] in response
to the provocative act, killed [a perpetrator of such crime]
[another person] [a fetus];
4. The [defendant's] [surviving perpetrator's] commission
of the intentional provocative act was a cause of death of
(name of the deceased). 0
Provocative act murder, therefore, is similar to second-degree
murder under an implied malice theory in that it requires a dangerous
act, performed with a conscious disregard for human life. The
difference is that the perpetrator of the intentionally provocative act
is liable for a killing even though a third party, rather than the
perpetrator, actually committed the killing.
3. Provocative act murder and the problem of causation
What makes provocative act murder so unique is that it is a
doctrine through which a defendant can be convicted of murder for a
killing that was actually committed by someone else. Usually in
provocative act murder cases, the liability attaches to an instigator
where a third party kills either the instigator's accomplice, target or
rival. Pizano v. Tulare County illustrates such a causal pattern.8'
In Pizano, two men forcefully entered a house shared by Vaca
and Coverdell. 2 The neighbors' children informed their parents that
two masked men had entered Vaca's house.8 3 The neighbor went to
Vaca's house, kicked the door halfway open, and saw the two men,
one of whom had a pistol.8 4 The co-defendant, Esquivel, mistook the
neighbor for a policeman, grabbed Vaca, and stated that he would
shoot Vaca if the police intervened. Pizano, the co-defendant, and
80. Id.
81. 21 Cal. 3d 128, 131, 577 P.2d 659, 661, 145 Cal. Rptr. 524, 526 (1978).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
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Vaca, then ran out of the house. Not realizing that Vaca was present,
the neighbor shot at the co-defendant because the police had not
arrived, and he thought that the defendants were robbing the house.
85
When the neighbor recognized Vaca and ceased fire, Vaca was
already mortally wounded by the neighbor's shot.86 Esquivel was
tried separately and found guilty of first-degree murder. The
prosecution successfully argued that liability should not depend on
the state of mind of the person firing "the fatal shot but on the
conduct of the defendant or his accomplice. 87
Although the court explained that the provocative act murder
doctrine is inapplicable to shield cases, Pizano is important because
it illustrates how the victim's death was proximately caused by the
defendant's provocative and reckless conduct rather than by the
robbery.88 Moreover, where the underlying crime, such as robbery,
does not involve an intent to kill, mere participation is not sufficient
to invoke murder liability.89 Therefore, according to the provocative
act murder doctrine, the provocative act must be greater than the act
that is necessary to perform the underlying crime.90
It is difficult to determine what is "greater than necessary."
91
"In every robbery the possibility exists that a victim will resist and
kill. 92 Once the robbery is in progress, the robber has little control
over such a killing.93  Thus, one can argue that imposing an
additional penalty for the killing improperly discriminates between
robbers solely on the basis of a victim's response to the robber's
conduct. 94 For a defendant's act to be sufficiently provocative for a
finding of implied malice, the defendant must have acted in
furtherance of an underlying crime that was dangerous to life and in
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 137, 577 P.2d at 664, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
88. See id. at 132, 577 P.2d at 661, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
89. See People v. Briscoe, 92 Cal. App. 4th 568, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401
(2001).
90. See id. at 582-83, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 412.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 583, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 413.
93. Id.
94. See id.
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a manner beyond that which is necessary to accomplish the
underlying offense.
95
However, in cases in which the underlying crime does not
involve an intent to kill, it is still difficult to determine what is
"greater than that necessary. ' '96  Through its decision of the
proximate cause requirement for provocative act murder, the court in
People v. Cervantes illustrates the difficulty in determining the
appropriate mens rea for the provocative act murder doctrine.97 In
essence, the defendant must commit an extremely reckless act, and
the act must actually cause others to respond in a deadly manner.
People v. Cervantes is distinguished from other provocative act
murder cases because in Cervantes, "the actual murderers were not
responding to the defendant's provocative act by shooting back at
him or an accomplice in the course of which someone was killed. 98
The murderers in Cervantes were not in the shoes of the police
officers in People v. Gilbert. There, the police officers responded
reasonably to the dilemma when they returned gunfire and killed the
defendant's accomplice. 99 Cervantes can be further distinguished
because (1) the defendant, Cervantes, was not the initial aggressor in
the original altercation, (2) the victim was not involved in the
original altercation, (3) there was no evidence that the "Alley Boys"
who killed the victim were present at the original altercation, and
(4) the defendant was not present when the victim was shot.'00 Thus,
95. See id. Provocative act murder requires implied malice. "Malice may
be implied if the defendant commits an act with a high probability that it will
result in death and does so with a base antisocial motive . . . . [T]he
defendant's conduct [must be] sufficiently provocative of a lethal response" for
the necessary implied malice to attach and therefore furnish a finding of guilt
on a murder charge. Id. (emphasis omitted).
96. Id.
99. 26 Cal. 4th 860, 862, 29 P.3d 225, 227, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148, 150
(2001). In this case, the defendant, a member of the Highland Street gang, shot
a member of the Alley Boys, who was trying to defuse an argument between
the defendant and another Alley Boys member. A short time passed and a
group of Alley Boys, in retaliation, shot and killed a member of the Highland
Street gang. The court found the defendant not guilty of the provocative act
murder of the member of his own gang.
98. Id. at 872-73, 29 P.3d at 234, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158.
99. See id. at 873, 29 P.3d at 234, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158 (citing People v.
Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 705, 408 P.2d 365, 374, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 918 (1965)
(alterations in original)).
100. See id. at 872, 29 P.3d at 233, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157.
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the court held that because the victim's murder by other parties was
not only felonious, but perpetrated with malice aforethought, and
directed at a victim who had no involvement in the original
altercation, the case lacked the necessary proximate causation to find
the defendant guilty of the murder of his fellow gang member.
10 '
Therefore, his mere verbal altercation with a rival gang member was
not sufficiently reckless, with respect to the likely responses of
others, to maintain that he proximately caused the death of his fellow
gang member.
4. When provocative act murder doctrine brings a
first-degree murder conviction
In People v. Briscoe, a jury used the provocative act murder
doctrine to convict the defendant of first-degree murder as opposed
to second-degree murder under the implied malice theory. 10 The
defendant, Briscoe, along with accomplice Pina, went to the victim's
home and knocked on the door.10 3 The frightened victim, Rozadilla,
armed herself with a gun)°4 When Rozadilla's boyfriend, Parovel,
returned, Pina and Briscoe told Parovel that they wanted to purchase
marijuana. Parovel hid the gun in his clothing. 10 6 As Parovel was
retrieving the marijuana, Pina pointed a semi-automatic pistol at
Parovel and demanded his gun from him. 10 7 Meanwhile, Briscoe
returned to the living room, held a .38-caliber handgun to Rozadilla's
neck and asked in a very loud voice, "Where's the gun, Bitch?"108 A
fierce struggle ensued between the three men, which eventually led
outside the house.'0 9 Briscoe gained control of the gun. Parovel
grabbed for the gun and it went off."0 Parovel feared for his own
life and started shooting."' Parovel shot Pina twice." 2 Parovel fled
to a neighbor's house to call the police."
3 Pina later died.14
101. See id. at 874, 29 P.3d 234, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2dat 158.
102. Briscoe, 92 Cal. App. 4th at 576, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407.
103. See id. at 577, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 408.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 578, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 408-09.
111. See id.
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Briscoe's murder charge alleged that Pina's murder was
committed during a robbery and burglary, and that Briscoe
personally used a firearm in the commission of all three offenses. It
did not matter that Briscoe did not actually fire the shot that killed
Pina because liability for Pina's death extended to Briscoe under the
provocative act murder doctrine. 115 The court explained that more
than one act may constitute the proximate cause of a killing.' 16 If
only one of the defendant's several acts provokes a deadly response,
then that is the act that constitutes the provocative act by which the
court finds liability.'17 "When the chain of causation is somewhat
attenuated, the jury decides whether [the defendant is liable for
murder] or not. 118 This fact scenario is similar to felony-murder
because a death occurred while defendant was committing an
enumerated felony. Instead, the defendant was convicted under the
provocative act murder doctrine because of the reckless indifference
he demonstrated during his participation in a felony that resulted in
death.
5. Second-degree murder conviction under provocative
act murder doctrine-in general
In People v. Aurelio, the court found the defendant guilty of
second-degree murder under a provocative act murder theory for the
death of his fellow gang member. 119 The defendant appealed his
conviction, based on the grounds that he did not intend to kill his
fellow gang member. The court rejected the defendant's argument
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 578-80, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 408-11.
116. See id. at 584, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 414.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. 167 Cal. App. 3d 52, 212, Cal. Rptr. 898 (1985). In this case, the
defendant was a member of a juvenile gang and was upset that the previous
week, another gang shot one of his fellow members. The defendant and four
other members decided to drive into the rival gang's territory and shoot a rival
member in revenge. As the defendant and his fellow gang members neared the
targeted area, they shot at a station wagon and the station wagon returned fire.
During the exchange, bullets from the defendant's car hit a residence whose
occupants were also members of the rival gang. The owner of the residence
shot back at the car and one of the defendant's fellow gang members was
fatally wounded.
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because the defendant and his fellow gang members committed a
murder that involved an intent to kill. 120 They drove into a rival
gang's territory for the specific purpose of shooting someone.
121
Therefore, the court did not question the defendant's liability for the
death of his fellow gang member-a death that resulted when the
defendant's plans misfired.122 The defendant's conduct qualified as a
provocative act because the act of discharging a weapon at someone
both provoked others to return gunfire, and resulted in the death of a
co-felon. 123 In other words, the defendant's conduct was sufficiently
reckless to support a finding of implied malice under the provocative
act murder doctrine because he performed an act dangerous to human
life, and he demonstrated extreme indifference to human life. His
conduct elicited a deadly response from a third party. Therefore,
even though the defendant did not intend to kill his fellow gang
member, he could be held liable for the victim's death by a third
party because defendant's reckless conduct caused the fatal response.
An alternative application of the provocative act murder doctrine
is found in People v. Shamis.124 This case is significant because it
does not involve fighting, a gun, or a police chase. In Shamis, the
court invoked the provocative act murder doctrine because someone
died as a result of the defendant entering into agreements to defraud
insurance companies by staging accidents involving automobiles and
big-rig trucks. 125 The court held that the evidence was sufficient to
support a finding that the defendant entered into a conspiracy to
commit insurance fraud, that the defendant committed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the victim's death was a
probable result of the common plan. 126
120. See id. at 60, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 872. In other words, they did not simply
enter a store and waive a gun hoping to simply rob and then leave without
firing a shot.
121. See id. at 60,212 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
122. See id. at 60-61, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73.
123. See id.
124. 58 Cal. App. 4th 833, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388 (1997).
125. See id. at 838-39, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390-91. Even though the
defendant did not intend to kill the victim, the defendant is liable for the acts of
her co-conspirators which follow "as a probable and natural consequence of
the common design, even though [they are] not intended as a part of the
original design or common plan." Id. at 843, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 393.
126. See id. at 843, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 393-94. The prosecution's evidence
showed that the collisions between cars and big-rigs were staged according to a
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In Shamis, the defendant's actions may seem too attenuated to
hold her liable for murder. However, the defendant was responsible
for the drivers' actions in driving onto the freeway and leading
another car to a position immediately in front of a big-rig truck.
127
The driver's pressing on the brakes in a life-endangering manner was
the provocative conduct which substantially contributed to the
victim's death.128 Although it was the driver's conduct that caused
the other driver to lose control of the vehicle, the defendant, in her
role as a co-conspirator in an insurance fraud scheme, is criminally
responsible for the actions of the drivers involved. 129  Having
instructed someone to stage an accident, she caused a third party to
react in a life-threatening manner. The defendant's conduct was
dangerous to life and it involved a conscious disregard for human
life. Her instigating conduct triggered a deadly accident, and
therefore, she may be held accountable for the killing.
C. Involuntary Manslaughter
A crime is committed when there is an act and an intent, or
criminal negligence. 13° A distinguishing factor between murder and
involuntary manslaughter is found in California jury instruction 8.51:
If a person causes another's death by doing an act or
engaging in conduct in a criminally negligent manner,
without realizing the risk involved, he is guilty of
involuntary manslaughter. If, on the other hand, the person
realized the risk and acted in total disregard of the danger to
life involved, malice is implied, and the crime is murder.
131
This section will discuss the requisite mens rea for involuntary
manslaughter' 32 and its development in California homicide law.
particular plan that the defendant had orchestrated even though she was not the
driver in either vehicle. See id. at 844, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394.
127. See id. at 846, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 396.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1999).
131. CALJIC, supra note 20, no. 8.51.
132. Id. at 8.52.
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1. How courts define involuntary manslaughter
California's Penal Code defines manslaughter as the unlawful
killing of a human being without malice.' 33  Involuntary
manslaughter, however, is a bit more complicated, and thus it is more
difficult to define. 134  Judges instruct California jurors that
involuntary manslaughter is an "unlawful killing without malice
aforethought and without an intent to kill.' 3  Specifically,
involuntary manslaughter occurs by the commission of an unlawful
act, not amounting to a felony; or in the "commission of a lawful act
which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due
caution and circumspection."' 136  "Without due caution and
circumspection"' 137  has the same meaning as "criminal
negligence."'
138
2. Civil vs. criminal negligence
A person is liable for negligent homicide where there is
"aggravated, culpable, gross or reckless negligence."' 39 Under the
Model Penal Code, "criminal homicide constitutes negligent
homicide when it is committed negligently.' 140  A person acts
negligently, with respect to homicide, when he should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk to human life. 14 1 The conduct of the
accused must be such a departure from the ordinary, prudent, or
careful man's conduct under the same circumstances that it shows
"disregard of human life or an indifference to consequences."'
142
133. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1999).
134. See Hobson, supra note 5, at 553. In his article, Hobson explains how
negligence is primarily analyzed for the purpose of defining civil negligence.
See id. at 529. He adds that it is more difficult to define criminal negligence
because such analysis requires a compromise. See id. at 553-54.
135. CALJIC, supra note 20, no. 8.45 (2002). Charles Hobson proposes that
the various forms of manslaughter in California should be retained because
there exist homicides that are less culpable than murder but that still require
punishment. See Hobson, supra note 5& at 527-28.
136. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (6 ed. West 1999).
137. CALJIC supra note 20, no. 8.46.
138. People v. Penny, 44 Cal. 2d 861, 869, 285 P.2d 926, 931 (1955)
(citations omitted).
139. See 26 AM. JUR. Homicide § 210 (1940).
140. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 (1980).
141. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985).
142. Id.
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Simple stupidity, irresponsibility, thoughtlessness, carelessness, or
lack of foreseeability, no matter how serious the consequences may
be, do not constitute criminal negligence143-this would simply be
civil negligence. In order to be found guilty, a defendant in an
involuntary manslaughter case must demonstrate gross/criminal
negligence. That is, the defendant must act in a manner contrary to
how a reasonable person would act in similar circumstances. There
is no subjective mental state required for a defendant to be guilty of
involuntary manslaughter. 144 The accused must be conscious of the
probable consequences of his act, and he must disregard the probable
consequences at the time of the act or omission.1
45
3. What the courts mean by their definitions
The definition of involuntary manslaughter is complicated and
can be confusing. A practical way to distinguish involuntary
manslaughter from other categories of homicide is to envision the
death as a result of a careless killing or due to gross/criminal
negligence. People v. Penny set forth the standard that is used in
California to define negligent homicide. 146 The prosecution must
establish (1) that the actor had knowledge, actual or imputed, that his
conduct would endanger life, and (2) that the consequences of the
negligent act were reasonably foreseeable.
147
In other words, a person may be held liable for involuntary
manslaughter after he acts carelessly by not perceiving a substantial
and unjustifiable risk. That is, the defendant should have been aware
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he took when he acted. A
reasonable person in a similar situation would have perceived the
risk and would have been more careful. 148
143. See People v. Wells, 66 N.Y.S.2d 161, 164 (1946).
144. See DOUGLAS DALTON, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw 5.07(E) (1995).
145. See generally id. (describing involuntary manslaughter).
146. Penny v. Penny, 44 Cal. 2d 861, 879-80, 285 P.2d 926, 937 (1955)
(reversing a conviction of involuntary manslaughter because the jury was not
properly instructed according to California Penal Code section 192 as to "what
constitutes criminal negligence, or the lack of due caution and
circumspection." (citing 26 AM. JuR. Homicide § 210 (1940)).
147. See 26 AM. JUR. Homicide § 210 (1940).
148. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985) (see Model Penal Code's
definition of "negligently").
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In People v. Rodriguez, the court reversed the defendant's
involuntary manslaughter conviction due to a lack of proof of
criminal negligence. 149 The prosecution failed to offer evidence that
the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that a fire would ignite
in her house and bum her toddler to death.150 The evidence showed,
at most, that the defendant was negligent. 15' Mere negligence,
however, is not enough to warrant an involuntary manslaughter
conviction. 152 There must be gross negligence, which involves a
gross deviation from the standard of care of a reasonable person in
the same or similar circumstances.
An omission to act may also constitute gross negligence and
warrant an involuntary manslaughter conviction. In People v.
Villalobos, the court explained that the defendant's lawful act of
bathing a child was performed in a grossly negligent manner.
153
Failure to use due care in the treatment of one's child is sufficient to
constitute involuntary manslaughter resulting from an act or
omission.
154
A person can also be convicted of involuntary manslaughter
where he unintentionally causes the death of his victim after
committing an assault and battery. 155 In People v. Morgan, one such
defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. 56 The court
found the defendant's intent immaterial, concluding that beyond any
149. People v. Rodriguez, 186 Cal. App. 2d 433, 8 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960).
150. See id. at 440, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
151. See id. at 441, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
152. See id.
153. 208 Cal. App. 2d 321, 325, 25 Cal. Rptr. 111, 114 (1962). In that case
the defendant placed her daughter in a washbasin with only hot water, added
some cold water from the kitchen, removed the child from the basin, and put
her in the shower where she discovered the child's wrinkled pinkish skin.
Knowing that the child's body parts were scorched by hot water, the defendant
put the child to bed. The defendant's sister returned to the house, heard the
child crying, discovered that the child's skin was peeling, and took the child to
the hospital. At the hospital the child was diagnosed with first and second-
degree bums. The child later died. See id. at 324, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
154. See id. at 328, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 115-16.
155. See People v. Morgan, 275 Cal. 2d 603, 608, 79 Cal. Rptr. 911, 914
(1969). In this case the defendant repeatedly hit his victim with his hands and
fists causing internal bleeding that eventually lead to the victim's death. See
id. at 605, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
156. See Morgan at 604, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
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reasonable doubt, the battery led to the victim's death.157  The
defendant could not offer a defense to the manslaughter charge
because there was no evidence showing that the defendant was
unconscious at the time of the beating.1
5 8
In a homicide case, a court must give an involuntary
manslaughter jury instruction if an intent to kill is absent. In People
v. Welch, the court reversed the defendant's conviction for voluntary
manslaughter because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on
involuntary manslaughter, and there was substantial evidence to
furnish a finding that the defendant did not intend to kill the
victim.
159
4. Evaluating criminal negligence objectively
Criminal negligence must be evaluated objectively. "[I]f a
reasonable person in the defendant's position would have been aware
of the risk involved, [courts and juries will presume that a defendant]
had such an awareness."' 160 Justice Holmes was a proponent of the
157. See id. at 608-09, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
158. See id. at 608, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
159. People v. Welch, 137 Cal. App. 3d 834, 840-41, 187 Cal. Rptr. 511,
514-15 (1982). In Welch, the defendant and the victim got into an altercation
at a bar and the victim told the defendant that he would take him outside and
"kick his ass." Id. at 837, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 513. The defendant suffered from
a life-threatening blood condition caused by an accident several years prior.
See id. at 837, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 512. The defendant testified that he was afraid
that he would die if the victim performed his threats. Therefore, the defendant
maintained that he acted in self-defense and was compelled by fear of great
bodily harm or death; not with an intent to kill the victim. See id. at 840, 187
Cal. Rptr. at 514. The court held that the defendant did not have an intent to
kill when he shot the victim and the victim was the aggressor at all times prior
to being shot by the defendant. The court further explained that a conviction
for involuntary manslaughter is appropriate where the jury finds that the nature
of the attack did not justify the resort to deadly force in self-defense or that the
force used in self-defense exceeded that which was reasonably necessary to
repel the attack. See id. at 838, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 513. The problem in this
case, however, was that the appropriate jury instruction was not given. See id.
at 841, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
160. People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290, 296, 637 P.2d 279, 283, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 43, 47 (1981) (citing Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal. 2d 226, 70 P.2d 183 (1931)
(emphasis in original)). Charles Hobson analyzes current jurisprudence on the
question of reasonableness:
The courts operate under the illusion that the primary difference
between implied malice and involuntary manslaughter is the
subjective standard of the former and the objective standard of the
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idea that negligence should be subjected to an objective standard.1
61
He said:
[T]he object of the law is to prevent human life from being
endangered or taken; and that, although it so far considers
blameworthiness in punishing as not to hold a man
responsible for consequences which no one, or only some
exceptional specialist, could have foreseen, still the reason
for this limitation is simply to make a rule which is not too
hard for the average member of the community. As the
purpose is to compel men to abstain from dangerous
conduct, and not merely to restrain them from evil
inclinations, the law requires them at their peril to know the
teachings of common experience, just as it requires them to
know the law.
162
This explanation, along with the involuntary manslaughter
category of homicide, is especially important because the law seeks
to prevent harm irrespective of any actual purpose to cause it. This
is illustrated in People v. Albritton.163 In Albritton, the victim died as
a result of the shaken baby syndrome after the defendant father
shook the infant victim.164 The court found that the defendant "did
not intend to kill [the child,] but [nevertheless] caused her death by
committing child abuse" in violation of California Penal Code
section 273(a), (b).165 The defendant was convicted of "one count of
latter. This simply cannot be. It ignores the fact that in most cases the
perpetrator will subjectively know what a reasonable person would
know .... The reports are full of involuntary manslaughter cases in
which there must have been a subjective appreciation of the risk. A
better way to differentiate between unintentional murder and negligent
manslaughter is the inherent risk of the conduct that caused the death.
Hobson, supra note 5, at 495.
161. See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALs 479 (Richard A. Epstein et al.
eds., 5th ed. 1989).
162. Id. at 480.
163. 67 Cal. App. 4th 647, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169 (1998).
164. See id. at 656, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174-75.
165 California Penal Code section 273(a), (b) states: "Any person who, having
the care or custody of a child who is under eight years of age, assaults the child
by means of force that to a reasonable person would be likely to produce great
bodily injury, resulting in the child's death, shall be punished...." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 273(b) (West 1999).
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involuntary manslaughter... and one count of assault on a child
with force likely to produce great bodily injury resulting in death.' 66
The prosecution's only burden was to establish that a reasonable
person, in the defendant's situation, would know that the force used
on the baby was likely to cause great bodily injury. "[The victim in
this case] had retinal hemorrhages and severe brain swelling [which
are signs] common in babies who have been shaken."'167 The
defendant maintained that he was simply trying to shake her so that
she would start crying because she had been unconscious after she
fell off the bed.' 68 Because he was in a state of panic, he could not
remember how hard he shook the child.' 69 However, to convict a
defendant of involuntary manslaughter, the jury has to determine
only that a reasonable person would believe that the force was likely
to result in great bodily injury. 7° In Albritton, the killing was in the
commission of the unlawful act of child abuse, under circumstances
that were dangerous to human life. Thus, the defendant could be
found guilty of involuntary manslaughter and child abuse, regardless
of his intent or lack thereof.17 1  Because substantial evidence
supported both the involuntary manslaughter charge, and the child
abuse charge, there was no inconsistency in rendering the two
verdicts.1
72
Likewise, a mother's failure to act in an objectively reasonable
manner in caring for her child led to an involuntary manslaughter
prosecution in Walker v. Superior Court of Sacramento County.'
73
There, the defendant did not physically apply force to the child, but
she exposed the child to harm by neglecting to seek necessary
medical treatment for her child's flu-like symptoms. Walker moved
to dismiss the prosecution because of her belief that healing through
prayer was the appropriate treatment for her child.174 Her motion
166. Albritton, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 651, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171.
167. Id. at 652, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172.
168. See id. at 653, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 655, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174.
171. See id. at 651, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171.
172. See id. at 656, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174.
173. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988).
174. Samuel H. Pillsbury highlights this case in his book entitled Judging
Evil: Rethinking the Law ofMurder and Manslaughter. He states:
"To most in contemporary America, Ms. Walker's belief that disease
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was unsuccessful. The child died from meningitis because the
mother, a member of the Church of Christian Science, chose to treat
the child's illness with prayer instead of appropriate medical
treatment. 7
"The relevant inquiry... turned not on the defendant's
subjective intent to heal her daughter but on the objective
reasonableness of her course of conduct."'176 In Walker's defense,
she summoned an accredited Christian Scientist prayer practitioner to
supervise her child's condition.177 In a pretrial review of Walker's
charge, the California Supreme Court rejected Walker's defense of
good motive and allowed for the involuntary manslaughter
prosecution to continue. The court held that the defendant exercised
extreme carelessness when she failed to take the child to a doctor.
Thus, the defendant exposed herself to prosecution for involuntary
manslaughter. 1
7 8
Walker is distinguishable from Rodriguez, where the court
reversed an involuntary manslaughter conviction of a woman who
left her children in a home that subsequently caught fire, killing one
[should be] treated by prayer and not medicine is crazy... If we were
to take a utilitarian approach to punishment, the case is a fairly simple
one. Parents like Walker may be strongly encouraged to seek medical
treatment for children by the threat of punishment." Pillsbury then
questions the deserved punishment for homicide and asks if Walker's
failure to seek medical attention demonstrated a "moral indifference"
to her child. Pillsbury sees this as a "case of tragically misguided
concern rather than of culpable indifference." SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY,
JUDGING EvIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND
MANSLAUGHTER, 186-87 (1998). Pillsbury proposed a reform to the
definition of involuntary manslaughter based on an indifference
approach to culpability-he suggests:
Involuntary manslaughter should be defined as follows:
A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter who causes
the death of another by the disregard of a substantial,
unjustified, and reasonably apparent risk to human life, under
circumstances that demonstrate a basic lack of concern for the
welfare of others.
Id. at 184.
175. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 119, 763 P.2d at 855, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
176. Id. at 137, 763 P.2d at 868, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
177. See id. at 119, 763 P.2d at 855. 253 Cal. Rptr. at 4
178. See id.
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child. 7 9 In Rodriguez, the mother's conduct was not sufficiently
careless to warrant a finding of criminal or gross negligence. 180 In
contrast, the mother in Walker failed to seek medical attention for her
daughter, who had been ill throughout a seventeen-day period. 181 In
terms of unreasonableness, the court found that her action was
"plainly more egregious than the decision of Mrs. Rodriguez to leave
her children alone at home for an afternoon."'
82
5. The "should be aware" element of involuntary
manslaughter
As discussed previously, more than ordinary negligence is
necessary to satisfy the requirements of involuntary manslaughter.
An act constitutes criminal negligence if a prudent man would
foresee that the act would cause a high risk of death or great bodily
harm. 83 This is a hotly contested issue in nearly all negligence
cases. Therefore, it is important to consider whether a person should
either be aware of an unjustifiable risk, or should have knowledge of
that risk.
184
In People v. Oliver, the prosecution established that the
defendant had knowledge of an unjustifiable risk of harm to the
defendant, and the court consequently convicted her of involuntary
manslaughter. 185 The sequence of events is of particular importance.
The defendant, Oliver, became friendly with the victim at a bar.
186
They both went to the defendant's house, where the victim injected
himself with heroin in the defendant's bathroom. 187 After the victim
collapsed on the defendant's floor, the defendant instructed her
daughter to drag the victim outside, where he was found dead the
next day.188 At trial, the evidence showed: (1) that the defendant
179. See People v. Rodriguez, 186 Cal. App. 2d 433, 441, 8 Cal. Rptr. 863,
868-69 (1960).
180. See id.
181. See Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 138, 763 P.2d 852 at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at
18.
182. Id.
183. See Rodriguez, 186 Cal. App. 2d at 440, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
184. See id. at 440-41, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69.
185. 210 Cal. App. 3d 138, 258 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1989).
186. See id. at 143, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
187. Seeid.
188. See id. at 144, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
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knew that the victim requested a spoon in order to shoot-up heroine,
(2) that the defendant gave the victim a spoon, (3) that the victim
injected heroin into his arm, and (4) that the victim fell unconscious
and collapsed.' 8 9 As a result, the court determined that there was
sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant intended to
facilitate the victim's drug use. 1
90
Determining whether the defendant's failure to call for medical
help rose to criminal or gross negligence required the court to
consider whether a reasonable person, in the defendant's
circumstances, would have reasonably known that the victim was in
danger of death or great bodily harm.191  Furthermore, the
circumstances that the court may consider include-but are not
limited to-the intoxicated state of the victim due to his alcohol
intake, and his apparent state of sleep. Ultimately, the defendant's
knowledge of the victim's intoxicated state, combined with the
defendant's failure to aid the victim, amounted to gross negligence,
and subjected the defendant to liability for the victim's death.
6. A nuance--"fist blow" cases and involuntary manslaughter
Mens rea and criminal intent play an interesting role in cases
where a moderate fist blow causes an unforeseeable death. A
common factual scenario involving fatalities from ordinary fist blows
raises significant issues about this doctrine.
In People v. Cox, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the
defendant's involuntary manslaughter conviction for a death that he
caused as a result of a battery. 192 The defendant struck the victim's
head after a confrontation regarding the defendant's ex-girlfriend,
who was the victim's girlfriend at the time.' 93 Shortly after the
confrontation, the victim's girlfriend walked the victim to his
motel. 194 The victim was unable to speak clearly. 95 The girlfriend
asked the victim if he wanted her to call 9-1-1. He declined her
189. See id. at 143, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
190. See id. at 152-53, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
191. See id. Footnote 4 further discusses the requirements of the knowledge
element of criminal negligence.
192. 63 Cal. App. 4th 974, 976, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 14 (1998).
193. See id. at 977, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.
194. See id.
195. See id.
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offer, went to sleep, and eventually died. 196  The defendant's
conviction for involuntary manslaughter was upheld after the Court
of Appeal determined that the trial court committed harmless error
when it provided the jury with an improper instruction. 197 The court
instructed the jury that for purposes of involuntary manslaughter,
battery is an inherently dangerous misdemeanor. 198  Because the
defendant committed the battery with criminal intent instead of
criminal negligence, the "dangerousness of the unlawful act [e.g.,
battery] is irrelevant."' 199 Furthermore, the court found that it is
sufficient that the offense is dangerous under the circumstances of its
commission.
200
196. See id.
197. "The trial court instructed the jury that the killing was unlawful if it
occurred 'during the commission of a misdemeanor which is inherently
dangerous to human life, namely, the offense of Battery....' Id. at 978, 75
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14. Appellant correctly argued that this was an incorrect
statement of the law because battery is not an inherently dangerous offense.
See id. Nevertheless, "it is almost universally held.., that one is guilty of
involuntary manslaughter who intentionally inflicts bodily harm upon another
person, as by a moderate blow with his fist, thereby causing an unintended and
unforeseeable death to the victim (who, unknown to his attacker, may have a
weak heart of a thin skull or a blood deficiency)." Id. at 978-79, 75 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 15. (quoting 2 LAFAVE & ScoTrr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §
7.13(d) (1986).).
198. See id at 978-79, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15. In People v. Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d
167, 173, 302 P.2d 5, 9 (1956), the court summarized its analysis by stating,
"to be an unlawful act within the meaning of section 192, therefore, the act in
question must be dangerous to human life or safety and meet the conditions of
section 20." This statement has sufficiently confused involuntary
manslaughter law. Courts have interpreted the Stuart case as adding a
"dangerousness" requirement to the underlying unlawful act. See id. at 979, 75
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15, 1998 Cal. App. LEXIS 408.
199. Id. "It has been repeatedly held that where a person, in committing an
assault and battery ... unintentionally causes the death of his victim, the crime
is [involuntary] manslaughter." Id. This determination does not depend on
finding that the battery underlying involuntary manslaughter charge is
dangerous. See id.
200. See id.
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V. CAUSATION IN CALIFORNIA HOMICIDE*
Causation may be defined as "the logical coming together of the
mens rea and actus reus, resulting in a criminal wrong."' Death
must be the logical result of both the intention and action in order for
criminal liability to attach.2 Other elements of the crime of homicide
change depending on which level of homicide the defendant is
charged with. The element of causation, however, does not change.3
Similar to tort law, causation in criminal law is divided into two
separate elements: (1) causation-in-fact (also referred to as but-for
causation or factual cause); and (2) proximate causation (also defined
as legal cause). 4 Causation-in-fact is satisfied if the result would not
have occurred without the conduct in question. In other words, "but
for the conduct the result would not have occurred.",5 The doctrine
of "but-for" causation, however, is not a common focus in homicide
cases where causation is at issue.
6
Proximate causation, on the other hand, is usually at issue if the
element of causation is relevant in a case. This Part will focus
primarily on different proximate cause doctrines, and it will provide
detailed examples of California jurisprudence in these areas.
Proximate cause is defined differently depending on the
circumstances. Because criminal codes rarely define proximate
* Laura Schiesl Goodwin: J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Loyola Law
School; B.A. Honors History, University of California, San Diego. This piece
is specially dedicated to Travis Goodwin for his unconditional love and
support, to my parents Sharon and Martin Schiesl for teaching by example and
for making my dreams possible, and to my angel, Aunt Penny.
1. PAUL E. Dow, CRIMINAL LAW 30 (1985).
2. See id.
3. People v. Harrison, 176 Cal. App 2d. 330, 334, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414, 417.
4. See Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88
CAL. L. REV 827, 831 (2000).
5. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: CASES
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 215 (1978).
6. JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS IN CRIMINAL LAW
293(4th ed. 2000) ("Surely the notion of but-for causation is ridiculously wide,
because it takes us back to Adam and Eve. The criminal's mother is a but-for
causation of his crimes, and so is his grandmother, and all his ancestry to
infinity." (quoting GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW,
379-81 (1983))).
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cause, the law surrounding proximate cause is largely defined by
case law.7 Case law commonly defines proximate cause in terms of
remoteness (closeness in time and space), forseeability, and
substantiality of causal contribution.8  Ultimately, in order for
proximate cause to be satisfied, the harm to the victim must be a
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's act.
Proximate cause, however, is typically subdivided into more
discrete categories. Although some courts discuss these categories
simultaneously,9 this Part divides the different components of
proximate cause into the following categories: (1) concurrent
causation; (2) preexisting condition of the victim; (3) the intervening
act doctrine; and (4) the felony-murder doctrine.
The discussion of concurrent causation addresses the different
situations where the doctrine is most commonly applied-when a
third party or the victim acts simultaneously with the defendant to
cause the death of the victim. 10 This Section illustrates the important
purpose of concurrent causation through a case analysis.
The discussion of a preexisting condition focuses on the fact that
in California, a defendant is commonly held criminally liable in spite
of the victim's preexisting condition. This Section also explores
examples where the victim's preexisting condition plays an
important role in determining the causation issue.
The most comprehensive issue in the causation analysis is the
intervening act doctrine. Some theorists argue that the intervening
act doctrine should constitute the entire discussion of proximate
cause." Because most of the case law that involves issues of
causation focuses on the intervening act doctrine, 12 this Section
further narrows the intervening act doctrine into more discreet sub-
categories. The focus of this Section is on intervening acts by both
the victim and third parties. Although some intervening acts are
foreseeable-dependent intervening acts-and do not break the
causal chain between the defendant's act and the victim's death,
7. LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 215-16.
8. See Moore, supra note 4, at 831.
9. Because courts tend to overlap these categories, some cases fall under
more than one category and are addressed accordingly.
10. See CALJIC 3.41 (6th ed. 1996).
11. See Moore, supra note 4, at 831.
12. See PETER SEAGO, CRiMINAL LAW 47 (2d ed. 1985).
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others are independent and superceding acts that break the chain of
causation and free the defendant of liability.' 3 Each type of
intervening act is addressed separately for a better understanding of
the court's analysis under the intervening act doctrine.
Finally, this causation discussion addresses the impact of the
felony-murder doctrine on the proximate cause analysis. It explains
both the wide reach of the felony-murder rule, and its limitations.
This Part provides examples where the felony-murder rule is not
applicable, yet the defendant is found guilty of the homicide under
another proximate cause doctrine.
A. Proximate Cause
1. Concurrent causation
The doctrine of concurrent causation addresses situations where
there may be more than one cause for the homicide. 14 If the conduct
of more than one person contributes to the cause of death, each
person may be guilty of the homicide if their individual conduct was
a substantial factor in the death.15 Even if there is only one cause of
13. See People v. Schmies, 44 Cal. App. 4th 38, 49, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185,
192 (1996).
14. The following is a good example of a garden variety concurrent cause
case: a victim dies from the loss of blood when shot by three defendants who
each individually fired a shot at the victim. The three defendants may be
criminally liable in each of the following situations: (1) all three wounds were
jointly sufficient because no individual wound was sufficient; (2) no individual
wound was necessary because each wound was sufficient to cause death by
itself (but the three were jointly necessary); or, (3) no wound was individually
sufficient, but any two of the wounds were jointly sufficient. See Moore,
supra note 4, at 860. This scenario is similar in nature to People v. Lewis, 124
Cal. 551, 57 P. 470 (1899), where the victim's death resulted from the
excessive bleeding of two different wounds. There can be more than one legal
cause. For example, if X dies from a combined attack from both A and B, both
men could be charged with homicide. If X's wounds, however, were not
mortal and B's acts were totally unforseeable, A's actions are a factual cause
of the actus reus of the crime, but only B will be held liable for the death; A is
not the legal cause and A did not proximately cause the death. See also PETER
SEAGO, CRIMINAL LAw 46-47 (2d ed. 1985).
15. California jury instructions also emphasize that there may be more than
one cause for a crime. The instructions explain concurrent cause to mean the
following: "When the conduct of two or more persons contributes concurrently
as a cause.., the conduct of each [person] is a cause.., if that conduct was
also a substantial factor contributing to the result." CALJIC 3.41; see, e.g.,
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the homicide, as is common in single-fatal-bullet cases, a defendant
may be held liable for a victim's death if the defendant's conduct
was a substantial factor in the cause of the death.
16
Moreover, a defendant may be guilty of a homicide even if a
victim's actions contributed to the cause of death. 17 The reluctance
of the court to attribute any liability to the victim is pervasive
throughout the discussion of causation and is addressed further in the
proximate cause discussion.
18
If a third party's actions contribute to the victim's death, each
surviving party's conduct may be a substantial factor in causing the
death, and both may be held criminally liable. 19 If the victim's death
People v. Pock, 19 Cal. App 4th 1263, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 900 (1993) (upholding
a murder conviction even where the jury was unsure of which of the two
defendants actually fired the fatal shot).
16. See, e.g., People v. Sanchez, 26 Cal. 4th 834, 845, 29 P.3d 209, 216,
111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 129, 137 (2001). The defendant drove by a house of a rival
gang member and shots were exchanged, resulting in the killing of an innocent
bystander. Id. at 838, 29 P.3d at 211, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 131. The court found
that a single stray bullet was the actual cause of death, but could not establish
which gang member fired the fatal shot. Id. at 838, 29 P.3d at 211-12, 111 Cal.
Rptr. at 131. The court did not determine who actually shot the fatal round,
but found that defendant's "life-threatening deadly acts" against his rival gang
member were a "substantial concurrent, and hence proximate, cause" of the
victim's death; the court found both gang members concurrently criminally
responsible for first-degree murder. Id. at 848-49, 29 P.3d at 218, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 140.
17. See, e.g., Lewis, 124 Cal. at 554, 57 P. at 471. The victim, after being
shot by defendant, cut his own throat. The court found that when the victim
cut his own throat, he was also dying from the gunshot wound and "[d]rop by
drop the life current went out from both wounds, and at the very instant of
death the gunshot wound was contributing to the event." Id. at 559, 57 P. 470
at 473. For a further discussion of a victim's act to hasten his own death, see
infra Part.III.A.3.a.iii. See also, People v. Scola, 56 Cal. App. 3d 723, 728,
128 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480 (1976) (holding that the defendant's speeding was the
proximate cause in the victim's death, although the victim had pulled her car
out in front of the defendant); People v. Wattier, 51 Cal. App. 4th 948, 953, 59
Cal. Rptr. 2d 483, 486 (1996) (finding the victim's failure to use a seatbelt was
not a concurrent cause of death). In sum, California courts have not found a
victim's conduct that contributes to his death to be a substantial factor in
bringing about his death that breaks the causal chain and, therefore, have not
removed liability from the defendant.
18. This is evident in the discussion of victim suicide and victim's
contributory negligence. See infra Section A.3.a.iii.
19. See Lewis, 124 Cal. at 559, 57 P. at 473. The court reasoned that if a
third party other than the defendant had cut the victim's throat, instead of the
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is the result of both the defendant's conduct and another criminal act
by a third party or the victim, the court may still find the defendant's
action to be the substantial factor in the victim's death.2 ° If the other
criminal act, however, unrelated to the defendant's conduct, proves
to be the substantial factor in the victim's death, the defendant may
be absolved of liability for the homicide.21
Concurrent causation is an important consideration if there are
"simultaneously sufficient conditions" that have caused the death of
the victim.22  This causation doctrine is helpful under certain
conditions, but it only applies when a cause is "operative at the
moment of death and [if it] acted with another force to produce the
death., 23 To the extent that the contributing conduct of the victim or
third party occurs after the defendant's initial harmful conduct,
concurrent causation is no longer at issue and instead the intervening
act doctrine is applied. As a result, concurrent causation serves an
important but narrow purpose within the causation doctrine.
victim inflicting injury on himself, both the defendant and the third party may
have been held criminally liable. Id. The two parties would have acted
independently to contribute to the victim's death, and each could have been
found guilty of the homicide. Id.
20. See People v. Vernon, 89 Cal. App. 3d 853, 864, 152 Cal. Rptr. 765,
772 (1979) (Defendant severely beat victim during the course of a robbery.
Victim's death resulted from both the beating and by arson committed during
the robbery. Defendant's beating of the victim was sufficient to support a first-
degree murder conviction.). Id.
21. See Lewis, 124 Cal. at 557, 57 P. at 472 (citing State v. Scates, 50 N.C.
420). The victim's death resulted from both a blow to the head and severe
bums. The defendant admitted to the burning but not the head injury. The
lower court found that the burning was the primary cause of the death and
convicted the defendant. Id. The appellate court reversed, holding that
because the blow may have been the independent act of someone other than the
defendant and if the head injury hastened the death, it-and not the burning-
was the cause of death. Id. Although this case does support the proposition
that a third party acting independently of the defendant may be held liable for
the homicide, typically a third party's actions are treated as intervening acts
that may break the chain of causation and release the defendant from liability.
See infra A.3.b.i. However, if a defendant acts concurrently with a third party
to cause the victim's death, and it is not clear which of the two caused the
death, both will be found to be substantial factors that caused the death. Thus,
both will be held criminally liable. See Lewis, 124 Cal. at 559, 57 P. at 473.
22. KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 288.
23. People v. Sanchez, 26 Cal. 4th 834, 845, 29 P.3d 209, 216, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 129, 137 (2001).
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2. Preexisting condition of the victim
When a victim's preexisting condition is combined with the
defendant's harmful conduct and results in the victim's death, it is
likely the court finds the defendant responsible for the victim's
death.24 The courts do not recognize the severity of the preexisting
condition; instead, the courts focus on the defendant's conduct as the
proximate cause of the injury. 25 Even if the victim is on the verge of
death, the defendant is criminally responsible if he accelerates the
victim's death in any manner.26
If the victim's preexisting physical condition is not the only
substantial factor that brings about the death, then the defendant's
24. California jury instructions further articulate this concept. See CALJIC
8.58:
If a person unlawfully inflicts a physical injury upon another person
and that injury is a cause of the latter's death, that conduct constitutes
an unlawful homicide... even if:
1. The person injured had been already weakened by disease,
injury, physical condition or other cause; or
2. It is probable that a person in sound physical condition injured in
the same way would not have died from the injury; or
3. It is probable that the injury only hastened the death of the
injured person; or
4. The injured person would have died soon thereafter from another
cause or other causes.
See also People v. Moan 65 Cal. 532, 536, 4 P. 545, 548 (1884) (defendant
struck the victim in the head but argued that the victim's death was a result of
the victim's chronic alcoholism). The California Supreme Court found that
although the victim's alcoholism may have had an effect on the victim's
organs, the defendant accelerated the victim's death with the blows to the head,
and was therefore responsible for the homicide. See id. at 537, 4 P. at 548.
25. See id. at 536-37, 4 P. 548-49; see also People v. Stamp, 2 Cal. App.
3d 203, 208-09, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 601-02 (1969) (asserting that even though
the victim had a fatal heart disease, the defendants accelerated his death
because the robbery upset his system and caused his fatal seizure. This case
also falls within the purview of the felony-murder doctrine and will be
discussed. See infra Section A.4).
26. See Moan, 65 Cal. at 537, 4 P. at 548-49. If a patient is lying in the last
stages of consumption, with a tenure upon life that cannot possibly continue
for a day, it is homicide to administer a poison to him by which his life is
ended almost immediately."); see also People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 578-
79, 414 P.2d 353, 357-58, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229-30 (1966), overruled on
other grounds by People v. Flood, 18 Cal. 4th 470, 957 P.2d 869, 76 Cal. Rptr.
2d 180 (1998) (holding that the defendant who removed terminally ill patient
from the hospital shortened her life and hastened her death).
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ignorance of the victim's condition will not absolve the defendant
from criminal responsibility.27 The defendant escapes criminal
liability for the death only in the rare circumstance where the
victim's existing physical condition is found to be the only
substantial factor that brings about the death.28
Even in extreme situations that involve the preexisting condition
of the victim, prosecutors may charge the defendant with homicide
despite the unusual resulting death.29 Thus, even if the victim has a
very serious preexisting condition, if the defendant's actions hasten
the victim's death, it is likely that the defendant is found criminally
liable for the homicide.
3. The intervening cause doctrine
"Proximate cause is clearly established where the act is directly
connected with the injury, with no intervening force operating."
30
Even when there is an intervening cause, however, the defendant
may still be held criminally liable.31
"Intervening causes ... are typically described as either
'dependent' or 'independent."' 32 A dependent intervening cause is
one that is a natural and foreseeable result of the defendant's acts,
and will not absolve the defendant of criminal liability.33  An
independent intervening cause, on the other hand, will break the
causal chain between the defendant's act and the harm to the victim,
and it will not result in liability for the defendant.34 Much of the case
27. See Stamp, 2 Cal. App. 3d at 210, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
28. See B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW
ELEMENTS § 38 (2001) [hereinafter CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS] (defendant
not guilty of homicide when victim's death resulted from high blood pressure,
pneumonia and stroke and not from being shaken by defendant).
29. See generally, KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 296 (Los Angeles
prosecutors charged a rapist with murder in the death of a 79-year old victim
whose official cause of death was heart failure and pneumonia. The prosecutor
argued that the brutal rape robbed the victim of her "will to live" and the rape
hastened her death.).
30. CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS, § 127 (2000).
31. People v. Schmies, 44 Cal. App 4th 38, 48-49, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185,
191 (1996)
32. Id. at 49, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192.
33. Id.
34. See id.
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law concerning the issue of proximate causation includes analysis
under the intervening act doctrine.
It is important to emphasize, however, that "there is no bright
line demarcating a legally sufficient proximate cause from one that is
too remote., 35 The question of sufficient proximate cause is almost
always reserved for the jury. The exceptions occur in instances
where the cause of death is so unforeseeable that the court may
decide that no trier of fact could find the needed nexus between
defendant's conduct and the victim's death.
a. dependent intervening causes
If the intervening act or cause is reasonably foreseeable, it is not
a superceding act, and thus the act does not break the chain of
causation. The consequence of the intervening act does not need to
be a strong probability-the precise consequence does not have to be
foreseen. In some cases, it may be sufficient that "that the defendant
should have foreseen the possibility of some harm of the kind which
might result from his act.",
36
i. medical treatment as a dependent intervening act
Negligent medical treatment may constitute a dependent
intervening act.3" Generally, if the defendant wounds a victim in a
manner that is either very dangerous or "calculated to destroy life,"
the negligence, mistake, or lack of skill by a physician or surgeon
that contributes to the victim's death is not a defense to a charge of
homicide. 38 Mere negligence in the treating of the wound, even if it
is the sole cause of death, is not a defense because it is a foreseeable
intervening cause.39 The California Supreme Court has held that
even extreme gross negligence in the medical treatment of an
35. Id. at 48 n.5, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191 n.5 (quoting People v. Roberts, 2
Cal 4th 271, 826 P. 2d 274, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276 (1992)).
36. Id. at 50, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192 (quoting CAL. CRiM LAW ELEMENTS, §
132 (1988)).
37. California jury instructions provide a good overview of the impact of
negligent medical treatment on a homicide case. See CALJIC 8.57. If the
original injury was the cause of death, even if the immediate cause of death
was the medical treatment given to the victim, the defendant is not relieved of
responsibility for the death.
38. See People v. McGee, 31 Cal. 2d 229, 240, 187 P.2d 706, 712 (1947).
39. See id. at 240, 187 P.2d at 713.
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otherwise deadly wound inflicted by the defendant does not absolve
the defendant of criminal liability.
40
Medical professionals now receive protections that ensure that
their intervening acts are not superseding causes that absolve
defendants of liability for criminal conduct. After the California
Court of Appeal faced extreme difficulties trying to decide the
differences between common law death and brain death,4' California
adopted a "brain death statute' 42 that enables a physician to
pronounce a person dead if the physician determines that the person
has suffered "a total and irreversible cessation of brain function."
43
Consequently, the common law determination of brain death has
been effectively overruled. The statute reflects the policy that the
defendant's morally reprehensible behavior is the focal point.
Additionally, the statute gives physicians greater leniency with
decisions to perform transplant operations and to end life support
systems.44 A physician's actions, however, may be viewed as
40. See id. at 243, 187 P.2d at 714-15. After the defendant shot victim in
the abdomen, the victim was taken directly to the hospital but was neglected by
the treating surgeon for ten hours even though he was severely hemorrhaging.
Although the court found the surgeon's actions to be "grossly contrary to good
surgical practice," the delay in treatment was not a foreseeable intervening
cause. Id. at 243, 187 P.2d at 714; see also People v. Nerida, 29 Cal. App. 2d
11, 14-15, 83 P.2d 964, 965-66 (1938) (upholding a defendant's guilty verdict
of manslaughter for stabbing victim even though victim's immediate cause of
death resulted from surgical shock from a major abdominal operation).
41. See People v. Mitchell, 132 Cal. App. 3d 389, 396-97 n.4, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 166, 170 n.4 (1982) (discussing the conflicting results in People v. Flores
and People v. Lyons). (In Flores, after deceased suffered brain death, but
before common law death, the surgeons performed a heart transplant operation.
Because California did not have a statute defining death, the court held that the
surgeons may have caused the death and released defendant. In Lyons,
however, two days after victim suffered brain death as a result of a gunshot
wound, the doctors performed an unsuccessful transplant. After hearing expert
testimony regarding brain death, the trial judge ruled that the transplant was
not the cause of death because the victim was legally dead before the
transplant.). These conflicting opinions meant that depending on the definition
of death, one court would find the defendant guilty of murder and another
would find only the charge of attempted murder or a much lesser offense.
Following these conflicting cases, California enacted the brain death statute to
resolve this issue.
42. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 2003).
43. Mitchell, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 397, 183 Cal. Rptr. 166 at 170 (1982).
44. See id. at 398, 183 Cal. Rptr. At 171. The victim suffered from "near
drowning" and after 10 days of hospitalization was taken off artificial life
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independent intervening acts that mitigate the defendant's liability.45
Current case law dictates that in order for California courts to
consider medical treatment as an independent intervening act, the act
must be "grossly improper" and the "sole cause of death. 46 Other
jurisdictions have applied this criteria and found that grossly
negligent medical treatment may absolve the defendant of liability
for the death of the victim. 47  Nevertheless, in most situations,
negligent medical treatment is a foreseeable dependent intervening
act that does not break the causal chain between the defendant's
support because she suffered irreversible brain damage and was in a vegetative
state. See id. at 399, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 168-69. The court did not reach the
issue of causation because there was no reasonable doubt that the victim was
brain dead. See id. Note that the issue of denying life-saving treatment is also
relevant when the victim, because of her religious beliefs, refuses medical
treatment which results in her death. See R. v. Blane, [1975] 3 All E.R. 446.
For further discussion of this topic please see infra Section A.3.a.iii.
45. See id. at 397 n.5, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 171 n.5 (discussing In Re Benjamin
C. No. J914419 (L.A. Sup. Ct. 1979) (Although the three-year old victim was
hit by a car and suffered irreversible brain damage, his life expectancy on the
life support machine was one year, and without the machine, only minutes. The
controversy in the case arose over the definition within the brain death stature
of "total" cessation of brain function. The court found that the victim fit with
the brain death definition but expressed concern over the scope of the
definition.).
46. People v. Scott, 15 Cal. 4th 1188, 1215, 939 P.2d 354, 371, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 240, 257 (1997). Id. at 1199-00, 939 P. 2d at 360-61, 65 Cal. Rptr.
21 at 246-47. Defendant raped, beat and severely burned his victim who died
almost a year later. Although the pathologist testified that the death was a
result of the severe bums, the defendant argued that the victim's death resulted
from the negligent treatment of the treating physician, specifically pertaining to
the victim's two cardiac arrests. Id. at 1200, 939 P.2d at 361, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 247. Although the court found that the victim would have survived absent
the negligence of the physician, it did not find the ordinary negligence to be a
superseding cause. Id. at 1200, 939 P.2d at 361, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247.
California jury instructions, however, leave open this possibility. See CALJIC
8.57 (6th ed. 1996) ("Where, however, the original injury is not a cause of the
death and the death was caused by medical or surgical treatment or some other
cause, then the defendant is not guilty of an unlawful homicide.").
47. See People v. Calvaresi, 534 P.2d 316, 319 (Colo. 1975). A shooting
victim died after a doctor made the "questionable" decision to transfer the
patient to another hospital, and the victim died in route. Id. at 317. The court
held that the gross negligence of the doctor might negate the defendant's
liability, even if the negligence was not the sole cause of the victim's death.
Id. at 319. A search of California case law did not reveal that medical
treatment involving gross negligence that was not the sole cause of death could
relieve the defendant from liability.
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wrongful act and the victim's death. Such proximate cause
jurisprudence-which does not place blame on the medical
profession-reflects the broader public policy that blame must be
placed on the one who is most morally culpable of the crime.
ii. dependent intervening acts of third parties
Intervening acts of third parties can be dependent intervening
acts. If the harm that occurs is a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of the defendant's conduct at the time that the defendant acts, then
the third party's conduct does not break the chain of causation, and
thus, the defendant is found criminally responsible for the victim's
death.48 If the third party's actions are not extraordinarily negligent
and are a "'normal consequence of a situation created by the
[defendant],"' the third party's actions do not constitute a
superseding cause.49
In People v. Schmies, the defendant fled from an attempted
traffic stop and engaged in a high speed chase with the police.
5 0
During the chase, a police patrol car struck another car, killing its
passenger. 51 The officer's conduct was found to be a dependent
intervening act, and the defendant was held criminally liable for the
death of the victim.
52
Another example of a dependent intervening act occurs when a
third party takes sudden action in an effort to avoid the harmful
consequences of the defendant's actions.53 In People v. Gardner, the
48. See People v. Schmies, 44 Cal. App. 4th 38, 49, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185,
192 (1996).
49. See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 443).
50. See id. at 43, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 58, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 198. The court, in another case that
involved a high speed police chase, came to the same conclusion: "[I]t was
probable that his conduct of fleeing from the officer at great speeds along city
streets would result in a collision, either of his vehicle or that of the officer,
with a pedestrian or a third vehicle." People v. Harris, 52 Cal. App. 3d. 419,
426-27 n.2, 125 Cal. Rptr. 40, 45 n.2 (1975).
53. See People v. Harrison, 176 Cal. App 2d 330, 336, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414, 418
(1959). During the commission of an attempted robbery one of the robbery
victims accidentally shot and killed another innocent victim. The court found
that defendants were a proximate cause of the victim's death because the
intervening act of the other victim was a foreseeable dependent act. "If a
loaded weapon is pointed at another at close range it may be foreseeable that
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defendant fired at the victim as the victim ran away.54 A third party,
believing the shots were fired at him, returned fire and killed the
victim. 55 The defendant's shooting at the victim was found to be the
proximate cause of the murder because the defendant's act provoked
the gun battle. 56 In this type of situation the defendant may be the
proximate cause of the death, whether or not the victim was killed by
the defendant or the third party.
57
In Gardner, the court addressed the provocative act doctrine.
58
Provocative act murder applies to situations similar to Gardner,
where the defendant did not kill or have the intent to kill; instead, a
third party kills the victim in response to the defendant's initial act.59
According to the provocative act doctrine, the prosecution has the
burden to show both that the defendant "committed an 'intentional
provocative act' whose 'natural consequences are dangerous to
human life,"' and that the killing was "proximately caused by the
intentional and dangerous acts perpetrated by a defendant." 60  A
discussion of the provocative act doctrine is important because it
implies a degree of foreseeability. Standing alone, however, the
doctrine is insufficient to prove proximate cause.
The possibility remains that although the defendant initiates the
provocative act, the third party's actions are so remote that they are
unforeseeable, superceding events that break the causal chain. As
long as the intervening acts of a third party, however, are not
"disconnected and unforeseeable," they are dependent intervening
he may grab for it and perhaps cause a discharge in this way .... " Id. Under
the current California Penal Code, the defendant would not be convicted of
felony-murder because the felony-murder rule does not apply when a victim
causes the death of another victim. See discussion of infra Section A.4. A
defendant, however, could still be held criminally responsible for the homicide
under the theory of proximate cause-the victim's act was a foreseeable
intervening act that does not break the causal chain.
54. 37 Cal. App. 4th 473, 475, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 603, 605 (1995).
55. See id.
56. See id. at 482-83,43 Cal. Rptr 2d at 609-10.
57. See id. at 480, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 608.
58. The court in Gardner, found that the provocative act doctrine jury
instruction was appropriate because the defendant, by firing at the victim,
committed an "intentional provocative act." Id.
59. See F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATr, CRIMES OF VIOLENCE:
HOMICIDE AND ASSAULT § 598.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
60. Gardner, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 480, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 608.
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acts, and the defendant remains the proximate cause of the
homicide.6'
iii. dependent intervening acts of the victim
Negligence of the victim, even if a contributory cause of the
victim's death, does not relieve the defendant of any criminal
liability from the defendant.62 Generally, a defendant cannot
introduce the victim's negligence to negate the element of causation.
In People v. Morse, two police officers died while trying to disarm a
bomb constructed by the defendant. 63  The defendant wanted to
negate the element of causation by showing gross negligence or
reckless behavior on the part of the police officers.64 The court did
not allow this evidence because negligence of the victim is not a
defense.
65
Nevertheless, a defendant may introduce a victim's negligent
conduct in some circumstances. 66 In order to prove that the victim's
negligent conduct was a superceding cause, the victim's conduct
must have been "'highly extraordinary' under the circumstances."
67
61. Id. at 483,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610.
62. See CALJIC 8.56 (the defendant may not argue that the victim's "or
some other person's negligence was a contributory cause of the death involved
in the case"); see also People v. Armitage, 194 Cal. App. 3d 405, 411, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 515, 518 (1987) (defendant flipped his boat over and the victim
abandoned the boat and died while trying to swim to shore). The court found
that, even if victim's decision was reckless, it was a reasonably foreseeable
intervening cause and defendant was held criminally liable. See id. at 421, 239
Cal. Rptr. at 525.
63. 2 Cal. App. 4th 620, 631, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 346 (1992).
64. See id. at 637-39, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350-51.
65. See id. at 639, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 351.
66. See id. at 668, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371 (Johnson, J., concurring &
dissenting). "Numerous cases from California and other jurisdictions, as well
as respected commentators, have recognized the possibility of the victim's
intervening negligence affecting causation to such an extent the defendant is
relieved of liability." Id.
67. Id. It will be very difficult to establish that defendant's conduct was a
superseding cause. For an example of what may qualify, see Carbo v. State,
62 S.E. 140 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908) (defendant's criminal acts resulted in the
explosion of the building, victim was warned about the dangers of entering the
building, but entered anyway and was killed in a subsequent explosion). In
Carbo, the defendant's conviction for involuntary manslaughter was reversed.
Id. at 141. These facts may rise to the level of "highly extraordinary conduct,"
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As noted by the dissent in Morse, the inability of defendants to
present evidence of a victim's negligence effectively takes "the
determination of proximate cause away from the jury."68 In fact,
some have argued that it is prejudicial error to preclude evidence of
the victim's negligence. 69 Regardless, proximate cause is usually a
question decided beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact.
A victim's behavior is also particularly important when the
victim is deciding whether or not to receive life-sustaining treatment.
A victim's decision to refuse life support is a dependent intervening
act that does not break the causal chain between the defendant's
wrongful act and the victim's death. According to the California
Legislature, a person's choice not to prolong his life through
artificial life support is protected as a matter of public policy; the
right to control one's own medical care-including life-sustaining
procedures-is a fundamental right.7 °
In People v. Adams, the victim directed his physician not to
place him on life support because he preferred to die rather than be
kept alive only by a respirator. 71 The court found that the victim's
right to reject life-sustaining treatment is a fundamental
constitutional right.72 California courts view a victim's decision to
refuse such treatment as a foreseeable intervening cause that does not
break the chain of causation. 73  Thus, the victim's choice not to
but one cannot be sure because as of yet, California cases have not dealt with
gross negligence or recklessness of the victim.
68. 2 Cal. App. 4th at 671, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
69. The dissent in Morse makes this important point but it has yet to prove
as a useful tool in causation jurisprudence in California. See id. at 670, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 372. It may serve, however, as a convincing argument to allow
such evidence into trial. See id.
70. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 4650 (West Supp. 2003). The California
Legislature has also set forth procedures that enable an adult to execute written
directives for withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures. See id.
§ 4673 (West Supp. 2003).
71. 216 Cal. App. 3d 1431, 1436, 265 Cal. Rptr. 568,571 (1990).
72. See id. at 1438, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
73. See generally id. at 1431, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 568; People v. Saldana, 47
Cal. App. 3d 954, 121 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1975) (discussing how the removal of
victim from respirator which resulted in the ultimate death was not an
unforeseeable intervening cause of death). If the victim's death, however,
results from the refusal of necessary medical treatment, the result is not clear.
For example, if a Jehovah Witness, because of his religious beliefs, refuses all
medical treatment and death ensues, should his actions be seen as dependent
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prolong his life through artificial life support is not an independent
intervening act.
Similar to a victim's decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment,
a victim's decision to commit suicide may constitute a dependent
intervening act.74 If the defendant intentionally inflicted injury on
the victim, which resulted in the victim's impulse to commit suicide,
the defendant may be held responsible for the death.75
This Section has presented various situations where an
intervening act is seen as a dependent and foreseeable consequence
of the defendant's actions. In those cases, the causal chain is not
broken between the defendant's criminal conduct and the victim's
death, and thus the defendant may be held criminally liable.
intervening acts? See R v. Blaue, 3 All E.R. 446, 450 (1975) (defendant's
conviction was upheld where the victim was stabbed in the lung and because of
her religious beliefs refused to have a blood transfusion which resulted in her
death). The following rationale supports the court's conclusion that the
victim's refusal of medical treatment is not a superceding cause: if a victim is
unable to receive medical treatment, the defendant is guilty of the homicide.
The defendant should be equally guilty if the victim elects not to receive
medical assistance. See id.
74. See Adams, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 1440, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
75. See Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 915, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 40
(1960) (defendant's acts allegedly caused victim to become physically and
emotionally disturbed, and as a direct result the victim committed suicide).
The court found that the victim's suicide could be found as a direct result of
the defendant's actions; this foreseeable result would not be an independent
intervening act. See id. at 915, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 40. The court remanded and
gave the prosecution an opportunity to amend its complaint to include a cause
of action under the newly proposed rules on suicide. See id. at 918-19, 5 Cal.
Rptr. at 42. Because this was a case of first impression, however, it is unclear
whether the case has had any influence in subsequent rulings. The case
presents a unique fact pattern, but may be relevant as the issues of suicide-
specifically physician assisted suicide-remain a national focus. See also
Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 57 P. 470 (1899) (after defendant shot victim, victim then
slit his own throat). Although the Lewis court found the defendant guilty
because it reasoned that the gun shot was a substantial factor in the victim's
death, it also concluded that if the self-inflicted knife wound alone would have
been the cause of death, "no doubt the defendant would be responsible, if it
was made to appear, and the jury could have found from the evidence, that the
knife wound was caused by the wound inflicted by the defendant in the natural
course of events." Id. at 555, 57 P. at 472.
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b. intervening independent acts/superceding causes
An independent intervening act is so unforeseeable and
disconnected that it supercedes and breaks the causal chain between
defendant's wrongful conduct and the resulting death of the victim.
Where an independent, intervening act occurs, the defendant's act
will not be the proximate cause of the injury.
i. intervening independent acts by a third party
Intervening acts by a third party that are unforeseeable may
supercede and break the causal chain between the defendant's act
and the victim's death.76 Harm done to the victim after the
defendant's wrongful act may be seen as unforeseeable, and may
thus absolve the defendant of homicide liability. In People v.
Herbert, the decedent was struck by the defendant and fell from a bar
stool, striking his head on the floor.77 The victim later fell down in
the police station, again striking his head on the floor. The court
found that because either of the blows might have caused the death,
the second fall could be raised as an intervening cause in defense of a
homicide charge. The court reversed the defendant's conviction
because the jury was not properly instructed on this matter.
78
76. See People v. Cervantes, 26 Cal. 4th 860, 872, 29 P.3d 225, 233, 111
Cal. Rptr. 2d 148, 157 (2001) (court found that the provocative act doctrine
requires a finding of proximate cause). This case involved a revenge killing by
persons who were not responding to defendant's initial provocative act. See id.
at 874, 29 P.3d at 234-35, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159. Because the court found
the third parties acted with malice aforethought when they fired at the victim
instead of the defendant, the third party actions were unforeseeable
independent intervening acts that broke the chain of causation between
defendant's wrongful act and victim's death. See also BAILEY & ROTHBLATr,
supra note 59, at § 598.1. In Cervantes, the third party acts were themselves
"criminal [and] felonious" and "[e]ven if the murder was in direct response to
the defendant's act, no one forced the killers' response." Id.
77. 228 Cal. App. 2d 514, 515, 39 Cal. Rptr. 539, 540 (1964).
78. See id. at 521, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
[T]he fall in the police station could have been found to be an
extraordinary and abnormal occurrence, not reasonably foreseeable as
a result of the first injuries. The failure of the court to instruct that
defendant would have been responsible for the consequences of the
injuries received after [the victim] was taken from the barroom only if
further injury was reasonably to be anticipated, and the giving of
instructions that enabled the jury to hold him responsible for later
injuries even if the same were not reasonably foreseeable was
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ii. independent intervening acts by the victim
A victim's conduct may be so unforeseeable that it supercedes
and breaks the chain of causation. In People v. Roberts, a state
prison inmate was attacked and stabbed eleven times by the
defendant.79 In response to the stabbing, the inmate grabbed the
knife and pursued one of his assailants up the stairs where he fatally
stabbed a prison guard.80 The court found that the jury could have
enough evidence to find the defendant guilty of both deaths, but
ruled that the failure to instruct the jury on the issue of forseeability
was prejudicial error. 81 That decision suggests that a fact pattern as
obscure as Roberts may cause a jury to determine that a victim's act
is independent and not a foreseeable consequence of a defendant's
conduct.
82
The dearth of case law on independent intervening acts reveals
that courts are much more likely to find proximate cause. Many
times, proximate cause is attributed to public policy concerns. As a
result, courts do not take a definitive approach to the issue. It is fair
to speculate that unless the intervening cause is overwhelmingly
remote and unforeseeable, it is unlikely that the intervening cause
will overcome a proximate cause challenge.
prejudicial and reversible error.
Id.
79. 2 Cal. 4th 271, 295, 826 P. 2d 274, 284, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 286
(1992).
80. See id.
81. See id. at 321-22, 826 P. 2d at 301-02, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 303-04.
Although the court in Roberts did not explicitly address the provocative act
doctrine, it did emphasize that: "principles of proximate cause may sometimes
assign homicide liability when, foreseeable or not, the consequences of a
dangerous act directed at a second person cause an impulsive reaction that so
naturally leads to a third person's death that the evil actor is deemed worthy of
punishment." Id. at 317, 826 P. 2d at 298, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
82. A victim's grossly negligent acts that result in his death may be so
remote as to constitute a superceding cause. See People v. Taylor, 112 Cal.
App 3d 348, 362-66, 169 Cal. Rptr. 290, 298-300 (1980) (defendant furnished
victim heroin which resulted in the victim's death, but defendant offered
evidence that the victim intentionally caused his own death because he was
depressed and wanted to commit suicide) (overruled by an unpublished case).
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4. Felony-murder and causation
Under the felony-murder doctrine, a defendant may be
prosecuted for a homicide committed during the perpetration of a
felony.83  As a result, there is not necessarily a strict causal
relationship between the felony and the homicide. Even if the
felony-murder doctrine is not applicable,84 however, the defendant
may be found guilty of the homicide under other proximate cause
theories such as foreseeable dependent acts by a third party or the
victim. 85 In other words, liability may be found independent of the
felony-murder doctrine.
In People v. Harrison, the victim was shot during the
commission of a robbery by his fellow worker, a non-participant to
the robbery.86 The court found that the victim's shooting was the
natural result of the defendant's acts; therefore, the attempted
robbery was the proximate cause of the death.87
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003) ("All murder
which is... committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson,
rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, [or] train
wrecking... is murder of the first degree.")
84. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783, 402 P.2d 130,
134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965) (court held that a felony-murder conviction
is only proper if the defendant or his accomplice committed the killing while
furthering their common design).
85. See discussion supra Sections A.3.a.ii., A.3.a.iii. (intervening acts by a
third party or the victim are foreseeable and do not break the chain of causation
between the defendant's wrongful act and the victim's death).
86. 176 Cal. App. 2d 330, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1959).
87. See id. at 345, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
[W]here it reasonably might or should have been foreseen by the
accused that the commission of or the attempt to commit the
contemplated felony would be likely to create a situation which would
expose another to the danger of death at the hands of a non-participant
in the felony, the creation of such situation is the proximate cause of
the death; and that the killing is murder of the first degree ....
Id.
Although the situation in Harrison may have fallen under the felony-murder
doctrine (this case came before People v. Washington, which placed
restrictions on the doctrine, see discussion supra note 84), the court in
Harrison decided the case outside the scope of the felony-murder doctrine. But
see People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195
(1989). Defendant supplied cocaine to victim, who died as a result of ingesting
the cocaine. See id. at 618, 779 P.2d at 552, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 198. The court
remanded the case to the trial court to see if this offense was inherently
dangerous and opined that if the trial court found the offense not inherently
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Although the felony-murder doctrine is virtually comprehensive
and many times causation is not at issue, the doctrine has certain
limitations.8 8 If the homicide falls outside the scope of the felony-
murder doctrine, the homicide may be a foreseeable result of the
defendant's act and the defendant will be liable for the homicide.
89
Thus, the application of the felony-murder doctrine virtually
eliminates the causation element, but the doctrine's limited reach
illustrates the importance of the intervening act doctrine within the
proximate cause analysis.
As evidenced throughout the discussion, causation plays an
important role in California homicide law. Although many times it is
not a central issue in the case, it still may have an important impact
on the final outcome. The examples and explanations of current
causation law in California provide tools to approach any causation
issue in a homicide case. Of course, this is only the starting point in
the analysis. The discussions of the case law within each area
provide a better understanding of the development of causation in
California homicide law. If the number of homicides continues to
increase in California, the issue of causation may become even more
important to homicide case law.
90
dangerous, dismissing the murder conviction would be justified. See id. at
625, 779 P.2d at 557, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 203. Although the court did not
specifically discuss proximate cause, it also appears that the defendant could
not be found guilty for the homicide under a proximate cause theory; the
victim's act of ingesting the cocaine was not foreseeable and it therefore
superceded and broke the causal chain between defendant's act of providing
the cocaine and victim's death.
88. See discussion of People v. Washington, supra note 84.
89. See discussion of People v. Harrison, supra note 87. If the intervening
act is foreseeable, it is a dependent intervening act, and defendant may be held
responsible for the homicide regardless of the impact of the felony-murder
doctrine.
90. "The number of homicides reported for the first six months of 2002
increased 16.0 percent compared to the same period in 2001." California
Department of Justice, Division of Criminal Justice Information Services,
Crime 2002 In Selected California Jurisdictions January Through June,
available at http://caag.state.ca.us/cjsc/publications/preliminarys/jjO2/jjO2.pdf
(last visited Mar. 17, 2003). See also United States Department of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Characteristics of Homicides in California,
available at http://149.101.22.40/dataonline/Search/Homicide/State/
RunHomStatebyState.cfm (last revised Jan. 16, 2003). The homicide rate
decreased from 3,531 deaths in 1995, to 2,005 deaths in 1999. The 2002
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B. Transferred Intent Doctrine in California Homicide
The doctrine of transferred intent was developed to hold persons
accountable for their unlawful conduct.91 The doctrine is better
understood through the following example: X intends to kill Y, but
the bullet misses Y and instead kills Z. Even though X's intent was
to kill Y not Z, X "caused the death of another and should therefore
be treated as if he had killed y.,,92 Courts often use the transferred
intent doctrine to avoid allowing persons to escape criminal liability
for wrongful, yet unforeseeable, consequences of their actions. A
person's intent, rather than the consequences of their behavior, is the
deciding factor.
93
1. Historical perspective
The transferred intent doctrine has been a part of criminal law
jurisprudence in the United States for many years. It was first clearly
articulated in a sixteenth century English case, The Queen v.
Saunders & Archer.94  In Queen, the defendant gave his wife a
poisoned apple. 95 She then gave the apple to her daughter who ate it
and died shortly thereafter. 9 The defendant was found guilty of the
murder of his daughter.97 The court was concerned that someone
must be punished for the crime of murder, and it found that the
defendant must suffer for the consequences of his actions.98 The
court explained:
[If he] lays the poison with an intent to kill some reasonable
creature, and another reasonable creature, whom he does
not intend to kill, is poisoned by it, such death shall not be
statistics, however, indicate that the current trend is an increase in the homicide
rate.
91. See PAUL E. Dow, CRIMINAL LAW 79(1985).
92. See PETER SEAGO, CRIMrNAL LAw 71 (1985). Dow provides the
following example to further illustrate the transferred intent doctrine: "if a
father intends to shoot and kill his hated son but the shot misses and kills his
beloved wife, the intent to kill is transferred from the son to the wife. A
charge of murder would result irrespective of the father's poor marksmanship."
Dow, supra note 91, at 34.
93. See Dow, supra note 91, at 34.
94. 75 Eng. Rep. 706 (K.B. 1907).
95. See id. at 707.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 706.
98. See id.
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dispunishable, but he who prepared the poison shall be
punished for it, because his intent was evil. And therefore
it is every man's business to foresee what wrong or
mischief may happen.., and it shall be no excuse for him
to say that he intended to kill another, and not the person
killed.99
The transferred intent doctrine carried over to the United States
and became a familiar component of many criminal cases where the
defendant's intended harmful act was perpetrated against an
unintended person. 100 One of the first formations of the transferred
intent doctrine in California criminal law was crafted in People v.
Suesser. There, the court determined that a defendant who shoots
with the intent to kill one person and hits a bystander is subject to the
same criminal liability that would have been imposed had "the fatal
blow reached the person for whom intended."' 0 '
The concept of transferred intent is not codified. Instead, it is an
imported theory from common law tort. In tort law, transferred
intent is invoked when the defendant intends harm but inflicts it on
an unintended person. 10 2 In most situations, the transferred intent
doctrine is applied to relatively aberrational fact patterns. 10 3 The
most common scenario is defendant shoots at A, intending to kill A,
but defendant's aim is bad and he misses A and kills B, an innocent
bystander.1°4 The intent to injure A is transferred from A to B-
"[tihe intention follows the bullet."'1 5 The defendant in such a case
99. Id. at 708.
100. See William L. Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEX. L. REV. 650, 652-
53 (1967). Prosser further explains that early criminal cases were preoccupied
with moral guilt and the "obvious fact that if the defendant was not convicted
there would be no one to punish for the crime." Id. at 653.
101. 142 Cal. 354, 366, 75 P. 1093, 1098 (1904). The court held that
although the defendant erroneously believed that the deceased was his intended
victim i.e., shot and killed the wrong person, it was "immaterial whether the
intent was to kill the person killed or whether the death of such person was the
accidental or otherwise unintended result of the intent to kill some one [sic]
else-the criminality of the act will be deemed the same." Id. at 366-67, 75 P.
at 1098.
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16(2).
103. Anthony M. Dillof, Transferred Intent: An Inquiry into the Nature of
Criminal Culpability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 501, 502 (1998).
104. Prosser, supra note 100, at 650.
105. Id.
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would be guilty of murder. Although the defendant's intent transfers
to B, the defendant cannot be convicted of a greater crime against the
unintended victim than he would have been convicted of had he
killed his intended victim. For example, if a person purposely
attempts to kill one person but mistakenly kills another, the law
transfers the intent, and the homicide committed is murder in the first
degree. If the defendant had not premeditated and deliberated about
the intended killing, however, he could not have been found guilty of
first-degree murder for the unintended killing.
The California Supreme Court explicitly approved the
transferred intent doctrine in People v. Sears. In that case, the court
stated that "if a person purposely and of his deliberate and
premeditated malice attempts to kill one person but by mistake and
inadvertence kills another instead, the law transfers the intent and the
homicide so committed is murder of the first degree."' 1 6 Similar to
the first application of the transferred intent doctrine, California
courts continue to believe that the transferred intent doctrine prevents
persons from escaping their punishment because of a "'lucky'
mistake."' 1 7 Further, the concern that defendants should not escape
punishment even if their harmful conduct was an "accident" is
embodied in California's twenty-first century approach to the
transferred intent doctrine.'
0 8
The transferred intent doctrine and its underlying philosophy on
punishment is criticized by both legal scholars and judges. 1°9 The
primary concern is that in cases where the transferred intent rule is
106. 2 Cal. 3d 180, 189, 465 P.2d 847, 853, 84 Cal. Rptr. 711, 717 (1970).
107. People v. Bland, 28 Cal. 4th 313, 321, 48 P.3d 1107, 1112, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 546, 552 (2002). This is the most recent California Supreme Court
case that discusses the transferred intent doctrine. See further case discussion
infra subsection 2.
108. See id.
109. See People v. Scott, 14 Cal. 4th 544, 554-55, 927 P.2d 288, 295, 59
Cal. Rptr. 2d 178, 185 (Mosk, J., concurring) (1996). Justice Stanley Mosk
described the transferred intent rule as "peculiarly mischievous" and an
"altogether unnecessary legal fiction". Id. Other commentators have also
criticized the use of the transferred intent doctrine, describing it as a "'bare-
faced' legal fiction." Id. at 550, 927 P.2d at 292, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182.
Some have gone as far as to declare the doctrine has no place in criminal law
because it "has the vice of being a misleading half-truth, often given as an
improper reason for a correct result, but incapable of strict application." Bland,
28 Cal. 4th at 324 n.2, 48 P.3d at 1114 n.2, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554 n.2.
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applied, defendants are lacking the necessary mens rea for the killing
for which they are prosecuted. Courts, including those in California,
recognize these criticisms, but continue to apply the transferred
intent doctrine.110  Instead of dismantling the rule, the courts
continue to clarify and narrow the doctrine.11 ' In its most recent
decision, the California Supreme Court placed more limits on the
application of the doctrine.112  It appears that criticisms of the
transferred intent doctrine continue to impact how the courts choose
to apply the doctrine.
13
2. Current application of the transferred intent doctrine
In People v. Scott, the defendants shot and missed their intended
victim, but fatally shot an innocent bystander instead." 4 The court
found that the transferred intent instruction was properly given.
15
The instruction states: "When one attempts to kill a certain person,
but by mistake or inadvertence kills a different person, the crime, if
any, so committed is the same as though the person originally
intended to be killed, had been killed."'1 6 The court further found
that the defendants could be found guilty of both attempted murder
of their unintended victim, and second-degree murder of the innocent
bystander.1 7 The court, however, left unanswered the question of
what type of criminal liability is appropriate when both the
unintended and intended victims are killed.
The California Supreme Court recently clarified the application
of the transferred intent doctrine to a homicide where the defendant
110. See, e.g., Scott, 14 Cal. 4th 544, 927 P.2d 288, 59 Cal. Rptr. 178.
111. See Bland, 28 Cal. 4th at 326, 48 P.3d at 1116, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556
(the transferred intent doctrine extends to everyone who is actually killed but
does not apply to attempted murder).
112. Id. at 326-31, 48 P.3d at 1116-19, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556-61 (court
narrowed the transferred intent doctrine and chose not to apply it to crimes of
attempt). See further discussion of current case law, infra subsection 2.
113. Some of the critics' concerns could have played a role in the California
Supreme Court's decision in Bland not to apply the transferred intent doctrine
to crimes of attempt.
114. 14 Cal. 4th 544, 546, 927 P.2d 288, 289, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178, 179
(1996).
115. See id. at 546-47, 927 P.2d at 289, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179.
116. CALJIC 8.65 (6th ed. 1996).
117. Scott, 14 Cal. 4th at 553, 927 P. 2d at 293-94, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 183-
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kills both the intended and unintended victims. Previously, in People
v. Birreuta, the court held that when the intended victim is killed it is
unnecessary to rely on the transferred intent doctrine.118 In Birreuta,
the court found that because both the intended victim and the
unintended victim were killed, the defendant was guilty of one count
of first-degree murder for the intended victim, and one count of
second-degree murder or manslaughter for the unintended victim." 
9
The court reasoned that a person who intends to kill two people and
does so is more culpable than a person who intends to kill one person
and accidentally kills two. Therefore, the court held that the latter
should be subjected to a lesser punishment.
120
This reasoning was not contested by the California Supreme
Court until recently in People v. Bland.121  In Bland, the court
strongly disagreed with the idea that if the intended victim is killed,
the same intent cannot be transferred to the unintended victims.
122
Instead, it found that the intent is not "'used up' once it is employed
to convict a defendant of a specific intent crime against the intended
victim.' ' 123 Therefore, a person's intent to kill the intended target can
be used to convict the defendant of murdering the target. In addition,
the intent to kill can be used to convict the defendant of all
unintended murders. The court's reasoning can be explained either
as the intent to kill the intended target transfers to others also killed,
or the intent to kill need not be directed at a specific person. 124
118. See People v. Birreuta, 162 Cal. App 3d 454, 460, 208 Cal. Rptr. 635,
639 (1984)(overruled by People v. Bland, 28 Cal. 4th 313, 326, 48 P. 3d 1107,
1115, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 556 (2002). Although Bland overruled Birreuta,
the latter case is included in this analysis to further articulate the evolution of
the transferred intent doctrine in California case law.
119. See Birreuta, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 460, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
120. See id.
121. 28 Cal. 4th 313, 48 P. 3d 1107, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (2002). It is
important to note that in People v. Carlson, the court found that "there can be
no doubt that the doctrine of 'transferred intent' applies even though the
original object of the assault is killed as well as the person whose death was the
accidental or the unintended result of the intent to kill the former." 357 Cal.
App. 3d at 357, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 326. In Bland, the court's reasoning is dicta
because the intended victim was not killed in this case. 28 Cal. 4t 313, 48
P.3d 1107, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546.
122. See Bland, 28 Cal. 4th at 326, 48 P.3d at 1115, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
123. Id. at 322, 48 P.3d at 1113, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 553 (quoting People v.
Scott, 14 Cal. 4th 544, 927 P.2d 288, 59 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1996)).
124. See id.
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In Bland, the court argued that this new expansion of the
transferred intent doctrine further served the purpose of deterrence.
The main reasoning articulated the definition of mens rea:
"By thinking of the mens rea in such finite terms-as some
discrete unit that must be either here or there-we have
created a linguistic problem for ourselves when no real-life
problem existed . . . . Unforeseen circumstances may
multiply the criminal acts for which the criminal agent is
responsible. A single state of mind, however, will control
the fact of guilt and the level of guilt of them all."
125
After Bland, it is clear that the defendant's guilt is unaffected by
the intended victim's fate. This holding was a departure from the
Birreuta decision, and resulted in the court's disapproval of that
decision to the extent that it was inconsistent with the Bland
opinion.126
In addition to expanding the transferred intent doctrine to
include convictions in situations where both the intended victim and
the unintended victim are killed, Bland also placed some restrictions
on the transferred intent doctrine. According to the court in Bland,
the transferred intent doctrine does not apply to the crime of
attempted murder. If the intended victim is killed, the defendant
cannot be charged with attempted murder of the unintended
victim.127  If only the unintended victim is killed, however, the
defendant can be charged with both murder of the unintended victim,
and attempted murder of the intended victim.
As evidenced in even the most recent court decisions, the
transferred intent doctrine remains an important part of the
development of homicide law in California. Because of the dearth of
case law in this area, it is difficult to speculate how--or even if-the
transferred intent doctrine will further develop. After Bland, the
transferred intent doctrine is restricted in certain crimes of attempted
murder, but it is frequently implemented in many other situations.
Because the doctrine is substantially criticized, however, the courts
may chose to place additional restrictions on it.
125. Bland, 28 Cal. 4th at 325, 48 P.3d at 1115, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 556
(quoting Harvey v. State, 681 A.2d 628 (1996)).
126. Bland, 28 Cal. 4th at 326, 28 P.3d at 1115, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
127. Id. at 331, 48 P. 3d at 1119, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
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Ultimately, although it is possible to conclude from the changing
application of the transferred intent doctrine that California courts
are willing to further refine the doctrine, one should plan to keep it as
an essential part of homicide law.
FELONY-MURDER
VI. THE FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE*
A. Introduction
California Penal Code section 187 defines murder as "the
unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
aforethought."' The phrase "malice aforethought" is a term of art,
which connotes a number of different mentes reae that render a
homicide particularly heinous, thus constituting murder.2
California law divides murder into two degrees, each
distinguished by a different mens rea.3 A killing committed with the
purpose and specific intent to kill based on willfulness, deliberation,
and premeditation constitutes first-degree murder.4 Second-degree
* Sections A-C are authored by Clayton T. Tanaka: J.D. Candidate, May
2004, Loyola Law School; B.S., Civil Engineering, University of California,
Los Angeles. I thank God for my wife Kathy, who is worth far more to me
than anything in this world, for her love, patience, and unconditional support
throughout my involvement in this piece. Sections D-E are authored by Larry
M. Lawrence, II.
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003).
2. See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW
& ITS PROCESSES CASES & MATERIALS 386 (6th ed. 1995) (citing to Report of
the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1945-1953, 25-28 (1953));
California Penal Code § 188 defines "malice" in both express and implied
forms. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 188. Malice is express when there is a
manifestation of "deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a
fellow creature. . . ." Id. Malice is implied when "no considerable
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart." Id.
3. See DOUGLAS DALTON & PATRICIA KNIGHTEN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
LAW § 5.5[A] (2002) (stating first-degree murder is divisible into three
different categories: (1) deliberate and premeditated murder, (2) statutory first-
degree murder, and (3) first-degree felony murder); See also id. § 5.6[A].
(stating second-degree murder may be proved based on one of three theories,
including: (1) unpremeditated murder with express malice, (2) implied malice
murder, and (3) second-degree felony-murder).
4. See id. § 5.5[B] ("Deliberation" refers to careful weighing of
considerations in forming a course of action, and "premeditation" means
thought over in advance); see also id. § 5.5[C] (stating [Cal. Penal Code] § 189
also enumerates certain acts to be conclusive evidence of premeditation as a
matter of law, including killing by means of a destructive device or explosive,
armor-piercing ammunition, poison, torture, lying in wait, or drive-by
shooting).
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murder, on the other hand, does not have the requirement of a
specific intent to kill. Proof of purpose to kill without premeditation,
or implied malice based on proof of recklessness constitutes second-
degree murder.5 Although a sufficiently culpable mens rea is the
distinguishing criterion in most homicide cases, there is controversy
surrounding its definition because some killings are heinous, yet do
not fall into either one of these categories.
6
The felony-murder doctrine is an alternative theory of murder
that does not involve the aforementioned mens rea requirements.7
The rule is triggered when a killing is committed in perpetration of
certain felonies, and it "operates to posit the existence of that crucial
mental state [for murder].,, 8 Specifically, the felony-murder doctrine
replaces the first-degree murder requirement of purpose to kill and
premeditation. 9  For second-degree murder, it replaces the
requirement of express purpose to kill without premeditation or
provocation, or the proof of recklessness under the implied malice
murder doctrine. 10 Moreover, the felony-murder doctrine renders
irrelevant whether the killing was intentional or accidental. 1
California Penal Code section 189 codifies the first-degree
felony-murder doctrine. 12  The statute explicitly proscribes the
5. See id. § 5.6[A].
6. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 396. It is plausible that
other jurisdictions did not adopt the term "malice" into their homicide statutes
because of potential problems with such an amorphous and limited definition.
See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2501-05 (1998 & Supp. 2002); see also N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 125-125.25 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2003).
7. See 3 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
LAW ELEMENTS §§ 134, 174 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter WITKIN CAL. GRIM.
LAW ELEMENTS].
8. People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 43, 489 P.2d 1361, 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr.
33, 44 (1971) (overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood, 18 Cal. 4th 470,
490 n.12, 957 P.2d 869, 882 n.12, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 180, 193 n.12 (1998)).
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189; DALTON & KNIGHTEN, supra note 3, §
5.5[A]-[B].
10. See People v. Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th 300, 308, 885 P.2d 1022, 1025, 36
Cal. Rptr. 2d 609, 613 (1994); DALTON & KNIGHTEN, supra note 3, § 5.6[A]-
[B]; see also CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 8.30 (6th ed. 1996) (jury
instructions on unpremeditated murder with express malice) [hereinafter
CALJIC]; see also id. No. 8.31 (jury instructions on implied malice murder).
11. See People v. Coefield, 37 Cal. 2d 865, 868, 236 P.2d 570, 572 (1951);
WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 7, § 135.
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189; see also People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441,
465, 668 P.2d 697, 710, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 403 (1983).
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felonies that are subject to this rule.13  Under the felony-murder
doctrine, a killing, whether intentional or unintentional, is murder if
committed in the perpetration of certain felonies.
14
While governed by similar principles as the first-degree felony-
murder rule, the second-degree felony-murder doctrine has a much
more restrictive application because it is a common law rule that
reflects the court's disfavor of the rule. 15 As a result, the second-
degree felony-murder doctrine only applies to felonies that are
"inherently dangerous to human life."'16 A felony is deemed to be
"inherently dangerous to human life" when, viewed in the abstract
and not to the particular circumstances of a case, there is "a high
probability that it will result in death."'
17
The California Supreme Court has further sought to limit the
felony-murder doctrine's application to second-degree murder by
adopting the "merger" rule.'8  Under this rule, the felony-murder
doctrine is inapplicable to cases where assault is the underlying
13. Those felonies include "arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary,
mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, [torture, sodomy, lewd or lascivious acts,
oral copulation, or forcible acts of sexual penetration] ... ." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 189.
14. See WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 7, §§ 134, 174.
For a discussion on what constitutes a "perpetration of felony," see supra Part
VI.B. .c (underlying felony and the killing as part of one continuous
transaction).
15. See Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 462, 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 708, 716 n.19, 194
Cal. Rptr. at 401, 408 n.19 (characterizing the felony-murder doctrine as "an
almost universally disfavored rule" and that "the second degree felony-murder
rule remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any
express basis in the Penal Code"); DALTON & KNIGHTEN, supra note 3, §
5:6[C].
16. See Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th at 308, 885 P.2d at 1025, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
612.
17. See id. at 309, 885 P.2d at 1026, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 613; People v.
Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452, 458, 406 P.2d 647, 650, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10 (1965).
When determining whether a felony is "inherently dangerous to human life,"
the felony should be viewed in the abstract, rather than according to the
particular circumstances in which the felony was committed.
18. See People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 539-40, 450 P.2d 580, 590-91,
75 Cal. Rptr. 188, 198-99 (1969); see also People v. Wilson, 1 Cal. 3d 431,
462 P.2d 22, 82 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969) (extending the merger doctrine to first-
degree felony-murder, where the underlying felony was based on burglary with
the intent to assault with a deadly weapon).
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felony.19 The rationale for such a rule is to ensure that prosecutors
prove the necessary mens rea for murder.20  The second-degree
felony-murder doctrine is thus limited to non-assault felonies that are
inherently dangerous to human life.
21
1. The purpose of the felony-murder doctrine
Under the felony-murder doctrine, a killing, whether intentional
or unintentional, is murder if committed in the perpetration of certain
felonies. 22  Although the common law felony-murder rule had a
seemingly limitless application,23 courts today apply it solely to
"deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding
them strictly responsible for killings they commit.
24
In People v. Washington, the defendant and an accomplice were
robbing a gasoline station when an employee fired a revolver at the
accomplice, mortally wounding him.25 The trial court convicted the
defendant for the murder of his accomplice under the felony-murder
doctrine.26 On appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's argument that the purpose of the felony-murder doctrine
was to prevent the underlying felonies.27 Instead, the court stated
that the purpose of the felony-murder doctrine was to "deter felons
from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly
liable for killings they commit. '28 The court held that the felony-
murder doctrine did not apply because the killing was not committed
19. See Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th at 312-16, 885 P.2d at 1028-31, 36 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 615-18.
20. See Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d at 539,450 P.2d at 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
21. See Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th at 312-16, 885 P.2d at 1028-31, 36 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 615-18.
22. See WITKIN CAL. GRIM. LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 7, §§ 134, 174.
For a discussion on what constitutes a "perpetration of felony," see discussion
supra Part VI.B. 1.c (underlying felony and the killing part of one continuous
transaction).
23. In common law, the potentially limitless application of the felony-
murder doctrine was never challenged because practically all felonies were
punishable by death. See People v. Aaron, 299 N.W. 2d 304 (1980).
24. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 442, 445 (1965).
25. See id. at 779, 402 P.2d at 132, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 781, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
28. See id.
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by the defendant or by his accomplice but rather by their victim. 29
The court reasoned that punishing the defendant for a killing
committed by the victim would undermine the purpose of the felony-
murder doctrine.
30
Today, the felony-murder doctrine applies only to deter
negligent or accidental killings.3' This limited application reflects
the court's disfavor towards the potentially harsh consequences of
the doctrine, especially under the common law.32  As the court
demonstrated in Washington, defendants are only liable for the
killings they commit and not for those committed by their victims or
by the police.
33
2. Application of the felony-murder doctrine
The felony-murder doctrine applies to both first-degree and
second-degree murders. 34  Although the rule achieves the same
results under both types of murders, the basis from which these
applications result is distinct.
California Penal Code section 189 codifies the first-degree
felony-murder doctrine, which is triggered when a killing occurs
during the commission of one of the felonies enumerated in the
statute.35 Prosecutors are free to invoke the rule so long as the
perpetrator showed an independent purpose for the commission of
the proscribed felony.
36
The second-degree felony-murder rule, on the other hand, has a
more limited application. Unlike its first-degree counterpart, the
second-degree felony-murder doctrine is a common law doctrine.
Courts disfavor the rule and generally restrict its potentially broad
application solely to non-assault felonies that are "inherently
dangerous to human life.",
37
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 462-63, 472, 668 P.2d at 708-09, 716, 194
Cal. Rptr. at 401-02, 408.
33. See Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 781, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at
445.
34. See id.
35. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003).
36. See id.
37. Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th at 304, 885 P.2d at 1023, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610.
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A comparative analysis of the first-degree and second-degree
felony-murder rules reveals a glimpse of the tension between the will
of the court and the people of California. Despite the California
Supreme Court's distaste towards the rule, the felony-murder
doctrine has enjoyed wide-spread public support because it
seemingly produces morally justifiable results.38
B. First-Degree Felony-Murder Doctrine
California Penal Code section 189 states that a willful,
deliberate, or premeditated killing is a first-degree murder.39
However, a first-degree conviction is still possible without proving a
purpose to kill, if the killing took place during the commission of one
of the enumerated felonies in section 189.
The first-degree felony-murder doctrine has been the law in
California since 1872.40 Despite its long history in California
criminal jurisprudence, it has generally remained unchallenged
except for the special circumstance issue under California Penal
Code section 190.2. 4'
38. See SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF
MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 108 (1998).
39. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189.
40. See id. When the California legislature enacted its first criminal law
statute in 1850, it codified the felony-murder rule as a proviso to its section on
involuntary manslaughter, and elevated a killing "in the commission of an
unlawful act, [that was] committed in the prosecution of felonious intent, [to]
murder." Stats. 1850, ch. 99, p. 231, § 21, amended by Stats. 1856, c. 139, p.
219, § 2. At that time, there was only one degree of murder and was
punishable by death. Id. By 1856, when the legislature divided the murder
statute into two degrees, the felony-murder doctrine appeared as a proviso to
the involuntary manslaughter statute. See Stats. 1856, ch. 139, p. 219, § 2.
Any killing that occurred during perpetration of a felony was elevated to
murder. See id. Then, § 2 was analyzed to determine the degree of murder.
However, when California adopted the Penal Code in 1982, it dropped the
proviso from its manslaughter statute but retained the degree-fixing language
of § 2, which reappeared as first-degree murder under California Penal Code §
189. although it is arguable that the felony-murder doctrine ceased to exist in
1872 as a statutory doctrine, the present legislative intent reflected the belief
that § 189 is a codification of the first-degree felony-murder rule. See Dillon,
34 Cal. 3d at 458, 668 P.2d at 706, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
41. A defendant, who is convicted of first-degree felony-murder may be
punished by death or life imprisonment in state prison without the possibility
of parole if the predicate felony falls under one of the special circumstances
listed in Cal. Penal Code § 190.2. See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 28 Cal. 4th
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1. Elements of the first-degree felony-murder doctrine
First-degree felony-murder is an alternative theory to willful,
deliberate, or premeditated murder. A killing, if committed during
the perpetration of certain felonies, can qualify as first-degree
murder.42 This qualification is irrespective of whether the killing
was intentional or unintentional.43 These felonies include "arson,
rape, cariacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train
wrecking," torture, sodomy, lewd or lascivious acts, oral copulation,
or forcible acts of sexual penetration.44
a. specific intent to commit felony enumerated under
California Penal Code section 189
The first-degree felony-murder rule eliminates the showing of
purpose to kill or premeditation-ordinary elements of first-degree
murder.4 5 The felony-murder rule holds a defendant strictly liable
for a killing caused by the defendant during the commission of a
section 189 felony, regardless of whether the killing was intentional
or accidental.46 The only criminal intent required under this rule is
the specific intent to commit the predicate or underlying felony.
47
1083, 52 P.3d 572, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 373 (2002) (explaining the validity of §
190.2 in general); People v. Michaels, 28 Cal. 4th 486, 49 P.3d 1032, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 285 (2002) (illustrating the validity under an equal protection
challenge); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (discussing the validity under
a cruel and unusual punishment challenge). See generally WITKIN CAL. CRIM.
LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 7, § 450 (explaining the felonies for which special
circumstances may apply).
42. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003); WITKIN CAL.
CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 7, § 134.
43. See WITKIN CAL. CRiM. LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 7, § 134
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 ("All murder... which is committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery,
burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable under
Section 286, 288, 288a, or 289... is murder of the first degree.") (West 2002);
see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (torture); CAL. PENAL CODE § 286 (sodomy);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (lewd or lascivious acts); CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a)
(oral copulation); CAL. PENAL CODE § 289 (forcible acts of sexual
penetrations); CALJIC, supra note 10, No. 8.21. See generally WITKIN CAL.
CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 7, § 134 (explaining which felonies are
predicate offenses for first-degree felony-murder).
45. See Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 475, 668 P.2d at 717-18, 194 Cal. Rptr. at
410.
46. See WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 7, § 134.
47. See id.
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People v. Coefield presents a good illustration of an application
of the felony-murder rule to an accidental killing.48 There, one of the
defendant's robbery accomplices was trying to beat the victim with a
gun when he accidentally shot and killed the attendant of a liquor
store.49  The California Supreme Court upheld the first-degree
felony-murder conviction because "the only criminal intent which
the prosecution had to show was a specific intent to rob.., it was
not required to prove a deliberate or premeditated killing or to prove
any intent to kill."5 °
In People v. Cantrell, the court ruled that the intent to kill was
irrelevant in the determination of first-degree murder under the
felony-murder doctrine.5" There, the defendant was engaged in lewd
sexual acts with a twelve-year-old boy.5 2  When the boy began
screaming, the defendant reacted by choking the boy to death.53 The
trial court convicted him of engaging in both lewd and lascivious
acts under California Penal Code section 288, and first-degree
felony-murder. 54 The defendant appealed the murder conviction,
contesting that he lacked the mental capacity to deliberately or
intentionally strangle the victim.5 5 Three psychiatrists testified that
the defendant reacted compulsively to the boy's yelling and
struggling, and that the defendant had no power to control himself
due to his mental condition.5 6 The California Supreme Court stated
that evidence of defendant's capacity to kill would only be relevant if
it was necessary to establish his ability to premeditate and to harbor a
purpose to kill.57  By upholding the first-degree felony-murder
48. See 37 Cal. 2d 865, 236 P.2d 570.
49. See id. at 867, 236 P.2d at 571.
50. Id. at 869, 236 P.2d at 573.
51. 8 Cal. 3d 672, 504 P.2d 1256, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1973).
52. See id. at 679, 504 P.2d at 1260, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 688, 504 P.2d at 1266-67, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 802-03.
55. See id. at 677, 504 P.2d at 1258, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 794. Subsequent to
Cantrell, the California Legislature barred the diminished capacity defense and
any evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder for the
purpose of negating intent to kill or premeditation by enacting § 28 of the
Penal Code. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a)-(b).
56. See id. at 679, 504 P.2d at 1260, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
57. See id. at 688, 504 P.2d at 1266, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
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conviction, the court reinforced the concept of only requiring
criminal intent to commit the particular felony. 8
Circumstantial evidence can establish the specific intent to
commit the underlying felony. 9 In People v. Moore, the California
Supreme Court held that although there was no actual testimony of
rape, circumstantial evidence supported such a finding. The
evidence showed the defendant's obvious desire and purpose to have
sexual intercourse with the victim, her refusal to go with the
defendant for that purpose, her nude body found with contusions
around the sex organs, and the fact that her clothing had been torn
off.
6 0
Similarly, in People v. Memro, the California Supreme Court
sustained a first-degree felony-murder conviction based on a
violation of California Penal Code section 288.61 There, the
defendant admitted to killing a seven-year-old boy because the boy
attempted to leave when the defendant disrobed him and began
taking pictures of him.62 The defendant did not attempt to have sex
with the boy until after the boy was dead.63 However, evidence of
the defendant's sexual interest in youths, including a confession in
which he described wanting to photograph and have sex with the
boy, was sufficient for "a rational jury [to] ... infer that he planned
to act on his sexual interest in young boys by performing a lewd or
lascivious act with [the victim]."64
In contrast, the California Supreme Court rejected a first-degree
felony-murder conviction in People v. Craig.65 There, evidence of
58. See id.; see also People v. Hemandez, 47 Cal. 3d 315, 346, 763 P.2d
1289, 1307, 253 Cal. Rptr. 199, 216 (1988) (the California Supreme Court
stated that it has "required as part of the felony-murder doctrine that the jury
find the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit one of the enumerated
felonies, even where that felony is a crime such as rape.").
59. See WITKIN CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 7, § 157.
60. 48 Cal. 2d 541, 544-47, 310 P.2d 969, 971-73 (1957).
61. 11 Cal. 4th 786, 861-62, 905 P.2d 1305, 1346, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219,
260 (1995).
62. See id.
63. See id. For an explanation as to the significance of defendant's
argument that the sexual act took place after the killing, see discussion supra
Part VI.B.1.c (underlying felony and the killing as part of one continuous
transaction).
64. Memro, 11 Cal. 4th at 862, 905 P.2d at 1346, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260.
65. 49 Cal. 2d 313, 316 P.2d 947 (1957).
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the victim's torn clothes, slightly spread legs, multiple contusions,
and lacerations on the abdominal area were not enough to
demonstrate that the killing was committed in the attempt to commit
rape or during the commission of rape.66 Instead, the court based its
decision on the fact that there was no evidence on the clothing or
body of a sexual act, no blood on the defendant's trousers, and
medical testimony revealed that the victim died from strangulation
around the neck.67
These cases demonstrate that the first-degree felony-murder
doctrine applies as an alternative theory to first-degree premeditated
murder, regardless of whether the killing was accidental, as in
Coefield, or whether the prosecution fell just short of proving intent,
as in Cantrell.68 As the statutory language of section 189 indicates, a
killing is first-degree murder if the underlying offense is one of the
enumerated felonies.69 Thus, the only relevant intent in a first-degree
felony-murder analysis is whether the specific intent to commit the
predicate felony existed. The prosecution can establish such specific
intent by circumstantial evidence.
b. must prove elements of the underlying felony
beyond a reasonable doubt
In order to raise the first-degree felony-murder theory, the
defendant must have committed one of the enumerated felonies
under section 189. As in any felony, the jury must find all the
elements of that independent felony proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.7°
66. See id. at 319, 316 P.2d at 951.
67. See id. at 316, 318-19, 316 P.2d at 949, 950.
68. See, e.g., People v. Morlock, 46 Cal. 2d 141, 292 P.2d 897 (1956)
(defendant's killing of A when he intended to kill P was irrelevant because the
killing took place during the perpetration of a robbery); People v. Johnson, 38
Cal. App. 3d 1, 112 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1974) (defendant's contention that he did
not personally fire the shot which killed the victim was irrelevant because he
personally used the revolver in the commission of aiding and abetting a crime).
69. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003).
70. See Coefield, 37 Cal. 2d at 870, 236 P.2d at 573; People v. Hart, 20 Cal.
4th 546, 609, 976 P.2d 683, 721, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132, 170 (1999); People v.
Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d 984, 1016, 755 P.2d 1017, 1037, 248 Cal. Rptr. 568,
587 (1988); People v. Whitehom, 60 Cal. 2d 256, 264, 383 P.2d 783, 788, 32
Cal. Rptr. 199, 203 (1963).
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In People v. Granados, the defendant was prosecuted for the
murder of his wife's young daughter, who was struck in the head
with a machete and died from resulting injuries. 71 The victim was
discovered partially nude, suggesting that she may have been
molested.72  However, there was no evidence of contusion,
laceration, or seminal fluid on the victim's private parts. 73 At trial,
the prosecution did not pursue a first-degree felony-murder
conviction because it could not prove the mens rea requirement for
murder. 74 Instead, it sought a first-degree murder conviction based
on the theory that the defendant had killed the victim while
committing a lewd or lascivious act.
75
The California Supreme Court instructed that in order to sustain
a first-degree felony-murder conviction, the jury must first determine
that the defendant committed the underlying felony beyond a
reasonable doubt.76 There, the trial court committed prejudicial error
by not instructing the jury that they must first determine that the
underlying felony was committed beyond a reasonable doubt before
they could find the defendant guilty based on the felony-murder
doctrine. 77 As a result, the court modified the defendant's first-
78
degree murder conviction to a second-degree murder conviction.
In order to invoke the first-degree felony-murder doctrine, the
prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant was, in fact,
engaged in one of the enumerated felonies. Thus, the prosecution
must first prove the occurrence of an enumerated felony beyond a
reasonable doubt before showing that the killing and the felony were
part of one continuous transaction.
c. underlying felony and the killing part
of one continuous transaction
The first-degree felony-murder rule does not require a strict
causal relationship between the underlying felony and the
71. 49 Cal. 2d 490, 492-93, 319 P.2d 346, 348-49 (1957).
72. See id. at 497, 319 P.2d at 351.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 495-96, 319 P.2d at 350.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 497-98, 319 P.2d at 351.
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homicide.79 However, the mere existence of a felony and a killing in
a particular set of facts does not automatically trigger the felony-
murder doctrine because the killing must occur during perpetration
of that felony.80 The homicide is committed in the perpetration of
the felony if the killing and the felony are parts of one continuous
transaction.
81
In People v. Hudson, the defendant and the victim were heading
back to town together after spending the night drinking. During the
trip, the defendant assaulted the victim, killing him.82 The defendant
then took the Victim's wallet and drove away. 83 At trial, there was a
factual issue as to whether the defendant had formed his intent to rob
before or after he attacked and killed the victim.84 The trial court
refused to instruct the jury that the felony-murder doctrine applied
only if the defendant formed his intent to rob before or during the
killing.8 5 The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction
holding that the trial court erred in its refusal because the evidence
did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had
formed the intent to rob before or during the attack.86
79. See Whitehorn, 60 Cal. 2d at 264, 383 P.2d at 788, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
80. See id.
81. See id.; Hart, 20 Cal. 4th at 609, 976 P.2d at 721, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
170 (defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for engaging in crimes of
rape, sodomy, and oral copulation); Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d at 1016, 755 P.2d at
1037 (defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for robbery and
kidnapping); Whitehorn, 60 Cal. 2d at 264, 383 P.2d at 787, 32 Cal. Rptr. at
203 (defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for rape and murder).
82. 45 Cal. 2d 121, 122, 287 P.2d 497, 497 (1955).
83. See id.
84. See id. at 126-27, 287 P.2d at 500-01. Here, the issue as to whether the
defendant formed his intent to rob the victim before or after the killing was
close. See id. There was no indication that the defendant prepared the robbery
before he killed the victim. See id. at 126, 287 P.2d at 500. Still, the
prosecution had a valid argument when it contested that the defendant's intent
rose after he knocked the victim down, but before he dealt the fatal blow. See
id.
85. See id. at 125, 287 P.2d at 499-500. Specifically, the defendant offered
the instruction, "If you find that [defendant] ... had not formed an intention to
rob [victim] until after he struck [victim], dragged his body into the ditch then
you are instructed that [victim] was not killed by [defendant] in the
perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate the crime of robbery." Id.
86. See id. at 127, 287 P.2d at 500-01.
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In People v. Anderson, the court further refined the requisite
nexus between the predicate felony and the killing. 87  The case
involved the killing of a ten-year-old girl, whose entire body
contained more than sixty cuts and wounds.8  Several of the
wounds, including a laceration extending from the rectum through
the vagina were post-mortem. 89  Evidence revealed that the
defendant had torn off the victim's clothes, but there was no trace of
seminal fluid.90  At trial, the prosecution contended that the
defendant committed murder in the perpetration or attempt to
perpetrate lewd or lascivious acts under California Penal Code
section 288. The California Supreme Court clarified its earlier
statement in Hudson, stating:
[T]he evidence must establish that the defendant harbored
the felonious intent either prior to or during the commission
of the acts which resulted in the victim's death; evidence
which establishes that the defendant formed the intent only
after engaging in the fatal acts cannot support a verdict of
first-degree murder based on section 189.91
The court reversed the first-degree felony-murder conviction because
the prosecution failed to present any evidence that the defendant
formed sexual feeling or engaged in any kind of lewd conduct
towards the victim.
92
In People v. Ainsworth, a witness saw the defendant and his
accomplice approach the victim's vehicle and then drive away with
the victim sitting between them.93 Police later found the victim's
abandoned car with a bullet casing inside. The bullet casing
contained both the defendant's fingerprints and the victim's blood.94
Months later, authorities discovered the victim's body with a .45
caliber copper-coated slug in her hip, which was consistent with the
bullet casing found in the car. 95  The California Supreme Court
upheld the first-degree felony-murder conviction, stating that there
87. 70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d 942, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968).
88. See id. at 21-22, 447 P.2d at 945, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 34,447 P.2d at 953, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
92. See id. at 31, 447 P.2d at 951-52, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 559-60.
93. 45 Cal. 3d at 994, 755 P.2d at 1022, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
94. See id. at 995, 755 P.2d at 1022, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
95. See id. at 996, 755 P.2d at 1023, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
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"was ample evidence to support the jury's finding that the death
occurred in the perpetration of the robbery."
96
These cases demonstrate that although a first-degree felony-
murder conviction does not require a strict causal relationship
between the felony and the killing, the killing cannot be merely
incidental. However, the courts are unclear about the extent of
continuity required between the felonious act and the killing.
The courts have held that the first-degree felony-murder doctrine
applies only if the defendant formed the requisite intent to commit
the underlying felony before or during the killing. 97 In Ainsworth,
eyewitness testimony of the robbery before the victim's death
sufficiently established that the felony and the killing were part of
one continuous transaction. 98 In contrast, the facts of Hudson and
Anderson are problematic to those relying on the felony-murder
theory. In those cases, in spite of the overwhelming evidence, the
court ruled that the evidence did not establish the defendant's intent
to commit the felonies.
99
d. burglary based on the intent to commit a felonious assault
precludes the first-degree felony-murder doctrine
The merger doctrine typically applies to assault-related felonies
in the second-degree felony-murder context. 100 For a burglary based
on intent to commit felonious assault, the merger doctrine precludes
the application of the felony-murder doctrine, despite the fact that
burglary is one of the enumerated felonies under section 189.101
In People v. Wilson, the killing occurred during a burglary.
10 2
The only basis for the felonious entry was assault with a deadly
weapon. 0 3  The California Supreme Court extended the merger
96. Id. at 1016, 755 P.2d at 1037, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
97. See Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d at 34, 447 P.2d at 953, 73 Cal.
Rptr. at 561.
98. See Ainsworth, 45 Cal. 3d at 994, 755 P.2d at 1022, 248 Cal. Rptr. at
572.
99. See Hudson, 45 Cal. 2d at 121, 287 P.2d at 497; Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d at
22, 447 P.2d at 945, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
100. See discussion infra Section C. 1.d.
101. See Wilson, 1 Cal. 3d at 442, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 501, 462 P.2d at 29-30.
102. See id. at 440, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 499, 462 P.2d at 28.
103. See id.
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doctrine in the context of the first-degree felony-murder doctrine,
stating that the assault is an "integral part of the homicide."
' 1°4
Burglary is one of the felonies enumerated under section 189.
Nevertheless, the merger rule precludes the felony-murder doctrine
for unlawful entries based on the intent to assault.105 Here, the
"integral part of the homicide" language suggested that the court
would merge other felonies subject to the first-degree felony-murder
rule.10 6  However, recent California Supreme Court cases have
limited the merger doctrine solely to assault felonies. 07 Thus, a
burglary with the intent to commit assault is one of the very few
exceptions to the otherwise strict application of the first-degree
felony-murder rule.
2. Application of the first-degree felony-murder doctrine to
provocative acts
Under the common law, the application of the felony-murder
doctrine was potentially limitless since its application relieved the
prosecution of having to prove deliberation or premeditation. The
potential breadth of this application was particularly evident in cases
where the defendant's perpetration of felonies provoked victims or
law enforcement officials into killing another.
The California Supreme Court's opinion in People v.
Washington reflects a view of the felony-murder doctrine that is
decidedly narrower than the view according to the common law.1
08
Washington involved a defendant and his accomplice who robbed a
gasoline station.10 9 The accomplice pointed a gun at the attendant,
but the attendant responded by firing his own gun at the accomplice,
killing him." 0 The court held that, despite provoking the attendant
104. See id.
105. See id. at 442, 462 P.2d at 29, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
106. See Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th at 313-14, 885 P.2d at 1029, 36
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616.
107. See, e.g., People v. Malfavon, 102 Cal. App. 4th 727,
125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 618 (2002) (merger rule is triggered only
when the underlying felony was assault); People v. Johnson, 15 Cal. App. 4th
169, 175, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 654 (court recognized that the "underlying
felony must have a purpose other than the assault for the felony-murder rule to
apply").
108. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 777, 402 P.2d at 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
109. See id. at 779, 402 P.2d at 132,44 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
110. See id.
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into killing his accomplice, the first-degree felony-murder rule did
not apply to the defendant because he did not commit the killing in
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery."' The court
interpreted section 189 as requiring that the felon or his accomplice
commit the killing.112 To consider the acts of the victim as those of
the accomplice "would expand the meaning of the words 'murder...
which is committed in the perpetration ... [of] robbery...' beyond
common understanding."' 13  The Washington decision reversed
People v. Harrison, where the court of appeal applied the first-degree
felony-murder doctrine under the similar circumstances of
defendants provoking a robbery victim into firing a gun that
accidentally shot and killed another victim. 114
This provocative act scenario is distinguishable from cases
involving agency or proximate cause issues, where the first-degree
felony-murder doctrine is still applicable." 5  Defendants are
responsible for both intentional and unintentional killings during the
commission of a section 189 felony, including situations where the
victim was not the intended target of the killing. The first-degree
felony-murder doctrine further applies to killings that the accomplice
caused during the commission of a felony. Thus, the courts draw the
line when anyone other than the defendant or an accomplice-e.g., a
victim, a police officer, or any other involved person-is provoked,
and kills.
3. Challenges to the first-degree felony-murder doctrine
While both courts and scholars have criticized the felony-murder
doctrine as an artificial concept, worthy of only a narrow application,
the first-degree felony-murder doctrine is a statutory concept that is
the law in California. Because of this fact, there have been very few
challenges made against the felony-murder doctrine itself.
People v. Dillon represents one of the few decisions involving
challenges to the first-degree felony-murder doctrine. 1 6 The trial
111. See id. at 781, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. 176 Cal. App. 2d 330, 345, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414, 424-25 (1959).
115. See discussion Agency and Proximate Cause in Felony-Murder infra
Section D.
116. 34 Cal. 3d 441, 668 P.2d 697, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983).
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court convicted the defendant of first-degree felony-murder and
attempted robbery. 17 On appeal, the defendant contended that the
first-degree felony-murder doctrine was an uncodified common law
rule that the court should abolish.1 18 Moreover, the defendant argued
that even if the felony-murder rule were a statutory doctrine, it
unconstitutionally presumes the existence of purpose to kill. 119
The California Supreme Court reviewed the "dubious origins" of
the felony-murder doctrine, which revealed that section 189, as
originally enacted, may have been merely a degree-fixing statute and
not a codification of the first-degree felony-murder rule.
12 0
However, the court held that its "shaky... historical foundation"
was irrelevant because the legislature has treated section 189 as a
codification of the first-degree felony-murder doctrine.121
Accordingly, the courts could not judicially abolish the rule.
122
The California Supreme Court also rejected the defendant's
constitutional challenge, stating that the felony-murder doctrine does
not presume purpose to kill, because as a matter of law, it is not an
element of felony-murder. 23 Because the rule does not presume
purpose to kill, it neither unconstitutionally denies due process nor
makes an irrational connection "between the fact proved (here,
felonious intent) and the fact presumed (malice).' 24
The first-degree felony-murder rule is a statutory doctrine that is
codified under section 189 of the Penal Code. Despite the objections
to the felony-murder doctrine, the court cannot judicially abrogate
the rule because it is a legislative creation.
117. See id. at 450, 668 P.2d at 700, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
118. See id. at 462, 668 P.2d at 708, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
119. Seeid.
120. See id. at 462-63, 668 P.2d at 708-09, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 401-02.
121. Id. at 471-72, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
122. See id. at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.19.
123. See id. at 475, 668 P.2d at 718, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
124. See id at 476. Other jurisdictions have also addressed the
constitutionality of the felony-murder doctrine. See Ulster County Court v.
Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 165 (1979) (citing Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36
(1969) which addressed the constitutionality of the felony-murder doctrine);
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943).
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C. Second-Degree Felony-Murder
"All kinds of murders other than those specified as first degree
are murders of the second degree."'125 Second-degree felony-murder
is an alternative to unpremeditated murder with express purpose to
kill, or implied malice murder. 126 It is similar to first-degree felony-
murder, where the killing occurs during the perpetration of a felony,
except that the underlying felony is not one of the felonies
enumerated under section 189.127
While the second-degree felony-murder doctrine has the same
effect as its first-degree counterpart, the second-degree felony-
murder doctrine is limited in its application. At first glance, the
second-degree felony-murder rule appears broad because it
potentially applies to any felony that results in a killing, and it is not
limited solely to statutorily enumerated felonies. 28 However, the
elements of the second-degree felony-murder doctrine suggest
otherwise.
The second-degree felony-murder doctrine is a common law
rule, and its many strictures reflect the court's disfavor of the felony-
murder theory in general. 129 Some courts believe that the doctrine
wrongly convicts people for murder without having to prove the
standard mens rea requirement.
130
125. DALTON & KNIGHTEN, supra note 3, § 5:6[A] (2002); see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 189 (West 2002); CALJIC, supra note 10, No. 8.30 ("Murder of the
second-degree is [also] the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought when the perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a human being
but the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and premeditation").
126. See DALTON & KNIGHTEN, supra note 7, § 5:6[A]; see also CALJIC,
supra note 10, No. 8.30 (jury instructions on second-degree express malice
murder); Id. No. 8.31 (jury instructions on second-degree implied malice
murder).
127. See WITKiN CAL. CRIM. LAW ELEMENTS, supra note 7, § 174.
128. See id.
129. See Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr.
at 408 n.19 (characterizing the felony-murder doctrine as "an almost
universally disfavored rule" and that "the second-degree felony-murder rule
remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any express
basis in the Penal Code").
130. See, e.g., Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 783, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr.
at 446 ("felony-murder rule has been criticized on the grounds that in almost
all cases in which it is applied it is unnecessary and that it erodes the relation
between criminal liability and moral culpability").
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1. Elements of the second-degree felony-murder doctrine
The second-degree felony-murder doctrine applies if a killing
occurred during the perpetration of an inherently dangerous
felony.13 ' Whether a felony is inherently dangerous is a question of
law for the courts to decide based on the felony in its abstract, rather
than the particular facts of the case. Even if the predicate felony is
determined to be inherently dangerous, the felony-murder doctrine
does not apply if that felony merges with the resulting homicide.
a. felony must be inherently dangerous
The second-degree felony-murder doctrine applies only if the
killing resulted from the perpetration of a felony that is inherently
dangerous. 132 An act is inherently dangerous to human life when
there is "a high degree of probability that it will result in death."'
133
This requirement is considerably narrower than in the past, when
killings perpetrated during any felony were deemed to be murder. 1
34
In People v. Ford, for example, the defendant kidnapped his
wife and another person. 135  When a deputy sheriff stopped the
defendant in his car and ordered him to hand over his gun, the
defendant fired at the officer, killing him.136 In affirming the trial
court's refusal to issue a manslaughter instruction, the California
Supreme Court stated that, as a matter of law, "[a] homicide that is a
direct causal result of the commission of a felony inherently
dangerous to human life (other than [those] felonies enumerated in
Cal. Penal Code section 189) constitutes at least a second-degree
murder.' 37 The court observed that at the time of the shooting, the
131. See discussion, supra Section B.1.c.
132. See Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 626-27, 778 P.2d at 558, 262 Cal. Rptr. at
204.
133. People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 262, 710 P.2d 861, 869, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 794, 802 (1985); People v. Thomas, 41 Cal. 2d 470, 480, 261 P.2d 1, 22
(1953).
134. See, e.g., People v. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d 142, 330 P.2d 763 (1958)
(second-degree felony-murder conviction based on administering narcotics to a
minor upheld) (overruled on another ground by Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 625,
778 P.2d at 557, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 203); People v. Powell, 34 Cal. 2d 196, 208
P.2d 974 (1949) (second-degree felony-murder conviction based on abortion
upheld).
135. 60 Cal. 2d at 782-83, 388 P.2d at 899, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 795, 388 P.2d at 907, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
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defendant was still in the commission of kidnapping, which was
"inherently dangerous to human life, and 'the killing had a direct
causal relationship to the [crimes] being committed.' ' 138  Thus,
under the felony-murder rule, the homicide qualified as being at least
a second-degree murder.
139
While the Ford court only observed that a killing resulting from
the commission of an inherently dangerous felony deserves at least a
second-degree conviction, it did not make the second-degree
conviction an absolute requirement. 140  The California Supreme
Court eventually approved this formulation. 141  For example, in
People v. Williams, the defendants stabbed the victim to death during
an affray with the victim, who was a methedrine supplier.142 The
California Supreme Court reversed the trial court's instruction
requiring the jury to find the defendants guilty of second-degree
felony-murder if they found that the killing occurred during a
conspiracy to obtain methedrine.143 The court stated that although
the purpose of the felony-murder rule, which is "to deter felons from
killing negligently or accidentally... may be well served with
respect to felonies such as robbery or burglary... it has little
relevance to a felony which is not inherently dangerous."' 44
138. Ford at 795, 388 P.2d at 907, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 636 (quoting People v.
Robillard, 55 Cal. 2d 88, 98 (1960)).
139. See id. Today, § 207 kidnapping is one of the enumerated felonies
under § 189, and any killing during such felony invokes the first-degree
felony-murder rule. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2002). Here, the
court also applied the second-degree felony-murder doctrine under conviction
of § 12021, for possession of a concealable weapon by an ex-felon. See id.
However, commission of a § 12021 crime does not trigger the second-degree
felony-murder doctrine today because of the California Supreme Court's
holding in Satchell, where the court stated that the "mere possession in itself-
ignore[es] the propensities and conduct of the possessor-is essentially neutral
in its intentional aspect and should not serve as the basis for the imputation of
malice." 6 Cal. 3d at 43, 489 P.2d at 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
140. See Ford at 795-96, 388 P.2d at 907-08, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
141. See, e.g., Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 780, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr.
at 445 (the court stated that "the felony-murder doctrine ascribes malice
aforethought to the felon who kills in the perpetration of an inherently
dangerous felony"); Williams, 63 Cal. 2d at 457, 406 P.2d at 630, 47 Cal. Rptr.
at 10 (1965) (the court referring to Washington as the case in which it
approved the "Ford formulation").
142. 63 Cal. 2d 452, 406 P.2d 647, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1965).
143. See id. at 455, 406 P.2d at 648, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
144. Id. at 457 n.4, 406 P.2d at 650 n.4, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 10 n.4.
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Conversely, the court reasoned that "[i]f the felony is not inherently
dangerous it is highly improbable that the potential felon will be
deterred" because "he will not anticipate that any injury or death
might arise solely from the fact that that he will commit the
felony.', 145 The court held that the felony, conspiracy to possess
methedrine, was not inherently dangerous.
146
Therefore, the courts rely on the inherently dangerous analysis
because it is consistent with the goal of the felony-murder doctrine,
which is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally while
committing a felony. As such, a great majority of cases involving
second-degree felony-murder now focus on whether the underlying
felony is inherently dangerous to human life.
1 47
b. felony must be analyzed in the abstract
In deciding whether the underlying felony was inherently
dangerous to human life, the courts look to the elements of the felony
in the abstract, not to the facts surrounding a particular killing. The
Supreme Court imposed this view-in-the-abstract approach in order
to prevent the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim
145. Id.
146. See id. at 458, 406 P.2d at 650, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
147. Cases where courts deemed that the predicate felonies were inherently
dangerous include the following: Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th 300, 885 P.2d 1022, 36
Cal. Rptr. 609 (shooting at an inhabited dwelling); People v. Clem, 78 Cal.
App. 4th 346, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727 (2000) (grossly negligent discharge of
firearm); People v. James, 62 Cal. App. 4th 244, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7 (1998)
(manufacturing methamphetamine); People v. Johnson, 15 Cal. App. 4th 169,
18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (1993) (reckless driving to elude a peace officer); People
v. Morse, 2 Cal. App. 4th 620, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343 (1992) (reckless possession
of a bomb). On the contrary, the courts deemed the following cases as not
inherently dangerous: People v. Smith, 62 Cal. App. 4th 1233, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d
918 (1998) (extortion); People v. Taylor, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1084, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d
439 (1992) (furnishing PCP); People v. Caffero, 207 Cal. App. 3d 678, 255
Cal. Rptr. 22 (1989) (child abuse); People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 678
P.2d 894, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1984) (practice of medicine without a license)
(overruled on another ground by People v. Blakeley, 23 Cal. 4th 82, 89, 999
P.2d 675, 679, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451, 455 (2000)); People v. Henderson, 19 Cal.
3d 86, 560 P.2d 1180, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1977) (false imprisonment) (overruled
on another ground by Flood, 18 Cal. 4th at 490 n.12, 957 P.2d at 882 n.12, 76
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193 n.12); Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 489 P.2d 1361, 98 Cal. Rptr.
33 (possession of a firearm by a felon).
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from swaying the courts into applying the second-degree felony-
murder doctrine.
In People v. Williams, the California Supreme Court elaborated
on the view-in-the-abstract approach.148 In holding that a conspiracy
to possess methedrine is not inherently dangerous, the majority
rejected prior decisions in which courts determined the inherent
danger of a felony based on (1) the particular circumstances of a
case; and (2) whether the resulting death was "an expectable incident
of the felony."'
149
In People v. Burroughs, the California Supreme Court reversed
the second-degree felony-murder conviction of the defendant, a self-
proclaimed "healer," who treated the victim without a medical
license.15 0 There, the California Supreme Court explained that the
Williams court's viewed-in-the-abstract analysis is necessary because
every case that potentially applies the second-degree felony-murder
rule involves a killing.15' The majority feared that courts would
apply the rule simply because "the existence of the dead victim
might appear to lead inexorably to the conclusion that the underlying
felony is exceptionally hazardous."'
152
In determining the inherent dangerousness of a felony, the courts
impose a viewed-in-the-abstract approach in order to prevent courts
from imposing their normative views, which could lead to potentially
148. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d at 457, 406 P.2d at 649, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
149. See id. In People v. Pulley, 225 Cal. App. 2d 366, 37 Cal. Rptr. 376
(1964) (overruled by Williams, 63 Cal. 2d at 458, 406 P.2d at 650, 47 Cal.
Rptr. at 10), the defendants were driving a stolen vehicle at seventy to eighty
miles an hour, while evading a pursuit by a traffic officer. They killed a man
when their car ran a red light and collided into traffic and cars proceeding with
the green light. See id. at 368, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 377. In rejecting the
defendant's contention that the felony-murder doctrine should be limited with
respect to felonies that are not dangerous to human life, the court of appeals
reviewed the particular facts involved in the case, rather than viewing the
elements in the abstract. The court observed that, "[b]y any reasonable
standard, stealing and driving a stolen car and endeavoring to escape pursuing
officers with the stolen car, entering an intersection against all rules of the road
at seventy to eighty miles per hour and crashing with other cars lawfully
proceeding therein, is highly dangerous." Id. at 373, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 380. It
concluded that, in such circumstance, death was "not a freak coincidence, but
an expectable incident of the felony." Id.
150. 35 Cal. 3d at 826, 678 P.2d at 895, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
151. See id. at 830, 678 P.2d at 898, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
152. Id.
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prejudicial results. Moreover, fairness requires the court to
objectively construe the underlying statute, especially because all
potential felony-murder doctrine issues involve a dead victim. Thus,
the courts are to analyze each statutory offense objectively.
c. the inherent dangerousness of each statutory offense is
determined separately
In order to determine whether an underlying felony is inherently
dangerous, courts examine the statutory definition of the applicable
felony. As such, the question of whether a felony is inherently
dangerous is a matter of statutory construction.
In Burroughs, the court held that the inherent dangerousness of a
felony is determined by the statutory definition as a whole, "taking
into account even nonhazardous ways of violating the provisions of
the law which do not necessarily pose a threat to human life." '153 The
court examined the language of California Business and Professions
Code section 2053,154 and held the conduct at issue was not
inherently dangerous because "one may violate the proscription
against the felonious practice of medicine without a license and yet
not necessarily endanger human life."' 55
153. Id. However, the inherent dangerousness of a statute having multiple
offenses may be analyzed separately based on the particular offense, which is
the basis for the application of the second-degree felony-murder doctrine. See
Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 625, 778 P.2d at 556, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
154. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2053 (West 2002) states:
Any person who willfully, under circumstances or conditions which
cause or create a risk of great bodily harm, serious physical or mental
illness, or death, practices or attempts to practice, or advertises or
holds himself or herself out as practicing, any system or mode of
treating the sick or afflicted in this state, or diagnoses, treats, operates
for, or prescribes for any ailment, blemish, deformity, disease,
disfigurement, disorder, injury, or other physical or mental condition
of any person, without having at the time of so doing a valid,
unrevoked and suspended certificate as provided in this chapter, or
without being authorized to perform that act pursuant to a certificate
obtained in accordance with some other provision of law, is
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not exceeding one
year or in the state prison.
155. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 830, 678 P.2d at 898, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 323;
see also Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d 86, 560 P.2d 1180, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1 (holding
that Cal. Penal Code § 237, false imprisonment, is not inherently dangerous
because it is effectuated by either violence, menace, fraud or deceit); People v.
Lopez, 6 Cal. 3d 45, 51, 489 P.2d 1372, 1376, 98 Cal. Rptr. 44, 48 (1971)
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The court of appeal faced a similar issue in People v. Caffero.
156
There, the defendants were charged with second-degree felony-
murder after their infant daughter died from an E. coli infection that
resulted from a lack of proper hygiene. 157 The second-degree felony-
murder charge was based on the felony child abuse provision in
Penal Code section 237(a)(1). Relying on Burroughs, the court of
appeal stated that if a statute may be violated by conduct that does
not endanger human life, it is not inherently dangerous to human
life.'58 It held that section 237(a)(1) is implicated in a wide range of
circumstances, including either life-threatening or non-life-
threatening circumstances.' 59
The California Supreme Court further elaborated on the issue of
statutory construction in People v. Patterson.160 The case involved a
defendant who furnished cocaine to the victim, who died after
ingesting it.1 61 The defendant faced a second-degree felony-murder
charge for furnishing cocaine, a felony under California Health and
Safety Code section 11352.162 The court found that more than one-
hundred controlled substances fell within the confines of section
11352, and the legislature did not proscribe separate statutes for each
of the offenses because it appeared to be more convenient.163 For a
statute having multiple offenses, the court held that "each offense set
forth in the statute should be examined separately to determine its
inherent dangerousness."' 64 In remanding the case, the court
instructed the trial court to determine whether the commission of the
(court held that Cal. Penal Code § 4352 is not inherently dangerous because it
constitutes "a multitude of sins" including both violent and nonviolent type of
escape).
156. 207 Cal. App. 3d 678, 255 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1989).
157. See id. at 681-82, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 683, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 25. Cal. Penal Code § 273(a)(1) shares
the same grammatical structure found significant in Burroughs in that it
separates the life-threatening risk, 'death,' from the non-life-threatening risk,
'great bodily harm,' with the disjunctive "or." Id.
160. 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
161. See id. at 617, 778 P.2d at 551, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
162. Seeid.
163. See id. at 625, 778 P.2d at 556, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
164. Id.
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statutory offense at issue involved "a high probability that it will
result in death."16
The California Court of Appeal cases People v. Johnson,
166
People v. Sewell,167 and People v. Sanchez,168 all involve second-
degree felony-murder charges based on the defendant's attempt to
elude a pursuing police officer. In Johnson and Sewell, the
underlying felony involved California Vehicle Code section
2800.2.169 In each case, the court stated that conduct under section
2800.2 is an inherently dangerous felony because its key element is
the "willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or
property."'170 In Sanchez, however, the court came to the opposite
conclusion when they determined that section 2800.3, a statute that
amended and replaced section 2800.2, did not make conduct within
its purview inherently dangerous. 171 There, the court found that the
statutory language of section 2800.2 differed significantly from the
wording of section 2800.3 in that section 2800.3 covered a wide
range of circumstances, including conduct that proximately caused
death or serious bodily injury.
172
Burroughs and Caffero demonstrate that a determination of
inherent dangerousness depends on statutory construction. 173 Each
case shows that a statute makes conduct inherently dangerous if its
language shows a possibility of violation by an act that does not
produce a high probability of death. The statutory interpretation in
Patterson was distinguishable from these cases because Patterson
165. Id. at 627, 778 P.2d at 558, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
166. 15 Cal. App. 4th 169, 172-73, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 652-53 (1993).
167. 80 Cal. App. 4th 690, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600 (2000).
168. 86 Cal. App. 4th 970, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 809 (2001).
169. See Sewell, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 693, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602 (stating that
Cal. Vehicle Code § 2800.2 makes it a felony for a person who "flees or
attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer in violation of Section 2800.1...
and the pursued vehicle is driven in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety
of persons or property .... ") (emphasis omitted); Johnson, 15 Cal. App. 4th at
173, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653.
170. Johnson, 15 Cal. App. 4th at 173, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653.
171. See Sanchez, 86 Cal. App. 4th at 977, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 813-14
(stating that Cal. Vehicle Code § 2800.3 makes it a felony when "willful flight
or attempt to elude a pursuing peace officer in violation of Section 2800.1
proximately causes death or serious bodily injury to any person.").
172. See id. at 980, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815.
173. See Burroughs, 35 Cal.3d at 830, 678 P.2d at 898, 201 Cal.Rptr. at 323;
Caffero, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 683, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
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involved a single statute that proscribed multiple offenses. In
contrast, Burroughs and Caffero examined statutes that proscribed
one offense that could be committed by numerous different acts,
including acts that are not inherently dangerous. 174 Finally, Johnson,
Sewell, and Sanchez represent a series of cases where the inherent
dangerousness of a felony depends on the precise statutory language.
Note that although each defendant in the cited cases essentially acted
in the same manner, the second-degree felony-murder doctrine was
inapplicable against one of them because the statutory language
altered the inherency of its danger.
75
Courts depend on the statutory language of the underlying
offense to objectively determine the inherently dangerous nature of a
felony. Despite the fact that fairness requires a determination of the
inherent danger, cases such as Johnson, Sewell, and Sanchez reveal
that the felony-murder doctrine can produce rather arbitrary results.
Because of this possibility, courts reluctantly apply the felony-
murder doctrine and place limitations on it, such as the merger
doctrine.
d. the "merger" rule precludes the application of the felony-murder
doctrine if the underlying felony is assault
Even if the predicate felony is inherently dangerous to human
life, the court may preclude the application of the felony-murder
doctrine if the felony "merged" with the resulting homicide. 176 The
court's adoption of the merger doctrine has spurred a renewed debate
over the second-degree felony-murder doctrine, despite its present
limitations.
As the merger doctrine developed in other jurisdictions, it
established that the felony-murder doctrine does not apply where the
only underlying felony is assault. 177 In such a circumstance, the
174. See id.
175. See Sewell, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 693, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
602; Johnson, 15 Cal. App. 4th at 173, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
653; Sanchez, 86 Cal. App. 4th at 977, 980, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 813-15.
176. See People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188
(1969).
177. See Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th at 311, 885 P.2d at 1028, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
615; see also People v. Huter, 184 N.Y. 237 (1906) (court held that the
defendant's alleged killing of an officer while resisting arrest for burglary was
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assault is regarded as having merged with the resulting homicide. 178
The merger doctrine singles out assault because homicide generally
results from the commission of an assault, and if assault constituted
one of the underlying felonies for felony-murder, the distinction
between first and second-degree murder would be obliterated.
179
Any application of the felony-murder doctrine based on assault
would relieve the prosecution of having to prove mens rea in a
majority of homicide cases. 180 Thus, as one commentator noted, the
inapplicability of the merger rule to assaults is "supported by the
policy of preserving some meaningful domain in which the
Legislature's careful gradation of homicide offenses can be
implemented.' i8 1
In People v. Ireland, the defendant was convicted of second-
degree murder after he shot and killed his wife during a dispute.'
82
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court erred by
giving the jury a second-degree felony-murder instruction based on
assault with a deadly weapon. 8 3  The California Supreme Court
agreed with the defendant, stating that the use of the felony-murder
doctrine in this situation extends the doctrine "beyond any rational
function that [it] is designed to serve."'184 The court explained that
because a great majority of homicides result from felonious assault,
use of the felony-murder doctrine unnecessarily "bootstraps" the
assault in the second-degree and that the act merged with the homicide); Buel
v. People, 18 Hun 487 (3d Dep't 1879), aff'd 78 N.Y. 492 (1879) (where the
defendant unintentionally killed the victim while raping her, the court denied
his contention that the felony merged with the homicide because the two
felonies were "so distinct that they [could] not be included in the same
indictment").
178. Seeid.
179. See id.; see also Note, The Doctrine of Merger in Felony-Murder and
Misdemeanor-Manslaughter, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 109, 117 (1960)
(describing that, in New York, the merger rule was adopted "[i]n order to
properly preserve the distinction between the degrees of murder and between
murder and manslaughter").
180. See Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th at 311, 885 P.2d at 1028, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
615.
181. Id. at 312, 885 P.2d at 1028, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615.
182. 70 Cal. 2d at 527, 450 P.2d at 582, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
183. See id. at 538, 450 P.2d at 589, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
184. Id. at 539, 450 P.2d at 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 198 (quoting People v.
Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783 (1965)).
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requisite mens rea for murder without ever having to consider it.18 5
In adopting the merger doctrine for the first time, the court held that
"second-degree felony-murder instruction may not properly be given
when it is based upon a felony which is an integral part of the
homicide and which the evidence produced by the prosecution shows
to be an offense included in fact within the offense charged."'
8 6
Subsequent decisions following Ireland tested the applicability
of the merger doctrine for various felonies.' 87  For example, in
People v. Landry, similar to Ireland, the underlying felony was
assault with a deadly weapon.18 8 There, the defendant was assaulting
the victim's friend with a gun when the victim appeared.'8 9 The
defendant's accomplice, who was next to the defendant, shot and
killed the victim.190 Relying on Ireland, the California Court of
Appeal held that the merger doctrine precluded a second-degree
felony-murder instruction against the defendant.' 91
In the companion cases People v. Schockley' 92 and People v.
Smith,193 both involving child abuse felonies, the courts further
demarcated the line between felonies that merge and felonies that do
not merge. In Schockley, the defendant was tried for second-degree
felony-murder based on willful cruelty and endangerment after she
185. Seeid.
186. Id. (emphasis added). Although the Ireland court did not specify how
they derived the phrase "integral part of the homicide," it appears to have been
derived from the law review article: The Doctrine of Merger in Felony-
Murder and Misdemeanor-Manslaughter, supra note 179, at 118.
187. See, e.g., People v. Mahle, 273 Cal. App. 2d 309, 78 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1969) (where the defendant had been convicted of second-degree murder for
stabbing his wife to death while intoxicated); see also People v. Carlson, 37
Cal. App. 3d 349, 112 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1974) (where the defendant had been
convicted of voluntary manslaughter and second-degree murder for the killing
of an unborn child and mother, where the death of the fetus was caused by the
death of the mother); People v. Jenkins, 275 Cal. App. 2d 545, 80 Cal. Rptr.
257 (1969) (where the defendant had been convicted of second-degree murder
for shooting the victim to death even though he claimed to have an abnormal
mental condition).
188. 212 Cal. App. 3d 1428, 261 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1989).
189. See id. at 1431, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 1438-39, 261 Cal. Rptr at 260.
192. 79 Cal. App. 3d 669, 145 Cal.Rptr. 200 (1978).
193. 35 Cal. 3d 798, 678 P.2d 886, 201 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1984) (overruled on
another ground by People v. Felix, 22 Cal. 4th 651, 657, 995 P.2d 186, 190, 94
Cal. Rptr. 2d 54, 59 (2000)).
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malnourished and dehydrated her infant son to death. 194 The Court
of Appeal held that the felony did not merge with the killing because
it is "based on an independent felony not related to the assault
causing murder .... ,19 However, the California Supreme Court in
Smith applied the merger rule because the underlying felony
involved a child beating.
196
When the Ireland court adopted the merger doctrine, the
amorphous "integral part of the homicide" language raised growing
speculation that the courts would apply the merger doctrine to all
felonies closely related to a homicide, and thereby circumscribe the
felony-murder doctrine. 197 Despite this concern, the cases following
Ireland failed to expand the scope of the merger rule because all the
cases where the underlying felony had merged with the resulting
homicide involved assaultive felonies. Although it seemed plausible
that a felony unrelated to assault could be characterized as "an
integral part of the homicide," the courts have never extended the
Ireland doctrine beyond the context of assault.
198
The California Supreme Court sought to clarify this issue in
People v. Mattison.199 The defendant in Mattison was a prisoner
who supplied methyl alcohol to an alcoholic inmate. The methyl
alcohol subsequently killed the inmate.200 The California Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's contention that the merger rule
precluded the application of the second-degree felony-murder
doctrine.20 ' The court explained that the merger rule did not apply
because the defendant had not committed the felonious act with the
194. See Schockley, 79 Cal. App. 3d at 673, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
195. Id. at 676, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
196. See Smith, 35 Cal. 3d at 801, 678 P.2d at 887, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
197. See Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th at 313-14, 885 P.2d at 1029, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
616.
198. See id.
199. 4 Cal. 3d 177, 481 P.2d 193, 93 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1971).
200. See id. at 180-81, 481 P.2d at 195, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 187. The defendant
was charged with second-degree felony-murder based on Cal. Penal Code §
347 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003) for willfully furnishing poisonous substance.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2002) (killing by means of a poisonous
substance, based on willfulness, deliberation or premeditation, is first-degree
murder; without the necessary mens rea for murder, it is second-degree murder
based on the felony-murder doctrine).
201. See Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d at 185-86, 481 P.2d at 198-99, Cal. Rptr. at
190.
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intent to commit an injury that would result in death.2 °2 The court
concluded that the application of the felony-murder rule was proper
because the underlying felony was committed with a "collateral and
independent felonious design."
20 3
People v. Hansen is the California Supreme Court's latest
pronouncement on the merger rule.20 4 The case involved a defendant
who fired a handgun repeatedly at an apartment building striking a
child occupant and killing her.2 °5 The defendant was found guilty of
second-degree felony-murder based on discharging a firearm at an
inhabited dwelling.206 On appeal, the defendant contended that the
second-degree felony-murder instruction was erroneous because the
felony had merged with the resulting homicide.20 7 The California
Supreme Court examined the "integral part of the homicide"
language in Ireland and the "collateral and independent felonious
design" language of Mattison.20 8 The majority rejected Ireland's
"integral part of the homicide" language as the determinative test in
the existence of merger. 20 9 The court stated that this language would
preclude the felony-murder rule from applying to felonies that are
most likely to result in death, making the felony-murder doctrine
inapplicable to felonies where the perpetrator can foresee the
likelihood that death may result, negligently or accidentally. 210 This
in turn would undermine the purpose of the felony-murder doctrine,
deterring felons from killing negligently or accidentally.
However, the court did not adopt Mattison's language either
because "a felon who acts with a purpose other than specifically to
inflict injury upon someone.., is subject to greater criminal liability
for an act resulting in death than a person who actually intends to
injure the person of the victim. '211 Rather, the court looked at
whether the use of certain inherently dangerous felonies "as the
predicate felony supporting application of the felony-murder rule
202. See id.
203. Id.
204. 9 Cal. 4th 300, 885 P.2d 1022, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 609 (1994).
205. See id. at 306, 885 P.2d at 1024, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 611.
206. See id. at 307, 885 P.2d at 1025, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 312-16, 885 P.2d at 1028-32, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615-19.
209. See id. at 314, 885 P.2d at 1030, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
210. See id.
211. Id. at 315, 885 P.2d at 1030, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
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[would] elevate all felonious assaults to murder or otherwise subvert
the legislative intent." 212 The majority held that most homicides do
not result from violations of willfully discharging a firearm at a
dwelling house. Furthermore, a second-degree felony-murder
instruction would not preclude the jury from "considering the issue
of malice aforethought in the great majority of all homicides. 2 13
Although the Hansen court did not explicitly state that the merger
doctrine applies only to assaultive felonies, the lower courts have
interpreted the decision as placing such a limitation.
214
The Hansen court's conclusion suggests a reversal of its
predecessor courts' narrow application of the disfavored felony-
murder doctrine.215 The majority's limitation on the merger rule
makes the felony-murder rule less restrictive; in spite of all the past
criticism.
216
2. Challenges made against the second-degree felony-murder
doctrine
Since 1872, the second-degree felony-murder doctrine existed in
California as "a udge-made doctrine without any express basis in the
Penal Code."21  The felony-murder doctrine has endured much
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., People v. Malfavon, 102 Cal. App. 4th 727, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d
618 (2002) (merger rule triggers only when the underlying felony was assault);
People v. Baker, 74 Cal. App. 4th 243, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 803 (1999) (citing the
Hansen court's test for the merger rule); see also, Johnson, 15 Cal. App. 4th at
175, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654 (court recognized that the "underlying felony must
have a purpose other than the assault for the felony-murder rule to apply").
215. See Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th at 314, 885 P.2d at 1030, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
617.
216. See generally Gerald F. Uelmen, California Courts: The Lucas Legacy,
1996 CAL. LAWYER 29 (May 1996). Chief Justice Lucas, who presided over
the Hansen case, but more importantly who presided over the California
Supreme Court after Justice Bird was removed from the bench, is considered to
have "brought strong law-and-order credentials to the anointed task of
'righting' a court some perceived as having slipped off the deep left end." Id.
Chief Justice Lucas is also described to be "deferential to legislative
authority," and "preached judicial restraint," seeing the "judicial creativity [of
his predecessors] as the problem, rather than the solution." Id.
217. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at
408 n.19 (1983). This is not to suggest that there is absolutely no statutory
basis, because Penal Code § 189 has a catch-all provision, where "[a]ll kinds of
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criticism, as it has been characterized by the courts as anachronistic,
disfavored, unnecessarily applied in almost all cases, and eroding
"the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability."
218
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court has refused all
invitations to abolish the felony-murder doctrine because "the
concept [is] imbedded in our law." 219
In People v. Dillon, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the
first-degree felony-murder rule.22° The holding suggested that the
legislature reconsider the subject of first-degree and second-degree
felony-murder doctrine.22 ' In Burroughs, the court referred to the
Dillon decision and suggested that although the issue regarding the
continued "vitality" of the second-degree felony-murder rule was at
stake in neither Dillon nor Burroughs, they would review the rule if
it were raised for review.222 However, the court rescinded its
invitation when it heard the Patterson case, declining the defendant's
invitation to determine the continued vitality of the rule.223
At one point, the California Supreme Court seemed inclined to
review the validity of the second-degree felony-murder doctrine and
to abrogate it. However, the Patterson court's refusal to review the
doctrine reveals the California Supreme Court's reluctance to further
limit the felony-murder doctrine. The felony-murder doctrine is
firmly rooted within California law and it is unlikely that this
doctrine will undergo many further changes without legislative
action.
murders other than those specified as first-degree murders are murders of the
second-degree." DALTON & KNIGHTEN, supra note 3, § 5.6[A].
218. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 783, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446;
see also Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 829, 768 P.2d at 897, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 322;
Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d at 92, 560 P.2d at 1183, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 4;. Indeed,
the Model Penal Code has eliminated the "strict liability aspects of the
traditional felony-murder doctrine but at the same time recogniz[ed] the
probative significance of the concurrence of homicide and a violent felony."
219. People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 582, 414 P.2d 353, 360, 51 Cal. Rptr.
225, 232 (1966) (overruled on other grounds by Flood, 18 Cal. 4th at 490 n.12,
957 P.2d at 882 n.12, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193 n.12).
220. 34 Cal. 3d at 472, 668 P.2d at 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (1983).
221. See id. at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.19.
222. See Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 829 n.3, 678 P.2d at 897 n.3, 201 Cal.
Rptr. at 322 n.3.
223. See Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 621, 778 P.2d at 554, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
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D. Agency and Proximate Cause in Felony-Murder
The most difficult part of felony-murder is determining how far
liability should extend under the doctrine.224 Should liability be
imposed upon a defendant whose co-felon does the actual killing?
What if a bystander commits the killing? Should a defendant be
liable when the person killed is a co-felon, or is a co-felon's death of
too little concern to impose liability at all? Because no intent to kill
is required before imposing liability under felony-murder, the
element of causation is paramount.22s This reliance on causation has
made answering the previous questions critical, but at the same time
exceedingly difficult.
This Section examines the agency doctrine within the context of
felony-murder. It begins by defining "agency" and explaining its
role within felony-murder in California homicide law. Sub-section
one examines the role of the felony-murder doctrine in killings by a
co-felon, and sub-section two examines the role of the felony-murder
doctrine in killings by a third party, such as the victim.
Historically, courts have used the agency theory226 as a way of
establishing causation.227 Originally, this doctrine was borrowed
from the conspiracy doctrine. When courts first applied the
224. See Michelle S. Simon, Whose Crime Is It Anyway?: Liability for the
Lethal Acts of Nonparticipants in the Felony, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 223,
224 (1994).
225. Id.
226. Agency is a fiduciary relation established when one person acts on
behalf of another. An example of the agency theory appears in Commonwealth
v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541 (1863). The defendant was involved in a riot, and
the court considered whether the defendant could be guilty of felony-murder
when another person was killed by a soldier who was resisting the riot's attack.
Id. at 542-46. In defining the scope of agency within felony-murder, the court
held that "a person engaged in the commission of an unlawful act is legally
responsible for all of the consequences which may naturally or necessarily
flow from it, and that, if he combines and confederates with others to
accomplish an illegal purpose, he is liable... for the acts of each and all who
participate with him... ." Id. at 543-44.
227. For a discussion of causation, see supra Part V.
228. See Simon, supra note 224, at 226-34. In the conspiracy doctrine, a co-
conspirator's liability is limited to only those acts that are committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy. They are not responsible for any acts that were
committed outside of those planned by the conspirators. These outside acts
were seen as destroying the agency relationship between the parties, severing
vicarious liability.
Summer 2003] 1511
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1479
conspiracy doctrine, liability was limited to those situations that
involved a killing in furtherance of the felony.229  As such, if a
bystander did the killing, no liability would be imposed because the
killing did not further the purpose of the felons in the commission of
the crime.230 Therefore, the identity of the killer became the
threshold issue for liability under the felony-murder doctrine, and the
killer's identity moved to the forefront in importance.
231
This theory of agency has been used by a majority of the
states.232 However, recently courts have begun moving~towards a
proximate-cause theory of liability.233  This approach shifts the
threshold issue to whether the killing was a foreseeable result of the
commission of the felony.234  This theory appears to have been
borrowed from tort law, where a defendant may be liable if the injury
suffered by the plaintiff was foreseeable.235 However, the defendant
would not be liable if there was an intervening event that broke the
chain of causation.236
California goes one step further by requiring only a causal
relationship. In People v. Stamp, the court imposed felony-murder
liability noting that "[t]he doctrine is not limited to those deaths
which are foreseeable. 237 Rather, the conviction rested on the direct
causal relationship between the felony and the murder.238 In Stamp,
the victim died of a heart attack shortly after the defendants
committed a robbery. 239 On appeal, the defendants argued that the
felony-murder doctrine should not have been applied because the
killing had not occurred in perpetration of the felony.2 40 Rather, the
229. See id.
230. See id. Indeed, if a bystander did the killing, it often is in resistance of
the felony, and not in furtherance of it.
231. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 472-80.
232. See State v. Branson, 487 N.W. 2d 880 (Minn. 1992); State v. Bonner,
411 S.E. 2d 598 (N.C. 1992); State v. Hoang, 755 P.2d 7 (Kan. 1988).
233. See KADISH & SHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 471-72.
234. See id.
235. See Simon, supra note 224. See generally, Note, Felony-murder: A
Tort Law Reconceptualization, 99 HARV. L. REV 1918, 1918-20 (1986)
(comparing the felony-murder rule to tort law).
236. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 42, 43 (5th ed. 1984).
237. 2 Cal. App. 3d 203, 210, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 603 (1969).
238. See id. at 209, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
239. See id. at 207, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
240. See id.
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killing was perpetrated after the robbery had already occurred. The
California Court of Appeal disagreed and held that the felony-murder
doctrine was not limited to foreseeable deaths. The felony-murder
rule would apply as long as the killing was a "direct causal result" of
the felony.
241
1. Agency: killings by a co-defendant
The felony-murder rule is invoked when a defendant kills
another during the perpetration of a felony.242 However, problems
arise when a co-felon commits the murder. How far should liability
extend? This has led to the development of agency within the
context of felony-murder.
California courts have repeatedly held that all co-felons involved
in the commission of a crime are equally responsible for a murder
that is committed by one of them during the perpetration of the
felony.243 This approach appears to have been first adopted by the
California courts in People v. Vasquez.244 There, a man had been
shot to death during the robbery of a store.245 Vasquez admitted to
being involved in the robbery but testified that another robber had
fired the shot without his approval.246 Vasquez appealed his
conviction, but the court held him responsible for the homicides
committed by his associates because they were "in furtherance of the
common purpose ... of the robbery.
247
Shortly after Vasquez, in the similar case of People v. Olsen, the
court held that "[i]f a number of persons conspire together to commit
a felony, and take the life of another person... it is murder in all,
although only one may have inflicted the fatal blow."
248
241. See id. at 210, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
242. See supra, Part VI.B.
243. See People v. Gilbert, 22 Cal. 2d 522, 140 P.2d 9 (1943); People v.
Martin, 12 Cal. 2d 466, 85 P.2d 880 (1938); People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 290
P. 881 (1930); People v. Perry, 195 Cal. 623, 234 P. 890 (1925).
244. 49 Cal. 560 (1875); see also People v. Smithson, 79 Cal. App. 4th 480,
94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 170 (2000) (holding that a defendant, if his accomplice in the
robbery killed his victim by accident, should be convicted of first-degree
murder).
245. See Vasquez, 49 Cal. 560-61 (1875).
246. See id.
247. Id. at 562.
248. 80 Cal. 122, 124, 22 P. 125, 126 (1889).
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This doctrine continues to be followed by the California courts.
Indeed, the California Supreme Court highlighted the deep
entrenchment of agency within the felony-murder doctrine in People
v. Martin.249 There, the defendant appealed his murder conviction,
claiming that although he did drive his co-felon to the scene of the
crime, he should not be held responsible for the murder because he
did not assist his co-felon in the commission of the murder.25 0 The
California Supreme Court denied his appeal stating:
It is, of course, the well-settled law in California that if a
human being is killed by any one of several persons jointly
engaged at the time of such killing in the perpetration of or
an attempt to perpetrate the crime of robbery, whether such
killing is intentional or unintentional, or accidental, each
and all of such persons so jointly engaged in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate such crime of
robbery, are guilty of murder of the first-degree.25'
Thus, the agency doctrine had become a deeply-rooted, integral
part of California felony-murder law.
252
a. in furtherance requirement
The California courts have been inconclusive about the scope of
complicity required to impose liability. This has resulted in two
conflicting formulations of the scope of the felony-murder rule when
applied to killings committed by co-felons. One line of cases-
sometimes referred to as the Vasquez approach-takes the view that
the killing by a co-felon must be "in furtherance of the common
purpose."25 3 This is consistent with language from the California
Supreme Court's earlier cases, such as Vasquez and Olsen.254
However, the other line of cases takes a broader view, simply
requiring the killer and the accomplice to be jointly engaged in a
249. 12 Cal. 2d 466, 85 P.2d 880 (1938).
250. See id. at 472, 85 P.2d at 883-84.
251. Id. (emphasis added).
252. See People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 782, 402 P.2d 130, 133
(1965).
253. Vasquez, 49 Cal. at 560; see also Olsen, 80 Cal. at 122, 22 P. at 125;
Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 777, 402 P.2d at 130 (holding that liability for
felony-murder requires a killing by a co-felon that is in furtherance of the
common purpose).
254. See Vasquez, 49 Cal. at 560; Olsen, 80 Cal. at 122, 22 P. at 125.
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felony at the time of the killing.255 This approach was adopted by the
California Supreme Court in People v. Perry.
256
In Perry, the defendant was tried and convicted of robbery and
felony-murder.257  On appeal, the defendant challenged the
instructions given to the jury.258 The court denied his appeal, stating
that it was not error to instruct the jury that "if a human being is
killed by any one of several persons jointly engaged at the time of
such killing in the perpetration of [a felony], whether such killing is
intentional or unintentional... all.., engaged in the perpetration of
[the felony], are guilty of murder of the first degree. 259  This
instruction did not include an "in furtherance" clause, even though
the court acknowledged that other cases had included such
language.260 The language used by this court was adopted in other
cases,261 resulting in a divergent approach to the scope of
complicity.262  This caused confusion about the requirements for
imposing felony-murder on co-felons who did not commit the
killing.
The California Court of Appeal attempted to reconcile the two
complicity rules in People v. Cabaltero.263 There, the defendant was
participating in a robbery when one of his co-felons, Dasalla, killed a
third member of the group out of anger.264 On appeal, the defendants
argued that they could not be held liable for the killing committed by
Dasalla because the killing had not been committed in furtherance of
255. See People v. Perry, 195 Cal. 623, 234 P. 890 (1925); see also People v.
Martin, 12 Cal. 2d 466, 85 P.2d 880 (1938) (requiring the killer and the
accomplice to be jointly engaged in the felony at the time of killing).
256. See Perry, 195 Cal. at 633, 234 P. at 894.
257. See id. at 626, 234 P. at 891.
258. See id. at 637-38, 234 P. at 896.
259. Id.
260. See id.
261. See generally People v. Witt, 170 Cal. 104, 148 P. 928 (1915) (finding
that any killing in furtherance of a felony is first-degree murder); People v.
Raber, 168 Cal. 316, 143 P. 317 (1914) (stating that a killing done in
perpetration of robbery is murder); People v. Milton, 145 Cal. 169, 173, 78 P.
549, 554 (1904) (holding that omitting the words "without any design to effect
death" from the felony-murder statute makes "any killing, while engaged in the
perpetration of a felony, murder in the first-degree").
262. See Perry, 195 Cal. at 623, 234 P. at 890; Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at
777, 402 P.2d at 130.
263. 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939).
264. See id. at 54, 87 P.2d at 365.
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the felony.265 The court acknowledged that there was indeed a line
of cases suggesting that the defendants could not be held liable for
killings not in furtherance of the felony.266 Nonetheless, the court
upheld the defendant's conviction, stating that the Perry line of cases
allowed for the imposition of the felony-murder rule when the killing
occurred during the commission of the felony.267
The court was attempting to reconcile the two approaches into
268one cohesive rule. Even though this rule has encountered a great
deal of criticism from commentators, it remains good law.269 The
critics of the rule charge that it removes the causal requirement from
felony-murder and replaces it with "mere coincidence of time and
place." 270 Commentators argue that the rule is too broad.271 It is
easy to think of a situation where two conspirators, Felon A and
Felon B, are committing a felony and while committing the felony,
Felon A sees his girlfriend on a date with another man. He shoots
them both out of rage. Applying the Cabaltero rationale, Felon B
would be liable under the felony-murder rule because the killing
occurred during the commission of a felony, despite a lack of causal
relationship between his activities and the killing of the victims.
272
The Cabaltero approach has resulted in a further widening of the
scope of complicity that allows for the application of the felony-
murder doctrine.
b. defendant joins co-felon after killing occurred
Although a felon is liable for killings committed by co-felons
during the commission of a crime, it was not clear whether liability
extended to co-felons who joined the felonious enterprise after the
265. See id. at 60-61, 87 P.2d at 368.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 61-62, 87 P.2d at 368-69.
268. See id.
269. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW (2nd ed. 1986) (criticizing the felony-murder doctrine as
substituting the "mere coincidence of time and place" for what should be a
required causal relationship between planned felony and killing). There has
been a lot of criticism of the felony-murder rule in general. However, a
detailed discussion of this criticism and its merits is beyond the scope of this
article.
270. Id. § 7.5.
271. See id.
272. See Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d at 52, 87 P.2d at 364.
1516
FELONY-MURDER
killing had already occurred.273 This problem recently presented
itself to the court in People v. Pulido.
274
In Pulido, a cashier at a gas station was shot in the head during a
robbery.275  The defendant, Pulido, claimed that it was his uncle,
Aragon who had committed the murder.276 Pulido testified that on
the night of the murder he and his uncle had been driving and his
27uncle stopped at a gas station to buy cigarettes. 7 Pulido claimed to
have heard gunshots, and when he ran into the gas station, he found
the clerk dead.278 When he ran back to his car, his uncle followed
him with the entire cash register.279 He then alleged that his uncle
forced him to open the cash register and take the money inside.28 °
Despite Pulido's claims, the jury convicted him of robbery and
felony-murder, but they could not decide if he in fact killed the
clerk.
281
On appeal, Pulido argued that the court committed reversible
error by failing to instruct the jury that in order to find him liable
under felony-murder, they would have to find that he joined in the
robbery before the killing occurred.282 The court held that under
both the Vasquez and Perry approach, an accomplice is not liable for
a killing that preceded any intent to engage in a felony.283
Looking first at the Vasquez approach to the scope of
accomplice liability for felony-murder, the court noted that liability
under felony-murder only attaches to killings that are committed in
273. Depending on the court, the defendant may only be liable if the killing
was committed in furtherance of the felony. See supra, Part VI.D.l.a for a
more detailed discussion of this conflict.
274. 15 Cal. 4th 713, 936 P.2d 1235, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625 (1997).
275. See id. at 717, 936 P.2d at 1237, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 718, 936 P.2d at 1237-38, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627-28.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See id. at 719, 936 P.2d at 1238, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628.
282. See id. at 726, 936 P.2d at 1243, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633.
283. See id. at 721-22, 936 P.2d at 1239-40, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629-30.
Although the court held that an accomplice was not liable for a killing that
occurred before the accomplice joined the felonious enterprise, it nonetheless
upheld the defendant's conviction because the trial court remedied the error in
a instruction.
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furtherance of a common purpose.2 84 Because the killing occurred
before the defendant had joined in the felonious purpose, it could not
have been committed to further that purpose.285 Furthermore, under
the Perry approach, liability would not attach because "the killer and
accomplice were not 'jointly engaged at the time of such killing' in
[a felony]. ' '286 Therefore, neither the Vasquez nor the Perry
approach encompassed killings that occurred before joining the
felonious enterprise.28 7
The court also pointed to the purpose behind the felony-murder
rule as justification for its decision.288  The court believed that
extension of felony-murder complicity to felons who join after the
killing has occurred would violate the court's prior holding that
"conspirators are not liable for substantive crimes committed before
their entry into the conspiracy.' ' 289 Furthermore, the court believed
that extending the rule would not further its deterrent function.290 It
reasoned that if the purpose of the felony-murder doctrine was to
deter negligent or accidental killings during the commission of a
felony, then "punishing late joiners for earlier homicides committed
by others [would] not deter the negligent or accidental commission
of such homicides" because the late joiners would have no way of
preventing the killing.291 Although imposing liability would deter
joining such enterprises, the court believed that the punishment that
would be imposed would not be proportional to the crime, especially
because the killing was not causally related to the acts of the co-
felon.292
284. See id.; Vasquez, 49 Cal. at 560; Olsen, 80 Cal. at 122, 22 P. at 125;
Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 777, 402 P.2d at 133.
285. See Pulido, 15 Cal. 4th at 721-22, 936 P.2d at 1239-40, 63 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 629-30.
286. Id. at 722, 936 P.2d at 1241, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631.
287. See id.
288. See id. at 724-25, 936 P.2d at 1241-42, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632-33.
289. Id. at 725, 936 P.2d at 1242; see also People v. Weiss, Cal. 2d 535,
564-65, 327 P.2d 527, 544-45 (1958) (explaining that one who joins a
conspiracy after its formation adopts the previous acts and declarations of the
other conspirators).
290. See Pulido, 15 Cal. 4th at 725, 936 P.2d at 1242-43, 63, Cal. Rptr. 2d at
633.
291. Id.
292. See id.
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c. co-felon kills a felon
Typically, it is the killing of a victim of the felony that results in
prosecution under the felony-murder doctrine. However, there are
situations where the killing is of a co-felon, by a felon. Situations
where a co-felon has been killed by his accomplice have stirred
much debate about whether the felony-murder doctrine should
apply.293 This debate has resulted in a split among jurisdictions.294
California has decided to impose liability under the felony-murder
doctrine.295
Imposition of liability for the killing of a co-felon by an
accomplice first occurred in People v. Cabaltero.296 As discussed
above, Dasalla, one of the defendant's co-felons, killed a third
member of the group out of anger.297 On appeal, the defendant
argued both that the killing did not meet the requirements of felony-
murder, and that the issue of whether it was accidental or intentional
should have been submitted to the jury.298 The court turned to the
specific language of prior cases defining the scope of felony-murder,
which held that any killing committed by a co-felon in furtherance of
the felony establishes liability.299  The court acknowledged that
although there were no cases directly on point, the "language
employed in the decisions ... makes it clear that said section [189]
was designed to include ... any killing by one engaged in the
commission of any of the specified felonies, regardless of the status
of the person killed.,
30 0
The defendants attempted to bolster their position by pointing to
People v. Ferlin.30 1 There, the defendant conspired with another to
bum his leased premises for insurance money.30 2  During the
293. See Lawrence Newman & Lawrence Weitzer, Duress, Free Will and the
Criminal Law, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 313,357-62 (1957).
294. See id.
295. See People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 58, 87 P.2d
364, 367 (1939).
296. Id. at 52, 87 P.2d at 364.
297. See id. at 56, 87 P.2d at 366.
298. See id. The court argued that the killing was governed by Cal. Penal
Code § 187 and not § 189. Therefore, if the jury found that the co-felon was
shot accidentally, he must be acquitted.
299. See id. at 58, 87 P.2d at 367.
300. Id.
301. 203 Cal. 587, 265 P.2d 230 (1928).
302. See id. at 589, 265 P.2d at 231-32.
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perpetration of the felony, a co-conspirator accidentally burned
himself to death.3 °3 The jury convicted the defendant of felony-
murder, but the California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
defendant was not liable under the felony-murder doctrine because
the co-felon killed himself.3°4 However, the Cabaltero court was
quick to distinguish the case.30 5 It noted that in Ferlin, the co-felon
killed himself, but in Cabaltero the co-felon was killed by another
co-felon.30 6 This distinction is what allowed for the imposition of the
felony-murder rule under California Penal Code section 189.307
2. Killings by a victim or police officer
Courts have had difficulty applying the felony-murder doctrine
in a variety of situations. However, one of the most difficult
situations for the courts to sort out involves applying the felony-
murder doctrine to killings perpetrated by third parties rather than
accomplices of the defendant.30 8
When this issue first arose, the California courts appeared to
treat it as an issue of causation, which led to the development and
application of proximate cause theories of liability.30 9 One of the
earliest applications of this approach can be found in People v.
Harrison.
310
In Harrison, three men went into a store with the intent to rob
it.3 11 While doing so, an employee of the store grabbed a gun and
began shooting at the defendants. 312 In the process, he ended up
killing his employer who was also in the store.313 The defendants
were charged and convicted of robbery and felony-murder. 314 They
appealed their conviction, arguing that because a co-felon had not
303. See id.
304. See id. at 596-98, 265 P.2d at 234-35.
305. See Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d at 59-60, 87 P.2d at 368.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. See WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 69 (1998).
309. See People v. Harrison, 176 Cal. App. 2d 330, 334-35, 1
Cal. Rptr. 414, 417-18 (1959).
310. See id. at 345, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
311. Seeid. at 331, 1 Cal. Rptr. at415-416.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id.
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committed the killing, the felony-murder rule did not apply.3 15 The
court noted that at the time the case arose, there were no California
cases on point.316 Accordingly, the court turned to an examination of
decisions reached by other states,3 7 as well as an examination of tort
law.3 18 Ultimately, the court decided to follow the lead set by cases
such as Commonwealth v. Almeida and People v. Podlski and applied
tort principles of proximate cause.3 19 The court stated that when the
co-felons should reasonably foresee the likelihood of a killing by a
non-participant during the commission of a felony, the co-felons are
liable for the killing as if they committed it.320 The court stated that
given the purposes of the felony-murder rule, there is no reason to
differentiate between killings by a third party or by a co-felon.
321
"The killing was murder and it was committed in the perpetration of
attempted robbery ... .,322 Therefore, because the defendants put in
motion a chain of events that they should have foreseen, they are
liable for the death of the victim, even though he was shot by a third
party.
323
However, a few years later in People v. Washington, the court
revisited this issue and clarified the scope of its prior holding.324 In
Washington, the defendant and a co-felon robbed a gas station.
325
The owner of the gas station pulled out a revolver and shot the co-
felon, killing him.326 The defendant was convicted of both robbery
and felony-murder.327 He appealed the conviction, arguing that the
rule of Harrison should be limited only to those situations where an
innocent bystander is killed, and that it should not include cases
315. See id. at 331-32, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
316. See id. at 332, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
317. The court primarily examined Commonwealth v. Almeida, 68 A.2d 595
(Pa. 1949) (overruled in part by Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa.
218 (1970)) and People v. Podolski, 52 N.W. 2d 201 (Mich. 1952). Both held
that felons who provoke gunfire are guilty of first-degree murder even though
the lethal bullet was fired by a third party.
318. Harrison, 176 Cal. App. at 343-44, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 424-25.
319. See id. at 345, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. Id.
323. See id.
324. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
325. See id. at 779, 402 P.2d at 132, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
326. See id.
327. See id. at 779-780, 402 P.2d at 132-33, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
Summer 20031 1521
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1479
where their accomplices are killed.328 The court rejected this
distinction because it "would make the defendant's criminal liability
turn upon the marksmanship of victims and policemen. A rule of
law cannot reasonably be based on such a fortuitous
circumstance. 3 29 However, the court reconsidered Harrison in light
of the purposes of the felony-murder rule.33 °
The court began by examining the function of the felony-murder
doctrine.331 California Penal Code section 189 ascribes malice
aforethought to a felon who kills in the perpetration of a felony,
allowing a jury to convict him of murder.332 However, the court
noted that when a killing is not committed by the felon, but rather by
a third party, malice aforethought cannot be attributed to the felon
because the killing was not committed in perpetration of the
felony.333 Although Harrison attempted to attribute malice through
the use of proximate cause, the court determined that this was not
enough to meet the requirements of section 189.334 In examining the
facts of Washington, the court noted that, "the killing was committed
to thwart a felony. To include such killings within Section 189 [sic]
would expand the meaning of the words 'murder . . . which is
committed in the perpetration ... [of] robbery...' beyond common
understanding."3  However, even though the court refused to apply
the felony-murder rule in such circumstances, the decision does not
preclude the state from attempting to attach liability through other
theories of liability.336 Indeed, the court itself suggested that the
defendant could still be found liable for the murder through doctrines
such as vicarious liability and recklessness.
337
328. See id. The broad rule in Harrison was based on decisions from
Pennsylvania and Michigan. Ironically, both states have already limited the
doctrine by holding that felons are not liable under felony-murder if a third
party killed their accomplice.
329. Id. at 780, 402 P.2d at 132, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
330. See id. at 781-84, 402 P.2d at 133-35, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
331. See id.
332. See id. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between the
elements of murder and felony-murder, see supra Part VI.B.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. Id. at 781,402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
336. See id.
337. See id. An in-depth discussion of vicarious liability and recklessness is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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E. Conclusion
The felony-murder rule continues to be met with a great deal of
criticism. The removal of the intent requirement seems to be the
most troubling aspect of this rule, especially when it creates the
possibility that defendants may become liable for unforeseeable
killings by third parties. Despite these concerns, the felony-murder
rule continues to be enforced in California, although the scope of the
rule is in flux.
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VII. ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY: DERIVATIVE RESPONSIBILITY*
This Part examines the accomplice liability1 doctrine in
California criminal law, specifically in relation to murder. This is a
difficult area of criminal law, which consists of islands of light in a
sea of darkness. This Part explains the statutory requirements of
accomplice liability and examines the current state of the law in
California criminal law. Section A turns to a close examination of
the nature of both the aiding and abetting requirements as well as the
"natural and probable consequences" doctrine within California.
Section C consists of an examination of the relationship required
between an accomplice and a primary perpetrator in order to find
liability.
Section 31 of the California Penal Code states that "[a]ll
persons... [who] aid and abet in [the] commission [of a crime]...
are principals in any crime so committed.",2 Prior to the enactment of
this statute, common law made an aider or abettor a principal to the
crime in the second degree. 3 Furthermore, the common law both
prohibited the aider or abettor from being brought to trial until the
principal who committed the crime had been convicted, and required
* Larry M. Lawrence, II: J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Loyola Law School;
B.A., Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles. For making me
smile, a special thank you to Ted Biaselli. Ted, your wonderful
encouragement and support has made this possible. I would also like to thank
Amir Afsarzadeh for his unique input and insight.
1. Throughout this paper, I use the terms "accomplice liability" and
"aiding and abetting" interchangeably. Although perhaps conceptually
distinctive, in that "accomplice liability" encompasses a wider range of
liability, these terms are frequently used interchangeably by the courts, so I
will do the same.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 2001).
3. See People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, 439, 119 P. 901, 903 (1911); see
also People v. Butts, 236 Cal. App. 2d 817, 46 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1965); People v.
Collum, 122 Cal. 186, 54 P. 589 (1898) (rejecting from the category of
accomplices the accessory after the fact). Second-degree murder does not
require premeditation; however, it does require "malice aforethought." For a
further explanation of second-degree murder see supra Parts III and IV. A
further discussion of the evolution of common law rules to the current statutory
code is beyond the scope of this Developments piece and unfortunately not a
topic discussed in this Part.
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a separate charge of complicity.4 California Penal Code section 31
has effectively done away with the common law rule, thereby
simplifying California criminal law by combining all principals into
one category without reference to degrees.5 As the California
Supreme Court recently stated, "The aider and abettor doctrine
merely makes aiders and abettors liable for their accomplices'
actions as well as their own. It obviates the necessity to decide who
was the aider and abettor and who the direct perpetrator or to what
extent each played which role."
6
A. Accomplice Liability Defined
The doctrine of accomplice liability makes those who aid and
abet in the commission of a crime liable as a principal for the actions
of their accomplices. 7  This is a form of derivative liability-a
method of deriving criminal liability based upon the commission of a
criminal offense by another person.8 Because it is derivative,
criminal liability depends entirely upon the crime that the actual
perpetrator commits. 9  Accomplice liability is, therefore, not
4. See Coffey, 161 Cal. at 437-40, 119 P. at 903-04.
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 31.
6. People v. McCoy, 25 Cal. 4th 1111, 1120, 24 P.3d 1210, 1216, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 188, 195 (2001).
7. See id.; People v. Francisco, 22 Cal. App. 4th 1180, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d
695 (1994) (holding that an aider and abettor is liable as a principal if the act
committed by the primary perpetrator is reasonably foreseeable).
8. See Francisco, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 1190, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700-01;
see also People v. Brigham, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1039, 265 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1989)
(holding that the appellant's derivative criminal liability as an aider and abettor
for his partner's crime existed even though the crime was unintended by the
appellant).
9. See People v. McCoy, 79 Cal. App. 4th 67, 82, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 827,
838. It is important to note that accomplice liability is not a form of vicarious
liability. Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, the defendant is held
responsible for the actions of another based solely on the relationship between
the two parties. The defendant's guilt is found, not because of any conduct
that they have engaged in, but instead vicariously through the actual
perpetrator. See McCoy, 79 Cal. App. 4th. at 84, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839.
Rather, under the aiding and abetting doctrine, the liability of the accomplice is
derived based on their willful and culpable conduct in helping the perpetrator
violate the law. See id. This distinction becomes more apparent in discussing
the liability of an accomplice for a lesser crime than that committed by the
perpetrator.
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considered a separate criminal offense. It is an alternate form of
finding liability for the charged offense.10
The statutory term "aid and abet" is a legal term of art not
commonly used, nor even understood by lay persons. It represents a
legal theory under which one may be held derivatively liable as a
principal for the criminal acts of another if two elements are met.
Each element, aiding and abetting, performs a function necessary to
justify the imposition of criminal liability.
The "aiding" element requires some conduct by the accomplice
that results in the accomplice becoming involved in the commission
of a crime." The typical way in which a party becomes involved in
the commission of a crime is through the assistance, promotion,
encouragement, or instigation of criminal action.' 2 Once a party
becomes involved in the commission of a crime, the aiding element
has been met, no matter how slight the assistance. The law
establishes no degree requirement to the amount of involvement
required to fix liability as a principal.
13
The second element, "abetting," serves to supply the mental
state necessary to justify the imposition of criminal liability.'4 This
requirement looks for a criminal state of mind-specifically, it
requires that the accomplice has both knowledge of the perpetrator's
unlawful purpose to commit a crime, and the intent to facilitate the
perpetrator's unlawful purpose.15
Thus, as in most criminal conduct, accomplice liability involves
both an actus reus (the actual aiding) and a mens rea (the intent to
facilitate the criminal purpose of the perpetrator). 16
10. See Francisco, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 1190, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700-01;
Brigham, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 1039, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
11. See People v. Croy, 41 Cal. 3d 1, 11, 710 P.2d 392, 397-98, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 592, 597-98 (1985); see also People v. Nguyen, 21 Cal. App. 4th 518,
530, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323, 330-31 (1993) (holding that sexual offenses could
be reasonably foreseeable consequences of robbery for purposes of aiding and
abetting).
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 2001).
13. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 31; Ngyuen, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 529, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 329-30.
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 31.
15. See People v. Campbell, 25 Cal. App. 4th 402, 413-14, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
525, 532 (1994).
16. See id., People v. Fredoni, 12 Cal. App. 685, 108 P. 663 (1910).
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1. Aiding
Accomplice liability is a charge brought against someone who
actually engages in the assistance of the commission of a crime.
17
Aiding is frequently thought of as assisting in the commission of the
criminal offense, helping to supplement the efforts of another, or
assisting the perpetrator's acts. 18 As such, if someone were to stand
by and watch a rape occur, but not aid the commission of the crime
or facilitate its occurrence out of fear, that person would not be held
derivatively liable as an accomplice because they did not act
affirmatively. 19  Although this omission may be morally
reprehensible, it is not a legal basis for criminal liability.
Accomplice liability requires an affirmative act-aiding. Otherwise,
accomplices may be punished for nothing more than bad thoughts. °
Traditionally, when looking for an actus reus, courts require
both actual and proximate cause.2' When looking for actual cause,
the traditional test used is the "but-for" test.22 However, this test
17. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 31; see generally People v. Dole, 122 Cal.
486, 55 P. 581 (1898) (holding that a person may aid and abet a crime
innocently as in forgery); People v. Etie, 119 Cal. App. 2d 23, 258 P.2d 1069
(1953) (requiring aid before imposing accomplice liability).
18. See Dole, 122 Cal. at 486, 55 P. at 581; Etie, 119 Cal. App. 2d at 28,
258 P.2d at 1072. It is important to understand that the aiding element does
not require any knowledge that the aid rendered was in support of a criminal
act. This element is solely concerned with the accomplice's actions.
19. See People v. Hill, 77 Cal. App. 2d 287, 294, 175 P.2d 45, 49 (1946)
(holding that the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime does not
alone establish liability as an abettor). However, it is important to note that
factors, such as presence at the scene of the crime, may be circumstances that
can be considered by the jury with any other evidence in deciding the guilt or
innocence of the accused. See People v. Villa, 156 Cal. App. 2d 128, 134, 318
P.2d 828, 833 (1957).
20. The problems associated with having a legal system where we are
punished for our thoughts is explored in the recent film Minority Report.
There, society has developed a way to predict murders, and intervenes to stop
them. The film raises questions of human choice and when crimes are
committed.
21. Actual cause is a search for a direct link between the perpetrator's
actions and the crime, whereas proximate cause examines the nexus between
the action and the crime-how closely they are related.
22. See Causation in California Homicide, supra Part V. Typically the test
used when looking for actual cause is: "but-for" the perpetrator's actions, the
result would not have occurred.
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becomes problematic when applied to accomplice liability. For
example, if the accomplice's efforts to aid are somehow thwarted or
have a negligible effect on the criminal actor, does this satisfy the
causation requirement? Despite a lack of actual cause, courts are
frequently willing to hold an accomplice liable, which is seemingly
at odds with traditional notions of causation that require both actual
and proximate cause.23
An example of this can be seen in People v. Wood.24 There, the
defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting statutory rape25 after
he rented out his room to a young couple.26 Normally, one would
not think that renting out a room would be considered as having
assisted in the commission of a crime. The couple would have likely
engaged in sexual intercourse even if the defendant had not rented
them the room; yet in Wood, the court found that the renting of the
room was enough to constitute facilitation.27 As a result, the court
found the defendant liable under a theory of accomplice liability.28
In situations such as this, courts seem to disregard the normal
causation requirements, finding that the mere attempt at offering aid
justifies imposing liability.
29
Another classic example can be found in State ex rel. Attorney
General v. Tally, Judge.3 In this case, Ross, the victim, seduced
Judge Tally's sister-in-law. 31 As a result, her brothers, the Skeltons,
followed Ross to a nearby town to kill him.32 Ross's relatives learned
23. For a more detailed discussion, see Causation in California Homicide,
supra Part V.
24. 56 Cal. App. 431, 205 P. 698 (1922).
25. California defines statutory rape as any sexual intercourse with
someone under the age of eighteen who is not the spouse of the perpetrator.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 2001).
26. Wood, 56 Cal. App. at 431-33,205 P. at 698.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. (the court found the defendant guilty of statutory rape even
though it was conceded that he did not have sexual intercourse with the
victim).
30. 15 So. 722 (Ala. 1894). Although this is not a California case, it serves
to highlight problems associated with applying the "but-for" test of causation
to accomplice liability and the traditional ways in which courts deal with the
issue.
31. See id. at 724.
32. See id. at 725.
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of this and sent a telegram to warn him.33 After Judge Tally learned
of the telegram, he instructed the operator not to deliver the message345
to Ross. The Skelton brothers managed to find Ross and kill him.
In finding Judge Tally liable as an accomplice, the court noted
that there were problems with the "but-for" test.36 The murder would
likely have occurred with or without Judge Tally's involvement,
meaning that there may not have been a causal link between his
37action and the death of Ross. His actions had a negligible effect on
the commission of the crime. However, the court noted that "[i]t is
quite sufficient if [his act] ... facilitated a result that would have
transpired without it. It is quite enough if the aid merely renders it
easier for the principal actor to accomplish the end intended by
him... though ... the end would have been attained without it."
38
This problem of causation has been eliminated in the Model
Penal Code section 2.06(3). 39 The drafters of the Model Penal Code
extended liability to an accomplice when they aid or attempt to aid in
the commission of a crime.4U Holding a party liable for even an
attempt to aid a crime eliminates a line drawing problem. Although
California's Penal Code is not this specific, the California courts
have adopted an approach similar to that in Tally, repeatedly
stressing that "[t]he test is whether the accused in any way directly or
indirectly, aided the perpetrator by acts or encouraged him by words
or gestures.
'Al
33. Seeid. at 728.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 724.
36. See id. at 740-41.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 739.
39. The Model Penal Code is a scholarly collection of penal laws drafted by
the American Law Institute. It is meant to be a model for the states to use
when drafting, interpreting, and revising their penal codes. Therefore,
although not binding on any jurisdiction, courts frequently look to it for
guidance.
40. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (Official Draft 1962).
41. Villa, 156 Cal. App. 2d at 134, 318 P.2d at 833; see also Campbell, 25
Cal. App. 4th at 413-14, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 532 (factors which may be
considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at
the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the
offense).
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As these cases demonstrate, it is not necessary to establish a
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abetting instructions made it irrelevant whether appellant had driven
away from the scene for the purpose of facilitating the robbery or for
some other purpose. ' 49
a. proving knowledge and intent
It is often difficult to get into the mind of the accused to
determine if the accused actually had knowledge of the primary
perpetrator's criminal intent. Although the defendant does not have
the burden of proof, statements by the accused accomplice that he
was not aware of a plan to commit a crime is not sufficient to
constitute proof that he did not know about the primary perpetrator's
criminal intent.50 Therefore, California courts allow circumstantial
evidence to prove that the accused accomplice had knowledge of the
crime.
5 1
b. presence alone does not establish knowledge and intent
Mere presence at the scene of a crime is not enough to establish
that one is an abettor. 2  In Hill, the appellant, Hill met the
perpetrators of the crime for the first time shortly before the crime
took place. 5 After inducing him to drive around and look for girls,
the perpetrators asked Hill to park on the street and await their
return.54 He sat in the car, turned off the lights, and went to sleep.
55
49. Id. at 16, 710 P.2d at 401, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 600. The court noted that
there will be many cases where no other possible explanation exists for the
defendant's conduct other than that the defendant acted with an intent to
facilitate the crime at issue. In those cases, the court found it would not be
reversible error. However, here, the court found that had the jury been
properly instructed, it would have been possible for a reasonable juror to
believe that the defendant did not act with the purpose of facilitating a robbery
and thus, the conviction was reversed. See id.
50. See People v. Martin, 12 Cal. 2d 466, 85 P.2d 880 (1938); People v.
Jaggers, 120 Cal. App. 733, 8 P.2d 206 (1932); People v. Hall, 87 Cal. App.
634, 262 P. 50 (1927). Indeed, there would be few convictions if the court
were to believe every word that a defendant said.
51. See generally Martin, 12 Cal. 2d at 466, 85 P.2d at 880 (allowing the
jury to infer knowledge of criminal intent from circumstances such as presence
at the scene of the crime and relationship with co-felons).
52. See Hill, 77 Cal. App. 2d at 287, 175 P.2d at 45.
53. See id. at 290-91, 175 P.2d at 47.
54. See id.
55. See id.
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When the primary perpetrators returned, Hill drove them away.56 He
was found guilty of aiding and abetting armed robbery.57  The
appellate court overturned Hill's conviction because there was
insufficient evidence to convict him of accomplice liability.58 The
court stated that "[t]he mere presence of the accused at the scene of
the crime does not essentially establish his guilt as an abettor ....
[E]vidence of his mere presence without showing his preconcert with
the actors is insufficient as proof of guilt. '59 There had been no
testimony that contradicted the appellant's version of the facts-that
he did not see a gun, he was not aware why the principal perpetrators
asked him to stop the car, nor was he aware that when they returned
that they had committed a robbery.60 Furthermore, there had been no
evidence that the appellant acted in any way as a look-out for the
robbery.61 Although it is true that there was a gun in his car, the gun
was tucked under the seat, and Hill claimed to have never seen it
before.62
However, the California courts have narrowed their definition of
"mere presence" by allowing the jury to consider actions taken both
before and after the crime when imposing liability. Compare the Hill
case with People v. Moore.63 Moore was accused of aiding and
abetting an armed robbery of seven dollars, stolen at knifepoint.
64
As in Hill, there was no testimony that he actually physically assisted
in the robbery.65 Indeed, the victim testified that Moore "just stood
at the steps. He did not do nothing. He did not say nothing; he just
stood there." 66  However, when the police arrested Moore, they
found the knife and the money in his pocket. 67 Moore argued that he
could not be found liable as an aider and abettor for simply being
56. See id.
57. Seeid. at 288, 175 P.2d at 45.
58. See id. at 294, 175 P.2d at 47.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 292-94, 175 P.2d at 48-49.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 289, 175 P.2d at 46.
63. 120 Cal. App. 2d 303, 260 P.2d 1011 (1953).
64. See id. at 304, 260 P.2d at 1012.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 305, 260 P.2d at 1012.
67. See id.
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present at the time the crime was committed.68 However, the court
rejected this argument because Moore was in the "company of the
other defendants before the crime was committed, remained with
them during the robbery, fled with them from the hotel, and when
arrested with the others he had the knife and stolen bills in his
possession." 69 This was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that
he had enough knowledge to have abetted in the commission of the
crime.70 Although mere presence at the crime scene is not enough to
establish accomplice liability, it is evidence that the jury can consider
in determining whether or not the defendant is guilty of aiding and
abetting. The presence, companionship, and conduct of the
defendant with the primary perpetrators before and after the offense
are circumstances from which his criminal intent may be inferred.7'
The fact that Moore had the money and knife when he was arrested
indicates an agreement between the defendant and the primary
perpetrator, that is relevant to establish an intent to aid and abet.
B. Natural and Probable Consequences
An accomplice is liable for the commission of any acts that the
accomplice has knowledge of and actually intends to aid.72 But what
happens when the principal actor does something that the accomplice
was not intending to assist, or the accomplice did not have
knowledge of? In such situations, an accomplice could still be found
liable for acts the accomplice had no knowledge of, so long as the
acts were within the natural and reasonable consequences of acts the
accomplice did have knowledge of.
73
68. See id. at 306, 260 P.2d at 1013.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 306-07, 260 P.2d at 1013-14.
71. See id.
72. See People v. Beltran, 94 Cal. App. 2d 197, 210 P.2d 238 (1949).
73. See id. at 206, 210 P.2d at 243 (holding that "persons who aid and abet
in the commission of a criminal offense, though not being present, are liable
for all the natural and probable consequences incident to the commission of the
act which they have counseled or advised.") Id. at 205, 210 P.2d at 243,
People v. Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331, 92 P. 861 (1907) (holding that the jury can
impose liability if they find an act is the natural and probable consequence of
the accomplice's actions).
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The court has found that in order to determine what is a natural
and reasonable consequence, it must first make several factual
determinations. 74 First, the court must determine what crimes were
actually committed. Then, the court must determine what offenses
were reasonably foreseeable consequence of those crimes.75 As a
result, the accomplice is not automatically liable for the actions of
the primary perpetrator. "Accordingly, an aider and abettor may be
found guilty of crimes.., which are less serious than the gravest
offense the perpetrator commits." '76  The accomplice's guilt is
directly related to the foreseeability of the perpetrator's criminal
acts."7
In People v. Brigham, the court explained that when determining
whether the actions of the primary perpetrator were reasonably
foreseeable by the accomplice, liability is based on an objective
analysis of causation, not the subjective view of what the accomplice
believed might occur. Under an objective analysis, the jury must
determine whether a reasonable person, under similar circumstances
as the defendant, would recognize that the crime committed by the
primary perpetrator was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
act that the defendant was aiding and abetting.79 This finding will
depend on the circumstances surrounding the conduct of both the
perpetrator and the aider and abettor.8 0 The jury can consider "not
[only] the circumstances prevailing prior to or at the commencement
of the [criminal] endeavor, but must include all of the circumstances
leading up to the last act by which the participant directly or
indirectly aided or encouraged the principal actor in the commission
of the crime."
81
74. See People v. Woods, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1570, 1587, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231,
240 (1992).
75. See id. at 1586, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 239-40.
76. Id. at 1586-87, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240.
77. See id.
78. 216 Cal. App. 3d 1039, 1051, 265 Cal. Rptr. 486, 493 (1989).
79. See id.
80. See id. at 1053-54, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 494-96; People v. Jardine, 116
Cal. App. 3d 907, 172 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1981).
81. Nguyen, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 532, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332.
1534
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
In People v. Nguyen, eight men robbed a tanning salon,
threatened the owner with guns, and pinned her to the floor.82 While
pinned to the floor, one of the robbers placed a gun in the owner's
vagina and threatened to fire it if she did not give them her
valuables. 83 These same individuals went on to rob a local spa, but
this time, one of the robbers fondled and sexually violated the owner
with a finger. 84 The other perpetrators were convicted of robbery
and of aiding and abetting sexual penetrations with foreign objects.85
On appeal, they argued that the forcible sexual penetrations were
neither reasonably foreseeable nor the natural and probable
consequence of robbery.86 However, the court found ample evidence
that the sexual offenses were a reasonably foreseeable result of the
defendants' participation in the robbery, especially because they
were charged with two different assaults.87 The defendants chose to
rob places that they believed were engaged in prostitution and had a
"sexual aura.",88 Additionally, those defendants who did not commit
the actual assault did aid in its perpetration because their presence at
the crime provided security and control to those who were actually
engaged in the sexual assault. 89 The court found that given these
circumstances, the "foreseeability of sexual assault went from
possible or likely to certain, yet defendants continued to lend their
aid and assistance to the endeavor." 90 Thus, there was plenty of
evidence for a jury to believe that a reasonable person would have
known that the sexual assault was a natural and probable result of
aiding and abetting the robbery.91
The court further clarified the jury instructions regarding natural
and probable circumstances for aiding and abetting in People v.
Prettyman.92 There, the defendant, Bray, was convicted of murder as
82. See id. at 526, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 327.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 524, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 326.
86. See id. at 527-28, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 328-29.
87. See id. at 533, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 533, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333.
90. Id. at 534, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333.
91. See id.
92. 14 Cal. 4th 248, 926 P.2d 1013, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 827 (1996).
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an aider and abettor.93 She encouraged the primary perpetrator to
beat a man in order to retrieve her wallet. 94  The primary
perpetrator's subsequent beating of the man caused him to choke on
his blood and die.95 At trial, the prosecutor argued that even if Bray
did not intend for the perpetrator to murder the victim, she should
still be found guilty because the murder was within the natural and
probable consequences of the primary perpetrator's actions.96 The
trial court instructed the jury that Bray could be found liable "for the
natural and probable consequences of the commission of [a]
crime." 97 The court stated that the jury must engage in a two-step
process. First, the jury must determine whether the defendant was
guilty of the crime that was originally contemplated. If the jury
determines that the defendant was guilty of the originally
contemplated crime, they must then determine whether any of the
other charged crimes were a natural and probable circumstance of the
crime that was originally contemplated. The court did not instruct
the jury about the elements of any criminal acts that Bray was
alleged to have contemplated. 99 The jury convicted Bray and she
appealed, arguing that the trial court had committed prejudicial error
by not "identifying [or] describing any target or predicate crime that
she might have originally contemplated."' 00
The California Supreme Court reversed, stating that the trial
court must identify the uncharged crimes that the prosecution
93. See id. at 254, 926 P.2d at 1015, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829.
94. See id. at 255-56, 926 P.2d at 1015-16, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829-30.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 264-65, 926 P.2d at 1022, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 836.
97. Id. at 257, 926 P.2d at 1017, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831.
98. See id. The court notes that this instruction was very similar to the
original (1988) version of CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 3.02 which
reads:
One who aids and abets is not only guilty of the particular crime that
to [his] [her] knowledge [his] [her] confederates are contemplating
committing, but [he] [she] is also liable for the natural and probable
consequences of any criminal act that [he] [she] knowingly and
intentionally aided and abetted. You must determine whether the
defendant is guilty of the crime originally contemplated, and, if so,
whether the crime charged was a natural and probable consequence of
such originally contemplated crime. Id.
99. Seeid. at 258,926 P.2dat 1018, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831.
100. Id.
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contends the defendant knowingly and intentionally aided and
abetted.10' Otherwise, the jury cannot properly engage in the two-
step process of determining whether the actually charged crime was a
natural and probable consequence of the uncharged crimes.
102
Therefore, the court required a jury instruction on aiding and abetting
and natural and probable circumstances to include the possible
criminal acts that might have been originally contemplated by the
defendant.10 3 It held that a failure to do so constitutes reversible
error. 
104
C. Required Relationship between Aider and Abettor
and Primary Perpetrator
1. An aider and abettor cannot be convicted of a greater offense
during the same trial on the same evidence
Since accomplice liability is based on the notion of derivative
liability, California recognizes that it is not possible for an aider or
abettor to be guilty of a greater offense than the offense the principal
offender is guilty of if they are tried on the same evidence at the
same trial.' 0 5
101. See id. at 267, 926 P.2d at 1024, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. In this case, although it was error to not instruct the jury on the
possible criminal acts that might have been originally contemplated, the court
found that it was not prejudicial because her attorney did not object at the time.
See id. Bray attempted to argue that failing to instruct the jury on the
underlying crime was per se error similar to failing to instruct the jury about
the underlying elements of a crime and therefore violated her constitutional
rights to due process. The California Supreme Court disagreed stating that
"the instruction[s] [did] not withdraw an element from the jury's determination
or otherwise interject an impermissible presumption into the deliberative
process ... nor [did] they fail[] to instruct the jury that it must find a particular
intent in order to find guilt." Id. at 272, 96 P.2d at 1027, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
841. Furthermore, the court stated that "there [was] no 'reasonable likelihood'
that the jury misapplied the trial court's instructions on the 'natural and
probable consequences' doctrine, and thus no federal constitutional error
occurred." Id.
105. See People v. Williams, 75 Cal. App. 3d 731, 737, 142 Cal. Rptr. 704,
708 (1977).
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This doctrine was most recently reaffirmed in People v.
McCoy. 106 There, two defendants, McCoy and Lakey, were tried for
murder, with Lakey being convicted under an aiding and abetting
theory.10 7 On appeal, McCoy's conviction was reversed for failure to
properly instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense. 10 8 As a result,
the court of appeal reversed Lakey's conviction as well because an
aider and abettor cannot be convicted of an offense that is greater
than that of the actual perpetrator, provided that both defendants are
tried in the same trial upon the same evidence. 10 9 Because aiding
and abetting is a means of deriving liability from another's
commission of a crime, it would be illogical for a jury to find an
accomplice liable for aiding and abetting a crime that the jury
decided the primary perpetrator had not committed. 10
However, although an accomplice cannot be convicted of a
greater crime, an accomplice can still be convicted of a lesser crime
based on the same evidence."' In People v. Woods, the defendants,
Windham and Woods, were charged with murder.112 Windham was
prosecuted under an aiding and abetting theory. 1 3 The trial court
instructed the jury that they could not find Windham guilty of aiding
and abetting second-degree murder unless they found his co-
defendant, Woods, guilty of second-degree murder.' 14  The jury
found Woods guilty of first-degree murder, and because of the jury
instruction, likewise found Windham guilty of first-degree murder."15
The court of appeal reversed the conviction, stating that because an
aider and abettor could have foreseen aiding a lesser offense than
that committed by the primary perpetrator, his liability could be less
106. 79 Cal. App. 4th 67, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 827 (2000).
107. See id. at 81, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837.
108. See id. at 71, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 82-84, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838-840.
111. See People v. Woods, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1570, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 231
(1992).
112. Id. at 1577,11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233.
113. See id. at 1579, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
114. See id.
115. See id.
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than that of the primary perpetrator.! 16 The court found it was errorto fail to instruct the jury in that regard.1 17
2. No conviction of principal perpetrator required
While the jury cannot convict an accomplice of a greater offense
when both the accomplice and primary perpetrator are tried at the
same time on the same evidence, it is possible to convict an
accomplice of a greater crime when the two are tried at separate
times, even if the accomplice is tried before the primary
perpetrator."1 8 In the recent California Supreme Court decision of
People v. Garcia, the court reversed the court of appeal by holding
that conviction of the principal agent is not required before imposing
derivative liability on an accomplice. 119 In that case, the victim was
killed in a drive-by-shooting. 120 At the time of his arrest, the
defendant admitted to his involvement as an accomplice, stating that
he was the driver of the car.121 He was charged and convicted of
murder.122 The trial judge also found him guilty of a sentencing
enhancement for discharging a firearm in the commission of a
murder.' 23 The defendant appealed this conviction, arguing that the
prosecutor had not proven all the elements necessary for the
sentencing enhancement to apply. 124  "Defendant argued that
although he was an aider and abettor and not the shooter, the firearm
enhancement could apply to him only if allegations under sections
12022.53, subdivision (d)... were 'pled and proved."'125 The court
116. See id. at 1589, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 241-42.
117. Seeid.
118. See People v. Garcia, 28 Cal. 4th 1166, 52 P.3d 648, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d
464 (2002).
119. See id. at 1177, 52 P.3d at 655, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472.
120. See id. at 1169-70, 52 P.3d at 649-50, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 466.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. Seeid.
124. See id.
125. Id. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.53(d) (Deering 2001) states:
[A]ny person who is convicted of a felony... and who in the
commission of that felony intentionally and personally discharged a
firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury.., or death, to any
person other than an accomplice, shall be punished by a term of
imprisonment of 25 years to life in the state prison, which shall be
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rejected this argument because the prosecution would face too much
of a burden if it were required to convict the primary perpetrator
before it could convict an aider and abettor. 126 The court's concern
in adopting such an approach to aiding and abetting liability was that
the primary perpetrators would use procedural devices to ensure that
they were tried after the accomplice, thereby allowing the
accomplice to escape liability.'2 7 The court noted that although some
defendants may escape conviction, the State should be able to
prosecute defendants when there is substantial evidence introduced
that would sustain a conviction. 28 An accomplice should not be able
to escape conviction simply because the State failed to meet its
burden against another defendant.
1 29
D. Conclusion
The doctrine of accomplice liability seeks to hold everyone who
assists in a crime responsible for the entire crime, even if their
actions do not directly aid in the commission of the crime. The hope
is that by allowing liability even when the actions taken do not
directly assist the crime, the State is deterring people from assisting
in the commission of a crime. This form of derivative liability has
become deeply rooted in California penal law, as well as most of the
United States. Despite a few areas of obscurity, the law in California
appears to be fairly well-settled.
imposed in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for
that felony.
This section is applied to both principals and aiders and abettors. See CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 31, 12022.53(e)(1) (Deering 2001).
126. See Garcia, 28 Cal. 4th at 1177, 52 P.3d at 655, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
472.
127. See id. Furthermore, the court believed that this had the strong
possibility of creating odd results. For example, what if the primary
perpetrator were also killed during the commission of the crime. The aider and
abettor would escape liability because the State would not be able to prosecute
the primary perpetrator first.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 1177, 52 P.3d at 655, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472.
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VIII. CONSPIRACY IN HOMICIDE*
The California Penal Code defines the crime of conspiracy as
"two or more persons conspir[ing]... [t]o commit any crime,"1
together with proof of the commission of an overt act "by one or
more of the parties to such agreement" in furtherance thereof.
2
Criminalization of conspiracy performs two main functions. The
first function is to interrupt criminal activity before its completion.3
As an inchoate crime,4 conspiracy subjects the defendant to criminal
sanctions at a stage earlier than any other offense, including attempt.
5
The second function is to guard against the evils of group danger.
6
As recognized in People v. Welch, "a group of evil minds planning
and giving support to the commission of crime is more likely to be a
* Benjamin S. Lin: J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Loyola Law School. I
thank my family and friends for their support and encouragement.
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 182(a)(1) (West 1999). In addition to crimes,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 182(a)(5) specifies that the object of a conspiracy may be
"[t]o commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to
pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 182(a)(5). Conceivably, a statutory conspiracy definition as broad as
"any act injurious to the public health [or] morals" would grant California
courts enormous discretion in determining what is punishable as a conspiracy.
Id. However, it has been remarked that this portion of the statute is rarely
employed as a basis for prosecution. See Walton E. Tinsley, Comment,
Criminal Law-Conspiracy and Conspirators in California, 26 S. CAL. L.
REv. 64, 66 (1952).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 184; see also CALJIC § 6.10 (6th ed. 2002)
(defining conspiracy as "an agreement entered into between two or more
persons with the specific intent to agree to commit" a specific crime, "and with
the further specific intent to commit that crime, followed by an overt act
committed in this state by one [or more] of the parties for the purpose of
accomplishing the object of the agreement.").
3. See Paul Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and
in Practice, 65 GEO. L.J. 925, 929 (1977).
4. An inchoate crime is a preparatory or anticipatory crime, "permitting
the punishment of persons who agree to commit a crime even if they never
carry out their scheme or are apprehended before achieving their objective."
Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV.
1137, 1157 (1973).
5. Conspiracy is a crime at the moment a minor act is taken in furtherance
of the agreement, whereas attempt usually involves a substantial step toward
the commission of the crime. See Marcus, supra note 3, at 929-30.
6. See id.
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menace to society than where one individual alone sets out to violate
the law."7 These two functions make conspiracy distinct from the
contemplated substantive offense and punishable as a separate
crime.8
When one understands the rationale underlying the doctrine of
conspiracy, it becomes clear that this doctrine carries broad
implications as applied to homicide in California. First, as an
inchoate or preparatory crime, conspiracy enables the prosecution of
culpable cohorts for agreeing to commit murder even when the actual
crime has not been committed. Although one person thinking and
planning a murder is not punishable for murder unless his efforts
extend far enough to constitute attempt, two or more people acting in
combination yields a basis for imposing the penalty even before
attempt.9  Second, as mentioned previously, in California
"conspiracy is a separate and distinct offense from the crime
committed." 10  This means that if a person plans a murder with
another, but for some reason never carries out the murder or is
arrested prior to its commission, he is still punishable for the crime.
Alternatively, if he does succeed in the killing, he may be convicted
both for the conspiracy and for the underlying substantive offense.1'
7. 89 Cal. App. 18, 22, 264 P. 324, 325 (1928). This is true because more
people can share the work, thereby enabling and encouraging the selection of
more elaborate and ambitious goals. Moreover, the moral support of the group
strengthens the perseverance of each member of the conspiracy and
discourages any reevaluation of the decision to commit the offense that a
single offender might undertake. See People v. Alleyne, 82 Cal. App. 4th
1256, 1261-62, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 737, 740-41 (2000).
8. See People v. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th 593, 599-600, 909 P.2d 994, 996-97,
49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390, 392-93 (1996) (stating that conspiracy is an inchoate
crime that does not require commission of a substantive offense that is the
object of the conspiracy); People v. Liu, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1119, 1131, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 578, 584 (1996) (stating that "Completion of the crime of conspiracy
does not require that the object of the conspiracy be accomplished, or even that
it be possible to accomplish it.").
9. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. 1 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) (explaining why reaching farther back into preparatory
conduct than attempt is desirable).
10. People v. Williams, 101 Cal. App. 3d 711, 721, 161 Cal. Rptr. 830, 835
(1980).
11. See People v. Cooks, 141 Cal. App. 3d 224, 317, 190 Cal. Rptr. 211,
278 (1983) (stating that "[S]ince conspiracy is a separate and distinct crime, a
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The extended reach of criminal liability derives from the realization
that the "strength, opportunities and resources of many is obviously
more dangerous and more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone
wrongdoer" 12 and that it is desirable to be able to sanction against
groups that engage in preparatory conduct which cannot be reached
by the law of attempt.'
Furthermore, the so-called co-conspirator liability (or Pinkerton
doctrine) makes a conspirator liable for any reasonably foreseeable
crime that falls within the scope of the conspiracy, even if he did not
intend to assist in any manner or otherwise facilitate or encourage the
commission of that crime. 14 Therefore, if a person agreed to commit
any crime (not necessarily murder) and the result of a killing was
both foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy, he would be
held accountable for the killing, regardless of whether he was aware
of it.
In California, the defense of withdrawal also operates differently
for a conspiracy than for other crimes. 15  Withdrawal from a
conspiracy, once an overt act has been done, is only a defense to
subsequent criminal acts, not to the conspiracy itself.16 To illustrate,
imagine that a group of people agree to construct and plant a bomb in
the hapless victim's house. After ingredients for the home-made
bomb are purchased, however, one of the conspirators decides to pull
out of the plan. Although the conspirator who withdraws is not
technically on the hook for any substantive crimes that ensue, he
cannot evade liability for the original conspiracy to commit murder,
which carries the same punishment as if the conspirator is charged
for the murder itself.
Finally, because conspiracy is a separate and distinct crime, it
provides an alternative to prosecution for the specific substantive
offenses committed by the conspirators. This alternative is often
taken because of the numerous procedural advantages that are
defendant may be prosecuted and convicted of the substantive offense and of
conspiracy to commit that offense.").
12. Williams, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 721, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (citations
omitted).
13. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 1157.
14. See discussion infra Part VI.B.2.
15. See discussion infra Part VI.D.
16. See id.
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afforded the government, including: (1) expanded venue choices;' 7
(2) potential statute of limitations extensions; 18 and (3) special
evidentiary considerations.19 Within the framework of homicide law,
these features make conspiracy a powerful and dangerous doctrine if
abused.2 °
A. Elements of Offense
The elements of a criminal conspiracy are:
1) an agreement between two or more persons, 2) with the
specific intent to agree to commit a public offense, 3) with
the further specific intent to commit that offense, and 4) an
overt act committed by one or more of the parties for the
purpose of accomplishing the object of the agreement or
conspiracy.
1
1. Agreement
a. the act of agreement
22The gist of a criminal conspiracy is the unlawful agreement.
The act of agreement is the basis for imposing early criminal
liability, special evidentiary rules, double prosecutions, and double
punishments. 23  Although an agreement is not punishable unless
some overt act is committed in furtherance of the conspiracy,24 the
17. See discussion infra Section B. 1.
18. See discussion infra Section C.
19. See discussion infra Section E.
20. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 1138.
21. People v. Liu, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1119, 1128, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 578, 582-
83 (1996); see People v. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th 593, 600, 909 P.2d 994, 997, 49
Cal. Rptr. 2d 390, 393 (1996); People v. Herrera, 83 Cal. App. 4th 46, 64, 98
Cal. Rptr. 2d 911, 922 (2000); 1 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 68 (3d ed. 2000).
22. See People v. Von Villas, I Cal. App. 4th 175, 244, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d
112, 154 (1992) (stating "[t]he punishable act, or the very crux, of a criminal
conspiracy is the evil or corrupt agreement."); People v. Manson, 71 Cal. App.
3d 1, 47, 139 Cal. Rptr. 275, 301 (1977) (referring to unlawful agreement as
the "gravamen of the offense of conspiracy to commit a crime").
23. See PAUL MARCUS, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACY CASES § 2.02 (2002).
24. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 182(b), 184 (West 1999).
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overt act itself need not be a criminal offense.25 The agreement, not
the overt act, constitutes the offense.26
In the early development of conspiracy law, the emphasis of
criminality was placed on the physical act of communicating mutual
understanding to a common unlawful enterprise. 27 For example, at
common law, the statute of limitations began to run on a conspiracy
as soon as such communication was made.28 However, the focus has
shifted from examining whether a communication of agreement was
made to whether an agreement existed.29
Modem conspiracy cases hold that conspiracy is a continuing
crime, extending beyond the initial communication of agreement.
30
In People v. Von Villas, the court explained that the agreement, being
the very crux of conspiracy, is not a tangible occurrence.31 Because
the specific time when a common illegal design comes into existence
can rarely be identified, an agreement is more appropriately thought
of as a continuous act, making conspiracy a continuing crime.32 In
sum, the criminal act of modem conspiracy is not just
communicating the agreement, but the continuous and conscious
union of wills upon a common undertaking.33  This broader
definition of agreement allows, inter alia, the admission of more
facts as evidence of overt acts. Because an agreement is continuous,
an overt act is not limited to acts committed after a "complete
agreement" has been decided upon.34 Thus, once a punishable
agreement is in existence, any discussions and arrangements between
25. For a complete discussion of overt acts, see discussion infra Section
A.3.
26. See People v. Fenenbock, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1688, 1709, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d
608, 620-21 (1996).
27. See Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv.
920, 926 (1959) [hereinafter Harvard Developments].
28. See id.; see also Von Villas, 11 Cal. App. 4th at 243, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
153 (holding that at common law, crime was complete when the agreement to
accomplish some unlawful purpose had been reached); Tinsley, supra note 1,
at 65.
29. See Harvard Developments, supra note 27, at 926.
30. See, e.g., Von Villas, 11 Cal. App. 4th at 244, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154
(explaining that conspiracy is a continuing crime).
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See Harvard Developments, supra note 27, at 926.
34. See Von Villas, 11 Cal. App. 4th at 244, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154.
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conspirators done in preparation of a criminal act can constitute overt
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
35
b. proof of agreement
As a practical matter, direct evidence is often not available and
is rarely used to prove the agreement.36 To establish a conspiracy, a
formal written agreement is not necessary;37 rather, a tacit
understanding to accomplish the act and unlawful design is
sufficient.38 Such an agreement may be inferred from the acts and
conduct of the parties in mutually carrying out a common purpose in
violation of the law.
39
In People v. Alexander, although there was not any direct
evidence that the actors agreed to commit the particular murders,
sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the defendant's
conviction of conspiracy to commit murder.40 The court inferred the
agreement from signs of preparatory activities as well as a significant
coordination among the conspirators both during and after the
commission of the target offense.4'
35. See People v. Sconce, 228 Cal. App. 3d 693, 703-04, 279 Cal. Rptr. 59,
65 (1991) (holding that overt acts included the defendant pointing out the
intended victim to a co-conspirator, the co-conspirator soliciting another
conspirator, and the defendant inquiring one co-conspirator to kill the victim).
36. See MARCUS, supra note 23, § 2.02.
37. See People v. Cooks, 141 Cal. App. 3d 224, 311-12, 190 Cal. Rptr. 211,
274-75 (1983).
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Quinteros), 13 Cal. App. 4th 12,
20-21, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 462, 467 (1993) (stating that unlawful agreement may
be proved by circumstantial evidence without necessity of showing that
conspirators met and actually agreed to commit the offense that was object of
conspiracy); Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d at 126-27, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 276
(holding that existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct,
relationship, interests, and activities of the alleged conspirators before and
during the alleged conspiracy).
40. See 140 Cal. App. 3d 647, 189 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1983).
41. See id. at 661-62, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 912-15. In Alexander, defendant
donned heavy clothing before the incident, wielded a knife in the company of
other assailants, effectively blocked a victim from escaping the attack of co-
conspirators, directed other participants from a vantage point on the stairwell,
and threw his knife out the window at the end of the riot; The assailants
initiated their attack with deadly force, stabbing or attempting to stab the
victim in the back, side, head and face. See id. All of the facts above
1546
CONSPIRACY IN HOMICIDE
Similarly, in People v. Tran, circumstances surrounding the
victim's death sufficiently supported a finding that the defendants
agreed to commit an intentional killing.42 The arrival of the
defendants at the crime scene with a co-conspirator as a lookout and
backup, combined with the swiftness with which the shooting began,
was enough to show that the shooting resulted from a conspiracy
between the defendants to kill the victim, not from a spontaneous
argument.43
Although mere association with the perpetrator of a crime does
not prove conspiratorial membership,44 it is a starting point for
analysis.45 For instance, common gang membership may in part be
circumstantial evidence of a conspiratorial agreement. In People v.
Superior Court (Quinteros), the court used a gang's motivation to
guard its territory to infer an agreement among its members to beat
up the victim. 46 This decision suggests that there is considerable
flexibility in inferring an agreement from the facts and circumstances
of the case, as long as there is a tacit coordination in the common
design, purpose, or objects of the conspiracy.
supported a reasonable inference that defendant acted in concert with the
assailants to assault and murder other prison inmates. See id. at 661-62, 189
Cal. Rptr. at 914.
42. See 47 Cal. App. 4th 759, 772, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 905, 913 (1996).
43. See id. at 772-73, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 913.
44. See CALJIC, supra note 2, §§ 6.13, 6.22 (stating that association alone
does not prove membership; and that the facts as to each defendant must be
considered).
45. See Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d at 126, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 276 (stating that
the very nature of the case and the theory of the prosecution "compel[s]
reference to circumstantial evidence of the conduct and relationship of the
parties.").
46. See Superior Court (Quinteros), 13 Cal. App. 4th at 21, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 467 (holding that defendant's act in issuing the challenge, "Where are you
from?", and attempting to extort money for the right to have intruded into his
gang territory evidenced a relationship between the territory and the
defendant's and his fellow gang members' conduct toward the victims).
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2. The mental state
Conspiracy is a "specific intent" crime.47 The specific intent
required divides into two elements: (1) intent to agree or conspire;
and (2) intent to commit the target crime (e.g., murder).48  "To
sustain a conviction for conspiracy to commit a particular offense,
the prosecution must show not only that the conspirators intended to
agree but also that they intended to commit the elements of that
offense.
' ' 9
a. intent to agree
Because there can be no conspiracy without an agreement, the
prosecution must establish that the several parties intended to
agree.5 0  However, the intent to agree in itself is "without moral
content." 51 It derives its wrongfulness from the objectives the parties
intended to achieve by their agreement.52 Thus, the state of mind for
the agreement is generally less important than the intent to commit
the crime because the prosecution cannot pursue a conspiracy charge
unless there is substantial evidence indicating that the parties
combined with some criminal objective in mind.53
47. Specific intent is an intent that goes beyond the required acts. See
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(e)(2) (2d
ed. 1986); MARCUS, supra note 23, § 2.09[3] (explaining that in their
agreement the parties must understand that they are uniting to commit a crime,
and it must be their desire [specific intent] to complete that crime as the result
of their combination); Harvard Developments, supra note 27, at 935 (stating
that specific intent is used to denote "something more than merely a corrupt or
wrongful purpose.").
48. See People v. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th 593, 600, 909 P.2d 994, 997, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 390, 393 (1996).
49. Id.
50. See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 47, § 2.09(e)(1).
51. Harvard Developments, supra note 27, at 936.
52. See id.
53. "Prosecutors do not generally have difficulty showing conclusively a
genuine agreement... [and] [t]he true state of mind issue in conspiracy cases
most often relates not to the agreement phase of the parties' conduct, but rather
to the objects of that agreement." MARCUS, supra note 23, § 2.09[2].
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b. intent to achieve objective-intent to kill required
for conspiracy to commit murder
Conspiracy has often been described as a specific intent crime
because the intent required is more than the intent to agree.54 For
criminal liability to attach, an additional intent to commit a particular
act or crime must be proved.55 Furthermore, a "conspiracy to
commit a particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least
the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense
itself.
56
If the substantive offense is murder, a conspiracy to commit that
offense requires an intent to kill and cannot be based on a theory of
implied malice.57 In People v. Swain, the defendants were convicted
of conspiracy to commit second-degree murder after participating in
a drive-by shooting.58 Because implied malice does not require a
finding of intent to kill, the defendants contended that the trial court
improperly instructed the jury on an implied malice theory to
determine whether they could be found guilty of conspiracy to
commit murder. The California Supreme Court agreed, holding that
a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder could not be sustained
on an implied malice jury instruction and that a specific intent to kill
must be proved.59
As the court explained, a conceptual problem arises when the
target offense of murder is founded on a theory of implied malice.
60
54. See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 47, § 6.4 (e) n.142.
55. See Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REv.
624, 635 (1941).
56. Harvard Developments, supra note 27, at 939.
57. California recognizes three theories of second-degree murder: 1)
intentional unpremeditated murder with express malice, 2) implied malice
murder (or unintentional killing resulting from extreme recklessness), and 3)
second-degree felony-murder. The theory at issue here is implied malice
murder, which occurs when: 1) the killing resulted from an intentional act; 2)
the natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life; and 3) the act
was deliberately performed with the knowledge of the danger to, and with
conscious disregard for, human life. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 601, 909 P.2d at
997-98, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 393-94. For a detailed discussion of implied
malice murder, see discussion supra Part IV, Second-Degree-Murder under an
Implied Malice Theory.
58. See id. at 596, 909 P.2d at 994, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390.
59. See id. 909 P.2d at 994-95,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390-91.
60. See id. at 602, 909 P.2d at 998, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394.
Summer 2003] 1549
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 36:1541
Normally, malice aforethought is derived or implied through
hindsight from proof of both a specific intent to perform some act
dangerous to human life and a killing that has occurred as a direct
result of such an act.61 However, this is contrary to the very nature
of the crime of conspiracy, which is an inchoate crime that does not
require the successful commission of the target offense. 62 Because
conspiracy to commit murder is a distinct crime from murder that
does not require an actual killing, it would be illogical to convict
based on implied malice, where the conspiracy could not be
established until and unless a death resulted from an intentional act.
63
Thus, the court held that the crime of conspiracy to commit murder
required express malice and that such an offense could not be
grounded on implied malice.64
c. conspiracy to murder is automatically first-degree murder
In California, persons who conspire to commit a felony are
punishable in the same manner as those who commit the felony.65
However, Swain left unresolved the issue of whether conspiracy to
commit murder was further divisible into degrees with differing
punishments, or whether it was a unitary offense for which the
punishment was first-degree murder in every instance.66 The
California Supreme Court settled the question in People v. Cortez by
ruling that all conspiracies to commit murder are necessarily
conspiracies to commit premeditated and deliberate first-degree
murder.67  In Cortez, the defendant was involved in a drive-by
shooting that led to retaliatory gunshots by the other gang.
Ultimately, the exchange of gunfire ended in the death of the
defendant's companion.68 The defendant was convicted of
conspiracy to commit murder, based on his agreement with the
61. See id. at 603, 909 P.2d at 999, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 395.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 607, 909 P.2d at 1001, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397.
65. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 182(a).
66. See Swain, 12 Cal. 4th at 609-10, 909 P.2d at 1003, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
399.
67. See 18 Cal. 4th 1223, 1231-32, 960 P.2d 537, 542, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d
733, 738 (1998).
68. See id. at 1227, 960 P.2d at 539, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735.
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victim to kill rival gang members. 69 Defendant contended on appeal
that the trial court should have required the jury to determine the
degree of the murder for the target offense of the conspiracy.
70
Relying on People v. Horn,71 he argued that not all conspiracies to
commit murder were necessarily conspiracies to commit first-degree
murder.
72
The Cortez court rejected the defendant's argument and
disapproved of Horn's discussion regarding the viability of the
offense of conspiracy to commit intentional unpremeditated second-
degree murder.73 Noting functional similarity between premeditation
and a conspiratorial agreement, the court observed that two
individuals cannot harbor the mental state required to conspire to
commit purposeful murder and also commit an overt act without
having willfully "premeditated and deliberated" the commission of
that murder. Because the agreement to murder "necessarily
involves the 'willful, deliberate and premeditated' intention to kill a
human being," a conspiracy to commit murder can only be
conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree.
75
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. 12 Cal. 3d 290, 524 P.2d 1300, 115 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1974).
72. See Cortez, 18 Cal. 4th at 1233-34, 960 P.2d at 543, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
739.
73. See id. at 1234, 960 P.2d at 543, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 739.
74. See id. at 1232, 960 P.2d at 542, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 738. But see Justice
Kennard's discussion of why conspiracy to murder should be divided into
degrees:
If conspiracy to murder were a unitary crime that required only intent
to kill, which is the mental state of second degree murder, but was
punished as first degree murder, then conspiracies that involve
agreements to commit only the elements of second degree murder
(e.g., that lack premeditation and deliberation) would be punished
more severely than the completed crime of second degree murder.
Id. at 1246, 960 P.2d at 551-52, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747-48 (Kennard,
J., dissenting). Justice Kennard also argued that a conspiracy to
commit second degree murder was theoretically possible. See id. at
1249, 960 P.2d at 553-54, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 749-50 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
75. Id. at 1231, 960 P.2d at 541, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737. There is a
potentially far-reaching implication of the court's ruling in Cortez. A
conspiracy to commit murder requires that the participants intend to kill. In
holding that "intent to kill plus conspiratorial agreement equals conspiracy to
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d. proof of intent
The prosecution can use circumstantial evidence to show that
the defendant had the intent both to join the conspiracy and to
complete the offense. For instance, in People v. Han, the defendants
were convicted of a conspiracy to murder a co-conspirator's twin
76sister. They contended that the sister might have intended to kill
her twin, but that they, as her accomplices, were ignorant of the
objective.77 In recounting the facts of the case in detail,78 the court
rejected the defendants' argument and concluded that enough
circumstantial evidence supported the conclusion that the object of
defendants' conspiracy was murder. 79  A conspiracy to commit
murder was inferred from evidence of related facts and
circumstances which demonstrated that the participants' activities
could not have been carried out except as a result of the preconceived
scheme or common understanding. 
8 0
commit first degree murder, the majority appeared to equate conspiratorial
agreement with premeditation and deliberation." Suzanne Mounts,
Premeditation and Deliberation in California: Returning to a Distinction
Without a Difference, 36 U.S.F. L. REv. 261, 328-29 (2002).
76. See 78 Cal. App. 4th 797, 804-05, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 144-45 (2000).
77. See id. at 803, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144.
78. The defendants posed as magazine salesmen and burst inside the
victim's apartment with nylon twine and duct tape, while armed with a loaded
gun. In the brief time before the police arrived, they terrorized the victim, tied
her up, and placed her in a bathtub at gunpoint. See id. at 799-800, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 141.
79. See id. at 803-04, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144.
80. See also People v. Herrera, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1456, 1464, 83 Cal. Rptr.
2d 307, 311 (1999) (holding that conviction for conspiracy to commit murder
was supported by evidence that a rival street gang killed a member of the
defendant's gang, that the defendant told his girlfriend that his fellow gang
members were after the rival gang and he was going to "back up" his gang
brothers, and that the defendant fired shots at the target's apartment); Von
Villas, 11 Cal. App. 4th at 248, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156-57 (holding that
circumstantial evidence that the victim disappeared, and completely ceased
normal daily activities, and testimony of the victim's wife that she paid
defendant to kill victim, sufficiently supported defendant's conviction for
conspiracy to murder).
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3. Overt act
At common law, conspiracy consisted of an unlawful a reement,
but an overt act was not required to establish the crime. 8  Today,
California, like most states,82 requires proof of an overt act.83
Consequently, the state must show that one of the conspirators took
some step to further the object of the conspiracy. "One purpose of
the overt act requirement is to provide... an opportunity to repent so
that any one of the conspirators may reconsider and abandon the
agreement before taking steps to further it, and thereby avoid
punishment for the conspiracy." 84 Another purpose is to show that
an indictable conspiracy exists because "evil thoughts alone cannot
constitute a criminal offense."
85
a. what qualifies as an overt act?
Although commentators, judges, and lawyers have had an
ongoing debate about the crime of conspiracy, in both theory and in
practice, virtually all agree that very little is required to satisfy the
overt act requirement.86 The act in furtherance of the conspiracy
need not be criminal in nature,87 nor does it need to amount either to
81. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 685 (3d
ed. 1982).
82. See LAFAVE & Scot, supra note 47, § 6.5(e). A few states, such as
Louisiana and Mississippi, still follow the common law rule that no overt act
needs to be proven.
83. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 184 (West 1999).
84. People v. Russo, 25 Cal. 4th 1124, 1131, 25 P.3d 641, 645, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 436, 441 (2001).
85. Id. at 1131, 25 P.3d at 645, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441 (citations omitted).
86. See MARCUS, supra note 23, § 2.08[3]; see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
5.03 cmt. at 454 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) ("[lt has been
well settled that any act in pursuance of the conspiracy, however insignificant,
is sufficient."); Solomon A. Klein, Conspiracy-The Prosecutor's Darling, 24
BROOK. L. REv. 1, 5 (1957) ("Any act, 'no matter what,' will suffice, if
committed by one or more of the parties to such agreement under
circumstances warranting an inference that it was done in furtherance
thereof.").
87. See People v. Robinson, 43 Cal. 2d 132, 139, 271 P.2d 865, 870 (1954);
Sconce, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 700, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 63; see also People v.
Buono, 191 Cal. App. 2d 203, 224, 12 Cal. Rptr. 604, 616 (1961) (holding that
overt acts in a conspiracy to commit murder included meetings and furnishing
the knife).
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an attempt to commit the offense or to aiding and abetting.88
Moreover, it is unnecessary for each conspirator to perform an overt
act because an overt act committed by any one of conspirators can
consummate the conspiracy.8 9 As the court in People v. Corica
elaborated:
To render him guilty, it is not necessary that a conspirator
perform some act which is in itself unlawful in carrying out
the criminal conspiracy. If there is a conspiracy to commit
murder by means of poison sent through the mail, a
conspirator may not escape responsibility because he only
agreed to and did purchase the postage stamps with which
the poison is sent to the victim, an act entirely lawful in
itself, but punishable if done under an agreement among the
conspirators and in carrying out the unlawful purpose of the
conspiracy.
9°
Even discussions and arrangements among conspirators can
constitute properly chargeable overt acts in a criminal conspiracy
prosecution. In Von Villas, the court defined the term "overt act" as
an "outward act done in pursuance of the crime and in manifestation
of an intent or design, looking toward the accomplishment of the
crime."91 Noting that "outward" referred to any "tangible acts that
manifest a criminal intention," the court concluded that partaking in
arrangements, discussions, and preparations for the criminal act
adequately met this definition.92 By performing these "outward"
acts, the conspirators have ventured beyond a mere criminal intention
and forgone the opportunity to reconsider.
93
b. unanimity ofjury verdict not required
Sometimes there is no doubt that a conspiracy exists, but the
jury cannot decide as to who did what or exactly what constitutes the
overt act. For example, consider a situation in which a jury can
88. See Sconce, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 700, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
89. See Russo, 25 Cal. 4th at 1135, 25 P.3d at 648, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444;
Robinson, 43 Cal. 2d at 140, 271 P.2d at 870.
90. 55 Cal. App. 2d 130, 134,130 P.2d 164, 167 (1942).
91. Von Villas, 11 Cal. App. 4th at 244-45, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154.
92. Id.
93. See id.
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reasonably conclude that the defendant conspired with someone to
commit murder, but the identity of the co-conspirator is unclear due
to mutual finger-pointing between the remaining defendants.
Moreover, the doubt extends to who committed the overt act and the
nature of overt act, even though it is certain that some overt act was
committed by some conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy.
94
This scenario raises a question of whether the jury must unanimously
agree on a specific overt act, or whether it is sufficient if the jury
agrees there was such act.
In People v. Russo, the California Supreme Court held that "the
jury need not agree on a specific overt act as long as it unanimously
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that some conspirator committed an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy." 95 In doing so, it struck
down the defendant's argument that because the overt act
requirement is an "element" of the crime of conspiracy, a specific
unanimity instruction is required.96 The court stated that although "it
would be unacceptable [to convict a person] if some jurors believed
the defendant guilty of one crime and other jurors believed her guilty
of another... unanimity as to exactly how [a single] crime was
committed is not required., 97 In Russo, because there was only one
conspiracy, whether the overt act occurred in one of several possible
manners "only concerns the way in which the crime was
committed... not whether discrete crimes were committed.,
98
Therefore, even "if the jurors disagreed as to what overt act was
committed, and agreed that an overt act was committed, they would
94. These facts are taken from Russo, 25 Cal. 4th at 1136, 25 P.2d at 648,
108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446.
95. Id. at 1128, 25 P.3d at 643, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 438 (emphasis added).
96. The requirement of unanimity as to the criminal act stems from the
concern that a jury may amalgamate evidence of multiple offenses to convict a
defendant even though there is no single offense which all the jurors agree the
defendant committed. See People v. Sutherland, 17 Cal. App. 4th 602, 612, 21
Cal. Rptr. 2d 752, 757 (1993).
97. Russo, 25 Cal. 4th at 1135, 25 P.3d at 647, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444;
People v. Vargas, 91 Cal. App. 4th 506, 558, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 245 (2001)
(reiterating that "a requirement of jury unanimity typically applies to acts that
could have been charged as separate offenses.").
98. Russo, 25 Cal. 4th at 1135, 25 P.3d at 647, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444.
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still have unanimously found defendant guilty of a particular
conspiracy."
99
c. timing
Generally, one who joins a conspiracy after its formation is a
conspirator equally liable as those who originated it.100 It does not
matter whether a defendant actually started to conspire with another
on the date when the conspiracy was alleged to have started, as long
as there was active conspiratorial involvement by the defendant
thereafter. 1°1 However, "[a] conspirator cannot be held liable for a
substantive offense committed pursuant to the conspiracy if the
offense was committed before he joined the conspiracy."'102 Thus, a
post-murder act cannot be in furtherance of a charged conspiracy to
commit murder because its object was already achieved.
10 3
4. Requisite plurality
a. general rule-concurrence of at least two parties
Criminal conspiracy requires the "proscribed concurrence of at
least two parties."' 0 4  It follows that in "cases where only two
persons are involved and one is a government agent or informer, the
other cannot be convicted of conspiracy," because the government
99. Id.
100. See People v. Anderson, 90 Cal. App. 2d 326, 335,202 P.2d 1044, 1050
(1949) (holding that where a third party joins a conspiracy that had been
previously formed, "such person adopts and ratifies all of the prior acts done
pursuant to the original conspiracy.").
101. See id. at 334, 202 P.2d at 1050.
102. People v. Marks, 45 Cal. 3d 1335, 1345, 756 P.2d 260, 267, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 874, 881 (1988); see also Rollin M. Perkins, The Act of One Conspirator,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 344-45 (1974).
103. See Marks, 45 Cal. 3d at 1345, 756 P.2d at 267, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 880-
81.
104. People v. Superior Court (Jackson), 44 Cal. App. 3d 494, 498, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 702, 704 (1975); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 182 (West 1999). This
contrasts with the Model Penal Code's "unilateral" approach, which focuses on
the culpable party's intent and does not require at least two guilty conspirators.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. 2(b) (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985).
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agent would not have the requisite criminal specific intent. 10 5
However, when a conspiracy involves more than two people, "the
feigned participation of a false coconspirator or government agent"
does not necessarily negate criminal liability.10 6 As long as there are
at least two co-conspirators whose mutual adherence to the common
plan is genuine, the fact that one member in a group of alleged co-
conspirators secretly does not or legally cannot intend to commit the
target crime does not prevent a conspiracy conviction against the
others.1
0 7
b. rule of consistency abandoned
The rule of consistency follows the requisite plurality principle
by invalidating convictions where one of only two alleged
conspirators has been acquitted. 10 8 Because it takes at least two
people to conspire, a conviction for conspiracy would be inconsistent
with a verdict of not guilty for the other alleged co-conspirator.
Under this rule, if all but one of the conspirators were acquitted of a
conspiracy to commit murder, liability cannot attach to the remaining
defendant for consistency. However, many jurisdictions, including
California, have largely abandoned the rule of consistency that once
reconciled separate verdicts in conspiracy cases. 109 The courts
accept the reality that such incongruities are built into the criminal
justice system and fear that "any rule demanding greater consistency
would inappropriately allow a defendant to exploit an erroneous
acquittal."
105. People v. Liu, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1119, 1128, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 578, 583
(1996) (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 1131, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 584.
107. See id.
108. See MARCUS, supra note 23, § 2.03.
109. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and
Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CAL. L. REV.
1423, 1429 (2001).
110. Id.; see also People v. Palmer, 24 Cal. 4th 856, 860, 15 P.3d 234, 236,
103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13, 15 (2001) ("[T]he law generally accepts inconsistent
verdicts as an occasionally inevitable, if not entirely satisfying, consequence of
a criminal justice system that gives defendants the benefit of a reasonable
doubt as to guilt .... ").
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Before the rule of consistency was abandoned in California,
there were already substantial limitations to its application. 1' For
example, there was no inconsistency when a defendant was
convicted of conspiracy where no co-conspirators were formally
charged. 12 Moreover, the rule did not apply where the conspirators
were tried in separate trials. 1 3 When faced with whether the rule of
consistency applied in joint trials, the California Supreme Court
decided to dispose of the rule altogether.' 14 In People v. Palmer, the
court concluded that the rule of consistency is "a vestige of the past"
and held that consistent verdicts are not required in joint trials for
conspiracy. 15 Consequently, if the defendant does not claim that the
conspiracy conviction lacks evidentiary support, a court can affirm
his conviction for conspiracy to commit murder despite the co-
defendant's acquittal by another jury on that charge.116
B. Scope of Conspirator's Liability
1. Single vs. multiple conspiracies
It is often vitally important whether the parties have made
several small agreements or a single all-encompassing agreement.
Because each agreement constitutes a separate conspiracy and each
conspiracy may be separately punished, the prosecution may attempt
to impose multiple punishments on members of a single conspiracy
by alleging multiple conspiracies. 1' 7  Conversely, the prosecution
may desire to secure the advantages of establishing a single
conspiracy. 18 One important advantage is that certain evidence
which is admissible against one conspirator is also admissible against
111. See MARCUS, supra note 23, § 2.03.
112. See People v. Sagehorn, 140 Cal. App. 2d 138, 146, 294 P.2d 1062,
1067 (1956) (upholding conviction when other persons not apprehended are
found to be co-conspirators).
113. See People v. Holzer, 25 Cal. App. 3d 456, 460, 102 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13
(1972).
114. See Palmer, 24 Cal. 4th 856, 15 P.3d 234, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13.
115. Id. at 858, 15 P.3d at 235, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.
116. See id. at 866-67, 15 P.3d at 242, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
117. See Harvard Developments, supra note 27, at 991.
118. See id.
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all other participants in the conspiracy. 119  For example, the
prosecution may invoke the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay
rule to admit evidence against defendants that would otherwise be
inadmissible. 120  Similarly, acts of one conspirator may eliminate
statute of limitations claims, and all parties may be held
substantively responsible for the crimes of each defendant.
21
Alleging a single conspiracy also enables the prosecution to join
multiple parties for a single trial in locations where venue would be
improper were they participants in a second conspiracy.
122
The general test employed by courts to determine whether a
single conspiracy has been formed is "whether there was one overall
agreement among the various parties to perform various functions in
order to carry out the objectives of the conspiracy." 123 If each
separate agreement had its own distinct, illegal end, and no overall
comprehensive plan could be shown, it would be improper to
consolidate these conspiracies into one count.1 24 On the other hand,
if the acts were merely steps or stages in the formation of a larger all-
inclusive conspiracy directed at achieving a single unlawful result,
then there is a single conspiracy.
25
For instance, in People v. Elliot, the defendant was charged with
a single conspiracy based on a series of overt acts that occurred over
an extended period of time with different actors. 2 6  The court
concluded that an overall comprehensive plan was lacking and that
the single "conspiracy charged was in reality a series of
conspiracies .... In contrast, People v. Vargas held that "a
119. See discussion infra Section E, The Co-Conspirator Exception.
120. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1223 (West 2001); United States v. Townsend,
924 F.2d 1385, 1388 (7th Cir. 1991); People v. Hardy, 2 Cal. 4th 86, 139, 825
P.2d 781, 808-09, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 823-24 (1992).
121. See MARCUS, supra note 23, § 4.02.
122. See Harvard Developments, supra note 27, at 991.
123. People v. Vargas, 91 Cal. App. 4th 506, 555, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 243
(2001) (citing People v. Skelton, 109 Cal. App. 3d 691, 718, 167 Cal. Rptr.
636, 650 (1980)).
124. See People v. Elliot, 77 Cal. App. 3d 673, 685, 144 Cal. Rptr. 137, 142-
43 (1978).
125. See People v. Liu, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1119, 1133, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 578,
586 (1996) (citing Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 558-59 (1947)).
126. See Elliot, 77 Cal. App. 3d at 682, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
127. Id. at 685, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 142-43.
Summer 2003] 1559
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1541
single agreement to commit a number of crimes is only one
conspiracy, regardless of the number of crimes sought to be
committed... under that conspiracy."' 28  Using a multi-factor
analysis129 to determine whether the crimes were pursuant to an
overall scheme, the court decided that the murder ordered by the
defendant did not evidence a separate conspiracy from the overriding
conspiracy with which defendant and others were charged (namely,
conspiracy to establish a criminal street gang to commit murder,
robbery, burglary, extortion, and drug trafficking).
130
There is some disagreement on whether individual murders
necessarily give rise to separate conspiracies. Whereas some courts
recognize that defendants can at times be engaged in a conspiracy of
dimensions far broader than the individual murders with which they
were charged,13 ' others maintain that "[e]ach separately planned
murder is the goal of a separate conspiracy."'
32
In People v. Liu, the defendant was convicted of two counts of
conspiracy to commit murder. 133  He argued that one of the
convictions should be reversed because the two murders were part of
a single all-inclusive conspiracy to kidnap and murder one of the
victims. The court disagreed, stating that the rule to determine
whether the acts are merely steps in the formation of a more general
128. Vargas, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 555, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243.
129. The factors are: "(1) the nature of the scheme; (2) the identity of the
participants; (3) the quality, frequency, and duration of each conspirator's
transactions; and (4) the commonality of times and goals." Id. at 554, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 242.
130. See id. at 549-56, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 238-44.
131. See id. at 550, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 239 (finding that the commission of
specific crimes, including murder, were all in pursuance of the overriding
purpose of establishing the criminal gang); see also People v. Remiro, 89 Cal.
App. 3d 809, 153 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1979) (finding that slaying of victim was only
a step in a planned series of terrorist activities designed to accomplish the
Symbionese Liberation Army's avowed goal of fomenting a violent upheaval
within American society in order to effect revolutionary change). In People v.
Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976), the court found that
the objective of the conspiracy was the realization of Manson's fanatical dream
of a racial war, a cataclysm he referred to as "Helter Skelter." The court
stated: "Boundaries of a conspiracy are not limited by the substantive crimes
committed in furtherance of the agreement." Id. at 155, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
132. Liu, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 1133, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586; see People v.
McLead, 225 Cal. App. 3d 906, 920, 276 Cal. Rptr. 187, 196 (1990).
133. SeeLiu, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 1133, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586.
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conspiracy "does not apply where the several different criminal acts
are separate murders of different individuals, even if the separate
murders are incidental to a single objective." 134 It reasoned that a
conspiracy to commit several murders is a more serious wrong than a
conspiracy to commit a single murder, "no matter the extent to which
the several murders are planned for the accomplishment of a single
criminal purpose."'
135
Like Liu, the court in People v. McLead concluded that there
was a separate conspiracy corresponding to each murder.'
36
However, the McLead court rejected the theo 7 that there are as
many conspiracies as there are victims per se. 13  Instead, the court
adopted an intermediate approach and noted that the existence of
multiple victims is only one factor in deciding the number of
conspiracies. 138 More recently, the court in People v. Vargas tried to
distinguish Liu's holding by explaining that the Liu court only
affirmed the separate convictions "because it did not find an
overriding conspiracy subsuming the two murders.' ' 139 Whether this
is adequate to reconcile the two positions remains to be seen.
Nonetheless, most courts agree that the question of whether there are
single or multiple conspiracies is not one of fact, and the trial court
need not submit it to the jury for determination.
140
2. Vicarious liability for substantive offenses of co-conspirators
In California, a conspirator is liable for an act of a co-
conspirator, not only when such an act was a part of the original
plan, but also when it was a natural and probable consequence of
134. Id. at 1133, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586.
135. Id.
136. See Mclead, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 920, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
137. See id.
138. Other relevant factors include "whether the crimes involved the same
motives, were to occur in the same time and place and by the same means." Id.
139. Vargas, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 556, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243.
140. See Liu, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 1133, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586; McLead, 225
Cal. App. 3d at 921, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 196; cf Vargas, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 554,
110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242 ("A trial court is required to instruct the jury to
determine whether a single or multiple conspiracies exist only when there is
evidence to support alternative findings.").
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carrying out the plan.141  This is consistent with the well-known
Pinkerton Doctrine under federal conspiracy law. 142  The co-
conspirator liability/Pinkerton Doctrine implicitly recognizes the
greater threat of criminal agency and explicitly seeks to deter
criminal combination by recognizing that the act of one is an act of
all.
143
The rationale makes the most sense when the conspiratorial
objects being contemplated contain a high risk of collateral damage.
In other words, when people conspire to commit crimes of a nature
that would probably result in the taking of human life, it must be
presumed that they all understand the consequences that might
141. See People v. Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331, 334, 92 P. 861, 862 (1997)
("'The general rule is well settled that where several parties conspire or
combine together to commit any unlawful act, each is criminally responsible
for the acts of his associates or confederates committed in furtherance of any
prosecution of the common design for which they combine."' (citations
omitted)); People v. Superior Court (Shamis), 58 Cal. App. 4th 833, 842-43,
68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388, 393 (1997) ("'The doctrine of conspiracy plays a dual
role in our criminal law. First, conspiracy is a substantive offense in itself....
Second, proof of a conspiracy serves to impose criminal liability on all
conspirators for crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy."' (citations
omitted)); People v. Luparello, 187 Cal. App. 3d 410, 437, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832,
847 (1986); see also CALJIC, supra note 2, § 6.11:
Each member of a criminal conspiracy is liable for each act and
bound by each declaration of every other member of the conspiracy if
that act or declaration is in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.
The act of one conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of the
common design of the conspiracy is the act of all conspirators.
[A member of a conspiracy is not only guilty of the particular
crime that to [his][her] knowledge [his][her] confederates agreed to
and did commit, but is also liable for the natural and probable
consequences of any [crime] [act] of a co-conspirator to further the
object of the conspiracy, even though that [crime] [act] was not
intended as a part of the agreed upon objective and even though [he]
[she] was not present at the time of the commission of that [crime]
[act] .... ]
142. See United States v. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946) (holding that
co-conspirators can be liable for the substantive crimes committed by members
of the conspiracy to the extent those offenses were reasonably foreseeable); cf
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. 6(a) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985) (rejecting conspiracy as "a basis of complicity in substantive offenses
committed in furtherance of its aims").
143. See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647; Luparello, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 437, 231
Cal. Rptr. at 847.
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reasonably follow from carrying out such plans and have assented to
the taking of human life if necessary to accomplish the object of the
conspiracy. 144 Thus, all the conspirators, not just those who do the
actual killing, are equally guilty of any homicide that is the natural
and probable consequence of their criminal enterprise. 145 This is so
even if a homicide is not directly contemplated by the
conspirators. 1
46
However, a conspirator is not liable for the act of a co-
conspirator where such an act is entirely unrelated to the common
plan or is a product of individual malice. 147 In People v. Kauffman,
the court explained that where one member of the party departs from
the original unlawful design and commits an act which is neither in
furtherance nor the natural or legitimate consequence of an attempt
to attain that conspiratorial object, that member would alone be
responsible for his acts. 148 According to the same logic, it would not
make sense to extend liability for an act that is actually forbidden and
144. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 59 Cal. 345, 354 (1881) (affirming
conviction of first-degree murder); People v. Alexander, 140 Cal. App. 3d 647,
662, 189 Cal. Rptr. 906, 914 (1983) (each act or statement in the perpetration
of crime is imputed to all of the conspirators); People v. Johnson, 33 Cal. App.
3d 9, 21-22, 108 Cal. Rptr. 671, 679 (1973) (stating that once it was conceded
that the defendant was engaged in a conspiracy with the co-defendant to rob
the shop owner, it became immaterial whether homicide was part of the
common plan); People v. Pedde, 25 Cal. App. 34, 43-44, 142 P. 894, 897
(1914) (affirming conviction of assault with intent to commit murder); 17 CAL.
JUR. 3D, Criminal Law: Crimes Against the Person § 9 (2002).
145. See People v. Morante, 20 Cal. 4th 403, 417, 975 P.2d 1071, 1080, 84
Cal. Rptr. 2d 665, 674 (1999) ("[I]t is not necessary that a party to a conspiracy
shall be present and personally participate... in all or any of the overt acts.");
People v. Harper, 25 Cal. 2d 862, 871-72, 156 P.2d 249, 254-55 (1945);
People v. Bringhurst, 192 Cal. 748, 751, 221 P. 897, 898 (1923); People v.
Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 57, 87 P.2d 364, 366-67 (1939); People v.
Jones, 136 Cal. App. 722, 727-28, 29 P.2d 902, 904-05 (1934).
146. See People v. Cowan, 38 Cal. App. 2d 231, 245, 101 P.2d 125, 133
(1940); see also CALJIC, supra note 2, § 8.26 (In a felony-murder where
killing is done in pursuance of a conspiracy, "all of the co-conspirators are
equally guilty of murder of the first degree" whether the killing is intentional,
unintentional, or accidental.).
147. See Kauffman, 152 Cal. at 334, 92 P. at 862.
148. See id.; CALJIC, supra note 2, § 6.16.
Summer 20031 1563
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 36:1541
cannot be anticipated as a probable and natural consequence of the
agreement.
149
Finally, the question of whether an act is a natural and probable
consequence of carrying out the common plan or whether it is
entirely unrelated is for the jury to resolve.'
50
C. Duration/Termination
The point at which a conspiracy terminates is important for
many reasons. First, a continuing conspiracy may allow for more
overt acts at different locations, which in turn will afford the
prosecution new choices for the place of trial.151 The termination
point also dictates whether additional persons joined the original
conspiracy or a new one, whether the declaration of one conspirator
will be admissible against other conspirators, 152 and whether the
statute of limitations bars a conspiracy prosecution.1
53
The statute of limitations begins to run either when the
defendant withdraws,' 54 or when the conspiracy itself terminates.'
55
A conspiracy terminates when the substantive crime for which the
co-conspirators are being tried is either attained or defeated. 156 If all
parties abandon the conspiracy before the successful attainment of
the substantive offense (i.e., the primary object of the conspiracy),
then the limitation period begins to run from the date the last overt
act was alleged to have occurred in furtherance of the conspiracy.
57
149. See People v. Garewal, 173 Cal. App. 3d 285, 300, 218 Cal. Rptr. 690,
698 (1985); Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d at 126, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
150. See People v. Superior Court (Quinteros), 13 Cal. App. 4th 12, 21-22,
16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 462, 467-68 (1993).
151. See LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 47, § 6.5(e).
152. In California, a conspirator's statements are admissible against his co-
conspirators only when made during the conspiracy and in furtherance thereof.
See People v. Saling, 7 Cal. 3d 844, 852, 500 P.2d 610, 615, 103 Cal. Rptr.
698, 703 (1972).
153. See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 47, § 6.5(e).
154. See discussion infra Section D, Withdrawal.
155. See Harvard Developments, supra note 27, at 961.
156. See Saling, 7 Cal. 3d at 852, 500 P.2d at 615, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
157. See People v. Zamora, 18 Cal. 3d 538, 546 n.4, 557 P.2d 75, 80 n.4, 134
Cal. Rptr. 784, 789 n.4 (1976).
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Otherwise, the statute of limitations starts to run at the same time as
the substantive offense itself.
158
1. Death or arrest of a conspirator does not
necessarily terminate conspiracy
A conspiracy cannot be deemed abandoned when there has
already been an agreement and there remains some party still able to
carry out the objective. For instance, a death of a conspirator in a
two-person conspiracy is not enough to end the conspiracy for the
co-conspirator. 159 In People v. Alleyne, two people conspired to kill,
but one of them died before the other consummated the plan. 160 The
issue was whether the death of a co-conspirator before an overt act
occurred would terminate the conspiracy. The court concluded that
the co-conspirator's death terminated his life but not the
agreement. 161 Because there was an agreement to kill, all that was
left to make the agreement punishable was the defendant's
perpetration of an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. 62 The
defendant's act of killing was the last requisite element that
established his culpability. 163 Moreover, a conspirator's arrest or
imprisonment does not terminate the conspiracy with respect to him
as a matter of law.164 In People v. Cooks, the court held that the
withdrawal of a conspiracy presents a question of fact, and the jury
must decide whether the alleged conspirator still concurred in the
general objective of the conspiracy after his arrest.'
65
158. See Parnell v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 392, 410, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 906, 916-17 (1981).
159. See People v. Alleyne, 82 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1260-61, 98 Cal. Rptr.
2d 737, 740 (2000).
160. See id.
161. See id. at 1262,98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 741.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See People v. Cooks, 141 Cal. App. 3d 224, 278, 190 Cal. Rptr. 211,
251 (1983).
165. See id. at 316, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 278; see also Saling, 7 Cal. 3d at 852,
500 P.2d at 615, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 703 (stating that jury should determine
precisely when the conspiracy ended).
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2. Acts of concealment/extension beyond commission
of a substantive crime
An act conducted for the mere purpose of concealing either the
conspiracy or the substantive crime cannot extend the life of a
conspiracy. 166  This rule is intended to prevent the indefinite
prolonging of a conspiracy for steps taken to bury their traces and to
avoid detection and punishment after accomplishing the central
criminal purpose.1 67 However, there may be situations where the
conspiracy will be "deemed to have extended beyond the substantive
crime to activities contemplated and undertaken by the conspirators
in pursuance of the objectives of the conspiracy., 1 68 For instance, in
People v. Saling, the prosecution sought to introduce statements
made to a co-conspirator three days after the murder. 169 The court
held that the statements were hearsay, but were nevertheless
admissible as being made in furtherance of a conspiracy. 170  The
conspiracy continued after the murder because one of the main
objectives included obtaining payment for the defendant's
participation, which had not occurred when the statements were
made.
The California Supreme Court has since narrowed the scope of
the holding in Saling by emphasizing that, as a matter of law, not all
conspiracies in which one conspirator is hired by another continue
until the person hired is paid to his satisfaction. 172  For hearsay
166. See Saling, 7 Cal. 3d at 852, 500 P.2d at 615, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 703
(citing Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949)).
167. See id. at 854 n.9, 500 P.2d at 616, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 704 n.9 (citing
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391,405 (1957)).
168. Id. at 852, 500 P.2d at 615, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 703; see also People v.
Brown, 131 Cal. App. 2d 643, 656-57, 281 P.2d 319, 328 (1955) (illustrating
examples to include: division of loot, payment for participation in the crime,
and acts contemplating escaping punishment); cf People v. Tinnin, 136 Cal.
App. 301, 306, 28 P.2d 951, 953-54 (1934) (finding that conspiracy deemed
still operative when defendant tried to escape punishment for murder by
making death appear accidental).
169. See Saling, 7 Cal. 3d at 851, 500 P.2d at 614-15, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 702-
03.
170. See id. at 851-52, 500 P.2d at 614-15, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 702-03.
171. See id. at 851-52, 500 P.2d at 615, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
172. See People v. Leach, 15 Cal. 3d 419, 432, 541 P.2d 296, 304, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 752, 760 (1975).
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evidence to be admissible under the co-conspirator exception,
independent evidence of a continuing conspiracy is required. 173 In
People v. Leach, for example, the court cautioned that conspiracy to
commit murder does not necessarily entail a second conspiracy to
collect the insurance proceeds to be paid upon successfully
committing the contemplated offense. 174 In contrast, where evidence
reveals that the goal of the conspiracy is to obtain money through the
receipt of insurance benefits for the life of the insured, the conspiracy
does not end with the death of the insured. 175 Instead, the conspiracy
continues until the conspirators receive the insurance proceeds, or
until the beneficiary of the policy is convicted of unjustifiable
homicide and thus rendered ineligible to collect.' 76 A survey of these
decisions reveals the tension between the prosecution's interest in
lengthening the duration of the crime and the danger of extending the
conspiracy doctrine too far.
177
D. Withdrawal
Withdrawal from a conspiracy may act as a defense in several
contexts. For example, a defendant may assert a withdrawal to avoid
liability for substantive crimes subsequently committed by other
conspirators. 178  Another possibility is that a defendant may rely
upon his withdrawal as a means of limiting the admissibility of the
subsequent acts and declarations of the other conspirators against
him.' 79 Additionally, under California law, withdrawal serves as a
complete defense to conspiracy if the withdrawal is accomplished
173. See id. at 432, 541 P.2d at 304, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
174. See id. at 434, 541 P.2d at 305-06, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 761-62.
175. See People v. Hardy, 2 Cal. 4th 86, 143-44, 825 P.2d 781, 811-12, 5
Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 826-27 (1992).
176. See id. at 144, 825 P.2d at 812, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 826-27.
177. See id. (recognizing Justice Jackson's frequently cited admonition in
Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 449, that 'the looseness and pliability of the doctrine
[of conspiracy] present inherent dangers which should be in the background of
judicial thought wherever it is sought to extend the doctrine to meet the
exigencies of a particular case."'); John Bilyeu Oakley, From Hearsay to
Eternity: Pendency and the Co-Conspirator Exception in California-Fact,
Fiction, and a Novel Approach, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 2-10 (1975).
178. See People v. Sconce, 228 Cal App. 3d 693, 702, 279 Cal. Rptr. 59, 64
(199 1); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 47, § 6.5(e).
179. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 47, § 6.5(e).
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before the commission of an overt act.18 0 Conversely, once an overt
act is committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, the crime of
conspiracy becomes completed and no subsequent action can
exonerate the conspirator of that crime.'
8 '
Requiring an overt act before conspirators can be prosecuted and
punished is said to provide a locus poenitentiae-an opportunity for
reconsideration or termination of agreement.1 82 The purpose of this
rule is to encourage the conspirator to abandon the conspiracy prior
to attaining its specific object, and thereby weaken the group that he
entered. 18 3 Because this rationale should continue to apply after the
commission of an overt act that is not itself a substantive crime,
commentators disagree about the wisdom of choosing the first overt
act as the locus poenitentiae184 Nevertheless, the rule in California
remains that once an overt act has been committed, withdrawal no
longer serves as an affirmative defense to the initial act of
conspiracy. 8
5
1. Burden of proof
A defendant's participation in the conspiracy, once established,
is presumed to continue unless he can prove that he effectively
withdrew from the conspiracy.' 86 Therefore, the burden of proof is
on the defendant to prove that he affirmatively withdrew from or
180. See Sconce, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 701-02, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 63-64
(stating that withdrawal after an overt act "merely precludes liability for
subsequent acts committed by members of the conspiracy," and does not relate
back to the criminal formation of the unlawful combination).
181. See id. at 702, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
182. See id. at 701, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
183. See Harvard Developments, supra note 27, at 957.
184. See id.; LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 47, at 559; see also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.03(6) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)
(recognizing a defense that it refers to as renunciation, which is not available in
California).
185. See Sconce, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 702, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
"[W]ithdrawal avoids liability only for the target offense, or for any
subsequent act committed by a co-conspirator in pursuance of the common
plan. '[in respect of the conspiracy itself, the individual's change of mind is
ineffective; he cannot undo that which he has already done."' Id. (citations
omitted).
186. See People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 791, 755 P.2d 310, 335, 248
Cal. Rptr. 126, 151-52 (1988).
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repudiated his role in the conspiracy.1 87  "'It is not part of the
People's prima facie case to negate the possibility of such a
withdrawal."",18 8  Similar to termination, withdrawal from a
conspiracy is a question of fact.1 89 "Although a defendant's arrest
and incarceration may terminate his participation in an alleged
conspiracy, his arrest does not terminate, or constitute a withdrawal
from, the conspiracy as a matter of law." 190
2. Communication necessary for effective withdrawal
To effectively withdraw from a conspiracy, a conspirator must
do more than merely cease participating; he must communicate to the
other conspirators "an affirmative and bona fide rejection or
repudiation of the conspiracy."' 91 In People v. Beaumaster, the
defendant's conspiracy conviction for assault with intent to commit
murder was sustained even though he complied with police orders
before any shooting occurred and his partner was the person who
fired the actual shots. 192 The court found that although the defendant
cooperated with the police, he had not communicated any withdrawal
to his co-defendant. 193  In fact, he handed the gun used in the
shooting to the co-defendant. 194 Furthermore, the court concluded
that the defendant's abandonment was inadequate to constitute
withdrawal because it was not a free and voluntary act.195 There is
no effective withdrawal where the abandonment is prompted by
threatened arrest or the appearance of police. 1
96
Another related issue is how much notice is necessary for an
effective withdrawal. The court in Loser v. Superior Court of
187. See id.
188. Id. (quoting People v. Crosby, 58 Cal. 2d 713, 731, 375 P.2d 839, 850,
25 Cal. Rptr. 847, 858 (1962)).
189. See Sconce, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 701, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
190. Id.
191. Id.; see CALJIC, supra note 2, § 6.20 ("In order to effectively withdraw
from a conspiracy, there must be an affirmative and good faith rejection or
repudiation of the conspiracy which must be communicated to the other
conspirators of whom [he][she] has knowledge.").
192. See 17 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1003, 95 Cal. Rptr. 360, 364 (1971).
193. See id. at 1004, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
194. See id. at 1004, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65.
195. See id. at 1004, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
196. See id. at 1003, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
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Alameda County held that such withdrawal requires an "affirmative
act bringing home the fact of his withdrawal to his confederates," in
time for them to also abandon the scheme. 197 In addition, the court
suggested that notice is insufficient unless it is given to all of the
other conspirators. 198  This position has never been explicitly
overruled, but it has been criticized for being too restrictive. 199 The
trend in more recent decisions seems to favor a more flexible
standard that relieves the defendant of the duty to actually notify
each and every co-conspirator of his intentions, as long as he made a
reasonable attempt to do so.
200
Finally, withdrawing from a conspiracy requires less effort than
withdrawing as an aider and abettor, which calls for a defendant to
notify his accomplices and do "everything in his power to prevent
commission of the crime." 201 The latter approach is similar to that of
the Model Penal Code, which recognizes an affirmative defense to
the crime of conspiracy if the defendant thwarts "the success of the
conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and
voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose. ' '20 2  However,
197. 78 Cal. App. 2d 30, 32, 177 P.2d 320, 321 (1947); see 1 WITKIN &
EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 92; Harvard Developments, supra note 27, at 958.
198. See 1 WITKN & EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 92.
199. See Harvard Developments, supra note 27, at 958 ("[T]he courts have
gone beyond the rationale of notification. It appears sufficient that the
defendant reasonably expected his withdrawal to be communicated to the rest
of his associates by those whom he informed; to require him personally to
contact all members seems too harsh.").
200. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422
(1978) (holding that an instruction stating the defendant could withdraw only
by either notifying every member of the conspiracy of his withdrawal or
notifying authorities of the illegal scheme is unnecessarily confining and
constituted reversible error). "Affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of
the conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach
co-conspirators have generally been regarded as sufficient to establish
withdrawal or abandonment." Id. at 464-65. Compare Loser, 78 Cal. App. 2d
at 32, 177 P.2d at 321 (using word "confederates" to indicate that notice of
withdrawal must be given to every co-conspirator), with People v. Crosby, 58
Cal. 2d 713, 730, 375 P.2d 839, 850, 25 Cal. Rptr. 847, 858 (1962) (stating that
"there must be... [a] rejection or repudiation... communicated to the co-
conspirators").
201. People v. Jackson, 13 Cal. 4th 1164, 1221, 920 P.2d 1254, 1286, 56
Cal. Rptr. 2d 49, 81 (1996) (citations omitted).
202. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(6).
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California courts rejected "renunciation" as a complete defense to the
conspiracy.2 °3 Thus, although a conspirator can withdraw by simply
informing the others of his intentions (thereby releasing himself from
any subsequent vicarious liability), going the extra step (by trying to
prevent the commission of the object offense) will not absolve him
of the conspiracy charge itself, once an overt act is committed.
204
E. The Co-Conspirator Exception
It is generally agreed that one of the chief advantages of the
conspiracy charge for the prosecution is that statements of one
conspirator are admissible against all co-conspirators. 2°5  Section
1223 of the California Evidence Code codified the long-established
"co-conspirator exception" to the hearsay rule,20 6 making hearsay
statements by co-conspirators admissible against a party "if, at the
threshold, the offering party presents 'independent evidence to
establish prima facie the existence of... [a] conspiracy.' 217 Once
proof of a conspiracy has been demonstrated, three preliminary facts
must be established:
'(1) that the declarant was participating in a conspiracy at
the time of the declaration; (2) that the declaration was in
203. See Sconce, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 702-03 n.4, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 64 n.4.
204. See id. at 702, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
205. See Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back From
an Ever Expanding, Ever More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1, 25 (1992); see also People v. Cooks, 141 Cal. App. 3d 224, 312, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 275 (1983) ("[O]nce the conspiracy is established it is not necessary
to prove that each conspirator personally participated in each of several overt
acts because members of a conspiracy are bound by all acts of all members
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy." (citations omitted)); People v.
Tinnin, 136 Cal. App. 301, 306, 28 P.2d 951, 953 (1934) (finding that acts and
declarations of one conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of the
conspiracy's purpose are admissible in evidence against any member of the
conspiracy).
206. See People v. Leach, 15 Cal. 3d 419, 428, 541 P.2d 296, 302, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 752, 758 (1975).
207. People v. Hardy, 2 Cal. 4th 86, 139, 825 P.2d 781, 809, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d
796, 824 (1992) (citations omitted); see also People v. Herrera, 83 Cal. App.
4th 46, 63, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 911, 922 (2000) (establishing that a prima facie
showing of a conspiracy for the purposes of admissibility of a co-conspirator's
statement requires the proponent to proffer sufficient evidence to "allow the
trier of fact to determine that the conspiracy exists by a preponderance of the
evidence").
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furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy; and (3) that
at the time of the declaration the party against whom the
evidence is offered was participating or would later
participate in the conspiracy.'
20 8
1. Independent proof of conspiracy
California courts require "that the existence of the conspiracy be
established by evidence independent of the proffered declaration."
20 9
Although "the showing need only be prima facie evidence of the
conspiracy," the evidence "may be circumstantial, and may be by
means of any competent evidence which tends to show that a
conspiracy existed . . . including uncorroborated accomplice
testimony., 210 "[I]t is settled that only slight corroborative evidence
is necessary to connect a defendant with the alleged conspiracy. '2 1'
In addition, "evidence of conspiracy may be admitted even if the
defendant is not charged with the crime of conspiracy.
212
2. Requirement of furtherance
The requirement that the co-conspirator's statement "must
further the object of the conspiracy is broadly construed., 213 Any
statement that relates to the conspiracy usually furthers that
conspiracy.
214
For example, in People v. Von Villas, evidence of a calendar
with a blackened out date that coincided with the murder victim's
disappearance was deemed in furtherance of the conspiracy and was
208. People v. Sanders, 11 Cal. 4th 475, 516, 905 P.2d 420, 440, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 751, 771 (1995) (quoting Hardy, 2 Cal. 4th at 139, 825 P.2d at 809, 5
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824).
209. Herrera, 83 Cal. App. 4th at 65, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 923 (citing Leach,
15 Cal. 3d at 430, 541 P.2d at 303, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 759).
210. People v. Rodrigues, 8 Cal. 4th 1060, 1134, 885 P.2d 1, 40, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 235, 274 (1994) (citations omitted).
211. Cooks, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 312, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 275 (citing People v.
Harper, 25 Cal. 2d 862, 876-77, 156 P.2d 249, 257 (1945)).
212. Rodrigues, 8 Cal. 4th at 1134, 885 P.2d at 40, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 274.
213. People v. Von Villas, 11 Cal. App. 4th 175, 231, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112,
145 (1992).
214. See id.
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admissible hearsay evidence under section 1223 .215 Although the
blackened calendar was found in the co-conspirator's home ten
months after the date of the victim's disappearance, and nothing
directly tied him to the act of blackening the date, the court
concluded that there was a proper foundation to submit the exhibit to
the jury under section 1223 as evidence against the defendant.216 In
People v. Sanders, the hearsay statement at issue was made by one of
the defendants to her co-worker, telling her a robbery was going to
occur that night.217 There, the defendant argued that her statement,
"Good thing I seen you today... [b]ecause they gonna [sic] rob
Bob's Big Boy tonight, and I don't want you hurt," was not
admissible because it was not made in furtherance of the
conspiracy. 218 The court was not persuaded, deciding instead that the
defendant made the statement to her co-worker "in order to remove
her from the scene of the planned crime so that she would not be an
eyewitness [sic] and victim of the robbery and would be less likely to
be able to establish [the defendant's] connection to the robbery. 219
The court's ruling supports the notion:
When a declaration occurs during a conspiracy and is
relevant enough to be offered against the defendant, its role
in furtherance of the conspiracy is usually so self-evident as
to warrant no more than a conclusory reference to the
furtherance requirement in stating the manifest
admissibility of the declaration pursuant to the co-
conspirator exception.
220
3. Requirement of pendency
The pendency prong with respect to the co-conspirator hearsay
exception requires that the statement must be made during the
215. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1223 (West 2003); Von Villas, 11 Cal. App. 4th
at 231-32, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145-46.
216. See Von Villas, 11 Cal. App. 4th at 231-32, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2dat 145-46.
217. 11 Cal. 4th 475, 515, 905 P.2d 420, 439, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 751, 770
(1995).
218. Id. at 515-16, 905 P.2d at 440, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 771.
219. Id. at 516, 905 P.2d at 440,46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 771.
220. Oakley, supra note 177, at 26.
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conspiracy, not before it commenced or after it terminated. 221 "It is
for the trier of fact-considering the unique circumstances and the
nature and purpose of the conspiracy of each case-to determine
precisely when the conspiracy has ended.,
222
F. Conclusion
Given the unique procedural aspects and the possibility for
enhanced punishment, it is not hard to see that conspiracy is a
powerful weapon in the prosecutor's arsenal. The potential abuse of
this weapon, however, has generated debates on whether the
conspiracy doctrine creates an unfair advantage for the prosecutor
and whether the doctrine itself is even necessary.223  Yet, it is
undeniable that group criminal actions are typically more dangerous
than individual acts, and that the nature of secret conspiratorial
agreements is such that there is often little evidence available for
prosecution. We need to be able to control the danger of people
getting together, encouraging each other, and planning bigger and
more complex crimes-before it is too late. Ultimately, conspiracy
appears to be an effective device to deal with serious group criminal
behavior. However, how the doctrine is applied in certain
circumstances may mean the difference between capturing the
culpable mastermind behind a nefarious plot and excessively
punishing the "small fish" for a crime beyond his control and
expectations.
221. See Leach, 15 Cal. 3d at 436, 541 P.2d at 307, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 763; see
also People v. Dominguez, 121 Cal. App. 3d 481, 497 n.17, 175 Cal. Rptr.
445, 454 n. 17 (1981) ("No act or declaration of a conspirator that is committed
or made after the conspiracy has been terminated is binding upon his co-
conspirators, and they are not criminally liable for any such act."). For a more
in depth discussion of when a conspiracy is deemed to begin and end, see
Duration/Termination supra Part VIII.C.
222. Hardy, 2 Cal. 4th at 143, 825 P.2d at 811, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
223. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 1138.; Marcus, supra note 3, at 926-27,
965-67
1574
Summer 2003] SELF-DEFENSE 1575
IX. SELF-DEFENSE*
California Penal Code section 197 states, "Homicide is...
justifiable when committed by any person ... [who is] resisting any
attempt to murder any person ..... " This definition does not fully
+U-. I - - A - A- A .. .-U . A-P-, n -
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Section A examines the current controversy surrounding how
much of the defendant's experiences and point of view should be
considered in determining how an objectively reasonable person
would act in the same position as the defendant. Section B
introduces and discusses the concept of justifiable homicide. In
Sections C and D, the requirement of imminent harm and the test for
reasonable belief are discussed in detail. Section E then discusses
imperfect self-defense and self-defense based on delusion.
Moreover, throughout this Part, development of the self-defense
doctrine in battered women's syndrome cases is discussed and
compared to the more common applications of self-defense. Finally,
this Part concludes with a discussion of where the courts seem to be
heading.
A. A Killing in Self-Defense is Justifiable
Justifiable and excusable homicide is not punishable in
California.7 California Penal Code section 199 states that if "[t]he
homicide appear[s] to be justifiable or excusable, the person indicted
must.., be fully acquitted and discharged."8 The statute is simple
and straightforward, but case law provides a multitude of issues that
must be considered.
California Penal Code section 197 states that "[h]omicide is...
justifiable when committed by any person [who is] ... resisting any
attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some
great bodily injury upon any person."9  When a person acts
justifiably and commits murder, the act is privileged. 10 A privileged
act is one that would usually subject the offender to liability, but it
does not do so under the circumstances in which the act took place."
The amount of force used by the defendant in self-defense must
be only that which is necessary. The use of excessive force destroys
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 199 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002).
8. Id.
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 197.
10. See, e.g., People v. Hardin, 85 Cal. App. 4th 625, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 262
(2000) (holding that the victim was privileged to use force in evicting
defendant from her home but the defendant's use of force against the victim's
force was not privileged).
11. See id.
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the justification, and therefore the defense. 12 For example, in People
v. Bates, the defendant and the victim were involved in a "tussle" in
the kitchen of the defendant's restaurant. 13 The victim grabbed a
knife and stabbed the defendant in the hip.1 4 The defendant grabbed
and secured the knife, and then repeatedly stabbed the victim in the
back, killing him.15 The court stated, "Self-defense may be resorted
to in order to repel force, but not to inflict vengeance."16 Although
the victim attacked first, the court concluded that there was no reason
for the defendant to take the victim's life.17 The court held that
"justifiable homicide connotes only the use of force.., which
reasonably appears to be necessary, to resist the other party's
misconduct... [and] that use of excessive force destroys the
justification ... ,,18
B. Requirement of Imminent Harm
1. General definition
Fear of imminent harm is an essential element to self-defense. 19
The fear of harm must be substantial enough to cause a reasonable
person to fear death or great bodily injury.
20
However, in some circumstances, imminent harm is not a
defense for murder. 21 For example, in People v. Hardin, the
defendant broke into the resident's home and was attacked with a
hammer by the resident after the defendant failed to comply with her
request to leave.22  The defendant then struck and killed the
12. See People v. Bates, 256 Cal. App. 2d 935, 939, 64 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578
(1967).
13. See id. at 938, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 939, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
17. See id. at 939, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
18. Id. at 939, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 578 (citing People v. Young, 214 Cal. App.
2d 641, 646, 29 Cal. Rptr. 595, 598 (1963)).
19. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 197-198 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002).
20. See id.
21. See People v. Hardin, 85 Cal. App. 4th 625, 631-32, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d
262, 266 (2000).
22. See id.
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resident.23 The court held that the defendant's belief that he was in
imminent and deadly peril ended when he disarmed the resident.24
Furthermore, the court held that a person who breaks into someone
else's home cannot assert self-defense if the home owner attacks
him.25 In sum, when a resident acts with deadly force against an
intruder in his residence, there is a presumption of imminent harm.
26
2. Imminent harm in battered women's syndrome cases
27
The California Supreme Court expanded the definition of
imminent harm in the case of a battered woman in People v.
Humphrey.28 The defendant, a battered woman according to expert
testimony, believed she was in imminent harm as a result of both her
interactions with the victim and the cycle of escalating violence that
characterized her relationship with the victim.
29
Battered women are typically involved in a continuing "cycle of
violence" that begins early in life and continues into adulthood.3° In
Humphrey, the defendant was molested by her father from the age of
seven to the age of fifteen, and she was later involved in another
abusive relationship.31
23. See id.
24. See id. at 634, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268.
25. See id. at 633-34, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 267-68.
26. In People v. Owen, 277 Cal. Rptr. 341, 347, 226 Cal. App. 3d 996,
1005 (1991), the court stated that California Penal Code section 198.5 creates a
rebuttable presumption of reasonable fear:
[T]he statute was enacted to permit residential occupants to defend
themselves from intruders without fear of legal repercussions, to give
"the benefit of the doubt in such cases to the resident, establishing a
presumption that the very act of forcible entry entails a threat to the
life and limb of the homeowner." (Press release from the office of Sen.
H. L. Richardson (the bill's author) Oct. 1, 1984).
27. "Battered women's syndrome 'has been defined as a series of common
characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and
psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male figure
in their lives."' People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1083-84, 921 P.2d 1,
7, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142, 148-49 (1996) (citations omitted).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 1073, 921 P.2d at 1, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
30. See id. at 1079, 921 P.2d at 4, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145.
31. See id. at 1079-80, 921 P.2d at4, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146.
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During the defendant's relationship with her husband, the
husband repeatedly brutalized the defendant by hitting her and
threatening to kill her.32 The day before the defendant shot her
husband, the husband fired his gun at her, narrowly missing her.
Then, on the day of the husband's death, the couple drove into the
mountains, where the husband said that the mountains would be a
good place to kill the defendant.33
Later that night, Humphrey shot her husband and then claimed
self-defense, arguing that the killing was justifiable because she was
in imminent fear for her life.34 However, Humphrey killed the
victim following an argument that had escalated into threats of
violence, not during the argument. 35 Her husband was unarmed and
not overtly threatening her at the time of his death.36 Nonetheless,
the court applied California Evidence Code section 1107 and held
that the defendant's objectively reasonable belief in the imminence
of harm could be examined from her viewpoint as a battered
woman. 37 For the first time, the court admitted evidence of battered
women's syndrome to prove the objective reasonableness of the
defendant's fear of imminent harm, and held that a perception of
imminent harm could "reasonably follow from the defendant's
experience as a battered woman."
38
In ruling that the defendant's past perceptions could create a
reasonable fear of imminent harm, the court fundamentally changed
32. See id. at 1080, 921 P.2d at 4, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 1082, 921 P.2d at 5-6, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147.
35. See id. at 1077, 921 P.2d at 4-5, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146.
36. See id. at 1077-78, 921 P.2d at 2-3, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144-45. The
defendant reported to the police that before firing, she told the victim, "'You're
not going to hit me anymore."' At the scene of the crime, the defendant told
the police officer, "'I'm just tired of him hitting me.' He said, 'You're not
going to do nothing about it."' She stated, "'I showed him, didn't I?" The
prosecution pointed to these statements as evidence of the lack of imminent
harm. Id. at 1077, 921 P.2d at 3, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
37. The California Evidence Code provides, "[i]n a criminal action, expert
testimony is admissible by either the prosecution or the defense regarding
battered women's syndrome, including the physical, emotional, or mental
effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic
violence ...." CAL. EviD. CODE § 1107(a) (West 1995 & Supp. 2003).
38. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1085, 921 P.2d at 8, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149-
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the defining properties of reasonable belief in imminent harm. This
change, however, remains limited to cases involving battered
women's syndrome.
3. Expansion of "imminence" in other contexts
The courts retain a narrow definition of "imminence" in other
types of cases.39 Although the court was willing to modify the way it
examined reasonable belief in imminence in Humphrey to include a
view of imminence from the defendant's perspective,40 it was
unwilling to do so in the case of People v. Romero.
In Romero, the defendant was a gang member who killed a
member of a rival gang during a street fight.41 The defendant was
armed with a knife, which he used to stab his unarmed rival in the
heart.42 Romero testified that his younger brother was in the area,
and that he was responsible for caring for his brother.43 The
defendant testified, "I had to stop [the victim]. From there, I didn't
think of nothing else. ' 4 The defendant argued that he had to stab the
victim to protect his brother, and that he therefore committed a
privileged act.45
However, in Romero, the court refused to allow expert
testimony that might explain why the defendant felt that harm was
imminent based on his perceptions as a Hispanic street gang
member.46  Citing the California Supreme Court's dicta in
Humphrey, the Romero court stated, "Our decision would not, in
another context, compel adoption of a 'reasonable gang member'
standard.'A 7 The Romero court summarily dismissed the issue of
admitting expert evidence on the basis that there was no imminence
39. See, e.g., People v. Romero, 69 Cal. App. 4th 846, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 823
(1999) (rejecting expert testimony about street fighting, Hispanic honor, and
paternalism in considering whether the defendant actually believed he was in
imminent danger).
40. See Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1086, 921 P.2d at 8, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
150.
41. See Romero, 69 Cal. App. 4th at 848, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 823-24.
42. See id. at 852, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 826.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 854, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 827.
47. Id.
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demonstrated by the facts.4 8 Because of the lack of imminent harm,
the court held that the expert evidence was irrelevant, stating that it
was not necessary to consider reasonableness if there was no
imminence.
49
In Humphrey, the court opened the door to allow juries to
consider the character, history, and perception of the defendant when
evaluating whether a defendant's perception of imminent harm was
reasonable.5 0 But from a purely factual perspective, Humphrey was
in no greater imminent harm than Romero. In both cases, there was
a chance that the violence could escalate.5 1 However, at the time of
each of the homicides, the violence had not yet escalated or shown
any clear signs that it might rise to the level of imminent harm.
Nevertheless, the court considered how "the psychological impact of
being a battered woman [affected the woman's] perception of
[imminent] danger,, 52 yet it ignored the psychological impact of
being a gang member.53
C. Requirement ofActual and Reasonable Belief
The test for self-defense consists of a subjective element and an
objective element. That is, the defendant must have an actual belief
in the need to defend himself against imminent harm, and the
defendant's belief in the need to defend himself against imminent
harm must be justified "from the point of view of a reasonable
person in the position of [the] defendant." 54 If a defendant satisfies
both of these requirements, he will be exonerated.55
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1085-1089, 921 P.2d at 8-11, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 150-52.
51. In Humphrey, the victim did not appear any more or less likely to use
lethal force on that particular day, at that particular moment, than he was on
other occasions. See id. at 1077, 921 P.2d at 3, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144.
Similarly, in Romero, although the violence could have easily escalated, it had
not yet done so. See Romero, 69 Cal. App. 4th 846, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 823.
52. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1084, 921 P.2d at 8, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149.
53. Romero, 69 Cal. App. 4th 846, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 823.
54. See Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1083, 921 P.2d at 6-7, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
148 (citing People v. McGee, 31 Cal. 2d 229, 238, 187 P.2d 706 (1947)).
55. See McGee, 31 Cal. 2d 229, 187 P.2d 706.
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"If the belief subjectively exists but is objectively unreasonable,
there is 'imperfect self-defense."'' 56  In cases of imperfect self-
defense, the defendant has acted without malice and can be convicted
of manslaughter, but not murder.57
1. Subjective test for actual belief
In a homicide case, the subjective element of self-defense
requires that a defendant have an honest belief that his life is in
imminent danger,58 and he must act based on that fear alone. 9
Evidence of the defendant's circumstances and mental state are
considered.60
a. factual evidence of actual belief
Defendants who claim self-defense are required to prove their
actual state of mind in order to show their belief in the need to
defend. 61 Accordingly, a defendant is entitled to present evidence to
corroborate his contention that he was in actual fear for his life.62
Character evidence, evidence of threats from third parties, and
evidence of the mental state of the defendant are all relevant to show
a defendant's belief in imminent harm.63 In sum, the defendant may
present evidence designed to convince the jury that, under the
circumstances, he believed that he was in sufficient danger to
warrant the use of deadly force.64
56. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1082, 921 P.2d at 6, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147-
148.
57. See id.
58. See In re Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th 768, 773, 872 P.2d 574, 576, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 33, 35 (1994).
59. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 198 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002).
60. See, e.g., Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1085-89, 921 P.2d at 8-11, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 150-52 (stating that the character, history and perception of the
defendant should be considered in determining the defendant's honest and
reasonable belief of fear for her life).
61. See id. at 1082, 921 P.2d at 6, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147.
62. See People v. Davis, 63 Cal. 2d 648, 656, 408 P.2d 129, 133, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 801, 805 (1965).
63. See People v. Minifie, 13 Cal. 4th 1055, 1067, 920 P.2d 1337, 1344, 56
Cal. Rptr. 2d 133, 139 (1996).
64. See People v. Minifie, 13 Cal. 4th 1055, 1066, 920 P.2d 1337, 1342-43,
56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133, 138 (1996). See id. at 1067, 920 P.2d at 1344, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 2dat 138.
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b. factual evidence of actual belief in battered
women's syndrome cases
The same requirements of actual and reasonable belief in the
need to defend against imminent harm apply in cases involving
battered women's syndrome. However, expert evidence can be
considered in determining the defendant's actual belief. For
example, in People v. Aris, the trial court admitted expert evidence of
battered women's syndrome to support the defendant's actual belief
in imminent harm.65 The court of appeal stated that the evidence was
relevant to the defendant's subjective mental state, the first element
of a claim of self-defense.66 In addition, the court of appeal held that
the admission of expert testimony was relevant "as to how the
defendant's particular experiences as a battered woman affected her
perceptions of danger, its imminence, and what actions were
necessary to protect herself.,
67
2. Objective test for reasonable belief
The objective or "reasonableness" element of self-defense looks
to the perceptions and actions of the reasonable person in
determining whether or not a defendant's actions are warranted.68
This is the same hypothetical "reasonable person" test that the court
utilizes in many cases dealing with torts or contracts. When
determining whether an action is objectively reasonable, we ask
whether a reasonable person, placed in the same circumstances and
65. See 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1197,264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 179-80 (1989).
66. See id.
67. Id. at 1198, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 180. However, the court of appeal inAris
held that although battered women's syndrome evidence was admissible to
prove the actual or honest belief element of perfect self-defense, it was not
admissible to prove the reasonableness element. See id. at 1199, 264 Cal. Rptr.
at 180-81. The California Supreme Court reversed that position when it ruled
that battered women's syndrome evidence was also admissible to prove
objective belief in Humphrey in 1996. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1085-89, 921
P.2d at 8-11, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150-52. The reasonableness element now
examines both the individual's perceptions and actions. See id.
68. See Minifie, 13 Cal. 4th at 1065-66, 920 P.2d at 1342-43, 56 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 138.
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with the same knowledge as the defendant, would have acted in the
same manner.
69
The objective test is based on appearances. A defendant's
actions are not evaluated from his perspective, but from the
perspective of the reasonable person standing in his shoes. For
example, in People v. Minifie, the defendant killed another man
because he feared that the decedent would seek retribution for the
death of his associate.70 The court held that the test for objective
reasonableness includes "how the situation appeared to the
defendant, not the victim" and allowed the jury to consider the
defendant's perception of the situation in evaluating how a
reasonable person would have acted.71  This was "[b]ecause
[j]ustification does not depend upon the existence of actual danger
but rather depends on appearances. 72
a. individualizing the objective element of self-defense
Reasonableness is generally measured by examining how a
reasonable person would behave when placed in the shoes of the
defendant. The present dilemma involves just how much of the
defendant's knowledge, information, and experience should be
attributed to the reasonable person before evaluating how he would
react in a given situation. The challenge is to fmd a clear distinction
between how a reasonable person in the position of a gang member
would act, compared to how a reasonable gang member would act.
Despite the difficulty, courts have been careful to draw the
distinction.
73
69. See Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1082-83, 921 P.2d at 6, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 148.
70. See Minifie, 13 Cal. 4th at 1055, 920 P.2d at 1337, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
133.
71. Id. at 1068, 920 P.2d at 1344, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139-40.
72. Id. (citing People v. Clark, 130 Cal. App. 3d 371, 377, 181 Cal. Rptr.
682, 685 (1982)); see also CALJIC § 5.51 (6th ed. 2002) ("If the defendant
kills an innocent person, but circumstances made it reasonably appear that the
killing was necessary in self-defense, that is tragedy, not murder.") (internal
quotations omitted).
73. See, e.g., People v. Romero, 69 Cal. App. 4th 846, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 823
(1999) (holding that the role of street fighters in the Hispanic culture is
irrelevant in determining whether the defendant actually believed he was in
imminent danger of death).
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The dilemma is illustrated in People v. Romero, where the
defendant killed a rival gang member.74 Refusing to admit the
testimony of a professor who was an expert in Hispanic culture, the
court affirmed the lower court's decision that the proposed testimony
was "clearly irrelevant., 75 The California Supreme Court agreed
with the trial court, stating that it was "not prepared to sanction a
'reasonable street fighter standard.' 76  The court dismissed
sociological evidence concerning the defendant's state of mind,
stating that because the defendant was unable to present evidence
that he was in fear for his life or his brother's life, the evidence could
not be used to prove that he had either an objective or subjective fear
for his life.
77
The decision to refuse to admit expert testimony in Romero
contradicts the Minifie principle of allowing the jury to use the
knowledge, information, and experience of the defendant when
considering whether the defendant thought harm was imminent78 In
Minifie, the court stated that what mattered in determining
imminence is how the situation appears to the defendant.79
b. individualizing the reasonableness test in battered
women's syndrome cases
In battered women's syndrome cases, the standard for admitting
evidence of the defendant's actual awareness (subjective evidence) to
prove the objective element of self-defense is dramatically different
from the standard in Romero.80  The objective test for battered
women now includes a much larger subjective component. For
example, in Humphrey, the court stated that a jury should consider
some degree of individualized experiences of the defendant when
74. See id.
75. Id. at 852 n.2, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 826 n.2.
76. Id. at 848, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824 (quoting the trial court).
77. See id. at 855, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 828.
78. See Minifie, 13 Cal. 4th at 1068, 920 P.2d at 1334, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
139.
79. See id.
80. See Romero, 69 Cal. App. 4th at 852, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 826.
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making an evaluation of what a reasonable person in the defendant's
circumstances would view as imminent.
81
In Humphrey, the court held that "[i]n determining whether a
reasonable person in defendant's position would have been aware of
the risks, the jury should be given relevant facts as to what defendant
knew, including his actual awareness of those risks."82 The court
stated, "Although the ultimate test of reasonableness is objective, in
determining whether a reasonable person in defendant's position
would have believed in the need to defend, the jury must consider all
of the relevant circumstances in which defendant found herself.,
83
Thus, the California Supreme Court held that the court in People
v. Aris was incorrect when it precluded admission of individualized
evidence of the defendant's status as a battered woman for purposes
of the objective test.84 In Humphrey, the court redefined how the
objective standard was applied. The court ruled that the objective
test in a battered women's syndrome case is how the reasonable
person would react in the position of a battered woman, knowing
what she knows and reacting to the circumstances in light of her
experiences. 85  The court held that the trial court erred in "not
admitting the testimony to show how the defendant's particular
experiences as a battered woman affected her perceptions of danger,
its imminence, and what actions were necessary to protect herself.,
86
The court stated in dicta that previous cases "too narrowly
interpreted the reasonableness element... [and] failed to consider
that the jury, in determining objective reasonableness, must view the, ,,87
situation from the defendant's perspective.
The court further clarified this point in People v. Jaspar, stating
that battered women's syndrome "is relevant to the question of
81. See Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1088-89, 921 P.2d at 10, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 152.
82. Id. at 1083, 921 P.2d at 7, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 1085 , 921 P.2d at 8, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150-51; cf Aris, 215
Cal. App. 3d at 1197, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
85. See Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1084, 921 P.2d at 7-8, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
149.
86. Id. 13 Cal. 4th at 1085, 921 P.2d at 8, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150 (quoting
Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1197, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 179) (internal quotations
omitted).
87. Id. at 1086, 921 P.2d at 8, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150.
1586
SELF-DEFENSE
whether defendant's actual belief is reasonable." 88 First, escalating
violence can cause a woman to become "increasingly sensitive to the
abuser's behavior," 89 which is relevant to determining whether a
defendant might reasonably believe that her life was in imminent
danger even though the attacker might not, at that moment, be an
overt threat to the battered woman's safety. Second, the expert's
testimony might be used to provide the jury with evidence that a
battered woman might be able to more accurately predict the
likelihood and extent of a forthcoming attack.90
Since Humphrey, the courts allowed the presentation of
evidence of battered women's syndrome to prove both the subjective
and the objective elements of fear of imminent harm.91 This has
resulted in blurring the lines between a reasonable person in the
shoes of a battered woman and a reasonable battered woman.
c. uneven treatment of individualized traits
in the objective test
It is unclear why the courts admit evidence of battered women's
syndrome in such a broad manner, yet decline to admit similar
evidence for many other factors affecting reasonableness. Current
case law is murky as to why the courts have developed this
dichotomy.
California's legislature has assured the admission of testimony
in battered women's syndrome cases by enacting California
Evidence Code section 1107, which specifically states that evidence
of battered women's syndrome should be admitted to prove its
"physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, perceptions,
or behavior of victims of domestic violence."92 Section 1107 clearly
supports the use of evidence of battered women's syndrome for the
subjective test.93 However, the courts have also used it as a vehicle
88. 98 Cal. App. 4th 99, 108, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470, 476 (2002).
89. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1086, 921 P.2d at 8-9, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
150.
90. See id. at 1080, 921 P.2d at 9, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150.
91. People v. Jaspar, 98 Cal.App.4th 99, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470 (2002).
92. CAL. EViD. CODE § 1107(a) (West 1995 & Supp.2003).
93. See id.
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through which to consider a battered woman's individualized traits in
applying the objective test.
94
D. Imperfect Self-Defense
A defendant who establishes a subjective belief, but not an
objective belief, in the need to defend herself is entitled to plead
imperfect self-defense. The doctrine of imperfect self-defense
assumes that the defendant acted without malice aforethought,
thereby preventing the defendant from being convicted of murder.95
The defendant can be found guilty of either voluntary manslaughter
(if the defendant had intent to kill at the time of the killing), or
involuntary manslaughter (if the defendant did not have intent to
kill).96
1. Imperfect self-defense after the elimination of the
diminished capacity defense
Although the diminished capacity defense was eliminated by
statute,97 imperfect self-defense remains a viable defense.
98
Although the California Legislature precluded a jury from
considering the defendant's capacity to form criminal intent, "it did
not preclude jury consideration of mental condition in deciding
whether or not a defendant actually formed the requisite criminal
intent."
99
In the matter of In re Christian S., the California Supreme Court
reaffirmed the viability of imperfect self-defense following the
statutory changes. 100 The court reviewed the legislative record and
concluded that the California Legislature did not intend to alter the
94. See, e.g., Romero, 69 Cal. App. 4th at 853, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 826-27.
95. See People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1082, 921 P.2d 1, 6, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 142, 147-48 (1996).
96. See id.
97. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a) (West 1999) (abolishing the defense of
diminished capacity); CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a) (making evidence of mental
disease, mental defect, or mental disorder inadmissible to show or negate the
capacity to form any mental state).
98. See, e.g., People v. Gregory, 101 Cal. App. 4th 1149, 1169, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 776, 791 (2002), cert. granted, 58 P.3d 928, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799
(Cal. 2002) (exploring the doctrine of diminished capacity).
99. Id.
100. 7 Cal. 4th 768, 771, 872 P.2d 574, 575, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 34 (1994).
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doctrine of imperfect self-defense when it eliminated the diminished
capacity defense.'1
0
The defendant in Christian S. was a minor who sought review of
his conviction for second-degree murder. The trial court rejected the
defendant's claims of self-defense and imperfect self-defense. 0 2 It
concluded that the killing would have constituted second-degree
murder had it been committed by an adult, and held that there was
inadequate provocation to find the defendant guilty of voluntary
manslaughter.10 3 The trial court failed to state whether it rejected
imperfect self-defense on the basis that it was no longer good legal
doctrine or because the court did not attribute a subjective belief in
the need for self-defense to the defendant.
The California Supreme Court reversed and clarified the
doctrine of imperfect self-defense. °4 In holding that the doctrine of
imperfect self-defense survived the amended statutory changes, the
supreme court stated, "When the trier of fact finds that a defendant
killed another person because the defendant actually but
unreasonably believed he was in imminent danger of death or great
bodily injury, the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice
and cannot be convicted of murder.'
10 5
2. Imperfect self-defense as a result of delusion
On November 26, 2002, the California Supreme Court granted
review in the case of People v. Gregory. 106 In Gregory, the
defendant's actual belief in the need to defend himself was based on
his own delusion.'0 7 The defendant was initially found incompetent
to stand trial.108  He suffered from schizophrenia and a resulting
paranoid delusion that several individuals intended to kill him.
10 9
Gregory was committed to a state hospital until his competency was
101. See id.
102. See id. at 772, 872 P.2d at 575-76, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34-35.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 783, 872 P.2d at 583, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42.
105. Id.
106. 101 Cal. App. 4th 1149, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776 (2002), cert. granted, 58
P.3d 928, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799 (2002).
107. See id. at 1155, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 779-780.
108. See id.
109. See id.
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restored.1 0 At his subsequent trial, he pled no contest to a charge of
second-degree murder."'I
The trial court later ruled that the defendant had not been
advised of the possible defense of imperfect self-defense."
12
Consequently, the court vacated the judgment of conviction and set
aside the no contest plea. 1 3 However, the court of appeal reversed,
holding that imperfect self-defense must be based on a mistake of
fact, not a delusion."14
The court of appeal reviewed de novo the issue of whether a
delusional belief of imminent harm can satisfy imperfect self-
defense. 1 ' The court stated that based on Christian S., imperfect
self-defense is applicable only when a defendant acts as the result of
an unreasonable mistake offact, and not on the basis of a delusion. 16
The court of appeal in Gregory based this distinction on the
California Supreme Court's statement that a defendant lacks malice
if "he acted under an unreasonable mistake of fact-that is, the need
to defend himself against imminent peril of death or great bodily
harm."' 17
The court of appeal in Gregory concluded:
[A] mistake of fact is predicated upon a negligent
perception of facts, not, as in the case of a delusion, a
perception of facts not grounded in reality. A person acting
under a delusion is not negligently interpreting actual facts;
instead, he or she is out of touch with reality. That may be
insanity, but it is not a mistake as to any fact.'
18
The defendant did not present facts sufficient to prove that he
experienced delusion.' 19 The court of appeal held that the imperfect
110. See id. at 1154, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 779.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1172, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
115. See id. at 1173, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794.
116. See id. at 1172, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
117. Gregory, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 1173, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793 (citing
Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th at 779 n.3, 872 P.2d at 580 n.3, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39 at
n.3).
118. Gregory, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 1172, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
119. See id. at 1178, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798.
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self-defense doctrine did not apply in this circumstance because a
defendant must present facts to corroborate actual belief to
adequately support a claim of imperfect self-defense. 120 It will be
interesting to hear whether the California Supreme Court will allow
the imperfect self-defense doctrine to be based on delusion in view
of the trend towards allowing a defendant's perceptions to factor into
the objective test, as in the case of battered women.
3. Jury instructions on imperfect self-defense
A court has a duty to instruct the jury on the theory of imperfect
self-defense whenever there is evidence sufficient to support a self-
defense claim.121 This is because "[tihe subjective elements of self-
defense and imperfect self-defense are identical. Under each theory,
the [defendant] must actually believe in the need to defend himself
against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury."
122
For example, in People v. Viramontes, the defendant was
accused of murdering the victim while they were attending a party. 
123
The defense presented evidence at trial that indicated that the
defendant shot the victim because the defendant felt threatened by
him.124 However, during the trial, the defense never mentioned the
theory of imperfect self-defense. 125 When the trial court considered
which jury instructions were appropriate, it erroneously interpreted
California Jury Instruction section 5.17126 to be limited to instances
when the defendant claims an actual, but unreasonable fear of death
120. See id. at 1174, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795.
121. See People v. Viramontes, 93 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1262, 115 Cal. Rptr.
2d 229, 232 (2001).
122. Id.
123. See id. at 1259, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 230.
124. See id. at 1263, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233.
125. See id. at 1262, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 232.
126. CALJIC § 5.17 (6th ed. 2002) states in part:
A person, who kills another person in the actual but unreasonable
belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great
bodily injury, kills unlawfully, but does not harbor malice
aforethought and is not guilty of murder. This would be so even
though a reasonable person in the same situation seeing and knowing
the same facts would not have had the same belief. Such an actual but
unreasonable belief is not a defense to the crime of... manslaughter.
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or great bodily injury.127 The court of appeal found the trial court's
reasoning faulty, holding that evidence which supports a claim of
self-defense necessarily supports a claim of imperfect self-defense.
128
The court of appeal held that the imperfect self-defense instruction
should have been given.
129
4. Constitutional right to present evidence
of imperfect self-defense
A defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense,
including self-defense. 130  In DePetris v. Kuykendall, the Ninth
Circuit held that a defendant must be allowed to present evidence of
actual belief in the need to defend.1
3'
In Depetris, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder
in the death of her husband. 132 At trial, she was not permitted to
present evidence related to the existence or content of her husband's
journal, which the trial court excluded as irrelevant. 133 The journal,
which the defendant had read prior to the killing, contained the
victim's own "chilling account" of his prior physical abuse of his
homosexual companion, his stepdaughter, and numerous beatings of
his first wife.
134
The court held that excluding the journal unconstitutionally
impeded the defendant's "ability to defend [herself] against the
charges against her."' 35 In addition, the court stated in dicta that
evidence of the diary was also clearly admissible under California
Evidence Code section 1107.136
127. See Viramontes, 93 Cal. App. 4th at 1262, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 232.
128. See id., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 233.
129. See id.
130. See DePetris v. Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001).
131. See id. at 1062-63.
132. See id. at 1060.
133. See id. at 1060-61.
134. Id. at 1059-61.
135. Id. at 1065.
136. See id. at 1061.
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5. Jury instructions for imperfect self-defense for
battered women's syndrome cases
Battered women's syndrome evidence is generally relevant for
three different purposes in murder cases. 137 First, it helps the jury to
determine the credibility of the defendant in evaluating the
defendant's claim of self-defense and dispels "commonly held
misconceptions about battered women.' 38 Second, it is relevant to
evaluate whether the defendant held an honest or actual belief in the
need to defend against imminent harm. 139 Finally, it is relevant in a
murder case to prove reasonableness under the objective test. 1
40
In Jaspar, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder
in the death of her boyfriend, whom she shot in the back of the
head.141  The court used a modified version of California Jury
Instructions section 9.35.1, instructing the jury that evidence of
battered women's syndrome can be considered for four limited
purposes:
1) that the [d]efendant's reactions, as demonstrated by the
evidence, are not inconsistent with her having been a victim
of domestic violence; 2) the beliefs, perception or behavior
of victims of domestic violence; 3) proof relevant to the
believability of the defendant's testimony; 4) whether the
defendant actually and reasonably believed in the necessity
to use force to defend herself against imminent peril to
life .... In assessing reasonableness, the issue is whether a
reasonable person in the [d]efendant's circumstances would
have seen a threat of imminent injury or death, and not
whether killing the alleged abuser was reasonable in the
sense of being an understandable response to ongoing
abuse. An act that appeared to be an understandable
137. See People v. Jaspar, 98 Cal. App. 4th 99, 107, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470,
475 (2002).
138. Id. (quoting People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1087, 921 P.2d 1, 9,
56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142, 150 (1996)).
139. See id.
140. See previous discussion of the objective test for reasonableness supra
Part IX.C.
141. See Jaspar, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 102, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471.
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response is not necessarily [an] act that was responsible
under the circumstances. 42
After considering whether the final combined instruction
precluded a finding of imperfect self-defense, the court held that
although the fourth instruction read in isolation might have been
confusing, the error was harmless. 143  The court found that the
arguments of counsel clarified any potential confusion.144 However,
the court suggested that the language of the fourth instruction should
be modified to read "whether the defendant actually... believed in
the necessity to use force to defend herself against imminent peril to
life ... and whether such belief was reasonable or unreasonable."'
4 5
E. Conclusion
Although the basic definitions and tests used in the area of self-
defense were established hundreds of years ago, they continue to
develop towards a more permissive inclusion of evidence of the
defendant's knowledge, information, and experience. The courts
have continued to utilize the two-prong test for actual and reasonable
belief in the need to defend against imminent peril. However, at
least in the case of battered women, the courts have expanded the
amount and types of knowledge, information, and experiences that
are allowed to be attributed to the defendant before the reasonable
person standard is applied. 1
46
Since the California Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Gregory, it is unclear whether imperfect self-defense can be based on
delusion or whether imperfect self-defense is limited to mistakes of
fact.147 In cases of battered women's syndrome, it is clear that the
defendant's knowledge, information, and experiences are relevant
and admissible for both evaluating imminent harm and defining the
142. Id. at 108-09, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476-77. Cf CALJIC § 9.35.1 (6th
ed. 2002).
143. See Jaspar, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 110, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477.
144. See id. at 111, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478.
145. Id. at 111 n.6, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479 n.6 (citations omitted).
146. See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1082-83, 921 P.2d 1,
6, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142, 148 (1996) (holding that defendant's subjective belief
in the need to defend should be considered by the jury).
147. See People v. Gregory, 101 Cal. App. 4th 1149, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776
(2002) cert. granted, 1259, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 230 (Cal. 2002).
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objective element of self-defense. But this thinking has not yet been
extended to other similarly situated defendants including the
mentally ill, the developmentally disabled, and battered children.
The courts are unwilling to recognize individualized traits in the
objective test for gang members, street fighters, and others.
148
As this area of the law develops, it will be important for the
courts to clearly define what evidence of individualized traits and
experiences should be attributed to the reasonable person for
purposes of the objective element of self-defense. In addition, the
courts need to further define how a defendant's viewpoint affects a
finding of imminent harm.
148. See, e.g., People v. Romero, 69 Cal. App. 4th 846, 854, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d
823, 827 (1999) (unwilling to apply reasonable objective test from the
perspective of gang members and street fighters).
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X. THE INSANITY DEFENSE*
Since the Nineteenth century, California has followed, with
slight variations,' the M'Naghten test for insanity and criminal
responsibility. 2  Under the M'Naghten test, a defendant who is
unable either to understand the criminal nature of the crime, or to
distinguish right from wrong at the time the criminal act was
committed, is not held responsible for that act.
3
Over time, California courts have implemented a number of
important variations on, or clarifications of, the basic M'Naghten test
for insanity. These include: (1) the additional requirement of
understanding and appreciating the nature of the criminal act;4 (2) the
* Stephanie K. Lashbrook: J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Loyola Law
School; B.A. English, Northwestern University. Thanks to Gabriel Padilla,
Jason Chow, Jerry Chow, Benjamin Lin, and Janet Grumer for their work on
this piece.
1. See infra note 4.
2. See People v. Reid, 193 Cal. 491, 225 P. 859 (1924); People v. Oxnam,
170 Cal. 211, 149 P. 165 (1915); People v. Pico, 62 Cal. 50 (1882); People v.
Coffman, 24 Cal. 230 (1864); People v. Zari, 54 Cal. App. 133, 201 P. 345
(1921); People v. Ashland, 20 Cal. App. 168, 128 P. 798 (1912). For a
discussion of insanity tests used by other jurisdictions, see MICHAEL S.
MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 218-32
(Cambridge University Press 1984); Michelle Migdal Gee, Annotation,
Modern Status of Test of Criminal Responsibility - State Cases, 9 A.L.R. 4th
529 (1981).
3. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843); see also, People v.
Horn, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 205 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1984) (discussing and
explaining the M'Naghten test for legal insanity). For a discussion of why
insane defendants are not held responsible for their criminal actions, see
MOORE supra note 2, at 243-45; Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The
Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1985).
4. See People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 801, 394 P.2d 959, 962, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 271, 274 (1964); see also, People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 351, 202 P.2d
53, 65 (1949) (explaining that in order to be subject to punishment, the
defendant must not only know that the act committed is criminal, but must also
appreciate its wrongfulness). The addition of the understanding or
appreciation requirement to the test is significant because without it, a criminal
defendant would be found sane if he was merely aware that the act he
committed was unlawful, despite a failure to appreciate the significance of
criminality - i.e., acts that are illegal are defined as such because they are
wrong.
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clarification of the "wrong" contemplated by the test;5 and (3) the
statutory definition of excusable "temporary" insanity.6
While the basic gist of the test for insanity has remained
substantially the same since its adoption,7 it has not been without
criticism.8
In response to such criticism, and after much judicial
dissatisfaction with the test,9 the California Supreme Court rejected
the M'Naghten test in People v. Drew.10 In its place, the court
adopted the American Law Institute (ALI) test for insanity.
11
However, that test was short lived.12 In 1982, the California voters
and Legislature abrogated the judicially imposed ALI test with the
5. See infra Section A.3 (explaining the difference between moral and
legal wrong).
6. See infra Section A. 1.b (discussing temporary insanity).
7. See People v. Phillips, 83 Cal. App. 4th 170, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 448
(2000) (stating that California applied the M'Naugton test for insanity); see
also, People v. Coddington, 23 Cal. 4th 529, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528 (2000) (also
applying the M'Naghten test for insanity) (overruled on other grounds by Price
v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 4th 1046, 25 P.3d 618, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 409
(2001)). California abandoned this approach for a brief period. See generally
People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978)
(rejecting the M'Naghten test for insanity in favor of the American Law
Institute (ALI) test: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law." Drew was abrogated by
popular initiative in 1982. See Proposition 8, in Victim's Bill of Rights
[hereinafter 1982 Victim's Bill] (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (West
1999 & Supp. 2003)).
8. See People v. Nash, 52 Cal. 2d 36, 46-49, 338 P.2d 416, 422-25 (1959)
(discussing various criticisms of the M'Naghten test, including lack of inquiry
into defendant's ability to control his conduct, lack of causal inquiry, and the
unscientific nature of the test).
9. See id.
10. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d at 336, 583 P.2d at 1319, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 275-76.
11. See id.; see also supra note 7 for definition of the ALl test. The
difference between the two tests is that the ALI test includes a volitional
aspect, whereas the M'Naghten test does not. See Drew, 22 Cal. 3d at 341,
583 P.2d at 1322, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 279 ("[The M'Naghten test] fails to attack
the problem presented in a case wherein an accused may have understood his
actions but was incapable of controlling his behavior.").
12. Four years later, the ALI test was abrogated by popular initiative. See
1982 Victim's Bill, supra note 7.
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passage of Proposition 8, which added section 25 to the California
Penal Code.
13
Though codification of the test put an end to the debate over the
proper test for legal insanity, it marked the beginning of an
interpretational dilemma. As enacted by Proposition 8, section 25
restored the M'Naghten test for insanity. However, whereas the
M'Naghten test was interpreted disjunctively, the language of section
25 suggested that it should be construed conjunctively.14 Unable to
determine the intent of the California Legislature, 5 California courts
struggled to reach the appropriate construction of the statute.
16
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court determined that a
conjunctive reading of the statute would be too harsh and, despite the
literal language of the statute, settled upon a disjunctive reading.17
Pursuant to section 25, a defendant is excused from criminal
liability if "he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the
nature or quality of his or her act [or] of distinguishing right from
wrong at the time of the commission of the offense."'
8
13. See id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003). For a
discussion of Proposition 8, its origins and ramifications, see Jeff Brown,
Proposition 8: Origins and Impact-A Public Defender's Perspective, 23 PAC.
L.J. 881 (1992) and Hank M. Goldberg, Proposition 8: A Prosecutor's
Perspective, 23 PAC. L.J. 947 (1992).
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25. A disjunctive reading would excuse a
criminal defendant if, at the time of the commission of the crime with which he
is charged, he either did not understand or appreciate the nature of his act or
was unable to differentiate right from wrong. Under a conjunctive reading, a
defendant would escape liability only if he was both unable to understand or
appreciate the nature or quality of his act and was unable to differentiate right
from wrong.
15. Proposition 8 was enacted by popular referendum. It is therefore
impossible to determine whether those who voted for it intended that the new
test be applied conjunctively or disjunctively.
16. See People v. Coddington, 23 Cal. 4th 529, 2 P.3d 1081, 97 Cal. Rptr.
528 (2000); People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765, 704 P.2d 752, 217 Cal. Rptr.
685 (1985); People v. McCowan, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1, 227 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1986);
People v. Horn, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 205 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1984).
17. See generally Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d at 765, 704 P.2d 752, 217 Cal. Rptr.
at 685 (holding that the test should be read as disjunctive, despite the literal
wording of section 25); People v. Horn, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 205 Cal. Rptr.
119 (1984) (holding that the statute should be read disjunctively, as a
conjunctive reading would restore the "wild beast" test of antiquity).
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25.
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A. The Current Law: A Return to M'Naghten
Although it has been established that the dual requirements set
forth in section 25 of the California Penal Code are to be read and
applied disjunctively,19 it would be inaccurate to say that the law
regarding the insanity defense is settled, or even straightforward. On
its face, the statute has two prongs: (1) the "act prong," which
requires that in order to escape responsibility for a criminal act a
defendant must prove he or she was unaware of the nature and
quality of his or her act; and (2) the "wrongfulness prong," which
predicates the insanity defense on a defendant's inability to
distinguish right from wrong.20 Additionally, although not expressly
stated by the statute, it is clear that a defendant pleading not guilty by
reason of insanity must also meet a third prong-the "mental defect"
prong.21 This threshold requirement demands that the defendant
show an inability to understand the nature and quality of his act or
that his inability to distinguish right from wrong was caused by a
mental disease or defect.
22
1. The unwritten mental defect prong
The California statute that dictates the test for legal insanity
lacks any reference to the mental capacity that is required at the time
the defendant commits the act with which he is charged.23 Thus, a
literal reading of the statute suggests that a defendant could have a
successful insanity defense even if he were not suffering from a
mental disorder, as long as he is able to show that he was unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his act.24 However, such a reading of
19. See, e.g., Coddington, 23 Cal. 4th at 529, 2 P.3d at 1081, 97 Cal. Rptr.
at 528; Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d at 765, 704 P.2d at 752, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 685;
McCowan, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 1, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 23; Horn, 158 Cal. App. 3d
at 1014, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
20. See CAL. PENAL CODE.
21. See id.; California Jury Instructions no. 4.02 (6th ed. 1996 & Supp.
2002) [hereinafter CALJIC]; see generally People v. McCaslin, 178 Cal. App.
3d 1, 223 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1986) (holding that legal insanity must be by reason
of mental disease or defect).
22. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25; CALJIC, no. 4.02; see also People v.
Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1973); McCaslin, 178
Cal. App. 3d 1, 223 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1986).
23. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25.
24. See id.
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the statute was rejected in People v. McCaslin.25  There, the
defendant argued on appeal that the trial court incorrectly instructed
the jury that in order to find the defendant legally insane they must
find that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect.
26
The court found that the defendant did not satisfy the requirements of
the insanity defense because he did not suffer from a mental disease
or defect and that the court below had properly instructed the jury.27
Specifically, the court found that section 25 was "intended to
reinstate the defense of insanity to the status which existed prior to
[People v.] Drew."28 Before Drew, the law required that a defendant
suffer from a mental disease or defect. 29 Thus, the court concluded
that section 25 embodies the same requirement, although it is not
expressly stated in the statute.
30
The court went on to discuss the likely consequences of an
interpretation of section 25 that did not include a mental defect
requirement. 31 According to the court, such an interpretation would
"have the effect of recognizing an 'antisocial personality' as a form
of insanity .... , 32 The court further noted: "Indeed, the 'antisocial
personality' is the classic criminal; our prisons are largely populated
by such persons. To classify such persons as insane would radically
revise the criminal law-insanity, instead of a rare exception to the
rule of criminal accountability, would become the ordinary defense
in a felony trial."33
25. McCaslin, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
26. See id. Though the statute lacks a mental defect requirement, the jury
instruction given both before and after the codification of section 25 instructed
the jury that it must find that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or
defect that resulted in his inability to either appreciate the nature and quality of
his act or to distinguish right from wrong. See CALJIC, supra, note 21, no.
4.02.
27. See McCaslin, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 8-9, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 591-92.
28. Id. at 8, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 591. Drew held that California should forsake
the M'Naghten test for insanity in favor of the test set forth by the American
Law Institute. See People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 275 (1978).
29. See McCaslin, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 8, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 8-9, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 591-92 (quoting People v. Fields, 35 Cal.
3d 329, 372, 673 P.2d 680, 708, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 831 (1983)). Similarly,
the crime with which the defendant is charged cannot be used as the sole
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Given both the state of the law before the judicial departure
from California's version of the M'Naghten test for insanity, i.e.,
defendants must show mental disease or defect to satisfy the test, and
the arguably absurd results of interpreting section 25 as not requiring
a showing of mental disease or defect, after McCaslin, the statute
must be understood to include such a requirement.
a. "settled" mental defect
Even before codification of the test for insanity, California
courts wrestled with the question of exactly what type of mental
disease or defect would suffice to relieve a defendant of criminal
responsibility. Obviously, the mental defect must be present at the
time the defendant committed the act with which he is charged.34
But how long before the act must the condition exist, how serious
must it have been, and how long after the act must the condition have
persisted?
Whether a defendant is insane within the meaning of section 25
is a legal, as opposed to medical, determination. 35 However, medical
insights inform the legal determination.36 Mental defect "includes
any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially impairs
behavior controls." 37  Sociopaths, psychopaths, and defendants
suffering antisocial personality disorders do not legally have mental
defects; defendants must point to symptoms and manifestations of a
disorder other than recidivism or antisocial acts.
38
evidence of insanity. In other words, a heinous crime is not evidence that the
defendant is insane simply because only a crazy person would commit a
heinous crime. See id.
34. See id. at 8, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
35. See generally People v. Cowan, 38 Cal. App. 2d 144, 100 P.2d 1079
(1940) (holding that a medical determination of insanity is not sufficient to
establish legal insanity, for medical insanity does not necessarily preclude a
defendant from distinguishing between right and wrong).
36. See People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333,345, 583 P.2d 1318, 1324, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 275, 281 (1978).
37. In re Ramon M., 22 Cal. 3d 419, 428, 584 P.2d 524, 530, 149 Cal. Rptr.
387, 393 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 854
(1962)). It is important to note that although the McDonald definition of
mental defect includes a volitional aspect, California's test for legal insanity
does not. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
38. See People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 370, 673 P.2d 680, 706, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 803, 829-30 (1983).
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Clearly, a defendant who has been medically diagnosed with a
mental illness, such as paranoid schizophrenia, may be able to
successfully present an insanity defense, provided that he can also
meet the other requirements of section 25.39 Less clear, however, are
cases where a defendant claims to be insane, but the "insanity" is the
result of the defendant's voluntary use of drugs and/or alcohol.4 °
Can a defendant who is "temporarily insane" due to voluntary
intoxication raise a successful insanity defense? Early cases held
that voluntary intoxication could induce insanity that would relieve a
defendant of criminal responsibility if the insanity was of a "settled"
nature.41
Over half a century later, the California Supreme Court was
called upon to explain the meaning of settled insanity. In People v.
Kelly, the court was asked to determine whether an eighteen-year-old
defendant, who had been continuously using hallucinogenic drugs
for approximately one year prior to attacking her mother, could have
been legally insane at the time she "repeatedly stabb[ed] her [mother]
with an array of kitchen knives. ' 4 2 Despite expert testimony that the
defendant suffered from an organic brain defect caused by the drugs
that rendered her "dingy, ' 43 the trial court held that the defendant
could not meet the definition of legal insanity because her condition
was not settled and permanent.44
According to the Kelly court, the trial court was mistaken in
construing "settled" to mean only "permanent. 4 5 The term "settled"
was apparently broad enough to include both permanent and
temporary insanity.46
39. See generally LAWRIE REZNEK, EvIL OR ILL?: JUSTIFYING THE
INSANITY DEFENCE 275 (Routledge ed., 1997) ("When... insanity acquittees
were matched for the same offenses with those whose insanity plea had faile,
being psychotic [(schizophrenic)] predicted 81 percent of the acquittals."). But
see infra Section D (discussing the role of expert testimony).
40. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr.
171 (1973); People v. Travers, 88 Cal. 233, 26 P. 88 (1891).
41. See, e.g., Travers, 88 Cal. at 233, 26 P. at 88.
42. See Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d at 568, 516 P.2d at 877, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
43. Id. at 569 n.6, 516 P.2d at 877 n.6, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 173 n.6.
44. Id. at 574-75, 516 P.2d at 881-82, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78.
45. Id. at 576-77, 516 P.2d at 882-84, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 178-80.
46. Under Kelly, so long as the defendant's insanity, even if it is the product
of voluntary use of drugs and/or alcohol, existed prior to and persisted after the
offense with which the defendant is charged, the insanity qualifies as settled.
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b. "temporary" insanity redefined
Under the reasoning of Kelly, a defendant may be excused from
criminal liability if he committed crimes while insane, even if the
insanity was only temporary, as long as that insanity was of a settled
nature.47 However, section 25.5 of California's Penal Code makes
the insanity defense unavailable to defendants whose insanity is
See id. Thus, the defendant may well have been insane when she stabbed her
mother, for it would make "no difference whether the period of insanity lasted
several months, as in this case, or merely a period of hours." Id. at 576-77, 516
P.2d at 883, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 179. Section 25.5 expressly overrules this type
of reasoning. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25.5 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003); see
also infra Section A. L.a (discussing "temporary insanity").
47. Despite the trial court's conclusion that his insanity was not settled, the
defendant in People v. Skinner attempted to persuade the court of appeal that
he came within the Kelly definition of insanity, particularly the part of that
definition that seemingly recognized a form of insanity that lasts only for a
period of hours but would, nonetheless, be "settled" for the purposes of section
25. See People v. Skinner, 185 Cal. App. 3d 1050, 1062, 288 Cal. Rptr. 652,
660 (1986). The defendant appealed his conviction for murder after
bludgeoning his wife with a wine bottle and then slashing her throat with its
broken shards following an all-night freebasing binge. At trial, expert
testimony was given to the effect that the defendant's ingestion of cocaine
produced a mental condition that persisted over time, rendering the defendant
unable to distinguish right from wrong. On appeal, the court expanded upon
the Kelly definition of "settled":
"Under People v. Kelly, when an effort is made to establish insanity
due to alcohol, it must be shown that there exists a "settled insanity"
and not the type of a temporary mental condition produced by current
use of alcohol. In other words, your friendly local lush cannot get
sloshed, commit a horrendous crime and slip into a state hospital free
from criminal sanctions. If an alcoholic wants to use his [or her]
problem as an escape hatch, he [or she] must drink enough to develop
a mental disorder that continues when he [or she] is stone sober even
though the damage is not permanent in the sense that it is beyond
repair. Kelly offers us the only escape from a completely absurd
situation in which those who produce distorted mental conditions by
the use of such mindbenders as acid, speed, angel dust or alcohol, then
commit bizarre, dangerous and ugly acts could escape criminal
sanctions on the basis that their self-induced mental conditions
produced an incapacity to appreciate the criminality of their conduct."
Id. at 288 Cal. Rptr. at 659 (citations omitted) (quoting People v. McCarthy,
110 Cal. App. 3d 296, 299-300, 167 Cal. Rptr. 772, 774 (1980).
The court affirmed the conviction based on evidence that the defendant's
"insanity" was merely temporarily induced by his contemporaneous ingestion
of cocaine, and consequently did not meet the legal definition of insanity. See
id. at 1063, 288 Cal. Rptr. at 660-61.
Summer 2003] 1603
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1596
solely the result of voluntary ingestion of drugs and/or alcohol.48
Section 25.5 significantly narrows the availability of the insanity
defense because "temporary" insanity now excuses criminal behavior
only if it is at least in part the result of an organic mental disease or
defect.49
Section 25.5 was first interpreted by the California Court of
Appeal in People v. Robinson.50  The court read the statute as
changing the then-existing law, which allowed defendants to show
that their insanity was of a settled nature, even if the insanity was
caused solely by the voluntary ingestion of intoxicants.51  The
Robinson court held:
[The] statute makes no exception for brain damage or
mental disorders caused solely by one's voluntary
substance abuse but which persists after the immediate
effects of the intoxicant have dissipated. Rather, it erects an
absolute bar prohibiting the use of one's voluntary ingestion
of intoxicants as the sole basis for an insanity defense,
regardless of whether the substances caused organic
damage or a settled mental defect or disorder which persists
after the immediate effects of the intoxicant have worn off.
In other words, if an alcoholic or drug addict attempts to
use his problem as an escape hatch, he will find that section
25.5 has shut and bolted the opening.
52
The court went on to explain that the change in the law reflected
the legislative determination that a criminal defendant, who is
rendered insane by voluntary substance abuse, should be treated
differently from a criminal defendant who is "afflicted by mental
illness through no conscious volitional choice on their part. 53
48. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25.5.
49. See id.
50. 72 Cal. App. 4th 421, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 832 (1999).
51. See id.
52. Id. at 427, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 836.
53. Id. at 428, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837. The court also noted that section
25.5 was passed after the implementation of California's Three Strikes Law in
anticipation of an increase in the number of criminal defendants claiming not
guilty by reason of insanity in order to avoid life sentences imposed as a result
of the new sentencing laws. See id. at 427, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 836.
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In response to the holding of People v. Robinson, the jury
instructions given in cases where a criminal defendant has invoked
the insanity defense were revised to read:
A person is legally insane if, by reason of mental disease or
mental defect, either temporary or permanent, caused in
part by the long continued use of [alcohol] [drugs]
[narcotics], even after the effects of recent use of [alcohol]
[drugs] [narcotics] have worn off, [he][she] was incapable
at the time of the commission of the crime of either:
1. Knowing the nature and quality of [his][her] act; or
2. Understanding the nature and quality of [his][her]
act; or
3. Distinguishing right from wrong.
[However, this defense does not apply when the sole or
only basis or causative factor for the mental disease or
mental defect is an addiction to, or an abuse of, intoxicating
substances.]
54
Thus, although a defense of temporary settled insanity is still
viable, the meaning of "settled" has changed. The Robinson case,
section 25.5 of California's Penal Code, and California jury
instruction Criminal No. 4.02 all illustrate that the insanity
contemplated by California's insanity defense leaves little hope for a
defendant unless he suffers from an organic mental defect or illness.
2. The act prong
The act prong, the first express prong of section 25, requires that
a defendant prove that "he or she was incapable of knowing or
understanding the nature or quality of his or her act... at the time of
54. CALJIC, supra note 21, no. 4.02. Prior to Robinson, the instruction
read:
A person is legally insane if, by reason of mental disease or mental
defect, either temporary or permanent, caused by the long continued
use of [alcohol] [drugs] [narcotics], even after the effects of recent use
of [alcohol] [drugs] [narcotics] have worn off, [he][she] was incapable
at the time of the commission of the crime of either:
1. Knowing the nature and quality of [his][her] act; or
2. Understanding the nature and quality of [his][her] act; or
3. Distinguishing right from wrong.
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the commission of the offense.",55 This requirement is met if, to use
a familiar if simplistic illustration, a defendant believed he was
squeezing a lemon, when in fact he was wringing the neck of a
victim. 56 The lemon-squeezing defendant does not know the true
nature of his act, and he is legally insane as a result.
5 7
Courts have not often found defendants insane under this prong.
For example, the defendant in People v. Horn was unable to meet
this prong in her trial for vehicular manslaughter.58 After pulling
into a service station for gas and filling her tank, the defendant
attempted to pay for the gas with her Automobile Club card.59 Upon
refusal by the gas station attendant, the defendant got into her car and
drove away without paying. With the attendant in pursuit, the
defendant sped through a red light and into an intersection at 60
miles per hour, striking and killing a motorcyclist.60 In the appellate
proceeding following her conviction, the court commented that there
was no evidence in the record that the defendant could not
understand the nature of her act-she knew she was driving in her
car, she knew she was being followed, and she knew that the light
was red before she entered the intersection. 61 Hence, the defendant
was not relieved of criminal responsibility under the act prong of
section 25.
In People v. Skinner, the court followed a similar analysis.
62
Skinner was charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder
after he repeatedly struck his wife in the head with a wine bottle and
then slashed her throat in order, according to the defendant, to assist
her in her quest for spiritual ascendancy.63 Police arrested Skinner
when he drove across the center lane of a highway, stopped his car
across two lanes of traffic, and proceeded to walk towards the
55. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
56. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 25.07[C][1] (2d
ed. 1995).
57. See id.
58. 158 Cal. App. 3d 1014,1020,205 Cal. Rptr. 119, 122 (1984).
59. See id. at 1018, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 1033-34, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
62. 185 Cal. App. 3d 1050, 1056, 228 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656 (1986).
63. See id. This case, involving defendant Raymond Skinner, should not be
confused with the case involving defendant Jesse Skinner, which is discussed
in the wrongfulness prong section infra Section A.3.
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oncoming cars. 64 When apprehended, Skinner told the police that he
had just killed his wife, and requested that the arresting officer kill
him.65 At the time of his arrest, Skinner was on his way to the home
of his children in order to "assist" them in the same manner he had
assisted his wife.66 Like the Horn court, the Skinner court reasoned
that Skinner knew what he was doing when he killed his wife-he
knew he was holding a bottle, and he knew that by hitting his wife in
the head with the bottle repeatedly, and then cutting her throat with
the broken bottle, he would cause her death.67 Consequently,
Skinner was unable to convince the court that he did not know or
appreciate the quality of his act, and he was unable to satisfy the act
prong of section 25.
As the above examples illustrate, it is difficult for a defendant to
meet the act prong of section 25. In other words, it is rare that a
defendant will not have realized what he was actually doing. For this
to be the case, a defendant would have to be delusional, so that he
did not know that he was committing an act of homicide. 69 To
further illustrate: A defendant who kills his neighbor because he
labors under a delusion that the neighbor was trampling his
flowerbeds may indeed be deluded if the neighbor was not actually
trampling the flowers. However, the delusion does not relieve the
defendant of responsibility for the killing because even under the
defendant's deluded version of the facts he is still killing the
neighbor.
70
64. See id. at 1052, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1056, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 655.
67. See id. at 1061, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
68. See id.
69. See M'Naghten's case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719-21 (1843). Here,
M'Naghten would arguably fail the test that bears his name had his delusion
not also provided him with the additional justification of self-defense.
M'Naghten was well aware that by shooting his victim he was committing an
act of homicide; he was only deluded as to the identity of his victim and his
perception that the victim was persecuting him. See id. M'Naghten believed
that the man he killed was going to shoot him, and thus, the homicide was
justified. See id.; see also People v. Horn, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 1021, 205
Cal. Rptr. 119, 123 (1984) (discussing M'Naghten's case).
70. Although intellectually it makes sense that a defendant with a cognitive
impairment has altered perceptions of his actions such that he thinks he is
doing one thing when he is really doing another, this is not how cognitive
impairment plays out in life. See Marc Rosen, Insanity Denied: Abolition of
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3. The wrongfulness prong
The wrongfulness prong of section 25, which requires that a
defendant be "incapable of... distinguishing right from wrong at the
time of the commission of the offense"71 is much more frequently
used by defendants in order to fall within California's test for legal
insanity.72  It is relatively easier to satisfy than the act prong
73
because insane people almost always know what they are doing; they
are simply unable to appreciate that they should not perform the act
because the act is "wrong." 74 The word "wrong" encompasses two
discrete meanings: (1) that which is legally wrong; and (2) that
which is morally wrong.75 Theoretically, simply asking a defendant
whether he knows that the act with which he is charged is a criminal
offense may show that the defendant is aware that this act is legally
wrong; a "yes" answer would preclude finding a defendant insane if
legality were the only aspect of wrong with which courts were
concerned.76 Such a simplistic interpretation of "wrong" is not the
state of the law.77
the Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 253, 257 (1999)
(explaining that "disordered persons' acts are willed even if they are the result
of crazy reasons or compulsion" and that "virtually all people know.. . what
they are doing and intend to do it."); see also Morse, supra note 3, at 810-11
(explaining that most insane defendants have general knowledge of their
actions, but are motivated to commit the acts by irrational perceptions of
reality).
71. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
72. See DRESSLER, supra note 56, § 25.04[C][1][a].
73. This is not to suggest that it is easy to meet-both are hard to satisfy,
which is why the defense is rarely used and even more rarely successful.
"[T]he insanity defense is raised in fewer than two percent of federal and state
trials and is rarely successful... [It] is a defense of last resort that betokens an
otherwise weak defense and that rarely succeeds." See Morse, supra note 3, at
797.
74. See id.
75. See generally People v. Stress, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 252 Cal. Rptr.
913 (1988) (discussing the difference between legal and moral wrong).
76. See generally People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 271 (1964) (discussing the addition of the terms "understand" and
"appreciate" to the test for insanity, suggesting that mere knowledge that an act
is illegal would not subject an otherwise insane defendant to criminal liability
if he did not also understand why the act is illegal, or appreciate the
consequences of his actions); see also People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336
P.2d 492 (1959); People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949)
1608
THE INSANITY DEFENSE
a. legal wrong
Although what is legally wrong frequently encompasses what is
morally wrong,78 they are not necessarily equivalent. 79 For example,
a defendant may understand that killing someone is illegal.
However, if he feels he has been commanded by God to kill, he may
not believe that it is morally wrong.80 Consequently, it is not enough
for the prosecution to show that the defendant was aware of the
criminal nature of the act if it cannot also show that the defendant did
not believe the act was morally wrong.
81
The California Supreme Court echoed this reasoning in People
v. Skinner.82 There, the defendant was convicted of murdering his
wife because he believed that the marriage vow "till death do us
part" bestowed upon him a God-given right to kill his wife when he
became inclined to violate his vows.83 In response to arguments that
the California version of the M'Naghten test for legal insanity
contemplates only that the prosecution show that a defendant is
aware of the criminal nature of his acts before he can be found sane,
the court concurred with jurisdictions that addressed the same issue
(discussing the requirement that the defendant not only know his act is illegal,
but also that he understand the nature and quality of his act).
77. See infra Sections A.3.a and A.3.b (discussing the difference between
legal and moral wrong).
78. See People v.Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765, 783-84, 704 P.2d 752, 764, 217
Cal. Rptr. 685, 696 (1985).
79. See Stress, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 1272-75, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 921-24.
80. This is also an example of a particular variety of insanity defense
known as the "deific decree." Under the deific decree defense, a defendant is
not held responsible for his act if he can show that his act was the result of an
insane delusion that he has been commanded by God to commit the act. See
Christopher Hawthorne, Comment, "Deific Decree ": The Short, Happy Life of
a Psuedo-Doctrine, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1755, 1755 (2000). California
courts do not accept deific decree defense, though the M'Naghten test for
insanity may encompass it under the moral wrong prong. See infra Section
A.3.b.
81. See Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d at 783-84, 704 P.2d at 764, 217 Cal. Rptr. at
696; see also Stress, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 1275, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 923-24
(holding that the defendant may have believed his acts were illegal yet not
morally wrong and that a proper standard for determining the defendant's
sanity must include an understanding of moral wrong).
82. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d at 783-84, 704 P.2d at 764, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
This case involving Jesse Skinner should not be confused with that of
Raymond Skinner, discussed supra Part X.A.2.
83. See id. at 770, 704 P.2d at 754-55, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
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and concluded that "a defendant who is incapable of understanding
that his act is morally wrong is not criminally liable merely because
he knows the act is [legally] wrongful. ' 4
The court of appeal followed suit in People v. Stress. There the
defendant was convicted of first-degree murder after striking his wife
in the head with an axe. 85 The court found that the trial court erred in
construing the "wrong" referred to in section 25 as merely that which
is illegal . Under that erroneous construction of wrongfulness, the
trial court found the defendant sane because he understood at the
time he killed his wife that his behavior was criminal.87 Indeed, it
was precisely the criminal nature of the act and its expected
repercussions that led the defendant to kill his wife: he believed that
he would thereby gain a forum in which to publicly voice his theory
that the government and professional sports associations had
conspired to keep professional athletes out of the Vietnam draft. 8
The defendant argued, and the court of appeal agreed, that the notion
of wrong articulated by section 25 encompasses moral as well as
legal wrong.89 In light of this interpretation and evidence in the
record that supported the theory that the defendant believed killing
his wife was not morally wrong,9° the court of appeal reversed the
trial court's sanity verdict and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with its interpretation of "wrong." 9'
b. moral wrong
Though the Skinner and Stress courts clarified that the wrong
contemplated by the California test for insanity encompasses both
legal and moral wrong, those cases did little to elaborate upon the
appropriate standard for determining whether the defendant's belief
84. See id. at 783, 704 P.2d at 764, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
85. Stress, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 1263, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
86. See id. at 1274, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 922-23.
87. See id. at 1273, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 921-22.
88. See id. at 1263, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
89. See id. at 1272, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 920-21.
90. The defendant believed his wife's death was a sacrifice, that she died as
a soldier, and that no jury would convict him when he exposed the conspiracy.
See id. at 1273, 1275, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 922, 924.
91. Id. at 1275, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
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that his act was not morally wrong will excuse him from criminal
liability.
92
Adding yet another wrinkle to the test for legal insanity,
California courts require not only the defendant's inability to
distinguish between what is morally right and wrong, but also that
the morality of the defendant reflect "generally accepted ethical or
moral principals derived from an external source." 93 Stated another
way, if a defendant's sense of morality is at variance with accepted
societal notions of morality, then the defendant may not be relieved
of criminal liability by compelling a finding of legal insanity.94
Under one interpretation of this requirement, a defendant who
suffers from an insane delusion that his God had commanded him to
kill would not be found legally insane if his God was not the God,
i.e., the insanity defense excuses only acts performed as the result of
delusions of commands from the Judeo-Christian God. A less
92. In a footnote, the Skinner court alluded to the matter when it quoted
Justice Cardozo's People v. Schmidt opinion:
"[I]t is not enough that [the defendant] has views of right and wrong at
variance with those that find expression in the law. The variance must
have its origin in some disease of the mind. The anarchist is not at
liberty to break the law because he reasons that all government is
wrong. The devotee of a religious cult that enjoins polygamy or
human sacrifice as a duty is not thereby relieved from responsibility
before the law."
People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d. 765, 784 n.16, 704 P.2d 752, 764, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 685, 697 n.16 (1985).
Though Justice Cardozo's discussion speaks to the requirement that a
defendant's inability to tell right from wrong be caused by a mental defect, his
comments foreshadow a dilemma that is later addressed by California courts-
that posed by the defendant who does not see his act as morally wrong, but
subscribes to a morality that differs from that which is accepted by society at
large. See People v. Coddington, 23 Cal. 4th 529, 2 P.3d 1081, 97 Cal. Rptr.
2d 528 (2000) (holding that defendant's version of morality could not excuse
him from criminal liability because it did not conform with that subscribed to
generally by society).
93. Coddington, 23 Cal. 4th at 608, 2 P.3d at 1143, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597;
see also Stress, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 1274, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 923 ("[M]oral
obligation in the context of the insanity defense means generally accepted
moral standards and not those standards peculiar to the accused.").
94. See Coddington, 23 Cal. 4th at 608, 2 P.3d at 1143, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
597; see also People v. Rittger, 54 Cal. 2d 720, 734, 355 P.2d 645, 653, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 901, 909 (1960) ("The fact that a defendant claims and believes that his
acts are justifiable according to his own distorted standards does not compel a
finding of legal insanity.").
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inflammatory explanation of this result is that the Judeo-Christian
God is a proxy for generally held precepts of morality. Thus,
excusing acts done by insane defendants who feel their conduct was
prescribed by the God, but not those by insane defendants whose
conduct is proscribed by some other god is simply a short hand way
of saying that the former believed what he was doing was right, and
that his "right" is recognized by society; while, though the latter also
believed what he was doing was right, that his "right" is not
recognized by society.
95
In People v. Coddington, the California Supreme Court
addressed a distorted sense of morality and held that the trial court
reasonably determined there was no support for a finding of legal
insanity.96 In Coddington, Herbert James Coddington was convicted
of kidnapping, rape, and murder after luring two teenage models and
their chaperones to his mobile home for what they believed would be
the filming of an anti-drug film.97 Once the women arrived at the
trailer, the defendant immediately strangled the chaperones, and then
repeatedly raped and sexually assaulted the models.98 The defendant
was convicted by the trial court despite his contention that he was
insane at the time he committed the acts, and that he had been
instructed through a series of traffic signals to lure the women to his
home and rape them. The court of appeal upheld the sanity verdict
because it appeared that the defendant's religion was not external to
him, but was rather his own aberrant version of a universal order.
99
Indeed, there was evidence in the record to suggest that the defendant
had rejected the Judeo-Christian concept of God and the moral
system associated therewith, and that he subscribed to a notion of
God as a force running through the universe.100 Thus, the jury was
justified in finding the defendant legally sane at the time he
committed the acts because there was reason to believe that even if
he were unable to distinguish right from wrong due to a mental
95. See Coddington, 23 Cal. 4th at 608-10, 2 P.3d at 1143-45, 97 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 597-99.
96. Coddington, 23 Cal. 4th at 608-10, 2 P.3d at 1143-45, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 597-99.
97. See id. at 547, 2 P.3d at 1104, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
98. See id. at 549-53, 2 P.3d at 1105-07, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 554-56.
99. See id. at 610, 2 P.3d at 1145, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
100. See id. at 609, 2 P.3d at 1144, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 598; see supra text
accompanying note 71.
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disease or defect, the defendant's concept of morality was such that
would not bring him within the definition of legal insanity.',, It is
not enough for a defendant to claim he thought what he did was
morally "right." To be relieved of criminal responsibility, the
defendant's notion of "right" must square with the jury's notion of
"right."
B. Procedure
1. Competency to stand trial
When a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, there
is often doubt as to whether the defendant is fit to stand trial for the
crimes with which he is charged. 10 2 If such a doubt arises, the
defendant's competency to stand trial must be assessed in a separate
proceeding before the trial on the issues of guilt and sanity may
proceed.10 3 The competency hearing can also be understood as a
determination of the defendant's present sanity, 104 as opposed to the
sanity of the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime.
The purpose of ensuring that a defendant is competent to stand
trial echoes that of the insanity defense generally-those who cannot
understand either what they have done or the consequences of their
actions should not be held accountable in the same manner as those
who have such an understanding.105 The competency requirement is
predicated upon both state and federal constitutional law, which give
a criminal defendant the right to appear and defend in person.
1 6
Mere physical presence, however, does not satisfy this constitutional
mandate.107 Such presence, "without mental realization of what was
going on would obviously be of no value to the accused" and would
101. See Coddington, 23 Cal. 4th at 659, 2 P.3d at 1177, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
102. See, e.g., People v. Lawley, 27 Cal. 4th 102, 38 P.3d 461, 115 Cal. Rptr.
2d 614 (2002); People v. Weaver, 26 Cal. 4th 876, 29 P.3d 103, 111 Cal. Rptr.
2d 2 (2001); People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d 508, 426 P.2d 942, 58 Cal. Rptr.
374 (1967); In re Dennis, 51 Cal. 2d 666, 335 P.2d 657 (1959).
103. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1367, 1368 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
104. See Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d at 518, 426 P.2d at 949, 58 Cal. Rptr. at
381.
105. See Morse, supra note 3, at 783.
106. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1043.
107. See In re Dennis, 51 Cal. 2d at 672, 335 P.2d at 660.
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lead to the absurd result of a "purported trial of... an insane person
without the least understanding of what was taking place in the
courtroom."
108
Constitutional demands and moral concerns with accountability
are satisfied only when the defendant is able to both understand the
nature of the proceeding, and to rationally participate in his own
defense. 10 9 If at any point during a criminal proceeding there is
doubt that the defendant meets this standard for competency, the trial
judge must suspend the criminal proceeding. 110 The issue of
competency, or present sanity, is then tried in a separate civil
proceeding where the defendant is presumed cometent unless
proven otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence."
Under section 1368 of the California Penal Code, the trial judge
must be the one to doubt the defendant's competency to stand trial,'
1 2
not the defense counsel or any third person.' 13 However, section
1368 contemplates that the trial judge will order a competency
hearing if informed by defense counsel that counsel harbors doubts
108. Id.
109. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1367, 1368; see also People v. Lawley, 27
Cal. 4th 102, 38 P.3d 461, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614 (2002); People v. Weaver, 26
Cal. 4th 876, 29 P.3d 103, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (2001); People v. Pennington,
66 Cal. 2d 508, 426 P.2d 942, 58 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1967); In re Dennis, 51 Cal.
2d at 666, 335 P.2d at 657 (all interpreting section 1368 as requiring that the
defendant appreciate the nature of the proceeding). Some courts have
interpreted section 1368 as also requiring that the defendant understand the
purpose of the proceeding. See, e.g., Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d at 515, 426 P.2d
at 947, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 379; People v. Merkouris, 52 Cal. 2d 672, 678, 344
P.2d 1, 4 (1959); In re Dennis, 51 Cal. 2d at 670, 335 P.2d at 659. As with
insanity at the time of the act with which the defendant is charged,
incompetence must be the result of mental disorder or developmental
disability. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367(a). Furthermore, the inability to
participate in the proceeding that the statute contemplates does not include
differences of opinion on tactical approaches to the defense. See, e.g., Lawley,
27 Cal. 4th at 129, 38 P.3d at 480, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636 (defendant's
preference for a bench trial over a jury trial, though derived from a distrust of
lesbian and transvestite jurors, was a difference of opinion about tactics, not a
manifestation of the defendant's inability to assist in his defense).
110. CAL. PENALCODE § 1368.
111. See id.; Lawley, 27 Cal. 4th at 131, 38 P.3d at 482, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
638. California Jury Instructions define a preponderance of the evidence as
evidence that has more convincing force than that opposing it. CALJIC, supra,
note 21, no. 2.50.2.
112. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1368(a).
113. See In re Dennis, 51 Cal. 2d at 670, 335 P.2d at 659.
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as to the present sanity or competency of the defendant.1 14 Read
together, sections 1368(a) and (b) require a competency hearing
whenever the trial judge doubts the defendant's competence, or when
counsel informs the judge that the defendant is not competent.'
15
Nevertheless, even when the trial court does not doubt the
present sanity of the defendant and has not been informed by counsel
of any competency concerns, the defendant may still be
constitutionally entitled to a competency hearing if substantial
evidence of the defendant's incompetence exists. 116  Denial of a
competency hearing in the face of such substantial evidence may be
grounds for reversal of a conviction if the defendant is found to be
sane and then convicted."
17
California trial courts have made some surprising decisions
regarding a defendant's competency to stand trial. For instance, in
People v. Pennington, the defendant appealed his conviction for first-
degree murder on grounds that he had been denied a competency
hearing over a defense motion.1 8  Evidence of the defendant's
alleged incompetence included expert testimony that during the
course of the trial, the defendant believed that he spoke with both his
dead grandmother and the devil, whom he described as having "real
nice eyes,.., curly hair, and... little horns;" 119 and the defendant's
unusual behavior, which included outbursts in the courtroom that led
to the defendant being gagged, and an episode in which defendant
displayed his penis and shouted, "come and bring Cracker Jack.'
20
Despite these indications that the defendant may not have been sane
during the trial, the trial judge stated that "this Court does not have a
doubt and has not had a doubt" that the defendant was competent to
stand trial. 
121
114. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1368(b).
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1368(a)-(b).
116. See, e.g., Lawley, 27 Cal. 4th at 131, 38 P.3d at 482, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 638; People v. Weaver, 26 Cal. 4th 876, 910, 29 P.3d 103, 120, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 2, 23 (2001); People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d 508, 518-19, 426 P.2d
942, 949, 58 Cal. Rptr. 374, 381 (1967).
117. See Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d at 520-21, 426 P.2d at 950-51, 58 Cal.
Rptr. at 382-83.
118. See id. at 511,426 P.2d at 944, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
119. Id. at 515 n.5, 426 P.2d at 946-47, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79.
120. Id. at 513, 426 P.2d at 945, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
121. Id., 426 P.2d at 946, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
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The Supreme Court of California disagreed and held that the
denial of the motion in the face of substantial evidence of
incompetence, even absent a doubt in the mind of the trial judge,
amounted to a denial of due process. 122
Clearly, the Pennington court found the aforementioned
evidence of the defendant's incompetence substantial. It did not,
however, define for the lower courts what other types of evidence
should be considered substantial. The California Supreme Court
finally did so decades later in People v. Danielson. There, the
Supreme Court held that evidence is substantial if it raises a
reasonable doubt about the defendant's competence to stand trial.
12 3
It affirmed this definition in People v. Marshall, where it held that
substantial evidence which requires a hearing on competency is that
which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.
12 4
The California Supreme Court applied this standard in People v.
Lawley. There, the defendant was adamantly opposed to having
women on the jury at his trial.' 25 The court did not consider expert
testimony that the defendant believed that many women who wear
pants are either transvestites or lesbians, and that all women who are
transvestites or lesbians also molest children to be substantial
evidence of possible incompetence. 126 The court accepted the trial
court's characterization of this evidence as illustrating mere
differences of opinion between the defendant and his counsel over
122. See id. at 518, 426 P.2d at 949, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 381. Failure to order a
competency hearing in the face of substantial evidence of incompetence robs
the defendant of his right to a fair trial, and thus amounts to a denial of due
process. See id. In reaching this conclusion, the court followed the reasoning
of the recent United States Supreme Court decision Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375 (1966) (holding that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a
competency hearing if he presents substantial evidence of incompetence). In
Robinson, evidence of the defendant's present insanity included his mother's
testimony that she had once observed him "' a little foamy at the mouth."' See
Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d at 517 n.7, 426 P.2d at 948 n.7, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 380 n.7
(quoting Robinson, 383 U.S. at 378-82).
123. 3 Cal. 4th 691, 726, 838 P.2d 729, 749, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 21 (1992)
(overruled on other grounds by Price v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 4th 1046, 1069
n.13, 25 P.3d 618, 633, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 409, 427 (2001)).
124. 15 Cal. 4th 1, 31, 931 P.2d 262, 278, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84, 100 (1997).
125. 27 Cal. 4th 102, 128, 38 P.3d 461, 480, 115 Cal. Rptr. 614, 636 (2002).
126. See id. at 128 n.7, 38 P.3d at 480 n.7, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 636 n.7.
Strangely, the expert also testified that defendant's thinking revealed "nothing
bizarre or grossly illogical." Id.
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tactical decisions. 127 Because such differences of opinion do not
constitute an inability to rationally participate in one's defense, this
evidence did not ultimately convince the court that the defendant was
not sane at the time of the trial. The decision of the trial court was
upheld.'28
2. Bifurcated trial
Once the defendant is found competent to stand trial, the
criminal trial proceeds.
The trial of a defendant who pleads both not guilty and not
guilty by reason of insanity takes place in two phases-the guilt
phase and the sanity phase. 129 Though often referred to as separate
trials, 130 the guilt and sanity phases are actually two parts of one
proceeding.13During the guilt phase of the trial, the defendant is
presumed sane, and any evidence of legal insanity is inadmissible.
132
If the jury returns a verdict of not guilty during the guilt phase, the
defendant is acquitted of the charges against him. If, however, the
jury returns a guilty verdict, the sanity of the defendant is then
tried.
133
3. Pleas
A defendant may plead both not guilty and not guilty by reason
of insanity. 134  Such a plea in effect allows the defendant two
chances to avoid criminal punishment for the acts with which he is
127. See id. at 134-35, 426 P.2d at 484, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 641-42; see also
supra note 105 (discussing the nature of the basis for incompetence under CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1368 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003)).
128. See Lawley, 27 Cal. 4th at 130, 426 P.2d at 481, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
129. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West 1985 & Supp. 2003).
130. See id.
131. See People v. Villarreal, 167 Cal. App. 3d 450, 458, 213 Cal. Rptr. 179,
184 (1985) ("In the eyes of the law there is only one trial even though it is
divided into two sections or stages if insanity is pleaded as a defense.") (citing
People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 349, 202 P.2d 53, 65 (1949)).
132. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026; Villarreal, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 213
Cal. Rptr. at 181-82; see also People v. Hemandez, 22 Cal. 4th 512, 523, 994
P.2d 354, 360, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 516 (2000) (explaining that the trial of an
insanity plea is not a separate action).
133. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.
134. See id.
Summer 2003] 1617
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1596
charged.135 Even if the defendant is found guilty during the guilt
phase, if he is found insane during the sanity phase, he will not be
convicted of the crime.136  This is not the case, however, if the
defendant pleads only not guilty by reason of insanity without also
pleading not guilty. A single plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
is an admission of guilt for the act with which the defendant is
charged; such a plea could also be characterized as "guilty but
insane. ' 137 Accordingly, if the defendant is found sane at the sanity
phase of the trial, he must be convicted of the crime with which he is
charged. 131
4. Burdens of proof and presumptions of
sanity and insanity
California places both the burden of production and the burden
of proof of legal insanity on the defendant. 139 In other words, in
order to present a successful insanity defense, the defendant will
have to come forward with enough evidence of his insanity to
convince a judge or a jury that he was insane at the time he
committed the crime. 14  Because the issue of sanity is raised as an
affirmative defense, as opposed to an element of the crime with
which the defendant is charged, the allocation of the burden on the
defendant is not unconstitutional.1
4 1
Regardless of whether the defendant has pleaded guilty but
insane, or not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, he will be
135. For a discussion on the effect of the judgment of insanity, see infra
Section C.
136. This does not mean, however, that the defendant is free to go. See id.
137. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026; People v. Weaver, 26 Cal. 4th 876, 964,
29 P.3d 103, 155, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 64 (2001).
138. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(a) ("[I]f the defendant pleads only not
guilty by reason of insanity... [and] [i]f the verdict or finding is that the
defendant was sane at the time the offense was committed, the court shall
sentence the defendant as provided by law.").
139. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 550, 522 (West 1995).
140. California evidence code section 115 defines burden of proof as "the
obligation of a party to establish by evidence a requisite degree of belief
concerning a fact in the mind of the trier of fact or the court." CAL. EVID.
CODE § 115 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002).
141. See People v. Medina, 51 Cal. 3d 870, 883, 799 P.2d 1282, 1290, 274
Cal. Rptr. 849, 857 (1990).
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presumed sane at both the guilt phase and the sanity phase. 142 To
escape conviction, he must prove he is insane, and he must do so by
a preponderance of the evidence.
143
The usual presumption of sanity at the sanity phase of the trial
does not apply where there is proof that the defendant was insane
before the commission of the crimes with which he is charged. 144 In
that instance, the presumption is that the insanity "continued to exist
until the time of the commission of the crime."'145 Moreover, the
presumption of insanity persists at the time of trial. Thus, the
defendant should be presumed insane for the purposes of the
competency or present sanity hearing.
146
Evidence that would be deemed substantial for purposes of
creating a continued presumption of insanity includes prior
commitment to a state mental hospital or prior adjudication of the
issue of insanity.147 Thus, if, prior to the commission of a crime, a
defendant has been previously committed to a mental facility or has
been previously adjudged insane, he will be presumed insane both at
the time of the commission of the crime and at the time of the trial.
A presumption of continuing insanity does not, however, relieve
the defendant of his burden of proof.4 8 He must still prove he is or
was insane by a preponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless, he
142. See id. "[T]he defendant shall be conclusively presumed to have been
sane at the time the offense is alleged to have been committed." Id.
143. See CAL. EViD. CODE § 522. In other words, the defendant bears the
burden of proof on the issue of insanity. See generally People v. Redmond, 16
Cal. App. 3d 931, 93 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1971) (holding that in a criminal trial on
the issue of sanity, the defendant must prove insanity by a preponderance of
the evidence).
144. See In re Dennis, 51 Cal. 2d 666, 673-74, 335 P.2d 657, 661 (1959);
People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 565, 268 P.2d 705, 714 (1954).
145. In re Dennis, 51 Cal. 2d at 674, 335 P.2d at 661.
146. See In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d at 141, 496 P.2d at 474, 101 Cal. Rptr. at
562.
147. See id. at 141 n.9, 496 P.2d at 474 n.9, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 562 n.9
("[W]hen insanity has been adjudicated it is presumed to continue unless the
contrary is shown." (internal quotations omitted)); see also In re Dennis, 51
Cal. 2d at 669, 335 P.2d at 658 (finding evidence of prior insanity in
hospitalization for schizophrenia).
148. See, e.g., People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 565, 268 P.2d 714 (1954); 1 B.E.
WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW ELEMENTS § 16
(3d ed. 2000); W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Presumption of Continuing Insanity
as Applied to Accused in Criminal Case, 27 A.L.R. 2d 121 (1953).
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will be entitled to an instruction informing the jury of his insanity so
that the jury may consider it when reaching its conclusion.
49
C. The Effect of the Insanity Verdict
One of the most misunderstood areas of the insanity defense is
the effect of an insanity judgment. Because the effect of a guilty
verdict is commonly understood to mean that the defendant will be
punished accordingly, it does not require a great leap in logic to
conclude that if a defendant is found guilty at the guilt phase and
sane at the sanity phase, he should be convicted of the crime and
sentenced. 50 Less clear, however, is what ha ppens to a defendant
who is found not guilty by reason of insanity. 15' What is a jury to
make of a defendant whom they have found guilty, but who is not to
be held responsible for his crimes? Section 1026 of California's
penal code, which governs post judgment procedure, requires the
defendant to be committed to an institution if he is found legally
insane at the time of commission of a crime.152 However, the jury
may not know this. Television shows and films add to the confusion
by depicting gleeful and devious defendants who use the insanity
defense to "get off' or "beat the rap." It is a misconception that is
popular with the entertainment industry: defendant commits a crime
but successfully raises an insanity defense. But, defendant is no
longer insane at the time of the trial ... so defendant goes free! A
jury that subscribes to this misconception might deliberately ignore
evidence of a defendant's legal insanity in order to avoid releasing a
violent criminal to walk the streets as freely as each juror.'
53
Jury misconception regarding the effect of an insanity judgment
and its possible consequences were among the issues raised on
149. See id.
150. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 2003).
151. See People v. Moore, 166 Cal. App. 3d 540, 552, 211 Cal. Rptr. 856,
863 (1985).
152. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(a). The fate of a defendant who is found
insane at the time of the crime but is no longer insane at the time of trial is
another matter entirely. See infra note 176.
153. See generally Frontline: A Crime of Insanity, (PBS television
broadcast, (Oct. 17, 2002), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/crime (discussing this problem generally and as it relates to
New York state law)).
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appeal by the defendant in People v Moore.154 At trial, the defendant
requested that the jury receive an instruction regarding the possibility
that he would be institutionalized if they found him insane. 155 The
trial court refused the defendant's request in part because the
instruction offered by the defendant did not accurately reflect the
law, and in part because the court reasoned that to instruct the jury on
post judgment procedures would inappropriately "[focus] the juror's
attention on [a] matter... [which] is certainly not [within] the
function of the jury.'
156
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court's refusal
unfairly prejudiced him.157 Addressing the issue for the first time,
the court of appeal agreed with the trial court. The court concluded:
(1) that the role of the jury is to decide the facts that are put before it;
(2) that the role of the court is to rule on issues of law; and (3) that
the issue of punishment is a matter of law.158 However, it also found
that an exception to the general rule that juries should not be
informed of the effects of judgments existed in the context of the
sanity phase of a criminal trial.' 9
In justifying its conclusion, the court addressed three principal
arguments against allowing an instruction of the type requested by
the defendant: (1) as a general rule the jury is not concerned with a
defendant's posttrial punishment, and to give such an instruction
invites the jurors to speculate on matters beyond their province and
perhaps return a compromise[d] verdict; (2) doubt that people in
general are as ill-informed on postinsanity verdict disposition as
[some courts have] assume[d]; and (3) the procedural aspects of
requesting the instruction tend to give justice an "a la carte
quality.'
160
In response to the first argument, the court reasoned that
instructions on post verdict commitment proceedings are
distinguishable from instructions on post verdict punishment. The
latter address only the duration of a defendant's incarceration, while
154. 166 Cal. App. 3d 540,211 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1985).
155. See id. at 543, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
156. Id. at 549, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 555-56, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66.
160. Id. at 553, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 864 (citations omitted).
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the former "pertain to the very nature of the defendant's
disposition-whether or not he will be detained and the
circumstances of the detention." 161 Thus, concerns underlying the
prohibition on jury instructions relating to post verdict punishment
should not apply with equal force to jury instructions relating to post
sanity verdict proceedings. 162 The court further acknowledged that
jurors, in fact, do consider the consequences of their verdict, despite
prohibitions to the contrary. 63 The court posited that in light of this
reality, and because instructions on post sanity verdict proceedings
are distinguishable from those relating to punishment, a juror should
know the general effect of a sanity or insanity verdict. Such
knowledge should prevent false assumptions from swaying the jury's
deliberations in favor of a false determination of sanity.'16
Turning to the second argument, the court noted that
California's post sanity verdict proceedings, as governed by penal
code sections 1026(b)-1026.2, are highly complex and technical.
The court also noted that "it is possible that at least some jurors are
unaware of the postverdict disposition of an insane defendant."'
165
The court continued, "The very phrase 'not guilty by reason of
insanity' itself could mislead some jurors to assume the defendant
will walk free just as would an accused found not guilty for other
reasons."'
166
Finally, the court countered the third argument by deferring to
the California Supreme Court, which had recently decided that an
analogous instruction should be given upon request by the defendant
or a juror.' 67 In concluding that the instruction should be available
when requested, the court balanced the possibility of imprisoning a
161. Id.
162. See id. at 554, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
163. See id. at 554, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
164. See id. at 554, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 864-65.
165. Id. at 554, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
166. Id. But see REZNEK, supra note 39, at 273 (stating that jury studies
reveal that jurors who were not instructed as to the effect of an insanity verdict
"assumed correctly that the defendant would be committed," and arguing that
effect-instructions do not effect the outcome of insanity trials).
167. See Moore, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 555, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 865. The
instruction at issue in the guiding case, People v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1982),
informed the jury that they should disregard the fact that the Governor might
commute a sentence of death or life without parole.
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defendant who did not deserve to be punished, 168 against the risk that
when informed of the consequences of their verdict, the jury would
shirk their responsibility to base its verdict solely on the evidence
presented at trial. 169 Weighing these risks, the court found that the
danger of improper imprisonment far outweighed that of inviting the
jury to step outside their normal role.'
70
The court went on to suggest language to be used in the
contemplated instruction.' 71 California Jury instruction 4.01 is the
codification of the court's holding in Moore and the instruction
closely mirrors the language suggested by the court. 172  When
requested by the defendant or a juror, the instruction informs the jury
"a verdict of 'not guilty by reason of insanity' does not mean the
defendant will be released from custody."' 173 It further explains both
that upon the return of such a verdict, the defendant will remain in
confinement while the court determines whether the defendant is still
insane, and that if the court finds the defendant's sanity has not been
restored, the defendant will be hospitalized until the court determines
the defendant's sanity has been fully recovered. 174 The instruction
also tells the jury that the purpose of giving them such an instruction
is to inform them of the "general scheme of [California's] mental
health laws" so that they will not harbor any misunderstanding as to
what will become of a defendant who is found not guilty by reason
of insanity. 175 Finally, the jury is admonished not to consider any of
what it has learned regarding the mental health laws, and that it must
only decide whether the defendant was sane at the time of the
commission of the acts with which he is charged, not whether he is
sane at the time of the trial.
176
168. See id. at 555-56, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
169. Seeid.
170. See id. at 556, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 556-57, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 866, CALJIC, supra note 21, no.
4.01.
173. CALJIC, supra note 21, no. 4.01.
174. See id. Interestingly, the instruction does not mention what happens if
the defendant is found sane at the time of the verdict.
175. Id.
176. See id. For a more complete outline of confinement, reassessment of
sanity, and terms of commitment, see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-
5020.1 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003). For a detailed outline of restoration of
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D. Evidence: Expert Testimony vs. Folk Psychology
As explained above, in order to successfully raise the insanity
defense, a defendant must prove his insanity by a preponderance of
the evidence.' 77 This begs the question: What type of evidence
would tend to convince a jury that the defendant was insane at the
time of the crime?
Evidence of a defendant's insanity can be divided into two broad
categories: (1) evidence that is presented to the jury in the form of
expert testimony, which includes both medical diagnosis and opinion
as to whether the defendant was sane at the time of the crime; and (2)
evidence that the jury gleans from the facts and events surrounding
the crime.' 78  The latter form of evidence can be called "folk
psychology," in that it enables a layperson to make a diagnosis of the
defendant's mental condition at the time of the crime.' 79  For
example, evidence that a defendant hid a body where it could not
easily be found suggests that he did not wish to be blamed for the
murder, which in turn suggests that he knew the killing was wrong.
As knowledge of wrongfulness precludes legal insanity, the body-
hiding behavior would allow a jury to determine that the defendant
was not insane when he killed.
Although psychiatric evaluations that lead an expert to conclude
that the defendant was insane at the time of his illegal act may be
valuable, it would be a mistake to say that evidence of this kind
always sways a jury. Indeed, a jury could feasibly find a defendant
sane despite unanimous expert testimony to. the contrary.180 In such
a case, the jury has likely based its finding on common sense notions
of insane behavior-or, stated another way, folk psychology.
As surprising as the above scenario may be, it is permitted by
the nature of the role of expert testimony in an insanity proceeding.
sanity proceedings, see People v. Sword, 34 Cal. App. 4th 614, 29 Cal. Rptr.
2d 810 (1995).
177. See supra Part X.B.4.
178. See generally People v. Coddington, 23 Cal. 4th 529, 2 P.3d 1081, 97
Cal. Rptr. 528 (2000); People v. Skinner, 185 Cal. App. 3d 1050, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1985) (both discussing expert testimony as well as other types of
evidence on which a jury might reasonably base a finding of sanity).
179. See REZNEK, supra note 39, at 287.
180. See, e.g., People v. Lawley, 27 Cal. 4th 102, 132, 38 P.3d 461, 483, 115
Cal. Rptr. 2d 614, 640; People v. Skinner, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 228 Cal.
Rptr. at 658.
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California courts have explained that expert testimony should be
persuasive only if the jury believes that the underlying basis for the
expert's conclusions is reliable and convincing.' In other words, it
is not so much the opinion itself that is important, but the material on
which the opinion is based and the analysis that leads to the
conclusion. 182 Thus, if the jury does not accept the basis for an
opinion as convincing or reliable, it need not give much weight to the
expert's opinion. For example, a jury might conclude that the
expert's examination of the defendant was insufficient,' 83 or that the
psychiatrist overlooked alternative explanations for the defendant's
behavior, 184 or even that the psychiatrist was fooled by a malingering
defendant.1
85
Although enlightening and potentially persuasive, expert
testimony is arguably not even necessary to a determination of sanity
because common sense may be all that a jury needs to render a
verdict in an insanity proceeding. California courts have
acknowledged that where the defendant's behavior betrays
knowledge of wrongfulness, a jury can reasonably find a defendant
sane despite expert opinion to the contrary. For example, in People
v. Skinner, the court of appeal upheld the trial court's determination
that the defendant was sane at the time he killed his wife in part
because it found that the defendant's behavior after the killing
supported the jury's conclusion that he was sane. 186 In particular, the
court noted that after the killing, the defendant changed his
bloodstained clothes and made statements to the police
181. See Lawley, 27 Cal. 4th at 132, 38 P.3d at 483, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640;
Skinner, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
182. Seeid.
183. See Skinner, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 1060, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 658
(explaining the jury's apparent determination that expert conclusions were
"somewhat speculative" because one psychiatrist did not interview the
defendant until six months after the crime).
184. See People v. Coogler, 71 Cal. 2d 153, 167, 454 P.2d 686, 694, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 790, 798 (1969) (noting that the defendant may not have shot the victims
because he was insane, but because he wished to avoid identification).
However, Coogler is not an insanity case-it deals with the analogous
determination of the defendant's diminished capacity.
185. See People v. Coddington, 23 Cal. 4th 529, 583, 2 P.3d 1081, 1127, 97
Cal. Rptr. 528, 579 (1985) (suggesting that the jury could find that the
defendant lied during his psychological evaluation, and that the expert's
assumption was based, at least in part, upon that lie).
186. See Skinner, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 1061, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
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demonstrating not only his remorse for the act, but also his
understanding that what he had done was wrong.
187
Similarly, in People v. Coddington, the Supreme Court of
California affirmed the trial court's holding that the defendant was
legally sane when he killed two women and raped two adolescent
girls.18 8  Again, the affirmation was based in part on the court's
conclusion that the jury was justified in relying upon evidence of the
defendant's behavior immediately prior to the crime, rather than on
expert testimony that he was insane. 189 Like Skinner, Coddington
betrayed his knowledge of the wrongfulness of his act in his choice
of wardrobe-he donned a series of disguises to conceal his identity,
both immediately prior to and during the crime. 90 Furthermore,
Coddington planned extensively before initiating contact with his
victims, presumably to avoid detection and apprehension.' 91
Clearly, both folk psychology and expert testimony play an
important role in comprising the evidence a defendant must produce
to succeed on an insanity defense. It would be wise, therefore, for a
defendant not to rely too heavily on psychiatric testimony if, when he
committed the crime, he behaved in a manner that would allow a jury
to make a common sense determination that he was sane.
187. See id.; see also supra Part X.A.3 (discussing the wrongfulness prong
of the test for insanity).
188. Coddington, 23 Cal. 4th at 547, 2 P.3d at 1103, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
189. See id. at 584-85, 2 P.3d at 1128, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
190. See id. at 551, 2 P.3d at 1106, 97 Cal.Rptr. at 556.
191. See id. at 547,2 P.3d at 1104, 97 Cal.Rptr. at 553.
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